Even in 1954, when relations between China and Russia had been amicable following the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Khrushchev informed others that “Conflict with China is inevitable’ and was dismissive of efforts made to welcome him during his visit, describing the atmosphere during his visit as “typically Oriental”. Mao and Khrushchev continued to criticize each other throughout the period, notable examples being Khrushchev labelling Mao’s Great Leap Forward as ‘impractical’ and Mao’s condemnation of the Soviet Union’s rapprochement with the US, finally culminating in bitter personal attacks on both sides in 1964. This was diametrically opposed to the close working relationship of Stalin and Mao in the 1950s who shared ideological views. Mao had great respect for Stalin and had based his domestic policies upon his ideas, and so was offended by Khrushchev’s Anti-Stalinist speech at the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956. Mao criticized Soviet leadership again in 1968 following his Cultural Revolution which aimed to preserve Communism in China and remove revisionist elements. The way in which the relationships between the leaders changed according to their ideological perspectives suggests that the disagreements between leaders, which fuelled the Sino-Soviet split, were a result of ideological differences and, arguably, Mao’s intolerance of those who did not follow his ideas.
However, ideological differences were not the only source of tension, as conflicting national interests further provoked disagreements between the two powers. Arguments arose over the USSR’s refusal to reduce its ties to Mongolia, which China considered to be within its own sphere of influence, and the USSR actively prevented Chinese expansion in North Korea. Russia withdrew economic aid in 1960 and refused to share its atomic or space technology. She also attempted to isolate China in international affairs by strengthening its ties with Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam following Zhou Enlai’s attempts to present China as the leader of world revolution. Russia’s actions are generally considered to be their attempt to thwart China’s struggle to become a world power.
Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the Chinese knew that Russia was prepared to use force against another Communist country, causing them to fear invasion and even nuclear warfare. Their fears were augmented by the appointment of Colonel General Tolubko, deputy commander of the USSR's Strategic Rocket Forces, to command the Soviet Far East Military District. In response, the Chinese developed a strategy of ‘active defence’ which involved a pre-emptive strike against the USSR when the position of their forces was advantageous. This strategy, combined with the leaders’ failure to negotiate, resulted in the Ussuri River Dispute.
The Ussuri River Dispute most serious example of armed conflict between the two communist powers, according to Soviet sources it resulted in the loss of 60 and 800 Russian and Chinese soldiers respectively. The incident was partly triggered by China’s ‘active defence’ strategy, as Soviet forces initially suffered the heaviest casualties suggesting the Chinese had attacked first, but also demonstrated the impact of the two leaders’ personalities upon Sino-Soviet relations. In 1964 the USSR had agreed to allow the Damansky Island to be governed by the Chinese, but Khrushchev was offended by Mao’s boasts that the island was the first of many Chinese territorial gains from the USSR and cancelled the agreement. As a consequence of the Ussuri River Dispute, tensions increased along the border, resulting in another incident at Xinjiang in which the Soviets eliminated an entire Chinese brigade. In October 1969, Beijing published its 'basic principles' demanding "the eventual replacement of the unequal treaties with a new, equal Sino-Soviet treaty and for the erection of properly surveyed border markers." There is little to suggest that border disputes were the result of ideological differences, however, as they had existed since the seventeenth century when Tsarist forces occupied Nerchinsk and Yakasa in the Amur region (north of Mongolia and west of northern Nei Mongol), long before the two countries became Communist.
To conclude, the mutual hostility between the two leaders, caused by differing ideological perspectives, was the most significant factor which resulted in to relations between the two communist powers deteriorating. The legacy of Khrushchev meant that by the mid 1960s relations had been damaged irrevocably and, despite changes in Soviet leadership, resulted in numerous instances of direct armed conflict. Mao was also to blame, as he was intolerant of any ideas that he didn’t consider fully in line with Communist theory, deeming them ‘revisionist’, and considered himself superior to Khrushchev as he had been in power longer. Hypocritically, he sought a Rapprochement with the US in 1969, which he had condemned the USSR for doing a decade earlier, suggesting that the personality clash of the two leaders may not have been purely because of ideology. Furthermore, conflicting national interests were not ideological in nature. However, the different ideological perspectives of the leaders provoked tension between them and meant that they could not be solved amicably, ultimately resulting in the Sino-Soviet Split.
Khrushchev Remembers by Nikita Khrushchev
The Chinese Prime Minister
