Nevertheless, Haig had failed to test one of the vital components of his plan. He believed that the barbed wire, which littered “No-Man’s Land”, would be destroyed by shrapnel fired from the artillery. Haig should have experimented in England, as there was a lot of reliance resting on the belief that there would be no barbed wire left; consequently, the shrapnel failed to cut through the wire. This is one of the very few factors which Haig should take the blame for.
Moreover, many historians believe that Haig was responsible for confusion and inaccuracy shrouding the plan, when actually many senior ranking officials within the British Army had disagreements about this offensive. Rawlinson, didn’t think that the aim should be for a breakthrough on the first day, but instead he believed in a systematic “bite and hold” method, which Haig considered far too conservative. Haig was right to have planned a breakthrough strategy, as a more conservative approach to the offensive allows the Germans time to gather resources. Certainly, Haig should have imposed himself more onto the other Generals than he truly did and make his strategy, above all, comprehensible to everyone involved with this offensive.
But ultimately, Haig failed to challenge Rawlinson about the infamous “walking order”. This allowed the Germans to have valuable time, in which they could rise out of their bunkers and prepare their weapons for the approaching British troops. General Haig had ultimate responsibility as Commander in Chief, yet he did not disagree with Rawlinson’s decision. Haig believed that Rawlinson knew best as an Infantryman, not a Cavalryman like himself. There is proof that running through “No-Man’s Land” would have been successful, as French troops rushed across and they succeeded all their objectives for the first day.
However, the walking order was vital in maintaining order and discipline along the 15 miles of front line. Many of the soldiers were conscripts, and so lacked the necessary training and experience to run across. If they had adopted a Blitzkrieg type of strategy then there would have been confusion and disorder throughout the Somme region; because bulges would form, leaving themselves flanked by the enemy, and then eventually they would be slaughtered. This is exactly what occurred two miles south of Beaumont Hamel, when the 36th Ulster Division ran to the German’s line creating a bulge. Some may argue that Haig was to blame for the decision to walk; even so this method retained structure in this offensive which was imperative, especially when the headquarters was about 100 miles away.
Understandably, Haig was lacking vital French troops who were defending Verdun. This meant that their forces fighting in the Somme region were stretched. Without these troops from the French Army, who were better trained and had more of the heavy artillery, a breakthrough on the first day would be very hard to achieve. I, along with many others, believe that General Haig can not be blamed for this problem.
Morale was a fundamental part towards success, without it men would have lacked the will to fight. Therefore British troops were often told that “not a rat would be alive after the bombardment”, and it would just be a “walk in the park”. Many believe that Haig was responsible for creating these false accusations, which led to thousands of men going joyfully over the top just to go to their death instead, as if they were lied to by Haig. But Haig never used these expressions himself, although he thought that it was essential to keep morale high.
Haig is usually identified to have been accountable for the series of events on the first day which ultimately gave the Germans valuable time to exploit. For example, Hawthorn Mine was exploded ten minutes before “zero hour” and the artillery stopped two minutes before 7.30am. Many people believe that these were merely telegraphs of the forthcoming British advancement, pre-planned by Haig. But General Hunter-Western gave the order to detonate the mines earlier than what was previously decided by Haig himself. Furthermore, the two minute delay between the end of the bombardment and “zero hour” was used to ensure that the artillery didn’t hit British troops, especially as it was hard to synchronise every watch along the 15 mile stretch of trenches.
Furthermore, if a creeping barrage had been used the Germans would have been forced to stay in their dug-outs, leaving little if no enemy resistance at all. However Haig was justified in his decision not to employ a creeping barrage strategy, because a lot of time is needed to train for such technique in order that it works effectively. Haig neither had the time nor strong quality of soldiers to perfect this strategy, due to pressure from the politicians. In addition, many people have the opinion that the offensive should have been launched earlier in the day, i.e. at dawn. This would have given the troops valuable cover, as they were easily seen during the day time. However, an attack during the dark would have meant that the ill-experienced soldiers would have lost structure in their attack, consequently causing more problems.
Haig is most notably criticised for continually sending in successive waves of British soldiers, even though the first wave had been a complete failure. However, Haig had received varied reports about the progress, and he didn’t have any knowledge of how close they were to breaking through the German line. He hoped that soon they would be successful. If Haig had decided to abandon the offensive then the deaths caused by the first wave would definitely have been in vain. Understandably, the majority of people were shocked by the massive losses during the Battle of the Somme, whereas Haig thought differently. However in a war of attrition the Allies had the advantage, as their combined populations were great enough to allow such losses, while the Germans could not afford similar losses.
Personally, I consider the Somme was a success, as the utmost aim was to distract German forces from Verdun, thereby saving the French from surrendering. Furthermore, to base one’s opinion about General Haig on the first day of a four month campaign is unjust. Undoubtedly, the approach taken by the majority of senior officers was too liberal. Nevertheless, I consider Rawlinson and the politicians to be at blame just as much as Haig, because the politicians forced the offensive to be launched prematurely and Rawlinson created an offensive which he wanted, not Haig. However, Haig had failed to seize a firm command over this offensive and Rawlinson.
However, ultimately I consider that it was the failure of the artillery bombardment which caused there to be no breakthrough on the first day. If the bombardment worked as well as previously intended, then a considerable amount of enemy territory would have been gained. There was no possibility that Haig could have ensured that the fuses were not faulty and that more heavy artillery was present. Therefore, I believe that Haig shouldn’t solely take the blame for the failure to breakthrough on the first day.
