First, a big statistical discrepancy exists between the US and Chinese estimates of the trade deficit. For instance, the US government calculated the 2002 deficit at 103 billion dollars while China computed it at 43 billion. Several reasons for these differences have been identified. Most notably, over 70 percent of China’s exports to the US consist of reprocessed goods - goods that have only been assembled in China while intermediate production has occurred in other countries. Therefore, American statistics are likely to be persistently overestimating the real volume of Chinese imports.
Second, the US large bilateral deficit with China should be analyzed in the context of the US current account deficit. For the past two decades, the overall US trade deficit has been growing rapidly (Figure 3). In 2003, the trade deficit excluding China was about four times greater than the bilateral deficit with China. In fact, China’s percentage share of the deficit has fallen slightly in recent years and China contributes about the same fraction of the deficit as it did ten years ago (Figure 4). Imports from China consist primarily of labor-intensive consumer goods and they partially reflect decreased imports of the same goods from other developing countries. According to a 1999 Institute for International Economics study, about 90 percent of US imports from China are substitutes for US imports from other low-wage economies, largely in East and Southeast Asia. Therefore, Chinese imports do not create as much job loss in the United States since the United States became a net importer of such goods long before China emerged as a world trader. For that reason, Nicholas Lardy concludes, “the argument that the growing deficit with China has caused a large loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States is wrong.” In addition, low-priced Chinese imports benefit US consumers since they are able to buy toys, clothing, plastic goods and home appliances at a much lower cost than they would be able to buy without imports from China.
Third, since 1990 China has been the fastest expanding market for US exports, growing at an annual average of 17 percent per year. In fact, while US exports to the world excluding China fell after 2000, US exports to China expanded at an unprecedented rate (Figure 5). In 2003 exports to China reached 28.5 billion dollars, making China the sixth largest purchaser of US exports in the world. Currently, China is the fastest growing market for technology-intensive goods, such as aircraft, computers, and semi-conductors, in which the US economy has a strong comparative advantage. As China continues to grow at a torrid pace in the future, its demand for American imports will grow as well, and Chinese markets will become increasingly important for many US firms. Moreover, China’s recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) signaled to the world that its open market reforms will continue in the future and China’s foreign trade regime will be further liberalized. Dynamic simulation models predict that China’s WTO entry will have a positive net impact on the US economy and that “the immediate increase in U.S. goods and services to China can be estimated at $3.1 billion.”
A number of critics contend that the current US trade deficit with China would be significantly smaller if the Central Bank of China did not follow a policy of one-way market interventions to prevent the Chinese currency from appreciating against the US dollar. Because China is keeping the Yuan artificially low against the dollar, the argument goes, Chinese goods are unfairly competitive in America while at the same time US-made goods are too expensive to compete in China. As a result, both US export and import-competing industries are compelled to reduce output and employment. There is little doubt that the weak Yuan in recent years has contributed to the rapid growth of Chinese exports to the United States, which in turn have put competitive pressure on certain sectors of the US economy. However, there are signs that China will loosen up its system of capital controls in the future and move toward greater exchange rate flexibility.
Over the past few years, China’s fixed exchange rate regime is also likely to have affected the US economy through quite a different channel. While the international movement of goods and services is one of the two main economic linkages between the United States and China, the international movement of capital is the other one. Before all, China is a huge buyer of US Treasury bonds and holds large stocks of dollar denominated assets. Since it pegged its currency to the US dollar in 1994, the Chinese government has had to purchase significant amounts of foreign exchange in order to keep the Yuan at its predetermined value. By the end of 2003 China had accumulated over 403 billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves, ranking it second in foreign ownership behind Japan. By keeping the Yuan low and buying huge amounts of US Treasuries, China has helped to keep the interest rates in the United States low. Since yield on bonds and bond pricing are inversely related, heavy purchasing of US securities increases their price and conversely lowers the interest rate. By financing low interest rates in the US, China has had a positive impact on investment and economic growth in the United States over the past year.
China’s continued integration into the world economy could also have several other dynamic impacts on the US economy that could prove significant in the future. For example, China’s elevated competitive position in the world economy may affect the long run incentives for factor accumulation and productivity growth in the US economy. Given China’s competitive pressures, the US economy can experience efficiency gains from factor reallocation, which in turn may lead to higher rates of productivity and economic growth in the future. In addition, given the low correlation between China’s business cycle and the business cycles of the big industrialized countries, China’s rising share in world output may help dampen cyclical swings in the global economy. On the other hand, China’s expanding demand for raw materials to sustain its growing economy will put an upward pressure on world commodity prices in the future and countries that are large net importers of these commodities may experience a rise in inflation.
In my opinion, China’s rapid emergence, like a number of other external shocks, will have complex, multifaceted effects on the US economy. In particular, the United States can benefit from labor-intensive imports, as well as from greater demand for its capital-intensive exports. Because of the significant complementarity between the US and Chinese economies, the mutual gains from free trade between the two countries will be considerable. However, this complementarity is neither perfect nor static and China’s increasing competitive pressures will hurt certain sectors in the US economy. As resources move toward more productive areas, transitional difficulties will inevitably occur and US-China trade relations are likely to remain contentious in the future. Although China’s rapid emergence presents both opportunities and problems to the United States, I think the long-term benefits for the US economy will outweigh greatly the near-term costs.
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More speculatively, however, through the same channel China could have exactly the opposite effect on the American economy in the future. Though unlikely to happen anytime soon, a massive sell-off of dollar denominated assets on part of China could trigger a chain reaction in which the dollar depreciates, stock market prices fall, interest rates rise and the US economy goes into a recession.
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2004 Chapter II, p.25
Fung, K.C., Lau, L. Adjusted Estimates of the United States-China Bilateral Trade Balances: 1995-2002 p.3
Nicholas Lardy, China and the WTO, Brookings Policy Brief no.10, November 1996, pp.2-3
Daniel H. Rosen, China and the World Trade Organization: An Economic Balance Sheet, International Economic Policy Briefs, Number 99-6(Washington: Institute for International Economics, June 1999), p.2
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report, 10/30/03
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2004 Chapter II, p.25
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2004 Chapter II, p.27
Lavelle, M. Higher prices? Thank China, U.S. News, 4/12/2004, Vol.136 Issue 12, p.32