It is also considered unforeseeable that the victim that the victim might try to escape. Where in the case of Pitts 1942: the defendant was held to be responsible for his death when he jumped into a river to escape further violent assaults. Also in the case of Mackie 1973, a father frightened his 3 year old son so severely that the child fell down the stairs and was killed. In another case, Williams 1992: the prosecution claimed that the deceased had jumped from a moving car because he was in fear of being robbed. It was alleged that his wallet had flown into the air as he had jumped. The victim was travelling to a festival and had ‘hitched’ a lift from the defendants. He then jumped out 5 miles further on and was killed. The occupants were held liable originally for the death of the victim, but appealed. The Court Of Appeal stressed that the conduct of the victim had to be impartial to the threat of harm and the conviction thus was quashed, as the trail judge had not directed the jury in this fashion.
It is foreseeable that others might be involved in the death, like for example in the case of Benge 1865, where the victims might already have a pre-existing medical condition and refuse treatment. Or that they themselves might aggravate their injuries. In the case of Holland 1841, the victims hand was severely cut by Holland, who attacked him with an iron bar. Blood poisoning occurred and the victim was advised to have his finger amputated, however, he refused to do so and developed lockjaw and died. The defendant was found guilty of his murder.
In the case of Dear 1996, this is another case that shows where victims might aggravate their injuries: the victim indecently assaulted Dear’s 12 year old daughter and the defendant later attacked him and slashed him with a Stanley knife. The victim died two days later from the wounds but apparently had done nothing to staunch the flow of blood. It was suggested that he reopened hid wounds himself. Despite this, the defendant’s conviction was upheld. The Court Of Appeal stressed that the question to be asked of the jury was if the injuries inflicted by the defendant were ‘an operating and significant cause of his death’. It’s also possible for doctors to switch off life support machines like in the case of Malcherek and Steel 1981: Where the two appellants had injured their victims so severely that they had to put on life support machines. When these machines were switched off by doctors, the defendants tried to claim that this action constituted a novus actus interveniens. Their appeals failed because there was no doubt that the original injuries inflicted by the stab wounds were still operating.
A novus actus interveniens is a new a intervening act which completely independent and is in itself so strong in causing the victim’s death that the original defendant’s acts are insignificant. This would have occurred for example in the case of Jordan 1956, but such cases are rare which shows here that it can be difficult for a defendant to prove a novus actus interveniens which has to relevant. The victim had been stabbed; he was admitted to hospital but died eight days later. The defendant was convicted of murder. Later, evidence came to light that the medical treatment had been ‘palpably wrong’. This showed that the victim had been given terrmycin, to which he had proved allergic. It had been withdrawn but inadvertently reintroduced later by another doctor. The broncho- pneumonia had set in where as on the other hand at the time of this death, the stab wounds had nearly healed. The conviction therefore was quashed.
From looking at the cases, it can be seen as difficult to prove that a novus actus interveniens had arisen. In cases where the intervening act seems to substantial and the negligence of the third party is of a high degree. This can sometimes still prove to be difficult in order for a defendant to prove that the chain of causation has been broken.
Does the voluntary act of the third party interrupt or break the chain of causation between the voluntary act of the accused and the resulting death? Again, legal responsibility is often imposed, in the context of interpersonal relationships, on those who influence others by advising, encouraging, helping, permitting, coercing, deceiving, misinforming or providing opportunities to others that motivate or enable them to act in a way that is harmful to themselves or to others. In some cases (coercion, deceit) the persons held responsible would naturally be said to have caused the persons influenced to act as they did, while in others they would not, though the weaker interpersonal relationship is in some respects analogous to more plainly causal relationships. Failing to help or provide opportunities to others by advising, warning, informing or rescuing them or supplying them with agreed goods and services are other grounds of responsibility for negative agency that, again, are at least analogous to causal relationships. The existence of this wide spectrum of causal or near-causal grounds of responsibility recognized in law and morality raises the question whether any uniform theory of causation is capable of accounting for all of them