Furthermore, I believe the very weak long-standing rivalries concerning imperialistic ambitions in Africa was not a major contributing factor to war, due to the evidence that shows a lack of direct aggression between the majority of European powers in the region.
A naval race between Britain and Germany officially began in 1897. The naval race was a long-standing rivalry between Britain and Germany that was rooted in a bed of imperialism, nationalism and a desire for the strongest economy in Europe.
An important point is that the origins of the naval rivalry between Britain and Germany were brought about through short term objectives, that is, Kaiser Wilhelm’s Weltpolitik. This essentially renders any contribution to war from this rivalry down to a short term objective root, in line with my argument.
It is debatable as to whether the naval race was a long-standing rivalry or a short term event. In terms of the time period covered, it would struggle to stand as long-standing. Although, because the rivalry was so intense; it exacerbated tensions between Britain and Germany to a great degree in a relatively short period of time. This created the same friction as would have been created had a less intense rivalry sprung up a few decades beforehand.
The naval race cannot be considered to be a true long-standing rivalry in a conventional sense, though it was effectively a long-standing rivalry, bar its maturity. In the context of the question and through the nature of the rivalry, the naval race can be taken as a long-standing rivalry. It was a relatively short-term rivalry, but the ambiguities of the definition of a long-standing rivalry and the intense tension between the two countries, allows the situation to be considered a long-standing rivalry in the context of the question.
The naval race played an important role in bringing about war. It spurred the formation of the alliance between Britain and France, which proved to be a vicious circle concerning the development of hostility, that is, Germany felt further threatened by this alliance. It can also be argued that Britain would not have entered the fray of war, were it not for the imperialistic rivalry with Germany. That is, Britain wanted to incapacitate Germany, rendering it no longer a threat to Britain’s economic supremacy. On top of this, the naval race created a negative atmosphere, which itself made the two powers pessimistic about the likelihood of avoiding war, exacerbating the negative atmosphere and suspicions in a vicious circle. This negative atmosphere played an important role in bringing war about.
Even though this (contextually) long-standing rivalry played a large part in bringing about war, the roots of this rivalry were embedded in a short term aims. That is, the fact that Britain wanted to maintain their two to one policy concerning naval ships, Germany’s expansionary economic and naval policies, coupled with the nationalistic and imperialistic aims both countries held, to be the main power in Europe.
The alliance system played a role in bringing about war. The alliance system was primarily borne through long-standing rivalries or tensions. Germany and Austria-Hungary created the dual alliance in 1879 to help fend of threats from each others rivals should they attack, that is, France is Germany’s case and Russia in Austria-Hungary’s case.
Alliances were set up a long time before the war. Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary established the triple alliance in 1882; Russia and France established an alliance in 1894, with Britain joining the fray with a non binding treaty, establishing the triple entende with France and Italy in 1907.
The rivalry between the alliances can in its own right be labelled as a long-standing rivalry, reinforced by long-standing rivalries between countries within the two sets of alliances.
It is true in this case that the vicious circle of alliances originated from the long-standing rivalry between Germany and France, with fear of an attack from France the primary motive for Germany entering an alliance with Austria-Hungary.
However, it is also true that alliances were formed because of short term conditions, such as German aggression. Alliances, therefore, were borne through long-standing rivalries but were escalated through short term factors.
The reasons why these alliances came about are irrelevant in the context of the question. What is important is how significant they were in bringing about WW1.
The alliance system caused suspicions between the countries compromising the different alliances. For example, Germany provoked the first Moroccan crisis in an attempt to test the alliance between France and Britain.
The suspicions that were created motivated each country, but Germany in particular, to further arm themselves. This led to a vicious cycle of increased armament and more secretive alliances, putting in place an atmosphere (as well as the weapons) necessary for war. Weltpolitik did not help put any country’s mind at rest.
However, there are limitations to the extent the alliance system could have realistically brought about war.
It was far from certain that Germany would back Austria-Hungary unconditionally in a Balkan war. The attitude of Italy within the triple alliance was extremely ambiguous (proven when Italy abandoned their position in the triple alliance). The triple entende was a loose arrangement, especially where Britain was involved as Britain’s treaty was non binding (proven during the first Moroccan crisis when Britain did not promise support to France). The Franco-British entende contained no element of military commitment whatsoever. On top of all this, colonial disputes in Persia had soured Britain’s relationship with Russia.
Even though alliances had caused tensions and suspicions to run high in Europe, creating an uneasy atmosphere that at first sight appears to be perfectly favourable to war, many more errors and miscalculations were needed to lead the continent into war.
In conclusion, although the alliance system did play a role in bringing about war, the system was at the same time very limited in its capabilities to do so. This suggests the structure of the system accommodated war as opposed to the view that the alliances themselves were responsible for war.
Militarism in the run up to the war, that is the arms race, is often labelled as a long-term rivalry between the powers in Europe, vying for the greatest military force to satisfy their imperialistic aims and their nationalistic sentiments.
In the period from 1880 to 1914, each of the European powers (France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia) increased their army and military massively.
The statistics show that it was Germany that first started to exponentially expand its army, with other countries soon following suit. It would appear the long-standing rivalries concerning militaristic competition between the European powers are another example of long-standing rivalries stemming from short term objectives.
German Weltpolitik and their expansion of their military sparked a race between the great powers to increase the size of their military, or risk being left in the quake of Germany, a position no country wanted.
This situation was of course conducive to war. The hostile atmosphere created from the arms race and the abundance of weapons made war likely. However, these rivalries were, in the first place, produced from Germany’s short term aims.
The crisis in the Balkans was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the outbreak of war. The most immediate problem in the Balkans was the growth of nationalist groups determined to break free of Ottoman rule.
Although Austria-Hungary and Russia signed a treaty in 1897 stipulating that neither one would try to annex part of the Balkans, both powers redeemed their interest in filling the power vacuum left by the Ottoman Empire.
The relationship between Russia and Austria-Hungary was an unusual one. In my opinion, the relationship did not show any blatant signs of being a long-standing rivalry in the conventional hostile sense during the latter part of the 19th century, although there must have been tensions concerning the Balkans.
Evidence showing there was a long-standing rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the late 19th century include; the agreement signed by both parties in 1897, each promising not to get involved with the situation in the Balkans in an attempt to gain territory. A treaty would not have been necessary had there not been tensions.
The rivalry only became belligerent when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1907, as Austria-Hungary had broken the agreement made with Russia.
Only to a limited extent did the long-standing rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia bring about the crisis in the Balkans, which in turn helped bring about WW1.
The trigger that sparked the war was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The relationship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was never a rivalry, more a long-standing dislike of each other. Austria-Hungary did not approve of the nationalistic sentiments and achievements in the Balkans, particularly Serbia. It feared that these movements may spark nationalist movements back in Vienna. Serbia believed Bosnia belonged to them due to their common Slavic identity.
The Balkan crisis cannot be considered a long-standing rivalry but it can be considered to be an event borne through a long-standing situation, that is, nationalist sentiments and goals that were present from the mid 19th century that only exploded when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia.
The primary reason that the crisis in the Balkans was so effective in bringing about a war lies in the fact the territory was being ogled by two European powers, both members of the two supreme and opposite alliances.
As discussed above, the alliance system
The alliance system meant that when Austria declared war on Serbia, instead of the war being one just involving Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the rest of Europe was dragged in.
This implies that the alliance system caused war to spread like wildfire, as opposed to starting it. In the context of this situation, those two can be considered to be one and the same thing.
In conclusion, the Balkans crisis cannot be considered a result of long-standing rivalries but as a result of long-standing tensions between Austria-Hungary and, Serbia and Russia.
The crisis was effective in bringing about war as the long-standing tensions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were exacerbated by Austria annexing Bosnia, and made chronic though the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
The long-standing rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia did make the situation worse. However, their rivalry was secondary, and in some ways irrelevant when compared to the tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia in terms of how significant these relationships were in bringing about war.
The alliance system (a long-standing rivalry in itself) only served as a tool to drag all of Europe into war, as opposed to a cause of war in its own right.
German aggression was the single main entity to bring about war. German aggression, with a particular emphasis on Weltpolitik, was primarily the work of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
German Weltpolitik was the root of long-standing rivalries such as the naval race with Britain and the arms race concerning all the European powers. These long-standing rivalries when some way to provoking war, German aggression was the root of these rivalries. The fact that Britain joined in the war can be attributed to Weltpolitik, as Britain wanted to limit German growth, as opposed to the excuse of defending Belgium.
German aggression and Weltpolitik were short term aggravations leading to war. Kaiser Wilhelm II implemented Weltpolitik, perhaps through his imperialistic and nationalistic desires, or perhaps his withered arm ensured he wanted to prove himself as a powerful force, through Germany. Nevertheless, German aggression cannot be attributed to any long term rivalries.
The German Schlieffen plan failed. This led to Germany having to occupy Belgium to achieve her goals and this gave Britain a reason to join the war, in supposed defence of Belgium.
Some argue that Germany became aggressive because it was encircled by the alliance of France and Russia, making Germany feel threatened. However, Germany was the first country to make an alliance and it was the aggressive policies of Wilhelm II, refusing to renew the reinsurance treaty; that lost Russia as an ally.
It is possible to go even further and hunt the root of German aggression. The chase leads back to Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose aggressive policies and implementation of Weltpolitik stemmed long-standing rivalries and would appear to be the main cause of the war. It is feasible to put the majority of the blame on one man, Kaiser Wilhelm II.
Blame can be put on the shoulders of Austria-Hungary. They wanted control of the Balkans primarily to suppress nationalistic uprisings, which posed a threat to the unity of Austria-Hungary. Imperialistic ambitions may well have also played a part. Austria-Hungary’s short term aims resulted in a world war, which may have been avoided were Austria-Hungary not so unreasonable towards Serbia.
In conclusion, there are a myriad of causes that could have brought war about. The alliance system, the naval race and the arms race, to some extent, were all sprouted from aggressive German foreign policy.
Long-standing rivalries did play a role in bringing about war. The rivalries exacerbated tensions between the European powers, created suspicions, but were not the most significant factors in bringing war about. World war one war was not the result of long-standing rivalries, though they do play a part.
What has proved to be more important are factors including German aggression, Weltpolitik and the crisis in the Balkans. None of these factors are the product of long-standing rivalries, or indeed are long-standing rivalries.
What has come across is that the reason long-standing rivalries were not the main factor in bringing about war was because, firstly, the short term factors were more significant. Secondly, long-standing rivalries only created the atmosphere conducive to war. The rivalries themselves would not bring about war without a trigger. The trigger in this case was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Long-standing rivalries ensured the resources and sentiments were in place for a war to begin.
However, long-standing rivalries were not enough in themselves to bring about war. The foundations of some rivalries relied heavily on the fact that Germany was so aggressive.
In conclusion, long-standing rivalries did play a part in bringing war about, but that part was only to ensure that when war did break out, it would be a large one. German aggression was the root of some of the rivalries and the main underlying reason why war came about.
