How did Stalin Rise to Power between 1922 – 1929?

On the whole, in control of the Bolshevik press and being ExCom of the Soviet, his totalitarian rule was not far away. At this stage he had already begun to lay his foundation. 

In late October, the Bolsheviks initiated a coup and seized power over Russia. Interestingly enough, Stalin took no part in this seizure. Conquest speculates that

"…this may have been due to a decision to keep him in the background, as an uninvolved Bolshevik, in case of failure…[or] in the urgency of organizing the coup, those chiefly concerned…called in only those felt immediately necessary, and Stalin's name did not occur to them.”

The second theory may hold more truth, and in fact it seems more plausible when one considers Laqueur's description of Stalin:

"Stalin was in no way designed to be an idol of the masses: He was neither a demonic, hypnotic figure like Hitler or Mussolini, who could impart emotions to millions, nor a 'Pied Piper,' seductive in leadership. Unlike Lenin, he could not impose his authority naturally on his peers. He was no intellectual; Trotsky, Bukharin, and many others were superior to him in this respect.”

The leadership struggle of the 1920s

When Lenin fell ill in 1922 the leading Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia – the members of the party’s Political Bureau, or ‘ Politburo’ for short – said that they would operate a system of Collective Leadership between themselves. Stalin, however, had no intention of becoming part of a system of collective leadership. Even before Lenin died in 1924, Stalin had set about the task of winning power for himself.  

Lenin’s Testament

At the time of Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin, as well as being in the politburo, also held four vital posts to which he had been appointed between 1917 and 1922: Commissar for Nationalities, Liaison Officer between the Politburo and the Orgburo (the Party’s organising body), Head of the Workers’ Inspectorate, and General Secretary of the Communist Party. The combination of these offices made Stalin the indispensable link in the party and government network.

Therefore his control over the party files meant he knew everybody, and that nothing could go on without his being aware of it. Moreover, he wielded the power of patronage; the key posts in the party were within his gift. Stalin, an opportunist rather than a planner, found power coming increasingly within his grasp.

Personality clashes

The seven members of the Politburo were not only split over the future of the economy; they were also divided by their personal likes and dislikes. While Zinoviev and Kamenev agreed with Trotsky’s views on the economy, they disliked him as a person. He was clever, energetic and original. He was popular among ordinary Party members and the army. But he was also vain and arrogant. At Politburo meetings he often treated his colleagues with contempt, sometimes turning his back on them, sometimes reading a book while they spoke, sometimes storming out of the room in a temper. Trotsky therefore had no friends in the Politburo. Stalin had to eliminate Trotsky, who was his biggest rival in the leadership struggle. At the end of 1922, he wrote a letter to the Party Congress, outlining his ideas for the future and giving his opinions about the members of the Politburo. In the letter, known after his death as his Testament, Lenin wrote that the main danger facing them all was a split in the Party. He thought that Trotsky and Stalin were chiefly to blame for this. He also wrote that about them as people:

“Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary has unlimited authority concentrated on his hands, and I am not sure whether he always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand... is distinguished not only by his outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present Central Committee but he has displayed excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work”

Obviously, this is a primary source, which is reliable since it was Lenin writing it in his testament. However its reliability is reduced and might be biased, since he was ill and one can argue that he was emotionally not capable of writing sincere and structured. Coming from the highest ranked person in the party, he was the only person who could write something without fear of being persecuted or killed. Hence increasing its reliability. On the whole, this source is very useful to the Historian studying the Rise of Stalin, since it is one of the few at the time, who sincerely stated what kind of person Stalin really was.

Ten days later, in January 1923, Lenin added a postscript to the letter:

“Stalin is too rude and this defect... intolerable in a Secretary General. That is why I suggest that comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from his post and appointing another man in his stead who... is... more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to his comrades, less capricious, etc.”

The postscript confirms my previous statement of the source that Lenin had no fear in writing sincerely, therefore increasing its reliability. Historians such as Martin McCauley speculate Lenin was referring to Trotsky, yet no evidence confirms that. As stated before, Stalin blamed Trotsky and Stalin for the split in the party, hence contradicting McCauley’s view.  Therefore the usefulness of the source decreases due to the lack of clarity and details. In May 1924, however, something happened which made Stalin’s position look suddenly very weak: Lenin’s Testament was read out to the Central Committee of the communist Party. According to an eye-witness:

“Terrible embarrassment paralysed all those present... Stalin sitting on the steps of the rostrum looked small and miserable. I studied him closely; in spite of his self-control and show of calm, it was clearly evident that his fate was at stake”

Although being an eyewitness account, this source might have been used for propaganda purposes in order to diminish Stalin’s position. Historically, this did affect Stalin, yet one person’s account is very limited and biased. Once again reliability of the source is decreased due to the person not being important within the party, just a mere spectator. Also this statement was not written just after the event, but years after, thus it could be distorted by time. Also it could be self justifying or even a political coup in order to embarrass or destroy Stalin. Hence the source is very limited and has little use when one wants Stalin’s reaction to the testament.

Ironically, Stalin’s fate was decided by Zinoviev, who told the Committee that Lenin’s fears about Stalin were groundless. Stalin, he said, had worked in perfect harmony with himself and with Kamenev ever since Lenin’s death in January. As a result of this speech the Committee decided to leave Stalin in office as general Secretary of the Party. To avoid embarrassing him, the Committee also decided not to publish the Testament and so most Russians never got to know what Lenin really thought about Stalin.

On the whole, Stalin was freed from the possible downfall of Lenin’s words. His grasp of power continued without the interference of the testament, which Historians such as Laqueur and Conquest see as an important reason for the failure of removing Stalin from his position.

The ‘troika’

During 1923 and 1924 Stalin engineered a dispute with his rival on a point of political doctrine. Trotsky took the view that communism in Russia could never be entirely secure unless there were communist revolutions in other countries:

“Without the direct support of European working class we cannot remain in power and turn its temporary domination into lasting socialism”

The above source by Trotsky seems to be more of an anti Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin tactic than genuine belief. This source is also very biased and inaccurate, since foreign troops were removed in 1921/22 due to the Rapallo treaty. Therefore, this source is very limited and of little credibility since it was more of an anti Stalin move than Trotsky’s genuine belief.

Stalin’s view was that a communist society could be established in the USSR without revolutions elsewhere. These views were labelled ‘permanent revolution’ and ‘socialism in one country’ respectively. The gap between the two views is not as wide as it might appear but it suited Stalin to exaggerate it. Stalin was backed in his dispute with Trotsky by Kamenev and Zinoviev. The three of them were known as the ‘troika’.

The troika inflicted a decisive defeat on Trotsky at the thirteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in 1924. Stalin kept a low profile as Zinoviev launched an attack on Trotsky. Not that speeches made much difference: Stalin had ensured that his supporters were in a majority at the Congress. After 1924, Trotsky’s fall was swift.

Trotsky and Stalin were men whose background and experiences before 1917 were very different.

We now realise why Stalin was able to discard Trotsky as easily. Firstly he was a Jew and only committed himself to Bolsheviks in 1917, whilst Stalin was already since 1903. Therefore the majority preferred Stalin as their leader than the arrogant and Jewish Trotsky.

On the whole there is every reason to believe that had Lenin’s stroke not intervened, Lenin would have demoted Stalin in the government hierarchy. Yet when Lenin died it was Stalin who was best positioned to succeed him. Trotsky’s failure to take the opportunity to undermine his rival remains a puzzle. The Historian Leonard Schapiro observes: “at the Twelfth Party Congress, in 1923, with Lenin’s explosive note on the national question in his pocket, which could have blown Stalin out of the water, he remained silent”

The leadership struggle: second and third phases

After the defeat of Trotsky, the second phase of the 1920s power struggle opened. Stalin turned on his former allies in the ‘troika’. Kamenev and Zinoviev had become impatient with the New Economic Policy. They called for an end to private enterprise farming and insisted on the need of rapid industrialisation. Supporting them was the discredited Trotsky. Together, the three were referred to by Stalin’s followers as the ‘Left Opposition’. The source below illustrates how the Left Opposition was criticised, helping Stalin to establish his position and rise to power. Yet this source has very little credibility since it is biased and used for propaganda purposes. However the source is not completely useless, since it helps the Historian to understand contemporary opinion and propaganda strategies. With a fierce anti Left Opposition campaign, Stalin’s way to the top was made easier, illustrated below with a weak Zinoviev and Trotsky led by the parrot Kamenev. Ultimately, the alliance broke and all three were expelled from the party and later assassinated by Stalin, who was left the supreme leader of the USSR.  

Stalin, backed by Bukharin, accused the ‘Left Opposition’ of recklessness. Bukharin claimed that the NEP had been successful and should be allowed to continue. Kamenev and Zinoviev soon found themselves isolated. By 1928 both men had been relieved of their posts of responsibility.

The third and last phase of the leadership struggle saw the defeat of Bukharin. Stalin did an U-turn in 1928 and 1929, abandoning his support for the NEP and beginning to argue for a policy of rapid industrialisation. He became a more extreme superindustrialist than members of the ‘Left Opposition’ had been. Bukharin and his supporters- chief among whom were Rykov, chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and Tomsky, head of trade unions- were routed. They were labelled the ‘Right opposition’ by Stalin’s supporters. Bukharin was forced off the Politburo in 1929. The Politburo was now packed with Stalin’s henchmen- men like Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich. On 21 December 1929 Stalin celebrated his fiftieth birthday. He did so as Soviet Russia’s unchallenged leader.  

Conclusion

"…as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and children…"

Niccolo Machiavelli

Stalin’s cunning in politics and his careful thought and manipulation of situations by far gave him his advantage over Trotsky. This is the main opinion from many historians, the idea of Stalin’s manipulation and cunning being the vital ingredients in his rise to power. By being able to utilize his influential position as General Secretary he masterfully paved the road to his rise which was to come later on. With the use of his practical thought he was able to identify with the people of Russia and therefore could better serve them, although he was a Georgian. He was aware of the qualifications and steps required in the gaining of power over the Party and he took those required steps to achieve his goal. This is where Trotsky had failed, with all his intellect and organizational skills where the military was concerned he lacked judgement concerning critical situations such as the publication of Lenin’s testament. As he was a military genius he made considerable reputation for himself, as one of Lenin’s leading member and as a mass contributor to the success of the Bolshevik Party. However, he was not designed for politics, nor was he experienced in the monotonous work required for that area, an area in which Stalin excelled. It is very natural to look at the state that Russia was in today; and easily say that Trotsky was far more suited for the position of power for many reasons. He was educated, he was Lenin’s right hand man, and was highly respected, and came from a respectable family. However, the Party was in need of control, stability and a firm ruler. A powerful man to take control of the entire state, a man perhaps made of steel, that man was Stalin.

The story of modern Russian history is indeed one of the most bizarre and twisted tales of deceit, lies, and politics. No one could have predicted the rise of Stalin. Here was a man from humble beginnings in the Slavic republic of Georgia who made his way into party politics through an almost unheard of path. Through his subversive and brazen actions, he cemented a firm foothold in the Bolshevik regime, establishing a reputation for himself as coarse, stubborn, and steadfast. Upon the death of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Stalin could almost have carved out his place in history with the very hammer and sickle upon which Marx based his ideas. And yet, for all the strategy, all the bold moves, and all the outright lies, "Stalin was saved, in fact, by luck alone." 

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Bibliography

• Lynch, M., Stalin and Khrushchev The USSR, 1924-64,Hodder & Stoughton, 1990
• Conquest R. , Stalin: Breaker of Nations, Viking, 1991
• White A., Russia and the USSR 1905- 1964, Collins Living History, 1995
• Brooman J., Stalin and the Soviet Union, Longman, 1991
• Walter Laqueur, Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1991
• McCauley M., Stalin and Stalinism, Longman, 1995

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