Many Germans were unhappy that they were still forced to pay reparations, hence acknowledging Versailles and the War Guilt Clause, however business benefited greatly from increased investment and better economic conditions for production and trade.
Overall, the Dawes Plan eliminated many of the factors that caused the social and political unrest during the first four years of Weimar. The reparations payments had been reorganised and the French had withdrawn from the Ruhr, however the American loans created a highly volatile basis for the economy while the continuance of the reparations payments was seen as an admission of war guilt by many Germans.
Political and Social Conflicts During the Golden Years
The Golden Age of Weimar or a Loaded Pause?
Between 1924 and 1928 the political scene in Weimar Germany did not stabilise to any great extent, despite the fact that both the KPD and the NSDAP gave up non-democratic methods in their fights against Weimar, other factors acted to counterbalance this stability.
The Golden Age proved to be an interesting time for the major coalition parties in Germany. Following the death of President Ebert and the election of Paul von Hindenburg as President, the SPD, Germany’s largest political party, refused to participate in any coalition believing that they could serve the interests of the working classes more effectively when in opposition. President Hindenburg evidently agreed with this sentiment, refusing to sanction a coalition containing the SPD (the two exceptions being Stesemann’s Government in 1923 and Muller’s in 1928).
The attitude of the SPD led to a total of six governments out of the eight formed between 1923 and 1930 being implemented without a majority in the Reichstag creating a vast instability. The fact that the Government in power did not have a majority meant that they Government had no guarantee that a piece of policy legislation would pass. The marginal nature of the majorities also resulted in smaller parties such as the NSDAP, the BVP, the KPD and, of course, the SPD being able to swing legislation in their favour. Overall, the combination of the limited coalitions and the minority governments contributed to the instability of the Weimar Republic during the so-called “Golden Age”.
In contrast to the SPD’s approach to coalition politics, the DDP and the DNVP both embraced their new places in the political structure of Weimar. The rapidly declining DDP joined all but one of the governments formed between 1924 and 1930, while the increasingly right-wing DNVP participated in government in 1925 and between 1927 and 1928.
During the Golden Age, the use of proportional representation produced a by-product in the form of single interest parties. These bodies, which represented groups like the ultra-extreme nationalist right and those seeking compensation for money lost during the hyperinflation crisis, showed both the benefit of PR with specific issues having voices and it’s disadvantages with the instabilities introduced by it.
During the so-called Golden Age, there was also an increase in paramilitary violence, despite the adoption of democratic tactics by the two main exponents of paramilitary barbarity the NSDAP’s SA and the KPD’s Red Fighting League. In addition to these other groups such as the Stalhelm, the Reichsbanner and the Red Front Soldier’s League became more common. The vast majority of the violence revolved around the main cities, including Berlin and Frankfurt, as well as in extremist strongholds such as Nuremberg, Munich and the Ruhr.
While the overall number of political associated killings decreased after 1923, the existence and popularity of paramilitary groups created yet more instability in Weimar.
The growth of the left-wing paramilitary organisations was, in some part, contributed to by the increased tension between employers and workers.
In 1919 workers had been granted extensive social welfare and wage rights in the German Constitution and the Stinnes-Leginen agreement. By the early ‘20s the employers had come to regret allowing these rights as they saw their profits decrease to pay unemployment insurance and health care costs.
These feelings came to a head in 1928 following the passing of the Unemployment Insurance Act, when the iron and steel industry in the Ruhr locked out 260,000 workers in a protest against compulsory arbitration in wage disputes. This highlighted the vast gap between workers and employers in Germany, and consequently many workers joined the KPD or the SPD, while industry gave increased support to the DNVP, questioning the levels of support for democracy in Weimar.
Between 1919 and the Golden Age, there was little change in the attitudes of the intelligentsia, the elite and the Reichswehr. The industrialists and businessmen, most of whom were already deeply conservative, tended even more towards the right with many supporting the DNVP and a few supporting the NSDAP, mainly as a result of the unsuccessful Ruhr lockout and the welfare legislation. The leaders of the Reichswehr and the landowners, in particular the Prussian Junkers, all of whom were traditionally right-wing became even more so in response to the loss of influence and lack of authoritarianism. The civil servants, judges and some teachers especially in Universities also moved towards the right.
To counter this exodus, a number of teachers, churchmen and newspaper editors and writers attempted to stir up a pro-democratic attitude in the general populace.
The overall move to the right in the pillars of Weimar society showed clearly that the German Republic was failing many of it’s most influential inhabitants, undermining the arguments for the Golden Age.
Possibly the single most important act in the undermining of the Golden Age concept was the election of the Prussian Junker, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as president of the German Republic. Following the death of the President Ebert of the SPD in 1924 elections were held. In the first round of these the results were as follows:
Due to the fact that none of the candidates held a majority, a second round of voting was held on the 26th of April. For the second round, the SPD candidate, Braun, withdrew encouraging SPD members to vote for the Centrum’s Marx aiming to unite the left, however the KPD’s leader Ernst Thaelmann refused to stand down. The one major addition was Paul von Hindenburg, standing for the DNVP and attempting to unite the Right-wing of Germany.
Hindenburg, one of the originators of the “stab in the back” myth, an open opponent of democracy and one time military ruler of the German Reich was declared President of the German Republic after asking permission of the former Crown Prince of Germany. It was a potent omen for the beginning of the end for Weimar democracy.
The Stresemann Era in Foreign Relations
Gustav Stresemann
Gustav Stresemann was born in 1878 and brought up in Berlin, studying economics at university. He was attracted to both liberalism and German nationalism and was elected to the Reichstag in 1907 as a member of the National Liberal party.
By the outbreak of war Stresemann was a competent politician speaking for the war as well as unrestricted submarine warfare, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and against the Peace motion of 1917. His assertive and pro-war attitude earned him the moniker “Ludendorff’s Young Man”.
Following the war, Stresemann became the leader of the moderate right Germany Peoples Party (DVP). Initially opposed to the new republic and favouring a constitutional monarchy similar to Britain, Stresemann moved the DVP to a more pro-democracy stance viewing the Republic as better then a Socialist or Nationalist dictatorship.
In August 1923, Stresemann became the Chancellor of a coalition featuring the SPD, DDP, Centrum and DVP. During this time Stresemann made a major contribution to the resolution of the Hyperinflation Crisis, and was rewarded with subsequent positions as Foreign Minister in all the Governments until his death in 1929.
Stesemann’s main policy aims were outlined in a private letter to the former German Crown Prince, and included the remilitariasation of the Rhineland, the alteration of Germany’s Eastern borders and to re-establish Germany as one of the Great European Powers.
During his time in office Stresemann also signed the Treaty of Locarno; ratifying Germany’s Western borders; built up trade agreements with Britain, America, France and the USSR, and gained Germany a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations, effectively reintegrating Germany with the rest of Europe.
He received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1926
The European Context
Following the First World War, Britain, France and America were all initially hostile towards Germany, however only the French hostility remained by 1924.
America saw Germany as a valuable trading partner and used the Dawes Plan and a loans scheme to rebuild the German economy for America’s benefit.
Britain was also willing to support the restoration of the German economy in order that Germany could pay the reparations and be used as a trading partner in Europe. Many British politicians also saw a strong Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Communism and the so-called “Red Menace”.
France was hostile towards Germany, and many politicians on the French right wanted to see the Allies occupy Germany permanently. By 1924, this had mellowed to a desire to keep Germany’s military at a level at which France could never be threatened again and saw the economic overhaul as a step towards rearmament.
The only major power in Europe that Germany was able to enjoy an open relationship with was the USSR. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Allies were unwilling to treat with Russia, who was refused entry to the League of Nations. By signing the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 Russia and Germany established trading rights and agreed to allow German military units to be trained in Russia.
The Progress of Stresemann’s Policies
Stresemann’s first major contribution to the Weimar politics was his work on the Dawes Plan. He realised that Germany needed to form trade agreements with Britain, France and America in order to rebuild the German economy. Stresemann also realised that the economic policy had to be closely linked to the foreign policy in order to build up better relationships with the Allies.
The most important treaty signed during the Stresemann era was the Locarno Pact, signed with Britain, France, Belgium and Italy, in 1925. Locarno was a reinforcement of Germany’s Western borders, as set out in the Treaty of Versailles, resigning Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen and Malmedy to French and Belgian rule. The consequence of this was to reassure France that Germany had no further desire to expand to the west. In addition to this, all five signatories also agreed to renounce armed force except in self-defence reassuring Germany against further French incursions.
As part of the Locarno Pact, non-violence agreements were signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia, however no agreement was made regarding the borders that these two countries shared with Germany.
In 1926, Stresemann signed the Treaty of Berlin with the USSR and saw Germany gain a permanent seat on the League of Nations Council. The Treaty of Berlin built upon the Treaty of Rapallo, allowing more trade and further military agreements. It was also a valuable tool for Stresemann, who used it to put pressure on the Allies, who feared a close relationship developing between Germany and Russia.
The membership of the League of Nations was a minor coup for Stresemann, as it saw Germany recognised as one of the Great Powers of the world and gave them the power to veto League decisions, including those regarding reparations and other German issues.
Stresemann was also able to persuade the Allies to leave German territory, starting the call for cessation of passive resistance during the French invasion of the Ruhr, convincing the French to leave. This was repeated in 1924 with the Locarno Pact, which resulted in a portion of the troops occupying the Rhineland to be withdrawn. Finally, the last of the Allied troops were withdrawn following the Young Plan in 1929. This was one of Stresemann’s main policy aims, and unfortunately was only achieved after his death.
The Young Plan was Stresemann’s final major piece of policy before his death in 1929. Under the plan, Germany was allowed participate in the negotiations for the first time and the overall amount of the reparations was lowered from 132,000 Million Marks to 37,000 Million Marks to paid over 58 years. In addition to this the Allied control of the Germany state bank, railways and customs was to cease and the remaining Allied troops stationed in the Rhineland were to be removed.
Stresemann: Good European or Great German?
Since the end of the Second World War, the true intentions of Gustav Stresemann have been debated many times, however the ultimate question remains was Stresemann aiming to help Europe or restore Germany to her pre-war glory?
In the post-war period, many historians opted for the former, using Stresemann’s support for Locarno, the Treaty of Berlin and policy of fulfilment (later called Stresemannpolitik by the NSDAP) as major steps in the path to a new and co-operative Europe.
In contrast to this, current historical thinking and evidence supports Stresemann’s nationalist aims. Evidence for this includes Stresemann’s awareness of Seeckt’s rearmament policy and a letter to Crown Prince Wilhelm Hohenzollern, the son of Kaiser Wilhelm the Second of Germany, which outlines Stesemann’s underlying policies. The letter runs: “In my opinion there are three great tasks that confront German policy in the more immediate future –
In the first place the solution of the Reparations question in a sense tolerable for Germany, and the assurance of peace, which is an essential premise for the recovery of our strength.
Secondly, the protection of Germans abroad, those 10 to 12 millions of our kindred who now live under a foreign yoke in foreign lands.
The third great task is the readjustment of our eastern frontiers; the recovery of Danzig, the Polish corridor, and a correction of the frontier in Upper Silesia…
The most important thing for the first task of German policy mentioned above is, the liberation of German soil from any occupying force. We must get the stranglehold off our neck.”
This source clearly shows that Stresemann was determined to free the Rhineland from Allied occupation, remove the reparations burden, redefine Germany’s eastern borders and allow those Germany who had be exiled from Germany by Versailles to return. As a basis for a foreign policy, it is clearly highly nationalistic and many historians have pointed out similarities between the Stresemann policy and the Hitler foreign policy (with the obvious exception of Lebensraum).
