The Climate Change Convention recalling and furthering the Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, and the Montreal Protocol on subsequence that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, as adjusted on 29th June 1990 (O’Riordan & Jäger, 1996). The Climate Change Convention in 1992 was considered as one of the most important events of the Earth Summit. It recognized that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects of humankind. The Climate Change Convention consent that the change in the global climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind. It involved that human activities have increased the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and the increases improve the natural greenhouse effects in which may result on average of the temperature increasing of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and that may adversely affect the ecosystems and humankind.
The major issues for the negotiating States
Vienna Convention
There are 43 nations and three industry groups attended the Vienna Convention. The negotiation over the Vienna Convention created the first international agreement to address CFCs. Within the low expectation, minimal public interest and no any environmental organizations’ participation (Klabbers & Lefeber, 1998). At the beginning, U.S. and European Community (EC) negotiators were in conflict. The U.S. position in which was backed by Northern European countries set up a ban on the use of CFC aerosol propellants. However, the European Community produce a ban on construction of new capacity argued against legal restrictions on consumption and favored limiting future CFC production levels. As the major CFC-producers France and the United Kingdom strongly supported this position over the opposite counties in which includes Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium. Because the EC industry had over production capacity, a restriction on new growth world allows to increase their production over the longer period while their competitive advantage over countries with nascent CFC industries was locked-in (Shanker, 2002). Since there is little environmental group interest in the negotiations, the industry groups influenced national positions strongly. The Alliance for a Responsible CFC Policy, a lobbying group of the U.S. with fifty companies, represented U.S. chemical industry interests during the negotiations. And the multinationals Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and Atochem strongly lobbied the UK and French governments. The 1978’s U.S. aerosol ban had result in the competitive dynamic of worldwide CFC sales. During the negotiations over the next few year, American industry groups showed more prefer to support international controls that their European counterparts. However, besides the issue of banning CFC aerosol propellants, industry was united in its opposition to further controls. Around 20 countries signed the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer as the result of these initial negotiations. The Convention rather than controls on CFC consumption or production encouraged for countries to take “appropriate measures” to protect the ozone layer and set up an international mechanism for the information exchange. It was hoped this information would form the basis for setting up a global production baseline since the limited known about the scale of CFC production in Soviet bloc and developing countries. At the end of the meeting, although encountered with the objection of the EC, a non-binding resolution was passed calling for the next meeting to work toward a legally binding protocol addressing controls. Although the Vienna Convention’s failure to establish controls on production or consumption, the future of CFCs still seemed bright (Sinclair, 1984).
Climate Change Convention
The Climate Change Convention in 1992 unlike the Vienna Convention would contain specific binding obligations to reduce GHG emissions. By the time of the opening session of the Climate Convention negotiations, numerous countries had committed to reduce GHG emissions. The European Community (EC) had committed to returning its joint carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The EC reasserted the commitment in Chantilly and promised to provide financial assistance to help developing countries respond to climate change. The position was established by individual country commitments by Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Austria, Norway, and Canada. Many of these commitments over stabilization at 1990 levels or promised deeper carbon dioxide cuts in later years. Japan had encouraged for negotiation first of a basic framework, but suggested the convention should contain concrete measures to be taken by the parties (Barrett & Stavins, 2003). There are 77 developing countries point out the fact that 75 percent of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are attribute to industrialized countries. The developing countries thought they have a responsibility not to follow the same path and called for industrialized countries on non-commercial terms to help them avoid the environmentally destructive aspects of development. However, the United States as a developed country refused targets and timetables, and they advocate taken actions only in some aspects as they produced benefits having nothing to do with global warming. For instance, the U.S might advocate to use a new technology that may benefits to deal with global warming if it showed more cost-effective, or reduced urban pollution, but not only to reducing GHG emissions. The U.S. also supported further research to solve uncertainties and a comprehensive approach to reducing emissions, which would consider not only carbon dioxide but all Greenhouse gases. The United States tried to avoid some of the criticism in the first negotiating round by releasing a White House “Action Agenda”, aimed to demonstrate that the U.S. acting responsibly concerns bout its GHG emissions. And unlike the European plan, the U.S. tends to contemplate significant increased in domestic carbon dioxide emissions. However, both the Europeans and environmentalists think the U.S. plan was irrational since CFCs were already planed to be phased out under the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone layer, and were not comprised in other countries’ emissions reductions plans. In order to break the deadlock between the U.S. and EC on the questions of whether the agreement should comprise firm commitments to reduce Greenhouse gases at the first round, the U.K. Environment Secretary traveled to the United States before the start of the second round with an offer of compromise. Under the support of the U.K. and France, Japan floated and informal paper proposing an approach of “pledge and review”. And environmentalists were quick to demonstrate this approach as “hedge and retreat”. In Nairobi in September in 1991, the environmentalists’ criticism reaffirmed their support for stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 (Campiglio, Pineschi, Sinicalco & Treves, 1994).
In conclusion, although the Framework Convention on Climate Change was in many ways disappointing to environmentalists, undoubtedly it was a positive step in the control of greenhouse gases.
References:
Barrett, S. & Stavins, R. (2003), “Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol.3, No.4, pp. 349.
Campiglio, L., Pineschi, L., Sinicalco, D. & Treves, T. (1994), The Environment after Rio International Law and Economics, Graham & Trotman Ltd.
Johnson, S. P. & Corcelle, G. (1995), The Environmental Policy of the European Communities, Kluwer Law International Sterling House, 66 Wilton Road, London.
Klabbers, J. & Lefeber, R. (1998), Essays on the Law of Treaties, Kluwer Law International, P.O. Box 85889, 2508 CN The Hague, The Netherlands.
O’Riordan, T. & Jäger, J. (1996), Politics of Climate Change, Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London.
Shanker, D. (2002), “The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, the dispute settlement system of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs agreement”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 721.
Sinclair, I.M. (1984), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Dover, N.H.: Manchester University Press.
Vig, N.J. & Axelrod, R.S. (1999), The Global Environment, Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1414 22nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.