The result, in April 1961, was a disaster which reflected badly upon the Americans, and Kennedy in particular, and boosted Castro's reputation in equal measure. In the Bay of Pigs some landing craft were wrecked by the coral reefs; the initial CIA air strike failed to destroy all the Cuban planes; contrary to intelligence reports the local population did not flock to support the invasion; those troops not killed in the assault were quickly rounded up by the 20,000 strong Cuban army.
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco Castro relied on the Soviets more than ever. US covert operations continued with propaganda, plans to assassinate Castro and raids which were carried out in 1962. In such circumstances it is not surprising that Castro agreed, in May 1962, to allow Soviet missiles to be stationed in Cuba.
Why did Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba?
Since America's protective attitude towards her own 'backyard' was well known, Khrushchev's reasons for placing missiles in Cuba remain puzzling. The Soviets' own insistence upon having friendly states on their borders caused them to crush the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, and both superpowers appeared to accept the unwritten rule of spheres of influence, which was why the Americans did nothing to help the Hungarians.
Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs in 1971 that he acted to protect Cuba (Source F)
However, an equally likely explanation is that he saw an opportunity to off set America's nuclear superiority and to equalise her strength, by placing cheaper short and medium range missiles in Cuba. This would have doubled the effectiveness of a Soviet nuclear attack upon 1 USA but at limited expense.
Other factors included:
- Khrushchev's need for a major success foreign policy to strengthen his personal position in the Soviet Union and abroad.
- The Soviet leader had already tried bluff and threats over Berlin and showed a tendency take risks.
- He thought Kennedy was a young a inexperienced opponent, whose weakness could be exploited.
The thirteen days
The first missiles arrived in Cuba in September 1962. Since the Soviet Union had always placed nuclear missile sites within her own borders, the American government was slow to realise the danger. It was French intelligence sources m alerted the new head of the CIA, who was honeymoon in Paris. He demanded a U2 flight of Cuba and finally got one on 14 October. The photographs provided clear evidence of the missile sites, which ended any hopes that Khrushchev h of fooling the Americans. The sites were not camouflaged in any way, because the Soviet technicians sent to do the job followed exactly 1 same procedures as they used at home, who camouflage was unnecessary. The clear evidence missiles pointed at American cities and an estimated 80 million people shook the government.
Timeline
16 October: Kennedy was informed. He then set up the Executive Committee (Excomm) to deal with the crisis. The Excomm met daily. They decided against negotiating with Moscow as it would be too slow. Kennedy did, however, use his brother, Bobby, as a contact with the Soviet ambassador in Washington.
17 October Kennedy got Khrushchev's assurance that he had no intentions of installing missiles in Cuba
20 October: Having decided against a full scale invasion, or an air strike, both of which would cause Soviet casualties and likely lead to war, Kennedy decided on a naval blockade around Cuba. This would prevent Soviet ships, known to be carrying missiles, from reaching Cuba. It also forced Khrushchev to make-the next move.
22 October: Kennedy addressed the nation on television, announcing the discovery of the missile sites and his decision to impose a blockade. The news stunned the world.
23 October: A blockade zone around Cuba was established. Americans waited for the Soviet response.
24 October: To everyone's relief the Soviet ships stopped before reaching the blockade. Those thought to be carrying nuclear warheads turned
back. However the missiles in Cuba still had to be removed and there was no guarantee that nuclear warheads had not got through already.
26 October: Kennedy received the first letter from Khrushchev in which he said he would remove the missiles, if Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba.
27 October: A second letter arrived. This took a tougher line and demanded that US missiles in Turkey be removed as well. To which letter should they respond? During the discussions news reached Washington that a U2 plane had been shot down over Cuba and the pilot killed. Tensions were high. Military commanders recommended an air strike on Monday, followed by invasion. Only the President continued o urge caution. His brother suggested a way out of the dilemma was to answer the first letter, as if the second had not been received. They accepted Khrushchev's offer but, through the Soviet ambassador, Kennedy issued a strong warning of the consequences if it was rejected. He also promised that the missiles in Turkey would be dismantled, but insisted that this would remain an informal and secret agreement.
28 October: Khrushchev accepted and the crisis was over.
How dangerous was the crisis?
People at the time were very worried. Many thought a nuclear war was imminent. U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, appealed to both sides to do all they could to avoid the disaster of nuclear war. One Soviet general said: 'The slightest spark or false move by either side could have triggered a nuclear catastrophe."
It was a stark choice between co-existence and non-existence.
- Both superpowers were on full scale alert. The USA had over 50 bombers armed with nuclear warheads continuously in the air during the crisis. When one landed, another took off. In the event of a Soviet first strike, the bombers would have been able to deliver the US response. Nuclear missiles were also armed.
-
Though Kennedy had to consider the possibility that nuclear warheads were already in Cuba, he appears to have thought that, on balance, they were not and made decisions accordingly. It is now known that there were 9 short, and 36 medium range nuclear missiles all armed and ready in Cuba. When Robert McNamara, Defence Secretary and a member of the Excomm found this out in 1992, he was deeply shaken, knowing that they had been 24 hours away from launching an attack on the island.
-
The CIA thought there were 12,000-16,000 Soviet troops in Cuba during the crisis. In fact there were 42,000 and, if Washington had known, this would have raised tensions even further. -
-
The shooting down of the U2 came at the most critical point of the crisis, on 27 October, while the Excomm debated their response to Khrushchev. Such an act could have plunged both sides into war. It is still uncertain whether it was a Cuban or Soviet action but t possibility that the local Soviet commander would have been left in control of nuclear, missiles, if communications with Moscow bro down, was alarming for both superpowers.
How was the crisis defused?
Khrushchev made the mistake of challenge the Americans in the Caribbean, where the naval power proved decisive. Since he did not want a nuclear war, he had no alternative but allow his ships to turn back.
Both sides acted with restraint in their effort to avoid a nuclear war. The Americans did not react to the loss of the U2, nor did the Soviet react to the U2 flight over Siberia on the same day, nor to the US navy's action in forcing a Soviet submarine to the surface, near their blockade line. Both allowed their opponents to retreat without too much loss of face. Kennedy was careful not boast of victory, and paid tribute to Khrushchev `contribution to peace', while Khrushchev did n reveal the concession Kennedy secretly made over the missiles in Turkey.
Results
1 Within months of the crisis the missiles in both Turkey and Cuba were dismantled. Castro was furious and refused to allow the UN inspectors into Cuba to confirm that the missiles really had been dismantled, with the result that Kennedy refused to promise that the US would not invade Cuba. However agreements between the superpowers were honoured.
2 Kennedy's prestige was greatly enhanced. He had shown firm resolve in a crisis where his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, spoke of the two sides standing `eyeball to eyeball’. Kennedy had not blinked.
3 Khrushchev was criticised by China for being foolish enough to put the missiles into Cuba and then for backing down. However, in his memoirs, he took the view that in getting the missiles out of Turkey, and in protecting Cuba, he had achieved "a spectacular success without having to fire a single shot!"
4 Castro remained in power and a thorn in America's side.
5 The crisis demonstrated the dangers of forcing leaders to act under pressure of circumstance, without having time to reflect upon their decisions. It showed how both superpowers needed to avoid direct conflict, and how communications between them needed to be improved. This led to the hot-line - a direct telephone link established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963.
6 Having recognised that their possession of nuclear weapons led to stalemate between them in Cuba, the way was paved for better East-West relations. Nuclear weapons as a deterrent, became the main focus of the arms race after 1962.
The Cuban missile crisis led to arms control, firstly by the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which forbade atmospheric and underwater testing, though not underground tests. Later, in 1969, the superpowers agreed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The threat of a nuclear war in 1962 was frightening enough, but recent revelations show that, to some extent, the threat was avoided as much through good luck as sound judgement. As Robert Mc Namara said in 1992:
"The actions of all three parties were shaped by misjudgment, miscalculations, and misinformation."
The crisis may have contributed to Khrushchev's downfall in 1964, but it also promoted 'peaceful co-existence' and prepared the way for détente.