To what extent did the 'collective' farms of Eastern Europe work?

To what extent did the ‘collective’ farms of Eastern Europe work?

The ideology of collectivisation 1st became a viable policy in Stalinist Russia. The primary thinking behind this revolutionary initiative was to improve agricultural production to a level that could sustain the ever-increasing urban masses. Furthermore the decision makers in Eastern Europe wished to ensure an abundant supply of cheap food was available so that they could control, and keep real wage rates at a manageable level. The collectivisation of agriculture was envisaged by the socialist regimes as the “Ideal vehicle to achieve this objective.” (1) The large-scale cultivation necessitated by collectivisation was seen by the socialist regime as a fundament strategy to improve the total productivity of the agricultural sector.

Within a short space of time its origins and principles had began to spread rapidly throughout the Eastern European states, until the widespread adoption of the policy became an essential tool for the majority of socialist regimes.

As one looks at collectivisation throughout Eastern Europe, it becomes apparent early on that no 2 nation states had identical results from the adoption of this policy. Each State has to be judged on its own merits and individual socio-economic results.

Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia were 3 infant states that had collectivisation enforced upon them by the expansionist German regime. In the immediate aftermath of the war they simultaneously decided that they would progress with the ‘cooperative farm’ ethos that the Nazi government had installed in their societies. It had shown a level of effectiveness and efficiency that when manipulated can have huge governmental benefits.

The Hungarian collectivisation policy applied the majority of its focus on the grain producing regions. The government believed that if they prioritised on a particular strain of harvest, then they would reap the rewards through increased efficiency and productivity levels. This policy never really came to fruition, primarily because the absurd quota levels being enforced on the cooperatives made for a distinct disincentive among the peasantry. This issue was further enhanced when in 1952 it was found that approximately 800,000 peasants were without sufficient grain to make bread or even sow a new crop.

After the ill-fated Nagy regime abolished compulsory collectivisation, calling on the fact that the lack of economic incentive to the individual peasant made it an ill conceived policy. This move led to the dissolution of 60% of all cooperatives between June and December of 1956.

It was not until the Kadar administration came to power that Hungarian agriculture began to show a return for its investment and endeavour. Kadar instigated a reformed version of collectivisation. He removed the element of class structure that was predominant in the Stalinist version. Instead he replaced this with a concerted effort to win the approval of the middle peasantry. Kadar was working from the assumption that if he could inflict his views on the middle peasantry, then the rest of the Village would fall into line and follow their example. On latter inspections the strategy that Kadar implemented seems full proof. Even if the middle peasants refused to join governmental orientated cooperatives, they were encouraged to form their own, which many evidently did.

The outcome of Kadar’s reformed collectivisation policy was astounding. The percentage of agriculture area socialised increased from, 34% in 1952, to 97% in 1962. This was the largest percentage that any of the socialist Eastern European countries have ever assembled either prior to this period in question or to this very day.

I believe that the overwhelming reason for the success of this policy was fundamentally due to the welfare reforms implemented within the new system. The very fact that health insurance and a pension scheme were incorporated into the strategy, and also the generous level of state subsidies to improve capital and machinery meant that it would be in every peasant’s best interest to join such a scheme. This approach enabled Hungarian collectivisation to be completed by 1961, only 3 years after the policy was initiated.

The Polish governments experience of collectivisation was minimal to say the least. ...

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The Polish governments experience of collectivisation was minimal to say the least. They implement their collectivisation drive in 1949, but only 3% of arable land was collectivised. This figure increased slightly and peaked at 8.5% in December 1954, with 173,900 peasant holdings entering into the wholesale cooperative. The fundamental reason why Polish collectivisation failed was because they did not gain the mass support of the peasantry. Aldcroft states that, “as early as 1948 guerrilla fighters made their appearance in the countryside ready to challenge collectivisation.” (2) Their resistance became so powerful that the campaign was abandoned by the end of 1957, with only 1770 cooperative farms remaining. Throughput the period in question the hostile regulatory framework that the Polish government set out meant that their collectivisation strategy was fundamentally flawed. Aldcroft furthers the issue by declaring that it created, “An odour of mistrust and uncertainty between peasants and government bureaucrats which had a negative effect on efficiency.” (3)

After taking the theoretical aspect into account, the statistical information sheds new light. If one is to examine the growth of agricultural output rates during the period it is apparent that Polish agriculture was experiencing an affluent phase. It experienced the highest growth rate of all the Eastern European countries in 1956 with a 6% increase; this was furthered in 1961 when an increase of 10.4% maintained the Polish expansion.

If one is to use the polish case as an example, it does call into question the visibility and credibility of collectivisation. The Nation that had the smallest percentage of agriculture actively involved in the cooperative scheme has experienced the highest percentage growth rate. This indicates to me that the Polish nation and its peasantry were more efficient and productive while farms were managed autonomously in the private sector.

During the immediate post war period Czechoslovakia progressed to becoming 1 of the most advanced countries in Eastern Europe. By the time that collectivisation was instigated agriculture was playing a secondary role within the Czech economy, comprising a mere 17.6 % of GNP in 1948. The communist party could rely on the support of the mass peasantry from its early years. Indeed, collectivisation was welcomed with open arms in certain regions in the Country, primarily because it provided the much sort after agricultural machinery as well as state subsidies that the peasantry craved. Czechoslovakia was unique in Eastern Europe in not having any surplus labour. Furthermore, where other countries in the Soviet Bloc lacked the resources to enable agricultural modernisation, Czechoslovakia as a by-product of its powerful industrial sector was in a position to provide machinery, chemical fertilizers and capital construction. As I again refer to statistical evidence before making any conclusions, one can see that the overwhelming majority of Czech farmers joined the cooperative farming system by 1962, a total of 90% of agricultural area was socialised, making Czechoslovakia 2nd only to Hungary in terms of agriculture covered by the initiative. The specific number of cooperatives peaked at 9076 in 1955, trailing only too the relatively unstable Yugoslavia whose collectivisation policy was deemed to be fundamentally flawed, as they did not establish the “appropriate political and economic framework.” (3)

Whatever agricultural system was adopted, the stark fact remained that all Eastern European states continued to struggle to provide cheap food for the urban masses. With the pressure on foodstuffs mounting some alarming signals came to light. In Bulgaria in 1962 for example, the government of the day had to import copious amounts of wheat from Canada to quell disturbances originating from food shortages in the industrialising cities. The reasons for the productive inefficiencies cannot be labelled solely at the door of collectivisation. Other factors need to be taken into account. Admittedly, Bulgarian weather played a role in deteriorating crop growth. Also the lack of competent infrastructure in many of the socialist territories led to vast inefficiencies. M. Kaser and E.A. Radice are of the opinion that poor infrastructure “Resulted in the loss of as much as a ¼ of gross harvest output.” (4) This is an astronomical amount of harvest to squander, but ultimately it underlines the inefficiencies that marred much of the socialist regime.

The relationship between investment levels and output within the socialist economies should have a positive correlation. Bearing this in mind, one can assume that the outcome of increased tractor provision and use of chemical fertilizers would lead to higher yield from the same amount of land. It seems that throughout this period it was chemical fertilizers that most cooperative farms relied upon the increase productivity rates. Between 1948 and 1971 the use of chemical fertilizer increased 7 fold in Czechoslovakia, and as much as 24 times its original rate in Hungary. Such extensive investment levels were the by-product of the burgeoning level of industrial growth throughout the region. A problem was only created when industry and agriculture were in direct competition for either capital or man power. Evidently it was agriculture that was neglected, this practice became more common throughout the period as the emphasis on industrialisation increased. The results of this initiative created a “Lopsided investment plan that left the needs of the countryside unsatisfied in important respects.” (5)

Looking into the capital formation aspect of this, it is overwhelming apparent that farm buildings and livestock enclosures would received the brunt end of this increased level of competition. And so it was, inadequate accommodation had an inverse relationship on the amount of animals that could be nurtured. Even the ones that were reared were of a lesser quality than those of previous years.

The continuing drain of manpower from rural farms to urban industry is another important factor to consider when investigating the extent to which collective farms worked. The impetus behind this move was the industrialisation programme of the eastern European governments; they required the large-scale emigration of the workers from the countryside into the major industrial cities. L.P. Morris states that, “The removal of too many young and energetic workers left an ageing and largely female workforce.” (6) The main appeal for the younger generations of working in industry lay in the social opportunities offered by town life, compared to the relative placid nature of rural villages. This obviously had detrimental effects on the level of agricultural production; a predominantly dormant workforce was left to supply the entire nations food supply.

A major factor that undermined much of Eastern European collectivisation policy was the lack of economic incentives for the workers collective to produce more productive, efficient yields. Morris states that, “Only in Poland and Yugoslavia was there a steady increase in the prices paid to farmers for their produce.” (7) The rest of the nations applied a constant price for goods, which ultimately proved a major disincentive for agricultural production on the whole.

The distinct possibilities for increasing domestic yields were illustrated by the productivity levels achieved on the private garden plots by members of the collective. Collective members were free to sell the produce of these plots on the unregulated, private market. Morris declared that in Hungary, the yield from private plots accounted for approximately, “one half of the income in the peasant house in the mid-1970’s and over ¼ of the total net agricultural output in 1974.” (8) If these figures are taken on face value then the distinct lack of economic incentive involved in the collectivisation process had detrimental effects on the domestic economy. It would be most interesting to see how well a nation would have faired if it had implemented a performance based collectivisation strategy that rewarded those cooperatives who exceeded their target yields. Economic theory would suggest that the outcome would have been mutually beneficial for the individual farmer and the socialist regime.

In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to judge the relative success of collectivisation as a concept. Each individual country had differing success ratios, making any overall judgement difficult to ascertain. What can be determined is the fact that no socialist collectivisation policy was without drawbacks. The theme that arises in the majority of these regimes is the fundamental lack of economic incentives for the collective farms to achieve and succeed relative crop yields.

If one is to compare the relative growth rates of a predominantly collectivised country such as Hungary to that of a country dominated by privatised farm i.e. Poland, the result makes for interesting reading. The constitution of arable land ownership in Poland in 1960 was split in the form of 86.9% of private ownership and only 1.2% was involved in the cooperative farms initiative. The benefits of this land distribution can be seen in the fact that in 1961 Polish agricultural output grew by 10.4%. In contrast, the percentage of the Hungarian agricultural area that was socialised in 1962 was 97%. In my opinion the limitations of their collectivisation policy are evident in the fact that agricultural growth in the previous year was just 0.7%. Although a level of growth was apparent it was far outstripped by that of Polish agriculture. The reasons for this could be complex and numerous. These figures only give us a guideline to the end product that was produced by either nation, they do not take into account long term policy objectives, also a comparison between national outputs has to be taken on a individual basis, as I have stated earlier, no 2 countries operate in the same manner.

When taking the above detail into account one can still come to some conclusions with regard to the success of collective farms.

It would seem from the agricultural growth rates in Poland that privatised farms meant increased incentive for the farmer to reap the full reward of his labour, This fundamental economic policy I cannot disagree with. Whether this policy would have been a success throughout other socialist countries is a matter of debate, unfortunately we will never have a definitive answer.

It is my belief that in the immediate aftermath of the War the cooperative farm initiative was a beneficial idea for recovering economies. It ensured that a steady if not ample supply of foodstuff was available to the nation. The discrepancies within the policy began to arise once rapid industrialisation had kicked in. The socialist governments of the day prioritised and supported the need for industrialisation over agricultural performance. This ultimately initiated the steady transformation from a predominantly agrarian society to the industrialised nations that we have today. Successful collective farms were no longer a governments 1st economic priority, thus its relative success rate would undoubtedly start to diminish.

This leads me to believe that during specific periods in certain countries collectivisation was a successful policy to operate. But there are also individual circumstances where collectivisation had a relative inadequate outcome. In particularly, the incentives for agricultural production were basic at best; this ultimately had an adverse effect on a nations economic prosperity. It is on these grounds that I have made the assumption that, although the collective farms of Eastern Europe played an important role in revolutionising agricultural production. The extent to which they were a success will remain inconclusive for many years to come.

Referencing:

D. H. Aldroft and S. Morewood, Economic change in Eastern Europe since 1918 (Aldershot, 1995), p. 118.
D. H. Aldroft and S. Morewood, Economic change in Eastern Europe since 1918 (Aldershot, 1995), p. 122.
D. H. Aldroft and S. Morewood, Economic change in Eastern Europe since 1918 (Aldershot, 1995), p. 119.
M. Kaser and E.A. Radice, (eds.) The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975, Volume II: Interwar Policy, the War and Reconstruction (Oxford, 1985), p. 67.
L. P. Morris, Eastern Europe since 1945, p. 109.
L. P. Morris, Eastern Europe since 1945, p. 109.
L. P. Morris, Eastern Europe since 1945, p. 107.
L. P. Morris, Eastern Europe since 1945, p. 109.

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