Did media coverage of the Vietnam War change the war's course and outcome?
Did media coverage of the Vietnam War change the war's course and outcome?
The American military action in Vietnam, from 1954's first CIA military mission in Saigon to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, has been the single most important war in recent history with respect to the relationship between the media and the military government. It was the first war where absolute freedom of the press was granted and where the technology was available to bring almost real-time media coverage to the citizens of America and the rest of the world. The lasting effects of the media coverage of Vietnam have been seen in every war since and unrestricted media access is not likely to be seen again in any conflict.
The debate over how much, if any, influence the media had over the wars final outcome has been a persistent one and is likely to continue for a long time to come. As a result, there is almost limitless material advocating each side of the argument, some statistical and some opinionated. This essay will attempt to study a balanced mixture of the differing arguments and draw some conclusions based on the evidence.
The first issue I wish to look at is a temporal analysis of the changing positivity of the media coverage by considering significant points in the war that were heavily covered in the media.
There was a steady build up of US military support activity in Vietnam throughout the period 1954 to 1965, but the first combat troops did not appear until March 1965. During this period, western media concentration in the area was very slow in building up, the first resident TV correspondent, NBC's Garrick Utley, only arriving in late 1964. The media did build up and as the war became progressively more serious, journalists were sent out in increasing numbers. I believe it would be fair to say that media presence in Vietnam itself increased approximately in proportion to the military presence.
The media back in the US were also reporting on the war and their stories also included the increase in anti-war sentiment. These stories included the 'Students for a Democratic Society' rally in 1965 and the Washington D.C. rally of 1967 that involved 50,000 people. The equivalent rally in 1969 involved 250,000 people. The event that is widely regarded as the turning point for media sentiment was the 1968 Tet offensive, a surprise attack by the communist forces on US military installations including the occupation of the US embassy in Saigon.
The Journal of Politics offers some statistical analysis of media coverage pre, during and post the Tet period. A random sample of 779 television broadcasts from August 1965 to January 1973 below shows the direction of television Journalists editorial comments on the major actors of the Vietnam War.1
Favourability to action or policy of:
Administration
South VN Gov
Dove critics
North VN
Pre-Tet Period
Favourable
78.6% (11)
50% (2)
0% (0)
0% (0)
Unfavourable
21.4% (3)
50% (2)
00% (2)
00% (20)
Tet Period
Favourable
0% (0)
0% (0)
0% (0)
40% (2)
Unfavourable
00% (6)
00% (3)
00% (3)
60% (3)
Post-Tet Period
Favourable
28.8% (23)
29.8% (17)
31.8% (7)
25.6% (10
Unfavourable
71.3% (57)
70.2% (40)
68.2% (15)
74.4% (29)
Note: the periods referred to are: pre-Tet (20th august 1965 to 30th January 1968), Tet (31st January 1968 to 31 March 1968), post-Tet (1st April 1968 to 26th January 1973). Bracketed data are the number of references for each possibility.1
The table shows a shift in media opinion from pre to post-Tet away from the US administration and towards the North Vietnamese. It also shows an enormous increase in the number of references to the war in general in the post-Tet period. This data seems to support the theory that 'prior to the Tet offensive, the Media portrayed the battle as 'our war', which quickly changed to 'the war' as feelings became mixed.'2
The enormous increase in numbers of references to the war post-Tet does also suggest that the media was paying more attention to the ...
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The table shows a shift in media opinion from pre to post-Tet away from the US administration and towards the North Vietnamese. It also shows an enormous increase in the number of references to the war in general in the post-Tet period. This data seems to support the theory that 'prior to the Tet offensive, the Media portrayed the battle as 'our war', which quickly changed to 'the war' as feelings became mixed.'2
The enormous increase in numbers of references to the war post-Tet does also suggest that the media was paying more attention to the war in general. Reporting on the success and failure of the battles was only one of the stories that the media covered. The US troops in Vietnam were also the focus of the media spotlight. The same Journal of Politics study discovered a shift in media coverage of the morale of the troops over the war also.3
Positive and negative references to the morale of US troops
Positive references
Negative references
Pre-Tet Period
4
0
Tet Period
0
Post-Tet period
2.5
4.5
This data shows a huge increase in negative references to the morale of US troops in the post-Tet period, 'these figures reflect primarily an increase in stories about drug use, attacks on officers, protests by soldiers and refusals to follow orders.'3 Although this data is a reasonable reflection on the actual number of insubordination convictions and incidents of 'fragging' (attacks on officers), the effects of this coverage on the US public are very significant indeed. The idea that the 'boys' fighting the war were not confident of winning, or did not consider that they were doing the right thing, can have done nothing but proliferate the anti-war sentiment back home.
So what effect was all this coverage having in the US? Up until Tet, the media had portrayed the US army as winning a necessary war through announcing low US body counts and high Vietnamese body counts. As mentioned earlier, there were limited anti-war demonstrations in Washington in 1967, but these were not on a significant scale. The President, Lyndon Johnson, had the American public convinced that the US were succeeding. The Tet offensive was not entirely unexpected by the US military, in fact, the eventual outcome was very positive, in military terms, for the US as the Vietnamese suffered enormous casualties and were driven back. The Press in Saigon and the editors in America were not expecting the attack and assumed that the military did not either. Seeing the US embassy taken by the enemy and much fighting inside supposed American strongholds had a salutary effect, the press portrayed the story as a defeat, 'television fell prey to its chronic lust for drama.'4
Even as the Tet offensive was driven back, the media were reporting a resounding victory for the Vietnamese 'the surprise was a story; recovery was not.' The way it was reported the whole balance of the war seemed to have changed and suddenly total defeat was being discussed. Lyndon Johnson had repeatedly spoken positively about the progress of the war and his reputation was terminally dented by the Tet offensive. Most significantly for LBJ was the visit to Vietnam by respected journalist Walter Cronkite, who claimed that 'all the US had left to do in Vietnam was negotiate'. Johnson's reaction to this was to acknowledge that when he 'lost Walter Cronkite he lost the war and certainly his own presidency'. This would suggest a significant influence of the media, but may be an exaggeration as Johnson's decline had already started before the Tet-offensive.
Subsequent to the Tet-offensive, the level and the pattern of media coverage of the US action in Vietnam was subject to a wind-change as many of the stories from the front line were overshadowed by news of domestic controversy. President Johnson was under fire from anti-war 'doves' and submitted to both ceasing the bombing of North Vietnam and beginning the Paris Peace talks. As expected, he also announced his decision not to stand for re-election.
One of the prevailing themes of Johnson's presidency was his determination to stick to his bottom line policy of 'no wider war' and 'no pullout' leaving little room for manoeuvre. Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, in an attempt to win the public support back in mid-1969 announced a plan of 'Vietnamization' of the war. This involved replacing US troops with more South Vietnamese soldiers, trained and armed by the US, subsequently the first US troop withdrawals from Vietnam started in June 1969. Unfortunately for Nixon, this did not deter the anti-war protestors who demonstrated in record numbers (250,000) in Washington in November 1969.
Even worse was to come for Nixon as each of his decisions on the war was interpreted differently, by both the press and the public, to how he intended. In 1970 the combined US and South Vietnamese armies attacked the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia and the US public were in uproar over what they saw as 'widening' of the war. The press in Vietnam saw this assault very differently, they were observing simultaneous withdrawals of troops as the attack on Cambodia took place. They interpreted the whole attack as a cover for these troop withdrawals.
The coverage of the actual fighting was declining, just at a time when the American military advisers hoped to push for victory. The North Vietnamese losses subsequent to the Tet offensive had left them vulnerable and it was expected that an immediate attempt to sever the Ho Chi Minh trail would allow the US forces the opportunity for total victory. The news, however, was almost entirely focussed on the growing anti-war controversy in the US and stories of low morale and indiscipline among the US troops.
The best example of this indiscipline can be found in the yearlong coverage of the March 1968 massacre by US troops in the village of My Lai. Reports of this event did not come out until mid 1969 and were still being investigated in 1970 when the protests in the US reached critical mass and four students were killed by National Guardsmen at a university demonstration. No wonder then, that the actual fighting was less well covered.
Then in 1972 the North Vietnamese launched a massive tank-led offensive which became known as the Easter Offensive. Similar in scale to the Tet-offensive, this attack was reported very differently, why was this? Firstly, the major US news companies sent their most experienced reporters to cover this assault, these reporters did not panic or instantly report exaggerated defeats or successes. Secondly, the reason those journalists arrived at an appropriate time was that the Pentagon had given ample warning that something 'big' was going to happen. Thirdly, Richard Nixon did not repeat the mistakes of Johnson and continue to insist that progress was being made. Instead, he responded to the assault with decisive actions; despatching more ships and armaments and bombing Hanoi.
A comparison of the Tet-offensive and the Easter offensive suggests that if better handled, the media would report favourably, not only on the war, but also towards the President and his military policies. This was confirmed by the resounding defeat of the democrat peace-at-any-price candidate, George McGovern in the 1972 elections. Nixon, however, did not aggressively follow through with the war and by April 1973 the last known US POWs were released and brought home, the last US troops to leave Vietnam. The media too, true to form, followed the troops home, only to return once more in 1975 when the North Vietnamese finally overwhelmed the South and Vietnam was unified.
So, the evidence shows us that throughout the Vietnam War the media was present and reporting (albeit to differing levels of proficiency) for all of the major events both in Vietnam and back in the US. To what extent, if any, did this coverage change the outcome of the war?
It would be fair to say that the Tet offensive was the most important event in determining the outcome of the war, especially in the context of the media. The media definitely reported the attack in the worst possible way for the US army. Reactionary young journalists, who had not previously seen any real fighting were suddenly surrounded by fighting in the streets and assumed that the North Vietnamese had won a great victory. The US government and army were partly to blame for this though because they knew the attack was going to happen and failed to warn the journalists for reasons of security. There was also no public announcement of decisive action by Lyndon Johnson to drive the Vietnamese back. There was a subsequent recovery by the Americans and the media failed to report this. The evidence shows that the Tet-offensive was the turning point in the war, not militarily, but for public support. Perhaps if the outcome of the battle had been reported more accurately the outcome of the war would have been different.
Public support in the US was another huge influence on the outcome of the war. The countless domestic controversies gave opponents of the war in the senate ammunition with which to attack the president. This forced government into adopting a more defensive military policy that may have affected the chances of total victory for the US. Was the media to blame for this? Certainly, the television pictures in every living room in America were showing the true horror of war for the first time. Reports of military failures (especially Tet) and moral atrocities such as the My Lai incident created an air of scepticism. The media at home were also reporting the growing number and ferocity of anti-war demonstrations, legitimising pacificism.
Once again, the government and military were equally to blame. Weak leadership, especially from Lyndon Johnson, did not inspire confidence in the war effort. Evidence does also suggest that there was never full public support for the war, even before the negative publicity started. The reasons for the war, to stop the advance of communism (the Domino Theory), were not clearly articulated, particularly when compared with the obvious imperative that media coverage of Pearl Harbour gave at the start of World War II (At least the start for the Americans!). A large number of anti-war activists were soldiers who had returned from Vietnam with first-hand stories of the atrocities that were occurring. The argument here is whether the media were active or passive in the changing public opinion. Media supporters would argue that all they were doing was reflecting public opinion, whereas media critics claim that they were encouraging the growing anti-war feelings in order to make a story. Evidence supports both arguments to a certain extent.
Why were these ex-soldiers coming home and protesting against the war? This is a direct result of the low troop morale seen increasingly throughout the war. Certainly, media reports of declining public support back home must have negatively affected morale. The Vietnamese, seeing the effect of low morale on the troops and the US public intensified their directed attacks on officers as the war progressed. The media dutifully reported these attacks as well as the examples of indiscipline amongst US troops, perhaps being manipulated by the North Vietnamese to some extent.
The North Vietnamese obviously watched the coverage of the war in the US with interest, did any of the coverage lead to the North Vietnamese gaining a tactical advantage over the US? A study by Oscar Patterson examined 847 Vietnam-related stories and applied the 12 Gulf-war reporting rules to them. These rules included; the banning of imagery or photography that displayed the location of military installations or forces, the banning of revealing rules of engagement details, the banning of information relating to specific numbers of losses which may give the enemy a tactical advantage. I hesitate to treat the report too seriously as many of these rules were written with the Vietnam war as a guide, but of the 847 reports studied, 901 violations of the 12 rules occurred.5
In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the media did have a definite effect on the course of the Vietnam War. This was almost inevitable considering the freedom given to the press in Vietnam. The outcome of the war is a different matter. Media champions would say that the press were the heroes of the time, giving voice to the people of America who did not want to be involved in a war with Vietnam, forcing the Government to listen to the public. Media critics have the opposite view, vilifying the media and accusing them of betraying the brave troops in Vietnam. Certainly the images of war stirred emotions in the American public and gave anti-war politicians ammunition to use against the administration, but how much impact the coverage actually had on the population rather than reflecting its opinion is not calculable. I would treat both media champions and critics views with equal cynicism settling instead on the middle ground.
'The media, the war in Vietnam and political support: a critique of the thesis of an oppositional media' Journal of Politics February 1984, vol. 46 no. 1 pp. 2-24 University of Texas Press.
2 William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media 1962-1973: The US Army in Vietnam (CMH Publishing 1991)
3(for table also) 'The media, the war in Vietnam and political support: a critique of the thesis of an oppositional media' Journal of Politics February 1984, vol. 46 no. 1 pp. 2-24 University of Texas Press.
4 Peter Braestrup 'The News Media and the War in Vietnam: Myths and Realties'
5 Oscar Patterson III, 'If the Vietnam War had been reported under Gulf War rules,' Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, v39, no. 1, Winter 1995
Media Politics Chris Mansfield
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