A closer examination should be cast on Kruger’s policies that elevated the antagonism with the economic interests of the British magnates of gold-miners. Knowing well of the significance of gold to the prosperity of the Transvaal Republic, Kruger was highly committed to promoting gold-mining industry and made harsh rules to skim the cream of benefit for his own nation, which as a result, in 1896, gold accounted for 97 percent of Transvaal exports. Among those unfavorable rules to the Uitlanders, stamp duties, land transfers, concessions, property and claim licences, and customs payments were all remarkable protectionist economic policies.
The problems that Kruger’s policies had caused mainly lay in his franchise, which restricting the rights of Uitlanders to vote on the ground of their fourteen-year residence. De Kiewiet interpreted the franchise policy as a just cause of Kruger, since by 1895, 7 out of 10 were Uitlanders in Transvaal, and that to give them the franchise was like giving up the Transvaal. He claims that it was not altogether a narrow and short-sighted judgment that impelled them to deny the franchise to men who were richer, more numerous, and of a different manner of living. Meanwhile, the hardships of the Uitlanders were greatly exaggerated by British Blue Book on South African Affaris, and to many Uitlanders, the lack of the franchise was no acute grievance. Uitlander grievances were easily exaggerated, whereby political and emotional capital culd readily be made out of them.However, he maintains that Kruger’s inflexible attitude on the franchise was bound to provoke resentment. Sooner or later, the problem of their civil rights was bound to call for settlement. With the doors to legal or constitutional modification so difficult to open, it was hardly surprising that men began to consider means to circumvent the law and constitution by force.
It has always remained a centre point of historical debate that if the war was entirely out of the crafter’s hand – Joseph Chamberlain and Milner were the main bearers of the blame. It is believed that they were imperialists, upholding British Empire’s integrity as the priority, but it is questionable if they were war seekers. The question for examination could be focused on if Chamberlain and Milner were the only devisers intriguing the war; was it them two’s responsibility or the will of the whole British government; even though they harbored strong imperial idea, was it part of the episode of that particular era?
Before Chamberlain and Milner’s appearance into political arena, economic consideration and wider political ambitions had already triggered an important figure – Rhodes, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony to forge an immediate political change in the Transvaal. And the lever Rhodes planned to use was the discontent of the Uitlander population of the Transvaal. By early 1890, Rhodes had staged his police force ‘pioneer column’. His plan of arranging an assembly of police force placed in Bechuanaland, thereby once the rising was under way in Johannesburg, the column would move into the Transvaal. Such an arrangement of coup was vital in terms of if won, Transvaal would have been under Britain’s territory of Empire; if lost, diplomacy would be harder to solve the problem, and overtaking by force of scale would be likely to take place. Unfortunately, the device failed because of the commander of the column, Jameson, acted a raid without the approval of Rhodes in 1895. This Jameson Raid, had a grave consequence of raising doubt on the honour and good faith of Imperial statesmanship, and is one of the most notorious incidents in the history of the British empire, which provoked suspicions and animosities, and which was inexcusable in its folly and unforgivable in its consequences. The ignominious failure of the Jameson raid made its participants look like cheap brigands and the Transvaal the victim of a plot on its honour, an failure that tainted all of future British policy.After Jameson’s Raid, Rhodes, Chamberlain, and the Conservative British government was left in a weak position; at the same time, it became more justifiable and favourable for Kruger to take tougher measures to strengthen the independence of his state.
What made the aftermath relationship between Transvaal and Britain worse was German Kaiser’s telegraph to congratulate him on the defeat of the raid, which was seen by patriotic British as evidence of German interference in the Transvaal, and which reinforced Chamberlain’s conviction that the interests of the British empire required the incorporation of the republic in a British federation or at least the full establishment of British paramountcy. But even at that time, war was still the marginal consideration for the British Government. Chamberlain hoped to persuade kruger of a reform and acceptance of British control which was refused by Kruger who discovered Chamberlain’s impossibility of compromise.
In 1897, Kruger consolidated his position, modernized his republican forces with weapons imported from Germany; strengthened the relations between Transvaal and the Orange Free State; renewed the dynamite monopoly which heightened confrontation between the mine owners and the state. New Laws, the Press Law, the Aliens Expulsion Law, and the Immigration Law were passed against the Uitlander. It was the same year that Milner was appointed as Higher Commissioner.
Milner, who had strong belief of British Race Patriot and British Empire’s victory, was not a force agitator in the beginning, nor a tool of mining magnates and financial interests. The possibility for the liberal element in the Transvaal still gained the upper hand. De Kiewiet in here also gave an impartial view to Milner’s contribution to the war: The view that represents Milner as the agent of an imperialist Colonial Secretary, bent on breaking the Transvaal’s will, does too little justice to the earnestness of Milner’s search for compromise, or to the nature of British policy which was now, as always, variously moved, contradictory in its phases, and uncoordinated between its agents. After a demonstration of British naval power, Milner tried to act as peacemaker,, holding that imperial defence was compatible with conciliatory policy. In a letter he wrote to Chamberlain after Kruger backed down, he said: Feeling all round here is much better than when I came, but improvement began with and depends on conviction of determination of Great Britain not to be ousted, and in matters of Imperial defence not to yield to local pressure. This is quite compatible with conciliatory policy, in fact essential to its success.
Not only does De Kiewiet rehabilitated Chamberlain and Milner from the stereotype of devil of war, but also he concluded the causes of Boer War in terms of an inexorable objectivity. The two causes he pointed out that led to Boer War were the gold-mining and British Government’s lengthy quest for a united South Africa. Year 1897 of Milner was a time when the will of compromise replete among every party. Year 1898 was seen by De Kiewiet as a year that brought about crisis, the year that Kruger won a re-election, after which Kruger dismissed the Chief Justice of the republic who had challenged the constitutionality of many acts of his government, to which Milner reacted violently. Milner wrote to Chamberlain: There is no way out of the political troubles of South Africa, except reform in the Transvaal or war. And at present the chances of reform in the Transvaal are worse than ever.
On the other hand, Chamberlain had in his policy determination to unite South Africa, and democratic imperialism as his priority proved to be impossible. Violence was endemic and war virtually inevitable. But Chamberlain neither expected the war nor recognized it as the crucial test of the empire he sought to strengthen. For years he had pressed his cabinet colleagues, usually in vain, to strengthen the British military pressure in South Africa; but he thought of armed force as an intimidating tool in negotiation rather than for deployment in warfare. He never foresaw the fundamental struggle with the South African Republic would be a matter of blood and guns rather than of propaganda and public reaction. If must be blamed, Chamberlain’s fault related to the war lay in his underestimate of the probable impact of the war. He thought that supposing war to come and England would be successful, there is really no fear of permanent discontent either in the Transvaal or any other part of South Africa. War was not his original intention, but he was not serious enough to give rise to it.
In conclusion, the Boer War’s occurrence could not merely be blamed on Chamberlain and Milner’s imperialistic ambition. War was the last resort when all other means failed while Kruger’s government reached its peak of toughness on its independence. The economic interests of gold-mining and British Empire’s strong will on preserving a unified South Africa would inevitably brought about a revolutionary event to achieve the end. Unfortunately, war was the one, which was out of partial consideration by the two leaders but which had inadvertent factor in it.
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