Compare two theories each of two of the following phenomena: a) Out-of-the-body experiences b) Near-death-experiences c) Déjà vu - Do such experiences provide a serious challenge to materialism?

Compare TWO theories Each of TWO of the following phenomena: a) Out-of-the-body experiences b) Near-death-experiences c) Déjà vu. Do such experiences provide a serious challenge to materialism?

Introduction

What does it mean to say that the world around us is ‘real’? Is it because we make complex judgements with our minds about the physical aspects and their relations that everything seems real? Perhaps our minds aren’t even here. Perhaps we’re just a physical exterior whose mind and soul is floating around endlessly in time and space.

By observing theories put forward for the déjà vu and out-of-the-body experience (phenomena which occur to the present day), I will hope to show that, far from being ‘spiritual’ and ‘parapsychological’, these phenomena can be better understood by observing psychological mechanisms that are testable. This will allow me to demonstrate the extent to which phenomena such as these, can seriously challenge the ideas of those that place faith in the doctrine that nothing but matter exists, denying the independent existence of spirit.

Out-of-the-body experience (OBE)

An OBE is marked out by the perception that a person’s locus of awareness has separated from their physical body. Factors leading to it are, relaxation and reduced sensory input, though drugs such as LSD are said to induce similar out-of-body feelings.

Loss of input control

Susan Blackmore (1986) claims that what we know as being ‘out there’ is because our senses construct models of the world with ourselves in it, through our minds (‘models of reality’). We understand these models as ‘real’ and the thoughts that we have as ‘unreal’ (daydreams, fantasies etc). However, what is real depends on which ‘model of reality’ the brain uses to represent the world. By comparing the models available at a given time, the brain chooses the most stable one to represent ‘reality’.

In our waking life, the most stable model we have is through our senses. That’s why everything around us seems real. However, as we fall asleep, this model becomes unstable and another, more stable, ‘memory model’ comes into play. At this point, everything seems real relative to this model, such as fantasies and imagery.

This could explain OBEs. After the phase of losing the sensory model, an individual may question what is going on. They’ll attempt to recall their memory of what happened, reconstructing incidents. It’s as if they’re receiving memory input when previously they were receiving sensory input. Therefore, a memory model of reality has taken over whereby things are observed from a birds-eye view, as with normal everyday memory. The OBE is then just our memories ‘in action’.

Supporting this idea, Irwin (1986) and Blackmore (1987) found that people dreaming as spectators have more OBEs, as well as those who can easily switch viewpoints in their imagination. This supports the idea that those constantly using birds-eye views are more likely to have OBEs.

The mental dream world

Stephen LaBerge (1985) proposed a theory where input is lost from the sense organs, at the onset of sleep, (directly from waking into REM sleep) while consciousness is retained. The mind is active in both states but when awake, sensory input is processed from the external world. However, when in REM sleep (dreaming), the mind creates a mental model unrelated to sensory input. When we dream, we experience ourselves in a body like the ‘real’ one. However, the senses that reside within our physical body when awake, telling us about our position in space, ...

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The mental dream world

In a way, the OBE is our mental dream world. This can explain why it feels like gravity has ceased and hence we float around. Rooms look the same as they did when awake because the brain judges where we are through memory. If we didn’t know that we’d fallen asleep, we would think we’re still in touch with the physical world and that the mind was departing from the body – the basis of astral theorists.

This theory has had support in the finding that frequent OBE reporting was related to frequent reporting of dreams. Also, there’s a growing body of data describing cognitive ‘maps’ operating at multiple levels of the CNS. Activating these maps supports conscious and perceptual activity when there’s no sensory input.

Loss of input control vs. The mental dream world

Both theories suggest that OBEs result when sensory input from the external environment and the body is lost; to be replaced by internally generated perceptual constructs. Blackmore mentions that fantasy/imagery becomes the stable model in OBEs and LaBerge talks about the mind creating a mental model without sensory input in dreaming. Although both theories mention the memory/mental aspect of the OBE, LaBerge emphasises the relation it has with the dream stage of sleep, i.e. REM sleep.

In Blackmore’s theory, a memory model takes over from the sensory model as it’s the best model available, and so observations are made with a birds-eye view. Similarly, LaBerge mentions sensory information being cut-off at REM sleep and so being liberated from the physical (waking) constraints, we float around taking up this birds-eye view.

Both theories make implications about what it is to be ‘real’. OBE experients mention OBEs as ‘too real to be a dream’. But what is it that makes the physical world ‘real’ and the dream world ‘unreal’? We only know what our senses tell us, and they tell us by constructing models with the mind. We have become so used to the physical world as being ‘real’ that when we experience OBEs, we don’t consider it to be a dream because of its realism. However, we must ask why it seems real. Why does anything ever seem real?

Blackmore sums by saying that the OBE is a peek into what’s in a person’s mind. Similarly, LaBerge talks of mental space - we never ‘leave the body’ because the part that supposedly ‘leaves the body’ is in mental space. We are never in our bodies. We are always in mental space. Mentally (through senses) we conjure the physical world and mentally (though memory) we conjure the dream world.

The déjà vu experience

The literal meaning of ‘déjà vu’ is ‘already seen’. It refers to the sense that, what someone is experiencing is familiar when in actuality it is novel. It feels like what we’re saying or doing has been said or done previously. Déjà vu is a common experience and factors such as illness, exhaustion and drugs are said to induce them.

Single-element familiarity (memory explanation) - SEF

SEF claims that déjà vu may be experienced when something in the present setting is objectively familiar, but isn’t recognised because it is now experienced in a new and changed context. The individual misinterprets the familiarity of the object to the whole setting, resulting in déjà vu. For example, you go to your friend’s house for the first time and you see a vase on the table that is similar to one at your nan’s house. You know that the vase is familiar but you don’t know how as you can’t connect it to the vase at your nan’s house. You then think that the vase is familiar to the setting and hence you believe that the whole setting is familiar – déjà vu.

MacCurdy (1925) called this phenomenon restricted paramnesia. To test this idea of misattribution of stimulus, Banister and Zangwill (1941a, 1941b) carried out a study using hypnotic suggestion. They did indeed find that individuals misinterpreted forgotten stimulus to the wrong setting.

This theory appears fruitful due to the various hypotheses that have been related to it or been extensions of it. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) showed that when information is re-experienced, it is processed quickly giving a sense of oldness to the stimulus. Sno and Linszen (1990) talked about different memories having different patterns of neural activity. If one element of a new scene overlaps with a previous memory, it can reactivate the entire old memory. These theories have the same fundamental basis of familiar stimulus in a new context.

Attentional explanation

The attentional explanation claims that déjà vu results when a brief initial perception of a scene with low attention, is followed by observing it a second time under full attention. This second observation is identical to the first and so the individual doesn’t think that the first perception is moments old, but sees it as a one from a distant past. An illustration similar to the one made by Titchener (1928, pp. 187-188) follows:

You’re about to pass a football, which involves controlling the ball and then

passing. The ball arrives at your feet and you control it. Now, for a second,

your eye is caught on a coin on the floor and so you look at it before you pass

the ball. The usual controlling of the ball, which is followed by the passing is

disjointed. This has been disrupted by looking at the coin. As you pass,

you think, “Why I passed the ball just now”. Your nervous system has severed

the two phases of one experience, both of which are familiar, and the latter

(passing the ball) appears as a repetition of the earlier.

Lee (1944) called this split perception and Mayer and Merckelbach (1999) say that it may be part of everyday perception where a ‘quick and dirty’ unconscious processing of information effects our reactions to what is around us. In support of the theory, Krijgers Janzen (1958) talk of how we all experience eidetic images at times. Those experiencing it regularly, experience déjà vu more frequently.

SEF vs. Attentional

Both theories emphasize the role of perception in the déjà vu experience, but in different ways. SEF says that you pay close attention to particular stimuli because it catches your attention due to its familiarity. The attentional explanation seems to talk of the opposite. You’re not paying close attention to anything. In fact, you only have a brief initial perception.

In SEF, perception seems to be based around smaller stimuli that develop into the belief that the whole scene is familiar. However, in the attentional explanation the whole scene is the focus from the outset.

It appears as though both explanations cannot account for déjà vu experiences that take place when one is talking to someone over the phone. In such déjà vu experiences, you feel that you’ve had a particular part of the conversation with the same person previously. In terms of SEF, where is the familiar object catching your eye but not recognised? What is the new setting that this object lies in? There are no objects and there is no particular setting. For attentional explanation, you may ask what it is that we make a brief initial perception towards. There is no scene. Your speaking on the phone and so your perception isn’t focused on anything.

SEF also finds it hard to explain déjà vu experiences taking place in extremely familiar settings. In this case, all objects are already familiar to you and you recognise them. This isn’t a new setting. Therefore, where is the familiar but unrecognisable object? Where is the new setting? Attentional explanation has a better hold, as it’s less to do with familiarity of stimuli. At any time, you may take a brief initial perception followed by one with full attention, which may lead to déjà vu.

Conclusion – Do such experiences provide a serious challenge to materialism?

Although debates like these have been going on for years, by noting the weight of evidence supporting these theories, a simple answer to the above question would be no. Those that wish to challenge materialism using these phenomena revert to theories that see the mind as apart from the body and hence face the normal problems of dualism, such as the remote control argument or how can a soul interact with the body. For example, they see the déjà vu experience as a chance for reincarnates to get a peak of their past lives. An explanation like this seems to break many of the laws of nature, which are unacceptable for materialism. Notions such as these are untestable and hence impossible to prove or disprove. For the OBE, amongst others is the theory of astral projection. Through this theory, followers claim that the world isn’t just matter and that consciousness can leave the body. If this is so, then you’d expect there to be minds and bodies everywhere. Souls may return to wrong bodies. Some might get lost forever. There may even be mindless bodies walking around abandoned by their souls. This astral body isn’t detectable and attempts to detect it have failed.

Both déjà vu and OBEs seem to be caused by events in the external world and our thoughts and decisions cause certain things to happen in the external world. Therefore, it’s hard to see how this can be explained without taking a materialistic view.

These phenomena do not challenge materialism because they appear to be best understood (and have many testable predictions) using materialistic ideas. Though people who oppose these ideas claim that materialists ‘explain away’ the spiritual, to them, it could be said that it is because they cannot explain it without using a materialistic base, that they revert to the spiritual.

References

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Brown, A., (2003) A review of the Déjà vu experience. Psychological Bulletin, volume 129, no.3, 394-413

Murphy, T., (1999) Here and Now, There and Then: The experience of Déjà vu in clinical & spiritual forms, (online)

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