The Purges during Stalin's reign

by cawilliams29 (student)

Conquest argues that the murder of Sergei Kirov was the turning point in history and the catalyst for Stalin’s Great Purges in the 1930s in Russia. It gave Josef Stalin, the Soviet Union’s dictator the ultimate opportunity to launch a fierce attack on his political opponents and the other sectors of society that threatened him. Before Stalin’s time, opponents and undesirables had been removed from the party, deported or exiled, but during his reign, they were killed. Khrushchev states that by 1940, 70% of the Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 was dead. Stalin’s regime of the Great Terror in 1937-38 had resulted in the death of around 20 million people. Out of the 8 million who were deported to the Gulags, only 1 in 10 survived. There is no doubt that the Purges were an atrocity of staggering proportions, but historians differ in opinions on the driving factor behind the mass killings. Service argues that the fear of opposition and the need to secure his position in the party resulted in the murder of many of Stalin’s political opponents. However, Deutscher argues that the purges were more a result of the fears of war with Germany looming on the horizon and therefore Stalin had to keep a tight grip on the party in order to keep up with the war effort and remain stable. Getty even argues that it was the economic problems in Russia that led to the purges, as Stalin needed a scapegoat for the failure of the Five Year Plans. However, it could be argued that all these arguments lead back to Stalin’s personality. As he was the man at the head of Russia, it is impossible to completely eliminate Stalin’s influence in the murders of millions. Although some of these killings could be perceived as being rational, the purging of the army as war was looming made no sense. As Conquest argues, this could suggest that Stalin had a lust for power and that his paranoia was ultimately a major factor in producing the purges.

Medvedev argues that the huge support that was shown for Kirov, the Leningrad Party boss, during the 17th Party Congress made Stalin paranoid that the party was conspiring against him and resulted in the death of Kirov. It could be argued that this paranoia was justifiable, as there is evidence to suggest that the provincial delegates had asked Kirov to replace Stalin as general secretary and Kirov was also supposed to have won all but three of the 1225 votes, whereas there were around 300 who had not voted for Stalin. Therefore, it could be argued that Stalin had opposition to his rule and he thought death was the only option for those that opposed his rule. However, Ulam argues that the death of Kirov was more because of Stalin’s jealousy of Kirov’s “high regard within the party” and he also sought for an excuse to get rid of other party members. Therefore, the purges cannot be seen as a rational reaction to real opposition, but an excuse to terrorise the party with no logical reason. Yet, Getty disagrees with Ulam, stating that there is no proof that Stalin had any part in Kirov’s murder and that perhaps the assassin, Nikolayev, had murdered Kirov on the suspicion that Kirov was having an affair with his wife. Nevertheless, it is clear that this murder gave Stalin the opportunity to arrest numerous members of the Bolsheviks on the grounds that they were conspiring against Stalin and his regime.

Thurston argues that the suicide of Stalin’s wife, Nadezda Allilueva, may have prompted Stalin to propel his guilt over her death onto others, resulting in the murder of millions of Russian people. Nevertheless, Radzinsky states that Stalin treated his wife badly and had numerous affairs with other women, therefore it could be argued that her death did not affect him very much and that it must have been other factors that provoked the purges. Yet, although Stalin was said to have never visited the grave of his wife, Radzinsky argues that Bukharin’s wife Anna stated that Stalin had asked for the lid of her coffin to be left open and he sat by it for hours. Stalin’s daughter said that after her mother’s death “something had snapped inside my father”. As Medvedev argues, Nadezda’s suicide made Stalin more paranoid and he did not trust anyone any more. Service states that “Stalin watched people always as if they might be his enemies” and that he had an “inner psychological compulsion”. However, Service argues that the death of his wife was not the only reason for the purges, as he had “plenty of badness in him to be brought out long before he held despotic power.” Medvedev agrees stating that Stalin had a “measureless ambition”.

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It could be argued that it was not Stalin’s paranoia, but his need to ensure the safety of his position that prompted the purges. Service argues that Stalin knew of his unpopularity within the party and this made him keen to get rid of any possible opposition. However, Ward argues that it is hard to see how his beaten opponents did pose any risk. Bukharin, for example, had become editor of Izvestiia and he was grateful to Stalin for bringing him back into the party fold. He also states that Zinoviev and Kamenev were “politically bankrupt” and that they did not have very much, if any backing in the party. On the other hand, there were several opposition groups, such as the Ryutin Group that could be argued to have posed a threat for Stalin. Ryutin, a former Moscow party secretary, criticised Stalin, calling his regime “a personal dictatorship” and when Stalin demanded the death penalty for Ryutin, other members of the Politburo opposed him. This could be argued to show that Stalin’s paranoia was not the only reason for the purges, but that opposition to his regime also played a key part. Yet, Ward argues that it was only in Russia’s current state of commotion that these people appeared to be a risk to Stalin’s regime—in reality they had no chance of success. Even though the purge of the party began as an attempt to solidify Stalin’s position at the head, his paranoia could be argued to have blown it out of proportion and it ended in 1000 of the 1478 delegates of the 17th Congress being shot.

It could be argued that regardless of the debate of the extent of his opposition, any opposition caused Stalin to become paranoid and perhaps the purges were triggered by his personality. Moreover, Stalin was not satisfied with the murders of his former opponents—he announced, “Spies had infiltrated all levels of the party”. He encouraged lower level party officials to denounce their superiors and created a climate of paranoia inside the whole party. However, it could be argued that Stalin wanted to instil fear into the party to keep them loyal, as he once commented that ‘It is better to rule through fear than through repent”. Volhogonov claims that Stalin’s mistrust for even his closest advisors was evidence of his paranoia. As Khrushchev argues, he had a “general distrust even toward eminent party members whom he had known for years”.

Yet, historians disagree whether Stalin actually did suffer from paranoia. In 1937, Bekhterev, a Russian neuropathologist, was killed after he diagnosed Stalin with paranoia. Nevertheless, Service states that Stalin did not suffer from paranoia or madness and that he did not “experience episodes which stopped him functioning with day to day competence”. Therefore, it could be argued that the purges did not arise from Stalin’s suspicions and mistrusts about other party members and the people under his command. However, it could be argued that Stalin felt threatened, as he was less intellectual than any other members of the party. Bukharin stated that as a result of this insecurity, “he could not help taking revenge for it on others”. More to the point, Service does argue that although he was not a sufferer of paranoia, he was not “fully in control of himself”. Djilas argues that Stalin’s personality was indeed a main part in producing the purges, as he was “a monster” and would commit any crime for success.

Yet, Stalin’s purge of the army seems to have no logical or rational explanation. In 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky, a hero of the Civil War, was arrested along with rest of his general staff. Their charges included being part of a Japanese conspiracy that would put the Russian Generals in power. Deutscher argues that a reason for these purges was that Stalin feared the power of the army and believed that they would become disloyal to him. However, Ulam makes the point that the Army generals were fiercely loyal and they were also not politically ambitious. Also, Russia was on the verge of a possible war and therefore, purging the army was not a sensible, rational decision. It could be argued that this is the ultimate example of Stalin’s paranoia ruling over his common sense. Nevertheless, it could be argued that there was opposition against Stalin and therefore his decision to eradicate leading generals was one, which would guarantee him security.

In particular, the purges of the Kulaks could be argued to have been because there was no place for the wealthier kulaks in the process of setting up a more socialist agricultural system. Stalin took the reports of peasants killing animals and raiding grain supplies as proof that the Kulaks were trying to wreck his policies in the countryside. Arguably, if he had done nothing to stop the opposition, Soviet attempts to industrialise would have been hindered. Getty agrees stating that the move against the Kulaks was one of pragmatism, rather than paranoia. However, the Communist Officials were too keen to root out the kulaks leading to a decrease in grain production and the orders that came from the central party to use more extreme action against the Kulaks showed that Stalin’s paranoia had turned the purge into excess. Nove argues that Stalin was paranoid, as if he had the smallest of doubts or suspicion about someone, he would have them killed.

Deutscher believes that the threats of war led Stalin to fear a possible insurrection against him. Stalin thought that there was a high probability of war against Germany and therefore, he did not want anyone in his party, who disagreed with his foreign policy. Stalin thought that a change in government could “weaken Russia’s fighting capacity” and that a different government might agree to a truce with Germany and surrender Russian territory, like at Brest Litovsk. He believed that if the USSR was invaded, his former opponents could try to usurp him. Deutscher argues that a possible reason for their action could be Stalin’s conduct of the war, as they might have seen it as “incompetent and ruinous”. Therefore, as Nove states, this explained the period of extreme violence between 1937-38. The first show trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev were only a few months after Hitler’s invasion of the Rhineland and around the time of the German Anschluss the last trial of Bukharin and Rykov took place. Perhaps as Deutscher argues, Stalin did not conduct the purges out of paranoia or out of “sheer cruelty or lust for power”, but that he believed that he was doing the right thing for Russia. More to the point, he did not want any opponents to slow down industrialisation, as he needed to make armaments for the war effort.

Gellately argues that Stalin was not the initiator of the purges, but that it had been Lenin who had introduced the policy of terror and therefore “Stalin was his logical successor”. Throughout the 1920s, there had been nationwide Chitskas and through the Red Terror, Lenin had killed and exiled many political opponents. However Conquest argues that it would be wrong to suggest that the purges “followed inevitably from the nature of Soviet society and the communist party”. Also, according to Service, Stalin had a “propensity for violence”, which was “excessive even by Bolshevik norms”. Ward argues that all that Stalin was doing was duplicating what Lenin had done, but was doing it better. This could be shown through Stalin’s purging of party members, which was a step further than Lenin. Therefore, it could be concluded that although Stalin had carried on the ideas of terror from Lenin, his paranoia had carried it to another extreme.

As Lynch argues, ideology was also a factor in the justification of the purges. Service argues that Stalin believed that his actions followed Bolshevik ideals. Arguably it is a distorted logic, as the murders of millions can hardly be justified, but it did rationalise the purges in the minds of the perpetrators. Therefore, it could be argued that it was not just Stalin’s paranoia that produced the purges, but his strong belief that he was working towards a Bolshevik utopian society and striving for a victory of the proletariat movement. Nevertheless, Ward argues that the Bolsheviks were too confident in their own ideology and that “self confidence bred intolerance”. It could also be argued that it is not only Stalin that could be blamed personally for the purges. Waites argues that Stalin was “not a one-man band” and that he had “thousands of willing collaborators”, which included ordinary party members. Hosking argues that many officials in the party used the purges to their advantage to advance their position and eliminate their rivals. However, it could also be argued that during the Yezhovshchina in 1937-38 there were some cases where the only way to survive yourself was to denounce others as “enemies of the state”. Getty argues that the purges gathered a momentum of their own and that it was not the sole fault of Stalin, as in October 1937, Stalin made a speech condemning the chaos that had been caused by the searching for victims, as he believed that it had gone too far.

It could also be argued that Yezhov and the NKVD played a significant part in “The Great Terror”. Medvedev argues that the purges of the people only began after Yezhov had written lists of over 250,000 people to be killed at the start of the Great Purge. This could suggest that it was not only Stalin and his paranoia that was ultimately responsible for the purges. However, Stalin was in control of the NKVD and they were his own “personal security organ”. Moreover, Nove argues that it was Stalin’s decision to employ Yezhov and Lynch argues that Yezhov had a reputation for terror and murder, so it could be argued that Stalin was still mainly responsible for the execution and engineering of the purges.

Manning argues that the purges were a way for the Communist Party to find scapegoats to hold accountable for the economic problems in Russia. Therefore, the Communist party purged factory managers and bourgeois specialists. However, Deutscher argues that there is only a certain amount of proof in this and that the economy actually improved during “The Great Terror”, as oil output doubled and coal and steel production increased rapidly. Also, if Stalin had only wanted scapegoats for Russia’s economic problems, then prison sentences would have been sufficient enough. Therefore, it could be argued that Stalin’s paranoid personality played a part in that putting people in jail or exiling them was not enough—death was the only option. When a target was not met in a factory, Stalin could not see a problem in the running of the factory, but thought that instead there was a “Trotskyite conspiracy” or “Bukharinist deviators”. Conquest argues that every decision Stalin made was driven by his personality and Deutscher admits that Stalin displayed a ‘quasi-paranoiac” tendency.

With the death of Lenin, Stalin sought for a way to remain in control of the people and to keep his dictatorship. Therefore, the “Great Terror”, as Conquest calls it, was unleashed on the people, resulting in the torture and deaths of millions. It could be argued that the driving factor behind the purges was Stalin’s paranoia and his suspicions that he would be usurped. Nevertheless, although most historians would agree that this is an underlying reason for the purges, to say that paranoia was the only driving force would be incorrect. Stalin faced opposition from inside the party, the threat of war from Germany and economic problems in Russia and therefore, it could be argued that the purges were executed to keep Stalin in power and to keep up the war effort. Ideology and the influence of Lenin also played a part, as Stalin believed that the purges were needed in order to create a utopian state. Yet, Conquest argues that the purges were also fuelled by Stalin’s desire for supreme power. With the death of his wife and in Kirov, Stalin saw opposition to his regime and this could be argued to have fired up his paranoia that he could not trust anyone. However, it could also be argued that Stalin was not solely to blame for the purges that swept Russia and the NKVD, Yezhov and even ordinary party members could also be held responsible for letting it get out of control. Ultimately, there were many reasons and many people involved in the Great Purges, but it cannot be denied that Stalin, at the head of the Party, was the commander and at the forefront all the way through.