Turkish Kurdish Intra-State War

Reacting to these new developments widespread revolt soon erupted in the Turkish east, orchestrated by Shaikh Said of Piran, a religious leader within eastern Turkey.  Although a relatively minor figure within Kurdish history, his uprising foreshadowed a common theme regarding quests for Kurdish independence.  His uprising did not enjoy the full support of all of the Kurdish people, it was marked by fractious infighting, which ultimately helped doom the rebellion. It is estimated that “between 40,000 and 250,000, died in the ‘pacification’”   Oppression of the Kurdish people’s occurred during the Kemalist regime, however with conditions improving slightly in 1950s, when the Kurds voted for and got greater representation in the Turkish government.  With these democratic elections Kurds were elected to office and infrastructure such as roads and schools began to be built in the economically depressed “east”.  Soon demands for greater Kurdish representation and expression grew.  McDowall states that “so [did] the government[s] increased its efforts to silence cultural and political activity of which it did not approve.”  The Turkish army overthrew the current government in 1971, resulting in erratic suppression of Kurdish people’s, until the situation steadily deteriorated with the “proclamation of martial law in the Kurdish provinces”  These measures altered forever the nature of the Kurdish people’s struggle, which culminated in the formation of an armed resistance group calling themselves the PKK ( Kurdistan Worker’s Party).  Formed in 1978, it soon emerged as the dominant radical fighting force amongst the various Kurdish independence groups.

With the announcement of martial law in the Kurdish provinces, and another coup e’etat by army generals another repressive era in Kurdish history was ushered in.  By the end of the 1980’s it was estimated that “approximately half of the 250,000 or so civilians arrested by the authorities on security grounds were in fact Kurdish”  This disproportionately high number reflects the state’s perceived threats to its security.  As a result of these perceived threats against their Kurdish identity the PKK began their large scale armed conflict in 1984, focusing on military and civilians targets within Kurdistan and eventually greater Turkey.  Fierce fighting occurred during the 1980’s with serious atrocities being committed by both the military and the PKK.  The PKK felt that “nothing short of outright victory and the independence of a socialist Kurdish state would solve their problems.”  According to McDowall, the Turkish government regarded the PKK and other affiliate Kurdish terrorist organizations as the “as the single most serious threat to state security”  This is corroborated by evidence which shows that a large percentage of the Turkish army was deployed by Ankara to South-eastern Turkey.  “By 1990 it was still reckoned that over 150,000 troops were in the region.” 

The PKK has never enjoyed wide-spread support from all of the Kurds within Turkey with “Substantial numbers of Kurds, probably over 50%, remained [remaining] either neutral or hostile to its [PKK] activities.”  This unease in supporting an organization whose methods of funding its activities with “drug smuggling, extortion and robbery,” is understandable.  

The situation within the Middle East during the 1990’s changed dramatically with Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent air campaign and American led invasion of Kuwait.  Following the failed Iraqi Kurdish uprisings it was estimated that approximately “400,000 Iraqi Kurds [tried to] find asylum in Turkey”  This influx of so many Iraqi Kurds caused the Turkish government much concern, because cross-border Kurdish connections would be made, and this large restless population could further aggravate the dire economic situation within South-eastern Turkey.  Refugee camps were set up, and many Iraqi Kurds soon returned home, helping the Turkish government to limit the negative impact of this large influx of Iraqi Kurds, on PKK independence efforts.

Over the years mass-arrests, beatings, kidnappings and torture tactics have become extremely common within this region as tensions have escalated.  Other Kurdish groups in the region, such as the KDP (Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party) have also been targeted by Turkish forces, even though they were based out of Iraq.  The incursion of Turkish military forces into Iraq was made possible following the signing of an agreement in October 1994 which “allowed the armed forces of both states [Iraq and Turkey] to enter each other’s territory in hot pursuit of rebel units.”  The Turkish government was so concerned about the PKK rebels that it signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein, technically allowing his army to enter Turkish territory in its pursuit of Iraqi Kurdish rebels.  In practise the Iraqi army never entered Turkey, but this is startling example of what the Turkish government was willing to do in it’s campaign to eradicate the PKK rebels.

During the late 1990’s the PKK began losing support amongst Kurdish people as a result of the Turkish state’s slow disassembly of a variety of anti-Kurdish legislation.  The ban on the Kurdish language was lifted, and further relaxations of Turkish laws regarded as discriminatory toward the Kurdish population have occurred. The PKK signed a cease-fire with the Turkish government in 1999 that has been described as shaky at best, with military action still being undertaken.  Although there have been numerous cease-fires signed between rebel groups and governments, it is important not to forget that this long simmering conflict has claimed over “some 30,000 — mostly Kurdish — dead.” These numbers however do not properly illustrate the suffering and hardship suffered by all parties involved in this conflict.

The American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has quickly thrust the long simmering conflict the Turkish government has been dealing with from the shadows of international affairs directly into the limelight.  Green Beret special forces advanced from the north of Iraq with support from Kurdish forces that had been ruling much of Kurdish northern Iraq as a semi-autonomous northern Iraq.  Although this paper focuses on Kurds within Turkey, it is impossible to objectively analyze each Kurdish situation within each country as separate issues, the Kurdish question within the Middle East is a trans-national problem, and developments in one country will affect all of the countries involved.  It is with this knowledge that the latest developments within Iraq has caused the Turkish government much concern, because the Kurdish majority in the north has established its superiority over other ethnic groups.  The armed Kurdish group within northern Iraq is called the peshmerga.  This 75,000 member strong force has allegiance to a variety of Iraqi Kurdish groups, such as the KDP (Kurdistan Democracy Party).  According the US Department of State, the peshmerga “[is] the most pro-U.S. force in Iraq, [having] played a growing role in the coalition-trained Iraqi security forces.”  The Turkish government is worried about the presence of a strong autonomous Kurdish population in the north of Iraq, stating that this would “inspire Turkey's own Kurdish population to start making demands.”   While the beleaguered US army in Iraq is quickly seeing the benefit of having a strong and unified peshmerga Kurdish police force, the Turkish government thinks otherwise.  They see the peshmerga as possible accomplices with the Turkish Kurds in their quest to achieve a Kurdistan independence.  More worrying to the Turkish government is the Northern Iraqi territory occupied by the Kurdish peshmerga is home to the Kirkuk oil fields, home to an estimated 10 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.  An economically rich northern Iraq would not help any efforts within Turkey to suppress PKK activities.   “[the] Turkish government states Ankara [capital city] could not tolerate the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, nor any Kurdish takeover in the two major cities of the region, and in particular Kirkuk.” 

Any conflict management efforts undertaken within the Middle East regarding the Kurdish question should be administered by the United Nations.  Only this international institution has the diplomatic clout and international legitimacy to defuse this situation in a region of the world that has seen far too many foreign governments meddle in the local affairs of people for their own national interests.  The UN would be able to provide a forum for discussion that would include all the organizations with a stake in the outcome of the Kurdish question.  By bringing together the various Kurdish independence organizations such as the PKK and the Northern Iraqi Peshmerga force fence mending between groups would be possible.  A third-party country could also prove to instrumental in this case, fulfilling a role that Norway itself has played in defusing a variety of international conflicts, such as that within Sri Lanka.  Canada is well suited to providing third-party support as it has a long history of impartiality within the Middle east, and it doesn’t have any (stated) vested economic or political interests in the long-term outcome of the conflict. Other international organizations such as NATO or the EU would be seen as meddling in the affairs of the Kurdish and regional governments.  Turkey is a NATO country, it could not claim impartiality by using an organization it belongs to, to solve the Kurdish problem.  Furthermore, any intervention by the EU, of which Turkey is trying to enter, would be deemed unacceptable by the Kurds.

An impartial international community under the directive of the UN could be instrumental in helping to achieve peace between the Kurds and their respective governments, however as Turkey has arguably the largest stake in the outcome of the conflict “it will be up to key Turkish politicians to take a lead and seriously tackle the Kurdish question,” states Kemal Kirisci in his book ‘The Kurdish question and Turkey’.

Following the European Court of Human Right’s ruling that the Turkish government’s trial of captured PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, under the now reformed judicial system was unfair, Turkey should undertake steps with the help of the European Court of Human rights to make sure that Abdullah Ocalan has a fair trial.  This would demonstrate to the rest of the world, and especially to the Kurdish people that Ankara is indeed trying to come to a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem by ensuring that the PKK leader has a fair trial.  

If peace is to break out within Kurdistan, all parties involved must be prepared to bargain and negotiate with the other groups.  Kemal Kirisci states that the Turkish government by “acknowledging the Kurdish reality, by granting additional rights to the Kurds, [by] moving towards the further democratization of Turkish society, and [the] beginning [of] a dialogue with certain Kurdish political groups would help to lessen ethnic tensions in the country.”  As stated within the Helsinki Watch report on the situation within Turkey it “recommends that the U.S. government end all military and security assistance to Turkey.”  he current issue’s of arms control and disarmament do not seem to be problems that could be solved in the near future.     The Kurdish rebels are heavily armed, with the Iraqi Kurds recently re-armed with the seizure of huge amounts of Saddam’s former armies military hardware, any attempts at disarming these groups would only be possible after serious negotiations and discussions between all parties involved have been undertaken.  The Kurds within Northern Iraq are relying on their weapons to guarantee their own security in a violent Iraq, and the Americans would be in no hurry to disarm their strongest Iraqi ally.  Disarming the Kurds therefore would be incredibly difficult, due to the variety of threats prevalent within the Middle Eastern security environment.

Any attempt’s at brokering a peace within the Middle East between regional Kurdish groups and national governments must take into account the historical Kurdish claims at independence, the various fractious Kurdish resistance movements, and current development’s within Iraq.  

The quest for a peaceful Middle East with the Kurdish people representing themselves in a democratic and peaceful manner is only possible with the help of the United Nations facilitating negotiations, encouraging bargaining between national governments, and encouraging acceptance of multi-culturally friendly laws, constitutions and governments, so that the ancient and unique Kurdish culture can thrive within the governments of the Middle east.      

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