The important point about such an objective for market entry is that it will change the calculus of the market entry mode decision. If a company is to maximize learning from a lead market, for example, it will need to participate with its own subsidiary and a cadre of its own executives. Learning indirectly, via a local distributor or other partner, is obviously less effective and will contribute less to the company�s development as a global player, even if short-term profitability is superior because of the lower investment required.
Competitive Attack or Defense
In some situations, market entry is prompted not by some attractive characteristics of the country identified in a market assessment exercise, but as a reaction to a competitor�s move. The most common scenario is market entry as a follower move, when a company enters the market simply because a major competitor has done so. This is obviously driven by the belief that the competitor would gain a significant advantage if it were allowed to operate alone in that market, and so it is most common in concentrated or even duopolistic industries. Another frequent scenario is �offense as defense,� in which a company enters the home market of a competitor�usually in retaliation for an earlier entry into its own domestic market. In this case, the objective is also to force the competitor to allocate increased resources to an intensified level of competition. In both cases, a company will have to adapt its strategies to the particular strategic stakes: rather than focusing on market development, the firm will set
Market share objectives and be prepared to accept lower levels of profitability and higher levels of marketing expenditure.
Scale Economies or Marketing Leverage
A number of objectives result from internationalization undertaken as what is sometimes described as a �replication strategy,� in which a company seeks a larger market arena in which to exploit an advantage. In many manufacturing industries, for example, internationalization can help the company achieve greater economies of scale, particularly for companies from smaller domestic country-markets. In other cases, a company may seek to exploit a distinctive and differentiating asset, such as a brand, service model, or patented product. In both cases, the emphasis is on �more of the same,� with relatively little adaptation to local markets, which would undermine scale economies or diminish the returns from replication of the winning model. To achieve either of these objectives, a company must
2. Koc, A Turkish conglomerate, which has invented its first washing machine & Dish wash bar in 1959 went for market capture in Europe without pre work.
retain some control, so it may enter markets with relatively high-intensity modes, such as joint ventures. In particular, either franchising or licensing are business models naturally suited for the rapid replication of businesses through expansion of units since both are centered on protected and predefined assets.
Apart from these varied marketing objectives, it is also common for governments to �incentivize� their country�s companies to export, in which case the company may enter markets it would otherwise not have tackled. In summary, given the rapid business evolution that has been identified as one of the distinctive characteristics of international markets, it is reasonable to suppose that, for most companies, international operations will consist of a patchwork of country-market operations that are pursuing different objectives at any one time. This, in turn, would suggest that most companies would adopt different entry modes for different markets. More commonly, however, companies have a template that is followed in almost all markets. This usually starts with market entry via an indirect distribution channel, usually a local independent distributor or agent.
Modes of Market Entry
The central managerial trade-off between the alternative modes of market entry is that between risk and control. On the one hand, low intensity modes of entry minimize risk. Thus, contracting with a local distributor requires no investment in the country-market in the form of offices, distribution facilities, sales personnel, or marketing campaigns. Under the normal arrangement, whereby the distributor takes title to the goods (i.e., buys them) as they leave the production facility of the international company, there is not even a credit risk, assuming that the distributor has offered a letter of credit from its bank. This arrangement also minimizes control, however, since the international company will have little or no involvement in most elements of the marketing plan, including how much to spend on marketing, distribution arrangements, and service standards. In particular, it should be noted here that effective control over marketing operations is impossible without timely and accurate market information, such as customer behavior, market shares, price levels, and so on. In many cases, low-intensity modes of market participation cut off the international firm from this information, since third-party distributors or agents jealously guard the identity and buying patterns of their customers for fear of disintermediation. Such control can only be obtained via higher-intensity modes of market participation, involving investments in local executives, distribution, and marketing programs. This is truly a trade-off in that companies cannot have it all, but must find compromise solutions. The fact is that control only comes from involvement, and involvement only comes from investment.
Another vital distinction here is between financial risk and marketing risk. It is financial risk that is usually the major consideration at the point of market entry, and it is financial risk that is minimized by low-intensity modes of market participation. However, this risk comes at the price of low control over business strategy, so that in fact marketing risk is maximized, with a local partner making all the important marketing decisions. It is the desire for greater control over the business (i.e., to minimize marketing risk) that explains the usual evolutionary pattern of increasing commitment.
The alternative modes of entry can therefore be distinguished by where each falls on the risk-control trade-off (see Figure 3-1). In addition, there are a number of points that should be borne in mind about each.
Figure 3-1. The Market Entry Mode Decision
Export/Import and Trading Companies
Serving an international market through export/import agents, is particularly suitable for companies with little international experience since almost all international operating functions are borne by the agent, including the costly and time-consuming requirements such as bills-of-lading, customs clearance, and invoice and collection. However, in addition to the low level of control, a couple of additional drawbacks should be noted. First, agents such as these operate on the basis of economies of scope, seeking to act as intermediaries for as many vendors as possible�they are servants of many masters. In many cases, therefore, the international vendor will be only a small proportion of the agent�s business, so the vendor may end up feeling underserved by the agent, who, if acting rationally, will at any time devote the greatest attention to the vendor that offers the greatest total margin in a given period. Second, agents often operate on a commission basis, and they do not actually buy the goods from the international vendor, so there is a credit and cash flow risk that is not present in distributor arrangements.
�Piggybacking�
Although such arrangements are rarely featured in international business texts, many companies begin their internationalization opportunistically through a variety of arrangements that may be described as �piggybacking,� because they all involve taking advantage of a channel to an international market rather than selecting the country-market in a more conventional manner. For example, a firm may be offered some spare capacity on a ship or plane by a business partner, or it may find that a domestic distributor is already serving an international market and so grants a foreign distribution license that requires nothing more than an increase in domestic sales. An example of this is the Italian rice firm F&P Gruppo, owners of the leading Gallo brand, which entered Poland via their Argentinean subsidiary rather than direct from Italy, thus leading to the rather bizarre situation of packets of rice with Spanish-language packaging covered in stickers in Polish. The reason, it transpires, was that the Argentinean air force was importing freight from Poland via regular flights, but it was sending over empty aircraft on the outward leg, a source of export distribution capacity that was bought by a consortium of local food companies.
The most common form of piggybacking is to internationalize by serving a customer who is more international than the vendor firm. Thus, a customer requests an order, delivery, or service in more than one country, and the supplier starts selling internationally in order to retain the customer and increases its penetration of the account. This is particularly common in the case of business-to-business companies and technology-oriented start-ups. Another common situation is when two companies in the same industry combine to use the same distribution channel for products that are not directly competitive, thus obviating to some extent the financial disadvantage of establishing distribution when sales volumes are still low. Thus, for example, Minolta piggybacked on IBM�s international distribution network, which helped Minolta achieve otherwise unaffordable distribution and helped IBM defray the cost of the distribution network. Similarly, competitors in some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, routinely license their sales and/or distribution to each other in markets where the competitor is better established and the products are not directly competitive.
When piggybacking via distributors or other comparable partners, the main disadvantage, in addition to the obvious lack of control, is the greater marketing risk that comes from not having studied the market potential and structure. The likely result is a short-term boost in sales, since this was the nature of the opportunity, but a medium-term problem arising from the unsuitability of the country-market, which was not analyzed before entry.
Franchising
Franchising is an under explored entry mode in international markets, but it has been widely used as a rapid method of expansion within major developed markets in North America and Western Europe, most notably by fast food chains, consumer service businesses such as hotel or car rental, and business services. At heart, franchising is suitable for replication of a business model or format, such as a fast-food retail format and menu. Since the business format and, frequently, the operating models and guidelines are fixed, franchising is limited in its ability to adapt, a key consideration in employing this entry mode when entering new country-markets. There are two arguments to counter this. First, the major franchisers are increasingly demonstrating an ability to adapt their offering to suit local tastes. McDonald�s, for example, is far from being a global seller of American-style burgers, but it offers considerably different menus in different countries and even different regions of countries In such cases, the format and perhaps the brand is internationally consistent, but certain customer-facing elements such as service personnel or individual menu choices can be tailored to local tastes. Secondly, it must be recognized that there are product-markets in which customer tastes are quite similar across countries. A business installing and maintaining swimming pools, for example, is a prime candidate for franchising, as sourcing and operations remain key success factors and are more or less universal. This is an example of a business, like fast food, that is not culture bound and in which marketing knowledge (i.e., the product- or service-specific knowledge involved in marketing this particular offering) is at least as important as local market knowledge (i.e., the knowledge required to operate successfully in a particular territory). It is also important to note that in such businesses, the local service personnel are a vital differentiating factor, and these will obviously still be local in orientation even if they operate within an internationally consistent business format.
The main drawback of franchising is the difficulty of adapting the franchised asset or brand to local market tastes�even experienced corporations like McDonald�s or Marriott, which have managed to thrive on this trade-off as discussed above, have taken several decades and some false starts to get to this point of advanced practice. A key indicator that franchising carries this constraint is the fact that marketing budgets at local levels are usually restricted to short-term promotions rather than market development. This is consistent with the concept that franchising is a rapid replication strategy.
Licensing
Licensing is a common method of international market entry for companies with a distinctive and legally protected asset, which is a key differentiating element in their marketing offer. This might include a brand name, a technology or product design, or a manufacturing or service operating process. Licensing is a practice not restricted to international markets. Disney, for example, will license its characters to manufacturers and marketers in categories such as toys and apparel even in its domestic market while it focuses its own efforts on its core competencies of media production and distribution. But it offers a particularly effective way of entering foreign markets because it can offer simultaneously both a low-intensity (and therefore low risk) mode of market participation and adaptation of product to local markets. Continuing with Disney as an example, its many licensing arrangements in China allow its characters to adorn apparel or toys suited to local taste in terms of color, styling, or materials this is because, as is usual in licensing agreements, the local licensee has considerable autonomy in designing the products into which it incorporates the licensed characters. The other major advantage of licensing is that, despite the low level of local involvement required of the international licensor, the business is essentially local and is in the shape of the local business that holds the license. As a result, import barriers such as regulation or tariffs do not apply.
As always, there are disadvantages, and two in particular should be factored into any decision on licensing. First, although it facilitates the creation of localized product, licensing is characterized by very low levels of marketing control. The licensee usually has to obtain approval from the international vendor for product design and specification, but it usually enjoys almost total autonomy over every other aspect of the marketing program (even if the contract includes constraints such as minimum price levels or promotional budgets). This is because the licensee is not a representative of the international vendor and, compared to a distributor or franchisee, is much more of an independent business that licenses only one specific and closely defined aspect of the marketing offer rather than acting as the de facto marketing arm of the international vendor. Second, and perhaps most importantly, licensing runs the risk of creating future local competitors. This is particularly true in technology businesses, in which a design or process is licensed to a local business, thus revealing �secrets,� in the shape of intellectual property that would otherwise not be available to that local business. In the worst case scenario, the local licensee can end up breaking away from the international licensor and quite deliberately stealing or imitating the technology. This might arise from malicious intent or simply a breakdown in relations, as is not uncommon between an international company and its local partner.
These particular low-intensity modes of market participation are the most frequently adopted at the time of market entry, although franchising and licensing are less common than entry via an independent local distributor�perhaps because they involve rather more complex inter organizational contracts and managerial processes. In situations in which a replication strategy is adopted and rapid expansion of the business is a priority, they are highly suitable, and to that extent they are underutilized. In all cases, it is clear that the organizational arrangement and the marketing strategy are interrelated: the less involved the international company, the less likely it is to develop locally customized offers and the more likely it is to follow a replication strategy. In fact, a replication strategy can run counter to the overarching objectives in entering the market in the first place, as much recent experience in the large emerging markets demonstrates.
Marketing Entry Strategies�Learning from Emerging Markets
Just as the internationalization boom of the 1990s proved instructive with regard to market assessment, so there is much to be learned from the marketing strategies adopted at entry by western companies in emerging markets. While most attention has been paid to market entry mode questions, such as the choice between a joint venture or a subsidiary, it is notable that most multinationals made the same assumption about their marketing entry strategy�namely, that they would replicate the competitive strategy that had served them well in developed markets, transferring their developed market brands and strategies to emerging economies without adaptation. While an argument can be made for such a replication strategy on the grounds of leveraging competitive assets such as brand names, it can only be made by ignoring the fundamental tenet of marketing, which is that companies should responsively adapt their offerings in the face of different market conditions. The result in most cases has been an unprofitable niche position, in which MNCs compete with each other for the business of the small elite who value their brands and can afford their prices. That this position is the wrong one for multinationals is evidenced by their subsequent struggles, many aspects of which flow directly from this marketing approach. The surprisingly rapid growth of local brands, many of which imitate their global competitors, demonstrates that distribution, for example, is an achievable goal when it is part of an integrated market-driven approach. The fierce competition among multinationals is also indicative of �me-too� niche marketing strategies driven by replication rather than local market responsiveness, and it is evidence of a flawed execution of the original market entry strategy (to judge from the MNCs� declared objectives in entering emerging markets) of market penetration.
To turn around their business in these markets, multinationals must in effect reenter the markets by rethinking their marketing strategy at two levels. First, they must embrace a mass-marketing mindset. While most MNCs have lost the mass-marketing competence that made them huge corporations in the first place (because of the intensified competition and fragmentation that has developed in their home markets), this approach is suitable both for current conditions in emerging markets and for the market penetration objectives behind their market entries. This mindset, which includes the need for aggressive attention to price competitiveness, should be reintroduced as the medium-term goal of the MNCs in emerging markets. Secondly, MNCs must develop dynamic strategies for reaching those mass markets; in effect, market expansion strategies that will take them out of the elite niche.
There are two major reasons why multinationals should adopt a mass-marketing approach in emerging markets. First, it is demanded by the typical emerging market structure. Second, anything else is inconsistent with the rationale behind the entry of multinationals into these markets, which was market penetration that was justified by the high potential of large and/or economically undeveloped populations. The principal reason why these billions of people are described as potential consumers rather than categorized into market segments is that they lack the financial resources to purchase the multinationals� products. The affordability gap will only be bridged when companies reach down to them by offering products at affordable prices; it will not be realized by emerging market populations increasing wealth to the point at which they trade up to the products currently on offer.
In practice, however, most multinationals did not develop localized products as part of their entry strategy, instead preferring to transplant offerings from their traditional developed markets. Even disregarding the question of whether the product met local needs, this is a niche strategy because of the price position that such products inevitably occupy. Keen to maintain a degree of global price consistency and unable to lower the price much because of the threat of parallel importing, these transplanted products end up being priced at points at which only 3�5 percent of the population can afford them. It is this niche strategy that has given local competitors the space to develop their own competence and brands far more quickly than multinationals had anticipated. It also fitted well with the niche distribution strategy adopted by most multinationals, which tend to rely on larger channels with which they are somewhat familiar and which cannot realistically achieve high distribution coverage of the traditional, complex, socially embedded channels characteristic of emerging markets.
In short, multinationals were pursuing marketing strategies that were fundamentally inconsistent with their declared objective of entering emerging markets to realize the mass-market potentials of their huge populations. This is particularly ironic for that large number of multinationals that trace their own historical roots to the development of mass marketing in North America and Western Europe in the early and mid-twentieth century. While it might be argued that, given a long enough time frame, this potential will be realized, the only circumstances in which this justifies such early entry is when first-mover advantage can be obtained.
Mass marketing, as explained by business historian Richard Tedlow, began with the �breakthrough idea� of �profit through volume.� 2 The alternative business paradigm, that of keeping prices and margins high, was dominant in the era preceding mass marketing and is increasingly a hallmark of the �era of segmentation,� which characterizes most developed markets now. In these developed markets, marketing strategies begin with breaking down demand into well-defined segments and developing brands and products narrowly targeted at those segments�almost the complete opposite of mass marketing. By contrast, mass marketing was built around good but simple products, narrow product ranges, and low rates of product obsolescence.
The case of Kellogg, the U.S. cereals giant, demonstrates that it is not only local competitors who can sense the need for mass marketing and deliver it. Kellogg, lured by the prospect of a billion breakfast eaters, ventured into India in the mid-1990s. Like many of its counterparts, Kellogg�s market entry strategy proved unsuccessful, and, after three years in the market, sales stood at an unimpressive $10 million. Indian consumers were not sold on breakfast cereals. Most consumers either prepared breakfast from scratch every morning or grabbed some biscuits with tea at a roadside tea stall. Advertising positions common in the west, such as the convenience of breakfast cereal, did not resonate with the mass market. Segments of the market that did find the convenience positioning appealing were unable to afford the international prices of Kellogg�s brands. Disappointing results led the company to reexamine
2 Richard Tedlow on Mass Marketing ,1996
its approach. Eventually, Kellogg realigned its marketing to suit local market conditions: the company introduced a range of breakfast biscuits under the Chocos brand name. Priced at Rs. 5 (10 U.S. cents) for a 50-gram pack (and with extensive distribution coverage that includes roadside tea stalls), they are targeted at the mass market and are expected to generate large sales volumes. Other emerging market veterans such as Unilever, Colgate Palmolive, and South African Breweries have amply demonstrated the viability of mass markets in emerging economies and the benefits of rapidly transferring knowledge gained in one emerging market to others.
Another argument articulated by some multinationals is that emerging market consumers are rapidly becoming more like their affluent market counterparts, and that it is therefore sensible to offer globally standardized products and wait for the consumer to evolve towards a preference for these. This convergence argument may or may not be true, but it is certain that the rate of change is slow; specifically, in most emerging markets, the mass market will remain poor well beyond the current planning horizons of most multinationals. Even as they grow more affluent, it is far from certain that Chinese and Indian consumers� preferences will converge with those of Europeans or Americans. It is as likely that they may retain idiosyncratic local consumption patterns that are driven by cultural norms. A better strategy for any serious emerging market player is to understand and cater to local consumers� current needs and evolve with them as they grow more affluent.
There are two general approaches to moving towards mass-market strength that correspond to a fundamental choice that MNCs must make about the basis and nature of competition. On the one hand, MNCs must decide the basis on which they wish to compete in emerging markets. They can do so by either transferring their global assets, such as brand names of proven strength in other countries, or by developing local (i.e., market-specific) sources of advantage, which include but are not restricted to brand names. In addition, there is the related question of whether to compete against other MNCs or against local competition. These are, of course, interrelated questions, and the strategies are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, they represent quite different uses of marketing resources, and they will thus be manifested in distinctive marketing strategies.
There are two principal routes of localization. The first is based upon the use of global sources of advantage, but it involves the MNC adapting its marketing mix to make that global asset more suited to local emerging market conditions. For example, an MNC might transfer an established global brand into an emerging market but change its packaging size, price points, or even its product formulation to enhance its attraction to the emerging market retailer and consumer. (Kellogg�s approach in India is an example of this degree of localization.) It is important to note that this strategy does leverage the MNC�s global assets (i.e., it is not based upon marketing derived ground-up from analysis of the local market). However, it is more than simply exporting a global brand via a local distributor�the necessary adaptation requires investment. Importantly, this strategy also brings the MNC into competition with local players.
An alternative strategy is to develop new market-specific resources, a more direct but more costly and probably a slower approach than adaptation. This strategy is starting to be seen in the form of a number of MNCs acquiring local brands that are added to their portfolio alongside global counterparts. In Japan, for example, Coca-Cola carries a number of locally-oriented brands, such as Georgia iced coffee, that enable it simultaneously to meet local taste segments and to derive greater economies of scope from its sales and distribution investments in the country. Alternative local resources that might be developed are distribution assets, such as company-specific warehouses or fleets of vans or even bicycles. P&G took this approach in certain Eastern European markets. In these former communist states, the distribution systems were not simply undeveloped�they had completely collapsed. Recognizing that intensive distribution was an enabling condition for the development of their consumer goods business, P&G invested substantial sums in developing its own distribution network. It did so by funding distributor businesses in the form of vans, information technology, working capital, and extensive training.3 This model, known within the company as the �McVan Model,� produced a significant competitive advantage over both international and local competition; in Russia, for example, the development of 32 regional distributors, with 68 further sub distributors, resulted in P&G having distribution coverage of some 80 percent of the population at a time when most multinationals were still restricted to marketing in the two main cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This bold approach illustrates perfectly the trade-off between control and risk�considerable investment was required to develop this network in a country renowned as a distribution challenge (being the largest country in the world in terms of area), but by tackling the issue head-on rather than waiting for the enabling condition to develop, P&G gained huge leads in market share in many categories. While this advantage has continued in some countries, the financial commitment makes P&G far more vulnerable to economic shocks, such as the Russian financial crisis of the summer of 1998.
A Framework for the Evolution of Marketing Strategies in an International Market
The process of business development in an individual foreign country-market consists of a sequence of distinct business challenges, and this evolution produces a sequence of marketing strategies and marketing organizations. This evolution, originally described in the conceptual paper by Susan P. Douglas and C. Samuel Craig from which Figure 3-2 is adapted, consists of three principal phases: (1) a low-commitment market entry, in which the MNC seeks incremental
3 McVan Model: McVan created the Distribution Channel for P&G in Russian market
sales with minimum investment and is in effect testing the market; (2) a phase of intensified local marketing activity to develop business beyond the platform achieved in market entry and maximize performance within the country; (3) the consolidation of national units into a more integrated and efficient global marketing organization. Although some start-up firms appear to telescope this incremental internationalization into a �born global� or �big bang� expansion, it remains the dominant pattern. The evolution of the corporation through these phases appears to accelerate with international experience�from a more laissez-faire attitude in early years of international operation to a deliberate and forceful approach as the firm becomes more dependent upon, and committed to, its international business. This reflects the organizational learning that occurs systematically during internationalization and highlights the fact that the objectives an MNC sets itself for its business in any individual country-market can be a function not only of characteristics of the country, such as market potential, stability, and existing business infrastructure, but also of its own corporate international experience, level of commitment to international markets, and relevant management resources.
Figure 3-2. The Evolution of International Marketing Strategy (Source: adapted from Douglas and Craig
In many ways, the initial phase is more concerned with sales rather than marketing. Given the international firm�s focus on risk minimization and its lack of local knowledge, the distributor will usually take the easiest option of selling the newly available products to its existing customer base. Indeed, the distributor will usually have been selected on the basis of this customer base. In this initial phase, there is little adaptation to the local market because the low sales levels cannot support the fixed costs of developing a local offer and because the international firm is still learning about the market. In fact, the only circumstance in which the international company is clearly targeting a segment of customers is when its broader international marketing strategy is based upon an international segment. In consumer markets, Nike, for example, addresses similar segments in multiple countries; in business to business markets, the customer is often international. Only when the distributor has exhausted the growth possibilities of �picking the low-hanging fruit� does the challenge of marketing arise with the need to target new customers or segments or introduce new product lines, in order to maintain growth.
It is often at this point that the international company takes over distribution and begins to invest in its own marketing organization in the country-market. Once this organization is in place, the range of products and services expands rapidly, often including new offers developed specifically for the local market. In this stage, the emphasis on local market development results in a marketing focus not unlike that in the domestic market or any other single market. Over time, however, the multinational firm can be expected to seek synergies across its global marketing network, both in terms of production and marketing economics, and market knowledge. It is also likely that it has a fully developed subsidiary in all developed markets, so it seeks consolidation to mirror the internationalization of its strategy. In the countries of the European Union, for example, many international firms are now shifting marketing strategy to a regional level, so they therefore realize that they do not need a senior marketing executive and team in each country.
There are a number of key learnings that experienced executives identify from this evolution:
Greater Commitment at Market Entry
Increasingly, experienced companies seek closer control over marketing strategy at the time of market entry instead of delegating everything to a local distributor. This usually involves placing one or two appropriately qualified executives, in-market alongside the local sales and distribution partner. The objective is to accelerate market development and maximize performance earlier in the process rather than relying on the distributor�s customer base.
Long-Term Planning at Market Entry
Frequently, the appropriate market entry strategy is the wrong market development strategy. In other words, a company learns after a few years in the market that the distribution organization has the wrong coverage, it has been offering the wrong product lines, or some other aspect of the marketing offer is wrong. The probability of this is higher when the company has taken an opportunistic approach to market entry and has viewed the country as no more than a potential source of incremental sales of existing products that can be achieved with minimal risk or investment. The remedy is obviously to prepare a more rigorous plan for market development at the time of entry�one that is based upon the level of analysis of market potential.
Early Development of Local or Regional Marketing Programs
Experienced multinationals are becoming far more capable of modular design in their products or services, identifying a core platform from which local variations can be more easily and economically developed. This enables earlier development of products tailored to local market conditions, which can be expected to accelerate market penetration. In many cases, the level at which products are customized is regional rather than country by country. This enables a multinational to retain some economies of scale while still adapting to local demand characteristics. Once a firm�s international marketing network is well developed, such regional products may then be available at the time of market entry for other country-markets in the region.
Another important underlying dynamic, which experienced multinationals come to learn, is the distinction between market knowledge and marketing knowledge. Market knowledge is a local operating capability that is required for doing business in any a
References:
� Ghemawat, Pankaj, and Fariborz Ghadar. "Global Integration ≠ Global Concentration." Industrial and Corporate Change 15 (August 2006): pp. 595-623.
� Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America. 2nd ed. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996
� Susan P. Douglas and C. Samuel Craig , International Marketing Research , 3rd Edition, John Willey & Sons, 2005
� www.newsweek.com