Can a plausible case be made for participatory democracy under modern conditions?

Can a plausible case be made for participatory democracy under

modern conditions?

The 'classical' theory of democracy, such as that advocated by Rousseau in the Social Contract and traditionally held as adopted by the citizens of Ancient Greece, arose from a vision of democracy as a fully participatory system, a system in which the citizens would gather together to rule in a sovereign assembly and, hence, each member would be able to contribute directly and equally to the political decision-making. This system of participation was thought to comprise the only true democratic system, allowing each their own voice and influence over political affairs. The 'classical' view of a fully participatory democracy differs to a large extent then from what we currently take to be democratic systems in the modern world and differs still from the 18th century conception of a democratic method as that institutional arrangement whereby political decisions are made in order to realise the common good. On in which the people themselves decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble and carry out the 'will of the people'. Both the 18th century idea and our modern practices of democracy then do call for participation, but only at a certain level. It is usually only in such times as election of a government or representative, or in times of referendum, when direct participation of the citizens is called for. That this is the level at which participation in a modern democratic system should remain is argued for a number of reasons. Such reasons include the impracticalities of a larger popular participation in politics due to the size and complexities of the industrialised societies of the modern world. The 'classical' theory in particular, we might argue, places unrealistic demands on the citizens of a participatory democracy and has generally unrealistic conceptions of politics. Finally, that greater participation presents an inherent danger to the stability of our political systems is counted as a further reason to reject such a system being applied under modern conditions. By assessing these objections to the implementation of a participatory democracy under modern conditions and trying to meet them, we can discover whether any plausible case can be made for a participatory democracy in the modern world.

In modern society, total participation is observed only at times of election or referendum, and even then not all choose to participate. Representation appears to be the obvious solution in modern society to the problem of a large-scale functioning democracy but we can ask to what extent direct participation can be accommodated under these conditions where representation appears widely necessary. If we take Rousseau's theory of a fully participatory democracy which he presents in The Social Contract, we notice in fact that Rousseau himself claimed that such a system could occur in practice only in 'small, peasant' communities and, hence, he himself appears to have realised the impracticalities of a fully participatory system on a large scale. For the greater the number of citizens there are, the smaller the share of the power. In the proposed assemblies in which citizens under the 'classical' theory are to discuss and voice opinions on political issues, each person's share of the time available will become infinitesimally short in duration if we begin to deal with societies on the scale of countries. This idea alone is problematic, but it does not even begin to address the problem of how all the citizens of a country can possibly hope to assemble in one place to enter in to such discussions. The idea then of direct participation on the scale of countries is unfeasible. Practically speaking, once we go beyond the size of what generally comprises a committee (whatever exact size that might be), the opportunity for citizens to participate declines significantly and our chance of any kind of direct and equal participation becomes unlikely. But, we might argue in reply, not everyone has to participate in such assemblies by speaking, for in reality surely it is highly unlikely that in an assembly of, say, ten thousand people that there will be ten thousand distinct points of view on an issue. In practice we would generally find more like two or three points of view and, if this is the case, then only a certain few need actively participate in the assembly by speaking, the rest 'participate' in as much as they can listen, think and vote on the issues. However, surely this would not be what advocates of the Classical theory, such as Rousseau, would count as a participatory democracy, since a truly participatory democracy calls for full and equal participation by all. We must admit then, as Rousseau does, that such a system of total participation is realisable only in small groups. On a large scale, out of pure pragmatism, what appears to result is a resort to some kind of representative system where a few will represent the views of the majority who, for practical purposes, cannot voice their own opinions in a large group. To ensure, however, that the choice of representatives is neither arbitrary nor unfair, this representative system would require some form of rules for fair representation. These would include such rules as that these representatives be selected by the vote of the people. By enforcing such a set of rules we then construct the more democratic system, electing representatives rather than allowing random speakers to voice their opinions. It seems then that this form of representative system would, in fact, be the more democratic choice over the assembly and 'participation' of all citizens. The advocate of the participatory system might argue, however, that in the case of such a representative system, the citizens, in fact, would have less direct control over decisions since it would be the representatives who vote on the policies to be adopted rather than the citizens themselves.

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But could such a participatory system be implemented in practice? Is there any evidence of any functioning participatory democracy in modern society? It is argued that such a participatory democracy is observed in the kibbutzim of Israel. But to use such a community as an example we must note that in Israel 95% of the population do not live in such a society and, if a fully participatory society requires societies such as these voluntary communes in order adequately to function, then we have to ask whether such a system could ever really work in practice for entire societies in the modern world. That such a system as specified in the Classical theory would be impractical under modern conditions is clear. To expect citizens to spend such a great proportion of their time in assemblies discussing political issues, as needs must in large-scale communities, would clearly be both an impractical and unrealistic expectation. The only way in which one could possibly avoid the impracticalities of the participatory system, to ensure that the request for citizens' time is not overly demanding and that decisions can be reached efficiently and effectively (and yet still take everyone's views into account), would be to restrict the size of such institutions to a reasonable number (and generally it is thought that a workable system would be no larger than a committee). The argument then that such a participatory system could occur in such systems as town governments is not wholly implausible, but the plausibility of this fact does not appear to help the notion of participatory democracy as a whole. For either we are proposing all governments be fully participatory, in which case all governments would need to exist as small, autonomous units like town governments, or we allow some governments to be participatory and let some, those of a greater size, remain representative systems or polyarchies. In either case, however, we will have to expect similar probable outcomes to ensue. Reflecting on the history of mankind, we will have to accept arguments for the natural human tendency towards aggression and empire, to the result that some societies will inevitably expand and begin to dominate others. Such consequences would result in societies too large to sustain participatory democracy and once again we would have to resort to some form of representative government or polyarchic system. Perhaps we might think that, in an effort to avoid this seemingly inevitable result, we could construct alliances between these small, autonomous states to prevent the spread of empires and resulting expansion of societies. But again we could only expect a similar result; the creation of states too large to support a fully participatory system. Some form of representation then seems to be the only way to retain a democratic system. This, although not as perfectly democratic as the 'classical' theorist demands, would allow for a society as democratic as it feasibly can be.

That some theories of democracy place unrealistic demands on the citizens of democratic systems is an objection faced not only by the 'classical' theory but also by the general 18th century conception of democracy. For both theories rest on the notion of a uniquely determined common good on which all people agree, but that such a common good exists or is at all evident to the citizens of a modern society is indeed debatable. It seems, in fact, far more plausible a suggestion that such a term as 'common good' will have different meanings for different people depending on their world view or ethical outlooks and, therefore, it seems there will be no objective, unequivocal meaning of such a term. Our ultimate values, we can argue, about life in general and what society should be like, can differ greatly from person to person and, if this is the case, then we can never come to some common objective conclusion about how such a 'common good' is to be achieved, for we will be arguing through an equivocation of meaning. Further, even if (fairly unrealistically perhaps) all citizens of a particular society were adhere to one definite moral code, act utilitarianism say, through which we could agree on some objective common good which was acceptable to all, we would still be faced with the problem of obtaining definite answers to all the individual issues that arise in political discussion. That is, there would still be much debate as to whether this method or practice rather than that will better allow us to attain that common good (arguments over whether to adopt a socialist or a capitalist approach for instance). Consequently such a term as the 'will of the people' which underpins the system of a fully participatory democracy is rendered meaningless.

Participatory democracy relies then on the unrealistic demand that every citizen know exactly what he or she stands for on every political issue. It relies also on the unrealistic demands that facts about each and every political issue be directly accessible to everyone so that citizens can come to these definite conclusions, presumably efficiently and effectively, independently of pressure groups and propaganda. This last point, that our political decisions be made independently, is something which does not appear at all possible in modern society. That the influences and views of others permeate our thoughts and help sway our opinions this way or that is something we constantly observe, whether that influence comes from the media, politicians or our peers. That people in general are amenable to the influence of advertising and this form of persuasion is simply a fact of modern life. Citizens of a society will be more likely to have independent, definite opinions on matters local, close to home but on national issues, issues further afield, where citizens are not simply apathetic to such issues, it is in these areas that they will be susceptible to the influences of the media or the government. Coming back to this idea of the common will or 'will of the people', from the function

of political processes in modern society, what we witness it seems, in regard to political issues are not decisions reflecting the genuine will of the people as such (a will initiated by the people), but a manufactured will, so to speak, that is the product, rather than the driving force, of the political process. For the information with which we are provided is often selective and directs our opinions accordingly. Under modern conditions then, that we could successfully accommodate a system which calls for citizens' independent, conclusive decisions on all matters political seems highly implausible since such a demand is clearly an unrealistic one.

We can object further that, not only would application of a fully participatory system to modern society call for impractical and unrealistic demands, but that there would be inherent dangers in such wide popular participation in politics. These dangers are said to stem from the necessary instability of such systems. Evidence for this resulting instability is thought to be exemplified in such historical events as the collapse of the mass participatory system of the Weimar Republic into fascism and the post-war establishment of totalitarian regimes of mass participation (where participation here was incurred by coercion and intimidation). Such examples have led some to believe there exists, in fact, rather a worrying link between active participation and totalitarianism. The political apathy of large proportions of society is regarded then as a necessary component for stability, rather than as a negative aspect of society that needs to be rectified. Increase in participation, it is said, could only be achieved either by coercion of the apathetic masses or by penalisation of the active minority - either way the political system is rendered less stable. For Rousseau and other proponents of the 'classical' theory stability was not an issue, for the system they had in mind, they claimed, would be self-sustaining in character. The individual participation of each citizen would have such psychological effects on participants as to ensure a continuing interrelationship between the 'democratic characters' of the citizens and the workings of the participatory system. This 'democratic character' would ensure that no one citizen would vote on any policy that was more to his advantage than another's so that the only possible policies that could be agreed upon would be those in which benefits and burdens were equally shared by all citizens. But as shown, and as argued by Rousseau himself, there are certain conditions necessary for this kind of self-sustaining participatory system such as that society be made up of 'small, peasant proprietors' which would display some degree of independence and economic equality in order that each citizen might feel secure within that system and for it, hence, to remain stable. Such conditions we can clearly see are not manifest in most modern societies and, therefore, we must still ask how a participatory democracy can possibly hope to retain stability in our complex, industrialised societies.

The answer to this question is claimed by Cole to be found in industry. In industry, he argues, we are at most points involved in certain relationships of 'superiority and subordination' and this system is then reflected in our political institutions - as he claims: 'the servile system of industry reflects itself in political servility'. In order then to develop the necessary 'democratic character' that citizens might experience no conflict, as it were, between their private and public interests, we must somehow find a way to equalise the status of the citizens; industry must, in effect, become participatory. Once this occurs, developing along with it the 'democratic character' of the citizens, a participatory system can be self-sustaining. This perhaps provides us with a possible method through which modern society could be altered to accommodate a participatory system, presuming we could, in fact, democratise industrial authority structures in such a way. But even if we could provide evidence to support this proposes link between equal participation in the workplace and equal participation at a political level, this would not be modern society on the conditions under which it currently exists. If we are asking whether a plausible case can be made for participatory democracy under modern conditions as they are, then surely the answer must be that it cannot. For the impracticalities and unrealistic demands of a fully participatory system would suggest that it could not be successfully implemented in our modern societies and its threat of instability renders it is an unlikely possible system to be adopted under modern conditions.

Melissa Gibson

Can a plausible case be made for participatory democracy under modern conditions?

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