“It is an accepted fact that the responsibility for coping with children is viewed by many people as falling to the female of the family. In asking questions … as to her children [the employer] obviously did not put [the applicant] at her ease. It is clear that any reasonable interviewee would infer from the questions/statements made by [the employer] that they were being asked to demonstrate that their responsibility to their children would not interfere with their ability to cope with the job for which they were competing.”
Although it is worth cautioning you that Labour Court determinations are not bound by precedent (unlike the European Court of Justice rulings on equality cases or those settled in the Circuit Court or High Court on a point of law) and rather take each case on its merits. However the Court has been strict on this issue. Similar discriminatory styles of questioning and hostile interviewing techniques to that which you experienced were suffered by the claimants in Medical Council v. Barrington, Trinity College Dublin v. McGhee, and Ballinrobe Community School v. Mary Walsh, Kathleen Jackson and Helen Acton, where the gender of the complainant was ruled to have influenced the outcome of the interview and compensation was duly awarded. Direct discrimination on the grounds of gender in an interview process was also established in the analogous claim of the complainant in Lisa Rodmell v. University of Dublin, Trinity College where Ms. Rodmell was also deemed to have been unfairly identified by her gender. In South Eastern Health Board v. Brigid Burke, the respondent was adjudged to have manipulated the scoring of the interview in a discriminatory manner, another potential explanation as to why a comparably under-qualified applicant was chosen for the promotion in your stead. The complainant in Eircom v. Boland was also determined to have been the victim of a gender biased promotion competition.
Another case bearing a resemblance to the present circumstances is DCU v. Horgan where the Labour Court found the female complainant had been victim of gender discrimination in a promotion process and had been treated less favourably than her male comparators despite being better qualified than them.
Given the distorted nature of the questioning in your interview, I am assuming that there was little effort on the employer’s behalf to abide by set criteria of questioning or keep adequate records of the interview. In Daughters of Charity v. Martha McGinn where the complainant did establish a prima facie case of discrimination, despite the Labour Court intimating that much of the case pointed away from any conclusions of discrimination, the lack of interview records did not allow for the discharge of the burden of proof from the respondent and on the “balance of probabilities” the claim for discriminatory treatment was upheld. Similarly in Jones v. Norwich Union International Ltd. a claim for gender discrimination was successful with the equality officer referring to the decision of the Labour Court in the Department of Health & Children v. John Gillen where the Court found:
“A failure to keep records of the interview process, which of itself may not be discriminatory, when coupled with other factors, may lead a Court to infer that there has been discrimination.”
When faced with a contradiction of evidence between the parties, the equality officer will be inclined to side with the party with the clearer recollection of the context of the interview, which tends to be the party to whom the claim holds greater significance: the individual claimant themselves.
In terms of the ultimate outcome of the interview process, sometimes a situation arises where an employer can prove that the rejection of an applicant was explainable in non-discriminatory terms but the questions asked in the interview were still found to be discriminatory, and thus recovery applies. In Midland International v. Murray, discriminatory questions relating to childcare were asked but were not adjudged to be the reason behind the applicant’s failure to acquire the work. This is unlikely in your case however. Based on your qualifications and familiarity within the company, the sole rationale behind your failed interview was gender discrimination based on your marital status and pregnancy.
“Pregnancy is one of a small group of human characteristics and conditions that are biologically determined by sex and which are, accordingly, peculiar to one of the sexes.” It is the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that has committed itself to gender equality as a basic principle of EC law and has led the way on this issue and will take a highly compassionate view of your complaints. It has adopted a firm and unsympathetic stance on pregnancy discrimination, treating it as a strict liability offence with the establishment of the ‘Pregnancy Directive’ and rejected any absurd requirement for a ‘sick male’ comparison.. Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus was a landmark case in the subject of pregnancy discrimination. Here the ECJ held that action hostile to the employee or potential employee on the basis of pregnancy is to be considered a product of direct sex discrimination and cannot be justified on the grounds of economic feasibility. The decision of the ECJ in Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd only served to highlight the Luxembourg Court as the purveyor of change. An employer cannot use the complainant’s unavailability for work as a rationale for dismissing her. This decision only serves to underline the weightiness of your claim and emphasizes a fact that that should be well and truly ingrained in the minds of all employers; discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy will not be tolerated.
Subsequent decisions in Ireland have replicated the European approach. The conclusions in Harco Investments Ltd. (T/A Wilton Hair and Beauty Salon) v. Lorraine O’Sullivan, Kwok Lee & Yuk Lee (T/A Peking House) v. Michelle Fox, Dollymount Crèche & Montessori School v. Siobhan Finnerty and Shinkwin v. Millett all point toward an extremely uncompromising attitude to pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, and signify reform in Labour Court recommendations in these cases. Ill-treatment of a woman during her pregnancy for absences relating to a pregnancy-related illness was also deemed discriminatory in North Western Health Board v. McKenna, a case that was ultimately referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Pregnancy discrimination has evidently become an expensive concern for employers, with compensation payouts often averaging a full year’s salary. The Equality Officer in the recent hearing of Lane v. MBNA – a case that encompassed similar circumstances to those incurred by you - decided to award the complainant €17,000 for the gender discrimination suffered, and in doing so illustrated the likelihood of your claim succeeding in the present climate.
I would also draw striking similarities between your situation and that of the claimant in Pamella Scott v. Deborah Costello. In this case the employee had also progressed through the preliminary stages of a promotion procedure only for her second interview to be cancelled having made it known to her employer that she had become pregnant. Ms. Costello was permitted to recover compensation in respect of the employer breaching both the Equal Treatment Directive and sections 6(2) and 8 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004. Just like in this case, your interview was effectively (but not literally) ‘cancelled’ once the interview panel became aware of your pregnancy (the thought process of the interviewing panel was irrevocably contaminated from this point onwards); the only difference being that the employer knew of this fact before the interview was allowed to take place rather than during it in your case.
As you can see, your case is by no means unique. In fact the Equality Authority revealed that it receives roughly 300 complaints (10% of all Equality authority casework files under the Employment Equality Acts) relating to pregnancy discrimination every year. Authority CEO Niall Crowley reveals that the Labour Court is intent on “sending out a strong unequivocal message” that such discrimination will not be tolerated.
Having ascertained the protection afforded to you by the law and disclosing to you the relevant case-law that will provide authenticity to your claim, it is necessary that we consider the options available to you in formally processing the claim.
I must firstly remind you that you are entitled by law to request and receive a rationalization of events from your employer’s perspective. It is open to the Company to refuse to provide such information to you and in those circumstances inferences can be drawn into their refusal at a subsequent Tribunal hearing. You can then refer a claim to the Equality Tribunal within six months of the date when the act of discrimination (the interview) occurred by completing an EE.1 form provided by the Tribunal. The Tribunal may extend the time limit up to a maximum of twelve months in exceptional circumstances. The Labour Court acknowledged such exceptional circumstances on behalf of the complainant in ALDI Stores (Ireland) Limited v. Jennifer Murphy, however it is generally stringent in what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’. A communicative problem between complainant and solicitor (GMK Ltd v. Julie Embleton) or a pregnancy (Mercury Analytical Ltd. v. Christine O’Callaghan) or non-serious illness (Calyx Ltd. v. James Mills) does not constitute ‘exceptional’ in the opinion of the Court. However my advice is that you proceed immediately to initiate a claim if that is your intention since there are no guarantees that an extension of time will be granted to you.
An Equality Officer will subsequently investigate the issue on a quasi-judicial basis. If the matter is one that is deemed reconcilable via mediation, an Equality Mediation Officer will be selected to mediate between both parties. This however is not compulsory and will not apply if either party objects.
The Tribunal may not award costs (legal fees, travelling expenses, etc.) in any event. Accordingly if you are successful you must still pay your legal advisors. However you do you face the risk of having an award of costs made against you in the event that your case fails. The Equality Officer does have a choice of possible corrective remedies in equality cases such as your claim. Under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004, the Tribunal can make an order for your employer to improve its equality policy. Akin to DCU v. Horgan it may also compensate you up to two tears earnings for the distress caused and instruct your employer to appoint you to the position you sought with full retrospection of salary and benefits. If this is not logistically possible, as in Eircom Ltd. v. Bridget Gertrude Boland, then it may recommend that you be appointed to the next promotion position that becomes available and award you further compensation in respect of arrears of pay, which you would have received had you been treated fairly in the initial interview process and promoted accordingly.
If not satisfied with the verdict of the Equality Officer, you may appeal in writing to the Labour Court within 42 days of the decision and are enforceable by the Circuit Court. The only further avenue of an appeal is to the High Court on a point of a law. The decisions and recommendations of both the Labour Court and Equality Tribunal under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004 are legally binding and decisions are published.
You may however choose to overlook the Equality Tribunal entirely and refer your grievance directly to the Circuit Court.
Section 14 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004 specifically protects you from being unjustly victimized in any way for making a complaint about discrimination. In the aforementioned dispute of Lane v. MBNA, the respondents were obliged to pay the complainant hefty compensation of €30,000 for the victimisation alone that she endured. With the details of this case being so similar to your proposed claim, I feel that you are in a strong position, in that your employer would be unlikely to victimise you and run the risk of incurring a similar penalty.
In the present case it is obvious you were blatantly the most qualified candidate for the post advertised and your non-selection must have been based on discriminatory grounds, namely your marital status and pregnancy. You have substantial grounds to constitute a prima facie case against your employer and the onus will be on them to demonstrate that they reached their decision to engage Ross based on purely objective reasons based upon the suitability of each of you to carry out your job in a proper manner. They must prove either, that the contentious questions were a necessary part of the interview and served a functional purpose; they were asked of all the candidates and ‘male comparators’; or that they served to satisfy specific criteria set out prior to the interview process.
Yours sincerely,
Ciarán Jennings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Textbooks
Connolly M., Discrimination Law, First Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2006.
Forde M., Employment Law, Second Edition, Dublin: Round Hall Ltd, 2001.
Gregory R.F., Women and Workplace Discrimination: Overcoming Barriers to Gender Equality, Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
Hervey K. & O’Keefe D., Sex Equality Law in the European Union, Chichester: John Wiley, 1996.
Kerr A., Employment Equality Legislation, Second Edition, Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005.
McColgan A., Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Second Edition, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005.
Journal Articles
Barry E, ‘Direct Discrimination, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave and the Sick Male Comparison’, (1993) 11 ILT 94. Available at: Last accessed 24/11/08
Gill T. & Monaghan K., ‘Justification in Direct Sex Discrimination Law: Taboo Upheld’, (2003) 32 ILJ 115. Available at: <> Last accessed 18/11/08.
Flynn L, ‘Discriminatory Questions in Job Interviews’, (1993) 11 ILT 221. Available at: Last accessed 15/11/08.
Flynn L, ‘Pregnancy and Dismissal: Rejecting the ‘Sick Male’ Comparison’, (1994) 12 ILT 257. Available at: Last accessed 30/11/08
Honeyball S., ‘Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination’, (2000) 31 ILJ 43. Available at:
Last accessed 18/11/08.
Other Sources
LIST OF STATUTES
European Community Statutes
Council Directive on the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination Based on Sex (Directive 97/80/EC as of December 15, 1997)
Council Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (Directive 2002/73/EC amending Directive 76/207/EEC as of September 23, 2002)
Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Directive 2000/78/EC as of 27 November, 2000)
See both Employment Equality Act 1998, S .25(3)
Ibid. 1, at s.22. Examples of indirect sex discrimination in a job application process may include age bars and experience requirements affecting women who have taken time off to rear their children, unsocial hour’s constraints discriminating against mothers or height/weight obligations. See McColgan A., Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Second Edition, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005, p74, 75.
Forde M., Employment Law, Second Edition, Dublin: Round Hall Ltd. 2001, p143, 144. Also see Gill T. & Monaghan K., ‘Justification in Direct Sex Discrimination Law: Taboo Upheld’, (2003) 32 ILJ 115, where any such justification is intensely opposed due to the inconsistencies that will arise in discrimination law Last accessed 18/11/08.
The EE.1 Forms now even incorporate pregnancy into the gender category, Last accessed 30/11/08
Connolly M., Discrimination Law, First Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2006, p59, 60.
Council Directive 2002/73/EC as of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.
Note that Council Directive 2006/54/EC, to come into effect by August 2010, is a recast directive that combines previous directives and case-law on equal treatment for women and men in employment. The directive characterizes sexual harassment as both a form of sex discrimination and a violation of dignity in the workplace. See Last accessed 15/11/08
A more powerful indication of the law’s desire for equality is through the encouragement of ‘positive action’ (s. 24 (as amended by s.15, 2004 Equality Act) which approves of the implementation of measures intended to promote equal opportunities for men and women in the workplace. See Case C-450/93 Kalanke v. Frei Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051 and Case C-409/95 Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363.
Article 2(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC as of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (as amended by Council Directive 2002/73/EC).
See Case C-320/01 Wiebke Busch v Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG [2003] ECR I-02041
Gregory, Raymond F., Women and Workplace Discrimination: Overcoming Barriers to Gender Equality, Rutgers University Press, 2003, p16-19
See Flynn L, ‘Discriminatory Questions in Job Interviews’, (1993) 11 ILT 221 Last accessed 15/11/08
See < > Last accessed 10/11/08
Note the decisions of the Labour Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Robert Sheehan [DEC-E2002-047], National Museum of Ireland, The Department of Arts, Heritage, The Gaeltacht and Islands, The Attorney General v. Dr. Anne O’Dowd [DEC-E2001-14] and Three Named Male Employees v. An Post [DEC-2005-013] where a prima facie claim for gender discrimination in the interview process was not established.
Cited by Labour Court in Co. Louth VEC v. Don Johnson [Dec-E2006-052]
Ibid. 13. Also see Sacred Heart Secondary School v. Duggan [EE 13/1992] where the equality officer noted the sincerity of the respondent’s version of events while still opting to trust the complainant’s account.
This approach has courted controversy, with many believing comparison to be fundamental to discrimination law. See Barry E, ‘Direct Discrimination, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave and the Sick Male Comparison’, (1993) 11 ILT 94 and Flynn L, ‘Pregnancy and Dismissal: Rejecting the ‘Sick Male’ Comparison’, (1994) 12 ILT 257 Last accessed 30/11/08
Case C-177/88 [1990] ECR 1-3941
Some academic commentators have also queried the incorporation of pregnancy into gender discrimination. They consider the concept to be flawed and inadequate in a scenario where two females apply for the same position. If the failed applicant happens to be pregnant, can she then bring a claim of sex discrimination against the employer? See Honeyball S., ‘Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination’, (2000) 31 ILJ 43
Last accessed 18/11/08
The Labour Court contradicted this decision somewhat in Winston’s Jewellers v. Mason [ED/02/20, Determination No. EED032], where the respondent’s financial woes were deemed sufficient to permit the redundancy of a pregnant employee.
See, e.g., Hervey K. & O’Keefe D., Sex Equality Law in the European Union, Chichester: John Wiley, 1996, p52-54.
Determination No. EED316 (2003)
Determination No. EED039 (2003)
Determination No. EED034 (2003)
Determination No. EED044 (2004)
Council Directive 76/207/EEC (as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC)
See <http://www.independent.ie/national-news/pregnancy-bias-is-widespread-494557.html> Last accessed 19/11/08
See < > Last accessed 20/11/08
Kerr A., Employment Equality Legislation, Second Edition, Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005, p L-304
Determination No. EET041 (2004)
Determination No. EET033 (2003)
Determination No. EET035 (2003)
See < > Last accessed 30/11/08
See < > Last accessed 21/11/08
Determination EEO032 (2003)
Statutory Instrument No. 880/2004 – Circuit Court Rules (Employment Equality Act, 1998), 2004, Rule 7
See Last accessed 19/11/08
Council Directive 97/80/EC as of 15 December 1997 on the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination Based on Sex. See also McColgan, p304.