After having had looked at the factual cause of death, the legal cause must be taken into consideration, which consists of two factors. The first being that the defendants act must be a substantial cause of death as explained in Cato 1976 and later emphasised in Kimsey 1971 where it was decided that, the contribution must be ‘more than a minimal’ cause of death. The second factor being that no intervening act had broken the chain of causation, because the conduct at the beginning of the chain far outweighed any other events, which may have taken place, after the original act had occurred. Clearly, the courts consider the legal cause very closely when dealing with the requirement of causation.
The chain of causation itself consists of various categories, which suggest that the act in question wasn’t the reason why the victim had died but did so due to the fault of an intervening act and therefore pass on the blame. The first being that the chain had broken by a third party, which can be explained via previous cases which have come before court with this defence. The case of Pagett 1983 where a police officer had been involved in a dispute and had fired back at the defendant as self defence but unfortunately shot the victim who was being used as a human shield by the defendant. The courts suggested that the third parties conduct in this case was foreseeable and therefore the defendant could still be held liable and therefore charged with manslaughter, as the chain of causation had not been broken. Goff LJ concluded that ‘if a reasonable act of self defence against the act of the accused causes the death of a third party, there was no reason in principle why the act being involuntary should relieve accused of the criminal responsibility.’
A further influential case in terms of causation would be that of Malcherek and Steel 1981 where the courts concluded that the victim’s wounds were ‘substantial and operating’ and therefore the attack itself was the cause of death, consequently resulting in the conviction of murder being upheld. It’s clear that the courts look at the event that started the chain of causation very closely and try to establish whether the attack in itself was the substantial cause of death, if so, then clearly the defence must accept liability. This is one of the many ways that the courts have approached the requirement of causation.
Another form of defence, which is pleaded under the chain of causation, is that where the victim himself breaks the chain of causation by causing himself harm.
It was applied in Roberts 1971 where it was made clear by the courts that the victim’s action was rational as any other reasonable person may of jumped out of a moving vehicle if it was made apparent that they maybe under threat. Therefore, the fact that the victim jumped out of the vehicle could not be considered as being a novus actus intervenien, and so the defendant would still be held liable for the death.
In Daley 1980, It was stated by Lord Keith that the prosecution had to establish that the victim was in fear of being physically hurt and it was this fear that had caused him to try and escape and consequently meet his death. It was made clear that the conduct had to be of an unlawful nature and also one which any reasonable person would forsee as having risk of some harm.
Williams 1992 outlines the same defence as it also was brought forward to court claiming that the chain of causation had been broken, due to the fact that the victim had tried to cause himself harm. The courts came to the conclusion having had looked at the evidence that the defendants were liable for the death of the victim because it was their act that the victim had felt the need to jump out of the car and die as a result. However, on appeal it was stressed that the conduct of the victim had to be ‘proportionate to the threat of harm and within the ambit of reasonableness’. Not so ‘daft’ in making his own voluntary act one which later can be seen as a novus actus intervenien and consequently break the chain of causation. It was this emphasis made by the trial judge, which lead to the case to be quashed as he had failed to direct the jury in an appropriate manor. The final principle gained from this case was that a ‘victim may in the agony of the moment do the wrong thing’ and so it should be taken into consideration.
A form of defence, which is often used by the accused, is that where it is felt that the medical treatment given had been inadequate and as a result the victim had died. The case of Jordan 1956 illustrates this point as it has been the only case where the courts have accepted that the medical staff where at fault and had broken the chain of causation due to their act being insufficient. The staff had been giving the victim a drug which he was clearly allergic to, it had been withdrawn by later introduced by another conclusively the victim died eight days after having been admitted into hospital. It was clear when the post mortem examination was carried out that the treatment had been the ‘direct and immediate cause of death’ and not the actual conduct, which had initiated the chain of causation. Although, however it is evident that even though the courts have decided to give way and hold the medical staff liable for the death that they will continue to be reluctant to apply the principles established from this case to others unless, the facts are impressively identical.
This decision was put forward and illustrated in the case of Smith 1959 where the accused had also used the same defence but unfortunately, the courts refused to accept that the doctors act had broken the chain of causation even though they had displayed unsatisfactory behaviour when treating the victim. In this case, the courts claimed that the original wound was operating and a substantial cause’ at the time of death and therefore the defendant would still be held liable. Its clear that the courts still remain bias towards the medical profession mainly because of policy issues and the idea of not wanting to lower the respect that the general public have for such people.
The general rule has always been that the accused ‘must take the victim as they may find them’, and if it means that the victim refuses to accept treatment as in the case of Blaue 1975 the defence may try to put forward this argument of a break in chain of causation, but with little success as courts havent generally
Public policy – medical conditions (take your victim as you find them)
Where he aggravates his condition/refuses treatment
