The social policies employed by Stalin were also key. Though he initially rejected it, Stalin grew to understand the political potential of a personality cult in his name. The Russian population was made up of vast peasant and labourer bodies still used to the memory of the Tsars, leaders thought of as no less than holy for their associations to the Russian Orthodox Church. The image of ‘Generalissimo Stalin’ became a central image of propaganda, symbolizing strong Soviet resistance to the cruel German invasion. These and other propaganda images (which focused upon images of Russia’s history, including military heroes such as Alexander Nevsky and Peter the Great) ensured widespread public support for Stalin, enlisting millions of soldiers and workers. Stalin moved away from strictly party-line policies, appealing to the patriotism, not communism, of the Russian people. By valuing nationalism over internationalism in propaganda efforts, Stalin may have slightly undermined Communist sentiment, but in a time of war this was a necessary step towards increasing morale; Russians were certainly more likely to fight for their nation than the regime than controlled it. The propaganda’s accuracy was important too, focusing on the bleak reality of the situation and the possible consequences of a German victory. Rejecting the publishing of inaccurate statistics and unrealistically optimistic reports, Stalin allowed official newspapers to portray the invasion in nearly all of its terror, and this had a mobilizing effect. After the virulent opposition to the Church of the 1920s and 1930s (in which members of the clergy were killed, publications were banned, and theological schools were closed), Stalin partially reversed these policies, enlisting the Church to support the resistance via a series of concessions. Thousands of churches were re-opened, schools were allowed again, and Sergius I, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was appointed Patriarch of Moscow. Millions of persecuted Christians were attracted to the war effort, and the Church persuaded the Allies to open up a Second Front, weakening the German Army. Again, while this move may now seem opposed to Communist policy, it was very effective during wartime, attracting a largely religious population to the war effort.
While these policies were certainly responsible in part for the victory, we cannot ignore the role of other factors, and also Stalin’s shortcomings. Firstly, Stalin made a series of significant mistakes which must be counted against his role in the 1945 triumph. While his general attitude to policy had definitely helped the USSR, many other strategic decisions had undesirable effects. The Nazi-Soviet Pact (signed out of an anxiety that Germany would invade the USSR) and the resulting trade pact of 1940 had equipped the Germans with the food, resources and materiel necessary to invade Russia in the first place. Pre-war purges of the Red Army, which executed 22,000 officers, accounted for initial troop shortages in 1941, and led to a series of crippling defeats. Similarly, in his policies of savage human repression, Stalin had alienated key sections of Russia (such as the annexed Baltic states and the Ukraine), leading one million Soviet soldiers to choose to fight on the German side. Stalin had failed to respond to the overwhelming evidence that a German invasion was imminent by 1941, believing that Hitler would not attack until he had conquered Britain. When the invasion did come, Stalin stalled for nearly a day, unsure if the invasion had been directly ordered by Hitler, and then retreated to the countryside in despair for days, limited in his capacity for decision-making. The lack of preparation was blamed on his commanders, many of whom were arrested, tortured and killed. When he finally began to issue commands, Stalin ordered an offensive, rather than defensive military strategy, rejecting any proposals for a retreat. This resulted in expansive successes for the German army, and the Soviet army had suffered over four million casualties by the end of the year. This initial chaos was mainly caused by the initial breakdown of command.
German mistakes must also be counted towards the reasons for Soviet success. Following Stalin’s purges during the 1930s, Hitler believed that the USSR was a militarily weak force sure to collapse after only months of Blitzkrieg tactics. This overconfidence lead to a string of errors that cost Germany the war in part. Unlike Stalin, Hitler did not choose to divert his economic policy unilaterally towards the demands of the war until too late. He believed that economic progress towards a post-war period was necessary independent of the conflict, and only reversed his position on this by 1943. This decision deprived the army of the ability to prepare adequately (in terms of supplies) for the winter war, and 250,000 soldiers died of frostbite. This first major setback allowed a Soviet counterattack. When Stalin ordered the government’s evacuation of Moscow, coming close to a forced surrender, the German Army failed to properly resume its offensive. A capture of Moscow, the centre of Soviet command and communication, could have prompted a Soviet collapse. Hitler certainly believed this was the case, so his decision to instead spread out the invasion across three fronts (he chose to attack Kiev and Stalingrad at the same time), resulting in high casualties and minor gains, was unwise. Another mistake came in the loss of support from members of the USSR’s Western Republics (the Ukraine, the Baltic states). Citizens at first welcomed advancing German troops, and it was then possible that anti-Soviet factions could have formed a strong alliance with the German Army in invading Russia. Instead Nazi atrocities and racist policies turned even those opposed to Stalin against Hitler, with citizens observing the horrific treatment of civilians and prisoners of war (nearly six million prisoners were taken, of whom over three million perished), as well as massacres against Communist officials, Jews and partisan fighters. Nazi policy only stirred up pro-Soviet sentiment, contributing to the growing civilian movement against the German advance. Workers stepped above even Communist-sanctioned levels of production, partisans disrupted German activity behind enemy lines, and civilians fought with the Red Army in forming militias that defended Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, building bomb shelters, anti-aircraft guns, trenches, and other defenses. This movement was largely responsible for the defense of Russia’s larger cities, and the propaganda that supported it would have been ineffective without the actual terror of the German invasion.
The USSR’s superiority in terms of resources has much to do with the German defeat as well. While resources were undeniably stretched and exhausted on both sides, the German Army could simply not compete with the Soviet Army’s ability to maintain sizable losses; in sheer human terms (as well as military and economic) the USSR dwarfed Germany’s assets. Following from Stalin’s command economy, Soviet arms production continued to outdo German production from 1941 onwards; even with a third of its industrial base under German occupation, the Russian economy still fulfilled the needs of the Red Army efficiently, and new industrial bases beyond the Urals ensured production protected from Hitler’s advances. Under Stalin’s centralized system, priority resources could be provided by direct order, while Hitler made the mistake of promoting competition within German industry, resulting in an unfocused war economy. With the German Army much smaller in number than the Red Army, Stalin was able to produce entire new units while Hitler struggled to maintain numbers in Stalingrad. In terms of population, even the most hideous of losses could be suffered by the Soviets without a need for surrender. The Soviet population lost 25 million civilians and soldiers during the war - in German terms this would have equated to over 30 percent of their 1940 population, whereas for the USSR these catastrophic losses claimed less than 15 percent of the pre-war population. Soviet losses could be replaced quickly, while German losses contributed to the gradual undermining of their wartime potential. The Soviet people - fueled by propaganda, government suppression and German brutality - were more attuned to unimaginable hardship, and the cities continued to be defended at the cost of millions of lives. By 1944 it was simply impossible for the Germans to continue in this manner, having nearly depleted their human resources. This is one of the most unavoidable reasons for their defeat.
The role of the Allies also complemented this; the relentless bombing of German cities and industrial centres had a very powerful impact on Germany’s civilian population and industrial power. The engagement of German forces in additional fronts (North Africa, Italy, France) stretched German resources and forced Hitler to divert troops and vehicles from Stalingrad and Kursk, weakening the already flagging invasion of Russia. The Lend-Lease Agreement between the USA and the Soviet Union supplied the Red Army with financial aid and vehicles, allowing the USSR to take advantage of German failures. These Allied efforts against Germany helped significantly towards their retreat.
In conclusion, though Stalin’s leadership definitely had an undeniable effect in mobilizing Russians towards the war effort, there are more persuasive factors involved: Russia’s human, military and economic resources, German mistakes, and the contribution of the Russian people to the war effort (spurred on partially by German policy). When considering these factors, and mistakes he made at the beginning of the war Stalin’s leadership cannot be called the main reason for the Soviet victory.