However it comes with several attachments, or what would be quantifiable as ‘limitations.’ These occur as this basic view tends to focus on the process of selection. For example this viewpoint is impotent in the tackling of institutional discrimination. Whilst the process of selection of a candidate will utilize equality of opportunity, there may be deeper structural characteristics that are present in the organization itself. This could be the length of working hours needed to work in order to achieve certain promotions, which overtly acts as a handicap to single mothers. Secondly, open competition can take place, but if mitigating factors of the candidate are allowed to be taken into account via the personal, or collectively held biases of the selecting powers; this process can then just become a façade. A façade that in the eyes of the law would be viewed as non-discriminatory and therefore non-discriminatory legislation alone is unable to combat the problem of inequality of opportunity. It therefore can be held that the opinion of equality of opportunity being one of, “Careers open to talents,” is more beneficial to those with affluent or favourable backgrounds, and this narrow focus is found wanting as it is still possible for major inequality of opportunity to occur.
The basic notion of equality of opportunity falls short of what I understand equality of opportunity to mean. This basic view would be better classified not as equality of opportunity but as a, “System of natural liberty” that is to say a formal right of equality of opportunity occurs with everyone possessing” The same legal rights of access to advantaged social positions” so all opportunities are thrown open to talent but there is no attempt made to preserve an equality or even similarity of social conditions among the competitors. I believe if this definition were to occur it would allow for a more definite distinction as to the understanding and meaning of equality of opportunity.
My understanding as of what equality of opportunity entails can be best summarised by “Those who are of the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system.” These conditions cannot be guaranteed to be met if we subscribe to the previous version of equality of opportunity, and society left to its own devices would not allow for equality of opportunity to exist either. Regardless of the fact that discriminatory practices are no longer legal, and many establishments have in good faith eliminated explicatory discriminate practices, women and people of colour continue to be the subject to often unconscious stereotypes, reactions, and expectations of the decision makers, who continue to be white or male, and usually both, affirmative action procedures are a necessary and just means of combating such assumptions and perceptions which persist in excluding women and people of colour.
This lack of equality of opportunity that exist without the intervention of affirmative action can be seen via initial critics of affirmative action, that have since changed their viewpoint due to empirical evidence. In Affirmative Discrimination. (New York: Basic books, 1975). Nathan Glazer argued the classic early statement against affirmative action, that is, now that legal protection against discrimination existed for groups that were previously discriminated against, they now would not need special preferences. Couple this with the fact that majority groups were to be discriminated against in order to achieve this, ran completely opposite to the notion of equality of opportunity. However in We are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), Glazer acknowledges the need for affirmative action because persistent segregation and discrimination continue to prevent blacks from realizing equality of opportunity.
Affirmative action or positive discrimination can take many forms, with varying levels of implementation. The fundamental aim of positive discrimination is to create practical polices which dismantle discrimination, be it institutionalised or informal cultural norms. There are certain methods of positive discrimination that do not encroach upon equality of opportunity, such as that of ‘tie-breaking’ where the individual from the marginalized group, is chosen in preference of an individual from a non-marginalized section of society, if both equally qualified. Equality of opportunity has not been breached, as the most qualified applicant is still the benefactor. However there are certain methods that do impede the notion of equality of opportunity, and herein lies the argument against positive discrimination. Procedures such as handicapping allow for a less qualified member of a marginal group to be preferred over a more qualified member of the non-marginalized group. This has created a situation where positive discrimination has inhibited equality of opportunity. However the counter argument to this is the primary purpose of positive discrimination is to mitigate the influence of current biases of institutions and decision makers it readjusts the position and possibilities able to those who would otherwise be less likely to succeed, yes it is a double edged sword, but it creates a rough-and-ready version of equality of opportunity. Which although is not perfect it is adequate For equality of opportunity to exist in any sort of notion or for society to move in a direction that is closer to this notion positive discrimination is a necessary evil.
The situation in existence can be summarized thus so, “If we do not use preferential hiring, we permit discrimination to exist. But preferential hiring is also discrimination. Thus if we use preferential hiring, we also permit discrimination to exist. The dilemma is that whatever we do, we permit discrimination.”
In the future I believe that there will be a continuous, gradual, movement towards equality of opportunity. This will be due to changing attitudes within society itself. A key component of this change will have been brought about by the effect upon society through the use of positive discrimination. The fact that institutions now employ historically subordinate members of society will lead to the breakdown of stereotypes and institutional discrimination. This in turn will lead to a situation where there will be less of a need for positive discrimination. Equality of opportunity may never be fully realised, however positive discrimination at least challenges the discriminatory practices, whereas to do nothing would be to abandon the principle of equality of opportunity, and it will therefore never be realised.
It is correct to say that as positive discrimination policies violate the principle of equal treatment and allow for favouritism to take place. In this sense, positive discrimination, and equality of opportunity will never be able to reconcile. However the alternative of permitting a system that whilst at face value should permit equality of opportunity to flourish, in fact due to human nature, and the predices we each posses in fact, ironically, creates social conditions that are more distant from the values of equality than if were are to use a tool that in itself is intrinsically at loggerheads with the notion of equality of opportunity, yet we arrive at a social position that is nearer to the accepted norms of an equal society. So it is based upon this argument if positive discrimination is viewed in the broader/wider social concept, then positive discrimination can be reconciled with the notion of equality of opportunity.
Rawls. J, Theory of Justice
Rawls. J, Theory of Justice
Rawls. J, Theory of Justice
Rawls. J, Theory of Justice
Schaar H John, ‘Equality of opportunity and the just society’ in John Rawls Theory of Social Justice (ed) Locker and Smith pp 168
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Davidson, 1076; cited in Fullinwider, 1980, pp. 151-52).
Glazer. Nathan. Affirmative Discrimination. (New York: Basic books, 1975).
Glazer. Nathan. We are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997),
Sumner, L Wayne ‘Positive sexism’ Social Philosophy and policy, vol. 5. no.1, 1987 pp135-144
Fullinwider, 1980 p156 (Young. Iris Marion, ‘The myth of merit’, Justice and the politics of difference p 194