social groups, workers and peasants, or urban dwellers and rural dwellers. Economic
liberalisation has created a new, much documented ‘middle class’, that many writers hold to
be the driving force behind democratisation. Reform has also affected the stature and
personal efficacy of the original groups. First I will look at how the workers situations have
changed and how they have reacted, next I will do the same with the farmers, and then I will
try to discover where the new middle class has come from and investigate what their
interests are.
Before reform, workers in the city seriously considered themselves the leading class,
and they had good reason to. Their jobs were secure, they were highly paid, highly
respected, and received many fringe benefits such as pensions and insurance. Workers had
‘the iron rice bowl’. Reform worsened their situation because with many industries trying to
cut down on costs, some workers lost their jobs. Even those that have kept their job have
suffered with inflation lowering their real income due to wages being fixed in most industries
where the state plays a part. A 1990 survey of Tianjin shows that contrary to urban regions
throughout the world, workers in this urban region lack personal efficacy, have little faith in
their ability ‘to get ahead’, and are closed to new or different opinions. Ironically the
frustration of workers led them to protest against economic reform with the students in
Tiananmen Square who were protesting political stagnation.
One group of people not complaining in Tiananmen were the farmers. Although
they’re a long way from comfortable, the peasants gained a lot from the reforms. Before the
1980’s peasants were banned from ‘trespassing’ in the cities, they farmed in unpopular and
inefficient communes and could only sell crops to the government at a price the government
dictated. Peasants received none of the benefits that workers enjoyed. According to
Bernstein, some lived below the poverty line, most just above it, and they were not listened
to by the government for fear of the mass enthusiasm of urban workers people being
damped. Considering it was the peasants that provided the support for the CCP in the first
instance, and that nearly 80% of the country lived in rural areas, Deng considered rural
reform a priority. First he raised the procurement prices, then he dismantled the communes
and let families lease land for a long period of time. Later he allowed controlled buying and
selling of leases so that the most efficient farmers could control more land and hire help from
surplus labour nearby. The rest of the surplus labour freed up was allowed to find
temporary work in the city although they were not allowed to permanently reside there. This
created yet another new class in China, that of the migrants. Migrants had little job security
and often lived in depressing conditions in the city but they were only there to raise a little
extra money for the household and could go back at any time to the farm.
Little has been said yet of the new middle class. That is because it draws from both
urban and rural areas and is divided itself. The first people to take advantage of a more
relaxed government line on production quotas in rural areas started to find themselves being
able to sell grain to the government at the increased price as mentioned, but also surplus
grain or other produce could be sold without much restriction on the local free market
(which was sometimes an even higher price). Small villages began trading each others
surpluses and the people making money became up to 5.9% richer than those who were not
(according to an investigation by China Quarterly). In the city some of the people who lost
their jobs or who had long been waiting for some freedom to do what they wanted began
polishing shoes at the street corner or selling newspapers. Of these people, G. Barme and
L. Jaivin said ‘Perhaps a new force is gathering, an energy that can be directed towards
social change. We must not underestimate them’. But these ‘owner-operators’ are not the
only category that should be included in this new force. Besides managers of state
companies who effectively became capitalists by default, David Goodman also defines
‘suburban executives’ and money middle-men as components of the new rich in China.
Suburban executives he says are those who were able to put together the technical know-
how gained by living close to the city, with the decollectivisation of rural reform. Industry in
these areas has become very flexible and usually consists of a mixture of agriculture markets,
and manufacturing plants or even large factories. Goodman also identifies wheelers and
dealers as those who had some money saved up and suddenly became much in demand as
banks started offering interest rates and businesses started looking for investors.
It is the emergence of this middle class that leads many commentators to predict and
indeed to recommend democratisation in China. They argue that the new social classes
need to vent their opinions and the only way they can do that is by voting for an alternative
party at an open election. This is perhaps oversimplified but is that not what arguing for
democracy amounts to? Two such commentators are White and McCormick. White thinks
that a gradual transition via an authoritarian government would be less likely to cause
political unrest. McCormick argues that taking this route would lead to unnecessary risks
and would not be as safe as White believes. Both these writers agree that these new social
forces cannot be suppressed, in fact that by trying to suppress them will only increase
tensions between state and society. White’s transitional approach though suggests that
governments control over society could be loosened to encourage the build up of social
pressures to a point where democracy would be demanded. He argues that at present,
there are not enough people interested or able enough to make a democracy of any sort
work. That most people in China ‘would be disenfranchised, in reality if not in form’. He
makes perfectly clear though that an authoritarian regime should be a temporary measure
when he talks of ‘the erosion of the legitimacy of state, the CCP, and the current
leadership’.
McCormick objects to White’s assertion that China is not ready for democracy
right now (or at least in 1993). For him democratisation cannot happen soon enough and he
regards the route through authoritarianism as was used by the Asian ‘tiger economies’ as a
bad model to follow. For these countries he says, the international climate was such that
they had a lot of backing from developed countries that China would not enjoy now. I think
the last 7 years have shown though that institutions like the WTO and western countries in
general have done their best to accommodate China and help her on her way to
Democracy. McCormick then raised the question of how difficult would it be to go from an
authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. He raises several objections to White’s
‘guarantees’ that democracy will follow authoritarianism. He points out several examples
including Argentina, Peru, and Chile where this practice has been tried and failed. He
rejects the theory that once China’s GDP grows to $5000 per capita, dictatorship would be
impossible, by pointing put that this would not happen in China until 2008. This is a long
enough wait but when one considers China’s economic slowdown over the past 7 years this
becomes a very effective argument.
In fact it is this slowdown that leads many journalists today to write persuasive
accounts of why China has reached the point where it must democratise to avoid collapse.
There is so much social tension in China now that according to a taiwan website
(taiwansecurity.org) the government admitted in 1999 that in the previous year there were
5000 collective protests. The problem perhaps unsurprisingly is one that McCormick
predicted, that the current crop of leaders just don’t want to let go. According to the
Economist, there are officials in China who whisper to foreigners that they realise change is
necessary, and that the NPC is testing out powers of holding the government to account.
There have also been experiments with local elections in many rural areas throughout China.
The problem is though that they may only be experiments, and that candidate’s are always
vetted by the party before being allowed to stand. The same article however points out that
there are a lot of politician ‘wannabees’ in China. It gives the example of a Beijing province
in 1981, where 10,000 candidates were nominated for 316 seats. This would seem to
contradict White’s argument that Chinese people would not have time to vote. The general
trend is one of diminishing totalitarianism - from Mao to Deng to Jiang - and this trend is
likely to continue in 2002 when Jiang retires. There are a lot of people among the leaders
that one would think do want to take the government towards a more open and accountable
way of working that would perhaps eventually result in democracy. In addition to this there
is an intense international pressure that cannot be ignored. China has been very
accommodating in it’s attempts to join the WTO, especially with their quick ‘forgive and
forget’ of the bombing in Belgrade in April last year. Perhaps if the west continues to
recommend democracy and help the CCP control over a smooth transition (which may
include some financial help), then everyone can benefit from a strong, stable China in the
future in the same way that they gain now from the U.S.
Word count: 2002
Bibliography
Governing China - Kenneth Lieberthal
The new rich in Asia - David Goodman’s entry
The Paradox of China’s Post Mao Reform - entries by M. White, T. Bernstein D.
Solinger, D. Goodman, and K. Parris
Democratisation and Economic Reform - G. White
Democracy or Dictatorship - B. McCormick
The Economist web edition - search for Chinese democracy
Various other websites
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