motives, was not a response to domestic pressure - precisely the
opposite; it created more trouble than it solved.
The table is reproduced from R.J. Overy, 'The German Motorisierung: a
comment' in Economic History Review (1979).
The German historian B.H. Klein argued from his statistics that rearmament was initially more
limited than had been supposed by those who believed that the Nazis had been planning WW2
for the outset of their era of power in Germany.
Klein's thesis was that this limited rearmament could be explained by:
(i) The need to avoid politically unacceptable levels of domestic consumption;
(ii) 'Blitzkrieg' tactics required fewer troops/supplies.
For Klein's thesis, which was modified by later historians, to be true, it must be assumed that
Germany doubted whether Britain and France would launch a continental war over Poland in
1939.
The 1937 Hossbach Memorandum put the latest date for a planned European war at 1943, but
this was only the latest date, not the earliest one.
Thereafter, Hitler maintained that:
(i) Germany's enemies would have rebuilt their own armed forces sufficiently to nullify any
temporary advantages the Third Reich might have;
(ii) Germany's lack of self-sufficiency in food, coupled with her low foreign currency reserves,
would leave her and the Nazi régime vulnerable.
Proponents of this basic thesis maintain, therefore, that the Nazi economy was only partially
ready for war in 1939, and so play down the importance of the supposedly wanton warmongering
of the Nazis in 1938-39.
Could it be then that it was a diplomatic miscalculation on Hitler's part, rather than diabolical
intent, that turned the Blitzkrieg on Poland into WW2?
In September 1939 Germany was far from her goal of economic autarky.
There had been a failure to develop the German armaments industry to an early and full
potential due to a mixture of
(a) Poor management of resources;
(b) The resentment of industrialists at interference in their factories by Party officials (as at
Heinkel and Focke-Wulf aircraft factories);
(c) A confused chain of command and overlapping areas of responsibility between rival
organizations.
For example, in addition to the Ministry of Economics, there was
1. Goering's Four-Year Plan organization with its various offices (dealing with such
items as raw materials, labour, pricing, foreign exchange etc), and
plenpotenaries dealing with specific industries (eg mining, chemicals, transport,
construction);
2. Independent supply departments within the three armed services (eg the Army's
Wi-Rü Amst. under General Thomas, who loathed and sought to undermine
Goering and his officials);
and from March 1940...
3. An additional Ministry of Armaments and Munitions under Fritz Todt.
Moreover...
- Much of the rearmament programme for the German Luftwaffe and Navy was not designed
to reach its peak until the mid-1940s - a date in accordance with Hitler's own foreign policy
analysis in the Hossbach Memorandum.
This helps to explain why Goering was so luke-warm about Germany
making any moves against Czechoslovakia or Poland, which might lead
to an outbreak of large-scale hostilities in 1938-39.
- Hitler had underestimated the problems involved in converting the German economy into
one geared to the needs of the military;
Industrialists were loath to foresake the lucrative consumer markets for
that of the military, and often it took the direct involvement of Goering's
army of officials to force them to re-gear their plants.
- There were many occasions where resistance from a leading Nazi to taking resources from
a pet, prestige project hampered the drive towards a true 'defence economy'.
eg Hitler's obsession with the motor-car and the road network meant that it was
not until 1942 that Albert Speer was able to persuade him to halt even
unnecessary repair work on the Autobahnen.
Despite the additional resources that had come into the Nazis' hands with the destruction of
Czechoslovakia, key items continued to be in short supply (and, of course, to be poorly
administered, when they were available).
The manufacture of synthetic petroleum products by the chemical giant
I.B. Farben more than doubled (up 130%) between the inception of
Goering's Four Year Plan in 1936 and the invasion of Poland in 1939, but
it could still only meet 18% of demand.
Moreover, R.J. Overy has demonstrated how the rapid expansion of the German transport
infrastructure and vehicle industry had resulted in a consumer boom, which left the German
military with insufficient vehicles for its own use.
In terms of foodstuffs, moves had been taken towards self-sufficiency in the 1930s, with
success in wheat/rye, potato and sugar consumption and an overall figure of 83% selfsufficiency
in 1939 (up 3% since 1933).
Germany was almost self-sufficient in meat, but the traditional shortage areas of animal fats and
fodder remained a problem (only 57% self-sufficiency in 1939) and a continuing drain on German
foreign currency reserves.
Deliberate growing of large amounts of oil-seed rape, lupins and clover
was introduced to reduce Germany's dependence on imported margarine
and animal fodder.
It is difficult to see where further improvements could have been made, given:
(a) the regime's ideological commitment to small farms, which made mechanisation
uneconomic;
(b) the regime's deliberate holding down of food prices, which made the very purchase of new
machinery difficult.
Nonetheless, by the end of the 1930s there had been a sufficient improvement in Germany's
domestic food production to win her at least the chance of following an independent foreign
policy, without fear of the starvation and poor nutritional standards she had endured during
WW1.
Hitler may have believed that he could afford to ignore the lack of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs
on the grounds that conquered territory in the east and frightened, client states would make up
the short-fall.
If so, he was to be disappointed, for most of the benefits brought by conquest were quickly
nullified by
- The loss of Russian imports;
- The necessity of feeding the 8m. foreign workers and POWs;
- The appropriation of 7000 tractors and 250,000 steel ploughs for use by the invading
German armies, which adversely affected food production;
- The need to introduce conscription within the agricultural work-force, which reduced the
efficiency of German farming.
Moreover, there was a reluctance on the part of Germans to take up
estates in Poland and Russia.
Thus the 'guns or butter' attitude, which had kept the German economy depressed throughout
the 1930s, continued during WW2 and weakened the Third Reich's ability to maintain an
efficient economic base.
Even Hitler was forced to concede on the eve of war (in a conversation
with the League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig, Carl Burckhardt, on
11 August 1939:
'I need the Ukraine so that they cannot starve us out, as
they did in the last war.'
Nonetheless, Hitler asserted his confidence in Germany's economic ability:
1. To finance a long war
Hitler believed that the age-old adage about States being unable to bear the cost of prolonged
warfare was erroneous.
In a speech to military commanders in May 1939 he argued that the only
threat to a modern Power's ability to cope with the demands of prolonged
war was the quick destruction of its major industrial regions (eg the
Ruhr);
2. To withstand an enemy blockade
In his last-minute address to military commanders on 22 August 1939 Hitler claimed not to be
even expecting such an eventuality, which would be ineffective anyway:
'because of our autarky and because we have supply sources in
Eastern Europe.... There is no need for us to be afraid of a blockade.
We will be supplied by grain, livestock, coal, lead and zinc from the
east.'
In other words, the profits of conquest in the East, in terms of both land and mineral resources
would adequately compensate for any weaknesses that were still evident in the German
economy at the outbreak of war.
