The mens rea requirement for murder can be satisfied by an intention to kill or to cause GBH, malice afterthought put more simply but interpreted by courts as to what was mentioned above. As an alternative to an intention to kill, which is very important. D acts or omits to act with the Intention to cause GBH if she intends directly, or oblique to cause a really serious bodily harm. For example, an intention to severely injure S would result to an intention to cause GBH. The jury would have access what D was thinking, how much harm does D Intend to cause at that time, and then the jury would have to decide whether it is equivalent to the legal term of at least GBH.
Allowing the liability for murder where D acts with the intention to cause GBH means that the murder is a constructive liability offence, where D acts with the intention to kill, there is uncontroversial correspondence between the actus reus which is causing the death and intending to do (mens rea). Nevertheless, when D acts with the intention to cause ‘merely’ GBH, it fully does not correspond with the actus reus of causing death. Rather D’s mens rea corresponds with the actus reus of causing GBH, with the additional actus reus element ‘causing death’ constructing upon this. D is liable for murder on the basis of constructive liability. The possibility for constructive liability in murder, where D intends to cause GBH has suffered several criticisms from academics and appeal court judges vividly.
Criticisms tend to arise because in different cases D may choose not to kill or risk the act of killing and therefore lacks the blame to deserve a liability for murder. For example, considering the case of D, who shoots W in the leg as a result of W’s unfaithfulness. D
intends to cause GBH, but does not want W to die. D is then liable for a serious offence against the person. However, where W dies as a result of the shot or an injury resulting to death, or lack of treatment, V’s liability then increases to murder and there will be the application of a mandatory life sentence. Under the law, D will satisfy the mens rea for murder even if she had no intention that her conduct will cause killing W, as long as D intends a certain level of harm that the jury interpret as GBH.
Despite the criticisms that have still been visible of the various aspects of the offence of murder, and the various reform recommendation, it is still very important that the law has remained largely unchanged over the past 50 years. They are two major areas of criticisms which have been identified and some recommendations for reform that have been offered. These relate to the maintenance of the mandatory life sentence and the scope of the mens rea for murder. Debates about the appropriate boundaries of murder have generally focused on mens rea elements, and some examples provide useful illustrations. In an article published 1988, lord Goff recommends that reforming the current law would narrow the current law by removing liability where D intends GBH, as opposed to death and by narrowing an intention to kill to direct intention only, it will widen it by allowing liability where D is “wickedly reckless” as to death. Goff would narrow the law excluding those who intend to cause GBH because he believes such defendants are inappropriately classified as murders. Alternatively, Goff would find liability where D is wickedly reckless as to death, this would apply where D did not necessarily act with the purpose of killing W, but her actions demonstrated a careless disregard for V’s life. Understanding this, it is useful to also to see the rebuttal of Goff’s approach in the reply article of Glanville Williams. The law commission is a review of murder, the commission sets of recommendations for a new ladder of homicide offences including first degree punished a mandatory life sentences, a new offence of second degree murder, punished with a discretionary life sentence and manslaughter punished with a discretionary life sentence. The separation of first and second degree murder allows the commission to narrow the offence of first degree and, thereby, the mandatory sentence. Furthermore, in a recent article, Norrie discusses the social definition of murder. He examined the claims of those calling for murder as manslaughter liability. The article focuses on the current law and it should be interpreted in order to meet social demands.
In conclusion, mens rea of murder is often referred to as malice afterthought, however, malice afterthought is commonly referred to as a work of art. The term is commonly referred to as misleading because it should consider sense of ill planning or preparing. Malice afterthought can be classified among the intention to kill or to cause great bodily harm. Despite several criticisms that have been raised there are different recommendations from articles of Norrie, the law commission and the lord Goff, different approaches regarding the scope of the mens rea of murder. In my opinion, the current law could be improved with the recommendations which have been identified by these academics to help improve and interpreted In order to meet social demands.
Cunningham [1982] AC566; Moloney [1985] AC 905.
DPP V Smith [1961] AC 290.
Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846.
Mitchell, “In Defence of the Correspondence Principle” [1999] Crim LR 195; cf Horder, ‘a Critique of the correspondence Principle in Criminal law’ [1995] Crim LR 795.
Hyam [1975] AC 55, the reasoning of Lord Diplock.
Goff, ‘The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder’ (1988) 104.
Williams, ‘The Mens Rea of Murder: Leave it Alone’ (1989) 105 LQR 387.
Law commission, A New Homicide Act for England and wales ? (Consultation 177, 2005); law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and infanticide(No 304, 2006).
Ashworth, ‘Principles, Pragmatism and the Law Commission’s Recommendations on Homicide Law Reform’ [2007] Crim LR 333.
Norrie, ‘Legal and Social Murder: What’s the Difference?’ [2018] Crim LR 531