Freud distinguished three structural elements within the mind, the id, ego, and super-ego.
(Frosch 1987) The id is the unconscious, that part of the mind in which the instinctual sexual drives are entrenched which require satisfaction; at birth a baby’s mind, is all id “want want want”, the super-ego is that part which contains the conscious, viz. socially-acquired control mechanisms (usually introjected in the first instance by the parents) which have been internalized; while the ego is the conscious self, created by the dynamic tensions and interactions between the id and the super-ego, which has the task of reconciling their conflicting demands with the requirements of external reality. According to Freud, the defence mechanisms are the method by which the ego can solve the conflicts between the superego and the id such defence mechanisms include:denial,repression and projection. (Eysenck HJ and Wilson, G. D 1973) All objects of consciousness reside in the ego; the contents of the id belong permanently to the unconscious mind, while the super-ego is an unconscious screening-mechanism which seeks to limit the blind pleasure-seeking drives of the id by the imposition of restrictive rules.
In what context did Freud intend this model to be taken? (He appears to have taken it extremely literally himself), however, what is being offered here is a theoretical model a metaphor, rather than a description of an observable object or theory, which functions as a term of reference to explain the developmental link between early childhood experience and the development into a mature adult (normal or dysfunctional) personality. Therefore this model represents the human psyche analogous to an iceberg, with substantially more below water than above, and the parts under water representing the unconscious emotions, that underpin our behaviour and experiences.
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Fig 1.0 Freuds tri-partite model
(Thomas, 1996) Klein another instinct theorist, worked with early infancy understanding the mechanisms of splitting and projection. She placed greater emphasis on maternal not just parental influences. Klein’s schizoid position was conceived of by the state of mind existing in babies of three or four to six months of age, but one that is constantly returned to throughout life to greater or lesser degrees. Her theory dictates that a baby is born with two conflicting impulses love/hate. (Thomas, 1996) The baby creates its own world of internal objects using unconscious phantasy and driven by these polarised impulses. As an Object Relations Theorist, Klein saw emotions as always existing in relation to other people or "objects" of emotions or feelings. Relations at this time are with part objects, such as the breast, babies produce intrapsychic creations and create the bipolar view of good. (Klein,M.1959) Kleinian internal worlds are densely populated from early in life with emotionally polarized versions of people encountered in the external world. These representations are the result of innate drives and unconscious phantasies rather than the experience of others.
As the child matures and as a result of predominantly good experiences being taken in, the baby gradually begins to be able to bring together the good and bad objects into a single object, and moves towards Klein's . This raises all kinds of new anxieties and set-backs, but it is essential to more realistic and satisfying relationships. (Thomas,K 1996) The depressive position is seen as an essential part of a normal infant’s development. The realisation that ‘part objects’ do in fact belong to the same ‘whole object’ therefore, good-bad introjections come closer together. For a healthy development, the infant needs to give up the wholly part good-object for the more ambivalent object which equals an amalgam of the split part-object.
The BOR such as Fairburn and Winnicott don’t agree with Freud or Klein regarding the basic assumption that people are pleasure seekers but people seekers; they believe that relating is a goal within itself. Being attached to others, confirmed by others, communicating and relating are seen as primary motivations. However, there are also some correlations; Winnicott has suggested that under certain conditions in infancy, the true self has to be hidden permanently, deep in the unconscious and protected by the conscious, compliant version of the self, called the false self. (Thomas, 1996) Winnicot went on to state that the false self takes over when the true self is so impinged upon and intruded by the pre-conceptions and demands of the infant’s principal carer that it cannot be developed. Fairburn saw the carer as pivotal to a child’s development the child needs to feel loved but also to know that their own love is reciprocated and valued. (Fairburn, 1990) If these two conditions are not met the developing psyche will be harmed which could further split the ego and fragment the self as the child develops. (Thomas 1996) Jung regarded the inaccessible parts of the self may be of more importance and saw a correlation to Winnicots true self he saw the benefit of the older wisdom of the unconscious which is underestimated by the conscious.
I have so far presented the psychodynamic perspective as an account of how a person’s behaviour and experience are determined by unconscious motives. This is not a universally held view and I will now present challenges; although the experientialists see the experiencing individual as embodied, as being influenced by the unconscious and also in the social world. For James (1950) consciousness is always personal and therefore private who makes a science of psychology that attempts to understand human experience which is incredibly difficult since, arguably, consciousness is at the core of what it is to be human.
For Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1992) consciousness is similar to Baar in that he sees the "flow experience" as being intentionally ordered which takes us a step beyond the notion of some free flowing stream but is consciousness under conscious control and what happens when other thoughts intrude. The issue of coming to any authentic awareness, because of the impact of unconscious motivations is an exaggeration of the role of unconsciousness and the lack of access to repressed unconscious needs. Popper, K. (1959) The rationale that neuroses is caused by unconscious conflicts buried deep in the unconscious mind in the form of repressed libidinal energy would appear to offer us, at last, an insight in the causal mechanism underlying these abnormal psychological conditions as they are expressed in human behaviour, and further show us how they are related to the psychology of the 'normal' person. However, even this is questionable, and is a matter of much dispute. In general, when it is said that an event X causes another event Y to happen, both X and Y are, and must be, independently identifiable.
(Dawkins 1993) believes that it is consciousness not unconscious that monitors past actions and events in order to modify future behaviour and actions. Meanwhile (Humphrey N, 1976) believes that the facilitation of social relations and the anticipation of the states of others minds is invaluable for both co-operation and competition, and thereby for perpetuating genes. (Stevens,R. 1996) However the notion of drive is a core feature of the psychodynamic perspective, and in many ways, because the drive is premised on survival and sexuality in many ways yet, although it is couched in terms of a different epistemology, it could be construed as being consistent with a biological position.
So why is it that certain people make us feel inexplicably angry, fearful or just plain uncomfortable? We discussed the work of Baumeister and how values may not be something introjected from our parents but more of a construct from our changing worlds. Freud believes behaviour is a response to unconscious forces battle of the id and its drives v the morality of Superego, which is driven by external forces, Klein saw innate sexual drives and powerful emotional states are what motivate and shape (distort) the early structuring of mind; meaning systems/psychic reality are defensive and the view that the self is more conflictive and fragmented, than that of Freud. The OBRs raised the emphasis on actual relational experiences as the source of internal and psychic reality. We have also considered the work of Jung who believed that parts of the self that are inaccessible, may be of more value, as is the case of Winnicots true self. (Thomas, 1996) Nevertheless; Klein, Freud and the BOR despite their differing opinions regarding the organization of the mind and what constitutes the self, are all united on the emphasis they place on the avoidance of anxiety through mobilization of psychological defences, some of which are built into the structure of the mind early in development. The other perspectives draw a valid argument regarding the theory of unconscious and self. Arguing against Determinism; all events, inc. human actions and behaviour are determined by causes regarded as external to the will. Behaviour is determined by external events or stimuli and that people are passive responders and to this extent are not free. Behaviour is determined by external stimuli with the concept of positive/negative and reinforcements. Even when we are not aware of it, our behaviour is dictated by avoidance of pain and pursuit of `not pain'. The core issue with the psychodynamic perspective is the means to assessing its usefulness or value however these perspectives would argue that in spite of such limitations it is essential to maintain an interpretative approach as we need to determine meaning and value to our social live and the social world we live in.
References
Csikszentmihalyi, (1988,1992) ‘Flow: The Psychology of Happiness’ London,Rider Press cited in Stevens 1996 “The Reflexive Self” in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 157
Dawkins, R ‘The Selfish Gene’, Oxford, Oxford University Press cited in Stevens 1996 “The Reflexive Self” in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 157
and Wilson, G. D.(1973) ‘The Experimental Study of Freudian Theories’, Methuen, London 756
Fairbairn, W.R.D (1952) ‘Psychoanalytic studies of the personality’, London,Tavistock/Routeledge cited in Stevens 1996 “The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective” in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 305
Frosh, S. (1987). ‘The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory’. Yale University Press, 354
Humphrey, N. (1976) ‘The social function of intelligence’, in Bateson,P.P.G. and Hinde, R.A. (eds) Growing Points in Ethology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press cited in Stevens 1996 ‘The Reflexive Self’ in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 157
James, (1950) ‘The Principles of Psychology’ Vol 1,New York, Dover (First Published in 1890) cited in Stevens 1996 “The Reflexive Self” in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 155-157
Jung, C.G. (1935) ‘Tavistock Lectures’, Lecture 3,London, Routeledge and Kegan Paul cited in Stevens 1996 ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 314
Klein,M. (1959) ‘Our adult world and its root iun infancy’, in Klein,M. (1993) Collected Works, vol III,Envy,Gratitude and Other Works,London,Karnac Books cited in Stevens 1996 ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 301-304
Popper, K.( 1959) ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’. Hutchinson, 135
Stevens,R. (1996) Audio cassette No 2946 ‘Personal lives Social Worlds’ side A
Stevens, R (1996) ‘The Reflexive Self’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 150-153
Stevens and Wetherell, (1996) ‘The Self in the modern world: drawing together the threads’ in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 342-343
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 282
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University 286
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 284-287
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 291
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 301-302
Thomas,K. (1996) ‘The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’ Milton Keynes, The Open University 303
Thomas, K (1996) The Defensive Self: A psychodynamic perspective’ in Stevens, R. (ed) ‘Understanding the Self’, Milton Keynes, The Open University 306
Figures
Figure 1.0 Freuds model of Personality structure http://www.psyche.com/psyche/cube/cube_psyche.html