What best accounts for the "successful" revolutions in Latin America?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

What best accounts for the "successful" revolutions in Latin America?

To fully explore the reasons for the success of the two post-war revolutions in Latin America, the term 'successful' must first be defined. Wynia defines a successful or 'real' revolution as requiring "the transformation of a nation's politics, social structures, and economic institutions" (Wynia,1990:pp284-5). Having defined the criteria by which a revolution's success is to be judged, he goes on to admit that fulfilling these criteria is "a monumental task" (Wynia,1990:p285). In the post-war period there have only been two revolutions that conform to Wynia's criteria; the Cuban revolution and the Nicaraguan revolution.

To directly address the question, both countries will first be examined to attempt to discover similarities between them, so as to provide a background to the search for similar causes of the revolutions in both countries. To begin this study, the pre-revolutionary history of both countries will be examined, and in this area there are indeed similarities, for both Nicaragua and Cuba have strong, relatively recent revolutionary traditions.

The Nicaraguan revolutionary tradition is connected to Augusto Sandino, the man from who the Sandinistas took their name. He was a Nicaraguan nationalist who was the leader of a patriotic guerrilla campaign to remove the United States armed forces from Nicaragua and set up an independent Nicaraguan state instead of an American puppet regime. To summarise briefly, Sandino continued his guerrilla campaign after the U.S. forces had left, until the head of the U.S.-trained National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, had him shot as he was leaving the Presidential palace after peace talks. Thus Nicaragua gained a martyr as well as a revolutionary hero.

Cuba also has a revolutionary tradition, with its figurehead being Jose Marti, "an eloquent revolutionary poet-lawyer" (Skidmore & Smith,1992:p254). Marti is still revered as an instrumental figure in the struggle to throw off the Spanish yoke and gain independence. These two revolutionary figures were drawn on by both groups of successful. Indeed Castro, years after Marti's struggle, described himself as a follower in Marti's tradition. Ironically, Marti's struggle to escape Spanish rule succeeded, only to bring Cuba under U.S. domination instead, although Cuba was, in theory, an independent country.

Both countries' history has also been characterised by domination of them by the United States in the post-colonial period. Central America has long been regarded as a U.S. sphere of influence, and both countries serve as extreme examples of American satellite states. In Cuba, U.S. intervention was even legitimised by an amendment to the Cuban constitution, the Platt amendment, "which gave the U.S. the right to oversee the Cuban economy, veto international commitments, and intervene in domestic politics at Washington's discretion" (Skidmore & Smith,1992:p256).

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The interesting thing about the American domination of these two countries is the fact that the Americans did not cease their intervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba and Nicaragua after both countries had undergone successful revolutions. The Bay of Pigs affair was the American answer to the direction that the Cuban revolution was taking, while the Nicaraguan revolutionary leaders faced an even sterner challenge in the form of the massive funding given to the Contras under the Reagan Presidency. The funding of the Contras proved more successful for the Americans than the Bay of Pigs 'invasion' as they were a contributory factor to the public disillusionment with the Sandinistas that eventually forced them from office. The war against the Contras ruined the Nicaraguan economy to the stage that 50% of the Nicaraguan budget was being spent on defence and inflation reached the dizzy heights of 33,000% in 1988.

Added to their traditions and history, the geography of the terrain in which the successful revolutionaries waged their guerrilla campaigns is also similar. The Cuban revolutionaries had their base in the Sierra Maestra, the mountainous area of Cuba, while the Nicaraguan revolutionaries struck from the mountainous regions of Nicaragua. Terrain undoubtedly plays a part in the success or failure of revolutionary guerrilla movements, a fact best illustrated by Che Guevara's death in the unfamiliar and inhospitable terrain of the Bolivian 'altiplano' in his failed quest to turn Latin America into a continent of 'many Vietnams'. Knowledge of local terrain plays a major role in the guerrilla struggle, as does the support of the peasants who live in that particular area. The Cuban revolutionaries turned this fact to their advantage in their struggle against the Cuban armed forces, as they were able to ambush them and wage a successful campaign with far inferior numbers.

Having pointed out various similarities between the two countries and their respective revolutionary movements, the actual causes of the revolutions in both countries will now be addressed. The causes of the revolutions will first of all be addressed separately, then they will be examined to ascertain whether there are any common factors connecting the two.

It is always difficult to point out exactly why a revolution occurs, but in the Cuban case there were a number of contributory factors. For obvious reasons, the importance of the actual revolutionary struggle in the form of the guerrilla movement in the Sierra Maestra has been emphasised in Cuban history. This undoubtedly played a major role in bringing about the success of the revolution, for the guerrillas' value to the revolution was much greater than just the warfare aspect. Some of their value to the struggle was their chosen way of fighting : guerrilla warfare. They gained a sort of mysterious notoriety to Batista's forces through the way that they would appear in the mountains and ambush them then disappear again, inflicting much heavier casualties on Batista's forces than they ever received.

However, this particular part of the armed struggle was relatively near its conclusion, for Castro's troops were forced to scratch around for food in the mountains when they first arrived there. One of the turning points in the revolutionary struggle was the broadcasting of the revolutionaries' exploits to the world through the New York Times journalist Herbert Matthews, who stayed with them in the mountains for a time. Up until this point it was not known whether Castro and his band were alive or dead, and the fact that they were alive in the mountains with a journalist stirred up support for their cause. This also had the added effect of weakening Batista's support, for it became widely known that a band of guerrillas and a fifty-seven year old journalist were in the mountains evading Batista's army and there was nothing that Batista could do about it. "Suddenly Batista was on the defensive in world public opinion. He was in that most dangerous of realms - seen to be both brutal and impotent" (Skidmore & Smith,1992:p265).

Although the guerrilla warfare of Castro and his movement was a contributory factor to the Cuban revolution, a revolution cannot occur without mass support. The reason that the revolution gained mass support was the state that Cuba was in at that time. It was totally dependent on America for its survival, as a large proportion of Cuba's imports came from the U.S. and a large amount of its main export, sugar, went there. Americans also owned large numbers of Cuban businesses, including oil refineries, communications companies and large parts of the sugar industry. This foreign control over their economy was resented by many Cubans, as was the U.S.-backed dictator, Fulgencio Batista.

Batista was an unpopular tyrant who tolerated no opposition to his regime, which was broadly supported by the U.S. His major claim for staying in power was his ability to keep order. After two years of guerrilla war in the mountains, he decided to send in the army and liquidate the revolutionaries. Unfortunately for him, the army was poorly trained and was driven out of the Sierra Maestra by Castro's band of followers. After this disaster and a U.S. arms embargo on Cuba, Batista replied with terror, imprisoning supporters or suspected supporters of Castro and torturing and shooting them. This tactic proved counterproductive, for it turned the people totally against him. Batista's final tactic was to run a front-man candidate in a new election but most of the voters abstained. Batista then realised that public opinion was overwhelmingly against him, so he left the country rather than fight a battle that he had already lost.

As in Cuba, Nicaragua was also ruled by a dictatorial regime headed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the third Somoza to rule Nicaragua after his father and his brother. None of the three were particularly enlightened rulers, but Anastasio was the most greedy and ruthless of the three. It was even rumoured that he made a large personal profit from the reconstruction of Managua after a major earthquake that left many dead. All three Somozas kept power through the fact that they were head of the National Guard, the major military power in the country. The greediness of the Somozas did no good for the country as a whole as they concentrated great amounts of money and power in their hands. As well as being corrupt, Somoza was also brutal, smashing any signs of resistance so that the National Guard was the only thing keeping him in office.

The revolutionaries, as in Cuba, conducted a guerrilla campaign against the dictator's army and, also similar to Cuba, their struggle had a nationalistic sentiment to it. The Sandinistas, as did many of the people, resented the strong role that the United States played in their country and had played for decades. Allied to this was the severe economic problems that Nicaragua was facing and the way the effect of this was magnified on the poor. The original focus for discontent against Somoza was the assassination of a popular opposition newspaper editor. The people blamed it on Somoza and took to the streets in protest. As in Cuba, all this provoked was brutal repression as Somoza's regime resorted to using terror to try and stop the riots. This further alienated Somoza from the people and, after a bloody battle, Somoza left the country.

After examining the causes of the revolutions in each country separately, similarities between the two will now be examined. To begin this discussion, there is one major thing that both countries have in common that is extremely important to the occurrence of a revolution : both were under the rule of brutal dictators who had alienated large sections of the population immediately prior to the revolution. Both Batista and Somoza ruled their respective countries with an iron hand, and, more importantly, there were no structures in either country through which discontent with the government could be expressed. As there was no way that opponents of the government could make their opinions known without being arrested, the only way that was left for them was armed rebellion.

Wynia makes the point that "what matters most is not the government's military strength, but the degree to which the urban and rural publics actively oppose it and the price authorities are willing to pay to defend themselves" (Wynia,1990:p285). However, if a revolutionary movement has gained sufficient momentum, as had those in Cuba and Nicaragua, cracking down on support for it by the military can be counter-productive. It can simply steady the resolve of the people against the government and provide the final piece of evidence that they should unite against it, as happened in both the Cuban and Nicaraguan examples.

To conclude, there are many different reasons for the successful revolutions in Latin America having taken placed. It is difficult to pick out any one reason as totally crucial to their success and to leave out others. The poor economic situation of both countries must go down as a major contributory factor, again pointing to the accuracy of a nineteenth century statement from William Cobbett, "I defy you to agitate a man with a full belly."

Bibliography

Wynia, G : 1990

"The Politics of Latin American Development"

(Cambridge University Press)

Skidmore, T & Smith, P : 1992

"Modern Latin America"

(Oxford University Press)

Wiarda, H & Kline, F (eds) : 1990

"Latin American Politics and Development"

(Westview Press : Oxford)

Marshall, P : 1987

"Cuba Libre"