Among the policies of his austerity programme were moves to further the deflation of the German economy. He believed that creating a leaner economy was the best way to secure its growth in the international market. In spite of the Young Plan’s renegotiations, he said “only deflation would convince the world that Germany could not afford to pay reparations.” He cut expenditure, raised taxes and encouraged exports, seemingly forgetting the world-wide scale of the depression and the increasing use of protectionist policies by foreign markets. These unpopular moves simply made the German people poorer, and caused the economy to sink still lower, earning Brüning the nickname of ‘Hunger Chancellor’.
At the same time, despite Germany’s weakening position, Brüning’s foreign policy became increasingly assertive. Indeed, it appeared that his strong line on reparations paid off. In July 1931 the Hoover moratorium secured the suspension of reparations, which later would be ended all together. Furthermore, he campaigned for parity of disarmament for Germany, which would result in a turnaround from the rules laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. A disarmament Conference met in Geneva in February 1932, although parity was not achieved until that December, after Brüning had left office. Brüning had hoped that a stronger German economy would give it more leverage in the international world to achieve its aims, and even despite the failure of Brüning’s economic policy to improve the situation of both the German people and economy, his foreign policy was seemingly successful in persuading the Allies of his case. It seemed that Germany gained the attention of foreign nations under Brüning, yet this meant little to the German people, still struggling in growing poverty.
In 1932 Brüning proposed a series of land reforms in Prussia. They would result in the loss of land by the elite, including among others President Hindenburg himself. By May 1932, Hindenburg had resolved to dismiss him as Chancellor, further persuaded by the influential General von Schleicher. In Brüning’s place he appointed Franz von Papen, a monarchist and friend of the President, to form a non-party ‘national concentration’ government consisting solely of the German elite and aristocrats, ignoring the Reichstag’s deputies. From the outset Papen seemed to adopt anti-democratic policies, almost immediately lifting the ban on the SA. In June 1932, when the SPD-Z coalition that had led the Prussian Assembly since 1919 lost its majority, an event greeted by street violence, Papen used Article 48 to place the state under central federal control, suspending the assembly. Thus the SPD lost one of its last strongholds, and the German constitution was fundamentally undermined by an action that Hitler would later seize upon to justify his suspension of other state governments.
As well as dealing a severe blow to German democracy, Papen’s government increased the extremist vote in the Reichstag. A first election was held in July 1932, in which the Nazis and Communists between them gained half the seats in the Reichstag. Hitler subsequently demanded to be made Chancellor, but Hindenburg held a strong dislike for him and refused. The new Reichstag almost immediately voted no confidence in Papen, causing it to be dissolved in September 1932, sparking an election in November in which the Nazis lost 2 million votes, but the KPD made only gains. The situation looked desperate. Industrialists wanted Hitler appointed Chancellor, but Hindenburg considered that option unworkable. Papen hoped to form an authoritarian military government without the Reichstag, and option far too extreme for the President. Schleicher meanwhile, who had developed widespread support from both Trade Unions on the left, and the NSDAP on the right, eventually persuaded Hindenburg to appoint him Chancellor. Papen had seemed to have failed dramatically, and though his adoption of Brüning’s public works programme had seen unemployment just begin to fall, he had lost too much support to continue.
Schleicher was appointed in December 1932, and saw his best option as ‘taming’ the NSDAP to bring at least one extreme and all its supporters on-side. He set about doing this by appointing the Nazi deputy Gregor Strasser as his Vice-Chancellor. He also further developed land reform schemes despite their causing of the downfall of Brüning. His actions to gain the Nazis’ support however, seemed to lose him much credibility on the left. Furthermore, as had happened to Brüning before him, the elite turned against his land reform policies, warning Hindenburg against him. The revenge-seeking Papen was at the same time plotting the overthrow of Schleicher in favour of a Hitler-led government with Papen as Vice-Chancellor, a proposal taken up by Hindenburg’s son and trusted advisor, Oskar. It took little to persuade the President to sack Schleicher, and put Hitler in his place, which he did in January 1933. Though Schleicher had sought to gain enough support to rule Germany at least partly democratically, and appeared to begin bringing the extremes of the political spectrum into line and improve Germany’s economic situation, his focus on the right-wing and his past influence and role in the downfall of two Chancellors came back to haunt him.
Brüning, Papen and Schleicher all apparently failed in their roles as Chancellor. Whatever positive contributions they made seem to have been undermined by their failings. What was it that placed Hitler in the position to take over as Chancellor in January 1933? In 1930 the Nazis had held only a small minority in the Reichstag, yet by Hitler’s appointment were the largest party. What prospects did the NSDAP offer that led to their rapid expansion?
Since their rebirth in 1925, Hitler had sought to give organisation to the Nazis. They presented numerous centrally organised fronts, including most influentially the uniformed and apparently strong SA, membership of which had reached 500,000 in 1933. In a time of economic depression and weak ever-changing coalition governments, the growing SA in particular must have presented an attractive prospect of strength, unity and order, in the face of apparent chaos. This theme of strength and decisiveness was particularly furthered by Hitler’s own cult of personality. A forceful, determined public speaker, he brought the NSDAP closer to the people, offering them clear solutions. His audiences are described as having exclaimed “God be thanked, he understands!”
From 1930 onwards, the Nazis were able to draw support from their opposition to Müller as a widely perceived weak Chancellor, with an economic policy which failed because it was too liberal. While the Grand Coalition was torn down by infighting over welfare policy, the Nazis offered quite simply “work and bread.” As opposed to Müller’s gradual and conciliatory economic and foreign policies, Hitler’s Nazis protectionism and national economic policies, particularly attractive at a time when Germany seemed to have been brought down by a foreign economic crisis. These simple messages of basic support for the ordinary German struggling to survive, and a placing of the interests of Germany first, seemed to strike a chord with the public throughout the period from 1930-33.
All the NSDAP’s words were backed up by a consistent and focussed propaganda campaign. It sought not to promote abstract philosophies, but rather simple pragmatic messages on the plight of Germans. Furthermore it ridiculed and undermined almost every other party active in German politics at the time. It targeted carefully selected sections of society, and spoke to them in a way that other more distant parties didn’t.
These tactics won them a great deal of electoral support, with every gain making them more and more credible. From 800,000 in 1928, their votes increased to 6.4 million in 1930 and 11.7 million in November 1932. In March 1932, Hitler had polled 37% in the Presidential election, though he failed to unseat Hindenburg. The Nazis fast became a party of government.
Clearly, the Nazis presented a strong and attractive option for government during a difficult period for Weimar democracy between 1930 and 1932. Yet by and large it was the same option they had presented since 1925. Little had changed in terms of policy, or indeed organisation. Why did the public suddenly pay so much attention to them, that they grew from fringe-party to government in just three years? The NSDAP was still, after all, and extremist party. It can only have been the successive failings of 4 coalition governments that led the German electorate to turn to the Nazis as a last resort, and take up their message.
Müller, for all his good intentions, was seen as too weak to rule, the infighting of his coalition losing him support. Brüning’s economic policies were a catastrophe for ordinary Germans, and it is little surprise that despite his progress in the international arena the public were put-off him by their worsening lot. Their support for extremists grew, although Brüning was eventually overthrown only by Hindenburg. Papen was from the outset a laughing stock. He restored the SA in an almost suicidal conciliation to his opponents, and consistently undermined what remained of the democratic process in Germany. He was soon replaced by Schleicher, who failed to make the most of his potential for a widespread support base, and was brought down by past enemies. Four successive Chancellors, and the actions of a President apparently far too easily influenced by those around him – the German elite and landowners in their opposition to land reform, and particularly his son Oskar and General von Schleicher – dug Weimar democracy and the German people with it into a pit so deep that the majority seem to have felt that only Hitler’s Nazis could pull them from it.
