To what extent was Bismarck in control of the direction Germany's Foreign Policy took between 1871 and 1890?

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Richard Cross

6U4

31/10/02

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To what extent was Bismarck in control of the direction Germany’s Foreign Policy took between 1871 and 1890?

To this very day Otto Von Bismarck remains one of the most significant political figureheads of modern Germany. This stature derives from his contribution to the creation and shaping of the modern German state as Prussian minister president and imperial chancellor from 1862 to 1890. Until his resignation in 1890, Bismarck had a relatively freehand in conducting foreign policy. After three successful wars, he saw his task as promoting peace and gaining time so that the powerful German Empire would come to be accepted as natural. Bismarck's two areas of concern were the Balkans, where the disintegration of the Turkish empire could easily lead to conflict between the Habsburg monarchy and Russia, and France, where the desire to avenge the defeat at Sedan was strong. In each area a general European conflagration could flare up and involve Germany. In the following I am going to investigate the extent of which Bismarck was in control of Germany’s Foreign Policy between 1871 and 1890.

        In the two decades proceeding the unification of Germany Bismarck was the dominant statesman of Europe, controlling the policy of Germany, settling disputes between other countries, and entangling all of Europe into a complex web of alliances and understandings, all of which were intended to preserve peace in Europe. If Germany made a foolish decision, this could ensue the disintegration of the whole system. In order to understand how the system created by Bismarck was dependant on Germany it is necessary to examine the predicament each power was in. The powers can be divided into two different classes: the satiated powers, Germany and Britain who were happy with the ‘status quo’; and the malcontent powers, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary, which still had interest in European expansion

        In my opinion, one man cannot control the course of one nations history, although there can be no disputing that Bismarck was a wonderfully skilled and talented politician, I feel he acted to situations as they arose, rather than orchestrating events. Therefore I perceive Bismarck as an interventionist rather than an intentionalist.

        It is possible to conclude that if a European conflict were to develop, it would occur in one of two places. The first possibility was a conflict between France and Germany over the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine on the Rhine; the second would be a conflict involving either Austria or Britain against Russia in the Balkans.

One argument to imply that Bismarck was in full control of the direction of German Foreign Policy between 1871 and 1890 was his radical change of policy. In the decade preceding the Unification, Germany was involved in three wars, which Bismarck had instigated, in order to achieve the United Germany. “For the rest of Bismarck’s career Germany remained at peace” (Lee, Stephen one of the leading historians of European history, he presents both arguments on my debate, therefore he is a reliable historian to quote). Bismarck wanted to focus on maintaining the unified Germany as it was. This is very clear and accurate as for twenty years, following the Unification; Germany was never at war.    

One possibility where a European Conflict could occur was between France and Germany on the Rhine. It could be argued that Bismarck was fully in control of this situation and that the isolation of France was due to Bismarck’s careful planning. It may be suggested that Bismarck premeditated that France would eventually seek revenge for their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck was not afraid of France alone, but he wanted to ensure that France would not align herself with Russia or Austria; therefore he set about isolating France through a series of complex and intricate treaties. The first of Bismarck’s complex web of alliance was the Dreikaiserbund (1872), also known as the League of the Three Emperors (1872). Bismarck's aim for forming this League was to isolate France by expanding relations with Austria and Russia. The partners were Kaiser William I of Germany, Tsar Alexander II of Russia and Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. These three rulers agreed to maintain the existing territorial arrangements in Europe; to resist the spread of revolutionary (e.g. socialist) movements; and to consult one another if any international difficulties arose. France was deviously being diplomatically isolated. This ‘understanding’, strengthened Germany’s position in Europe and helped to maintain the Status Quo. A further strategy of Bismarck’s in the isolation of France was how Bismarck had tactfully encouraged France to expand overseas in the hope of diverting her attention away from Alsace-Lorraine. French annexation of Tunis in northern Africa in 1881 alienated Italy. Italy was thus driven into Bismarck's camp in anger. Therefore Italy joined The Triple Alliance of 1882. The terms of the alliance if Italy or Germany were attacked by France, each would aid the other; if Austria was attacked by Russia, Italy would remain neutral, although Austria would aid Italy if she was attacked by France; if one of the parties was attacked by two or more powers, the other signatories were to come to her aid; and at Italy's request, both Austria and Germany agreed that in no case would the Treaty operate against Britain. Consequently, by this time, a powerful bloc had been formed in central Europe. Germany was now guaranteed against Russia by Austria, and against France by Italy. Bismarck had successfully kept the friendship of Russia, Austria and Italy and kept France completely isolated. He was indeed a skilful diplomat who was able to handle the European powers for Germany's advantage. Moreover, following these alliances, Bismarck formed the Reinsurance Treaty (1887) with Russia. This Treaty on its face did not do much. Both Russia and Germany promised to remain neutral in case the other was involved in a war with a great power, except for a Russian attack on Austria, or a German one on France. Since there were the only two possible conflicts, it seems the treaty might be useless. This, however, is not true. As Bismarck explained, “Our relations with Russia depend exclusively on the personal feeling of the Tsar Alexander III”, and such a treaty brought Germany up a notch in the Tsar’s eyes. Thus the Treaty led to better Russo-German understanding, and at least temporarily lowered the chance of a Russo-French alliance. The complicated set of treaties and alliances show Bismarck to be in control and carefully planning for all eventualities. James Joll supports this view; “Bismarck needed to ensure that France remained isolated and thus unable to think in terms of revenge for 1870 and of war for the recovery of Alsace Lorraine”.

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On the other hand, a case can be constructed to argue that Bismarck was not in full control, that he was a revisionist, reacting to events as they arose, this is obvious in the instance of Bismarck’s policy of French isolation. According to D. Richards, “Bismarck was willing to run the risk of alienating French feeling because, “Firstly…. France would take many years to recover from the Franco-Prussian war. Secondly…. he could use the bogey of a French war of revenge to make the Reichstag maintain a high level of German armaments. And…. Thirdly…. his diplomatic genius could keep France ...

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