Admission to selective universities, a discusion.

Barr

J Barr

Dr. Lockhart

POSC 30203:035

20 November 2003

Throughout history, perpetual conflict has existed between what is fair and what is practiced in the distribution of societal goods. The modern arena has raved incessantly on how to fairly distribute admissions to selective universities. Fairness, the ever-debated word, may seem simple at a glance, however it is highly subjective, especially in a purported free society such as the United States. In a culture that understands humans to be generally self-serving, that organizes government to counter overly ambitious parties, and that believes in staunch individualism, it is certainly conceivable how such a conflict of interests could arise. The spectrum of potential solutions is diverse and wide reaching, but extensively stratified beliefs prevent an easy solution. Affirmative action represents the 21st century’s embodiment of the fight for a more just distribution of societal goods.

The fairness aspect of equality of opportunity puts into conflict, to a large extent, procedural fairness on one end of the spectrum, or equality of life chances on the other. A utopian society does not exist, thus as stated, procedural fairness and equality of life chances occupy hopelessly irreconcilable and contradictory positions. Both conceptions attempt to realize a single truism; that if people believe a system is fair from their personal and inherently selfish perspective, they will be more inclined to follow the established rules of society (Rawls 6). Procedural fairness embodies the commonly held notion that it is inequitable to treat one person differently than another. It maintains that impartiality is necessary and only relevant personal characteristics be considered in college admissions. On the surface it appears that this notion of distribution would end all argument as to fairness, however it assumes two fundamental premises incorrectly. First, that all people have equal talents in the eyes of society, and second, that all people have had an equal opportunity to develop their respective talents (Rawls 58). John Rawls states that theoretically procedural fairness is the most logical means of distribution, however reality intervenes, insisting that due to stark inequalities during early life experience, implementing a procedurally fair system in later life is only truly beneficial to those who were able to gain the most from their experiences in early childhood (Rawls 16). Based on the premise that people have an unequal opportunity to develop their talents, “background fairness,” or accounting for ones early misfortunes by evaluating their potential, would have to be taken into account (Fishkin 21). Although highly difficult to assess, by retrospectively compensating individuals for deficiencies that were incurred outside of their control, society takes on a more truly fare face in realizing equality of life chances (Fishkin 32). It may well also be argued that such a system could help discourage widespread racially based income disparities, and increase the perception of an equal society, which as Rawls states, will lead to a more efficient and progressive culture (5). “Procedural fairness” and “equality of life chances” both aim to build a more just society, but their contradictory nature prevents cooperation. While “procedural fairness” has advantages, it exhibits irreconcilable deficiencies that are addressed by “equality of life chances.”

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Consideration of ethnicity in admissions to selective universities is a highly charged topic. Opponents and proponents alike have compelling cases for their respective stances on the issue. The opponent’s argue that consideration of race is improper on several valid bases and that procedural fairness is the only just method of admitting students. First, using group preferences, a common alternative to procedurally fair admissions, is morally and empirically wrong. On the moral front, providing a significant point advantage towards admission to students solely based on their membership in a particular group does not account for individuality (Thernstrom 394). Furthermore, by undertaking such a halfhearted practice, less advantaged students that cannot claim membership in the favored racial group are further disadvantaged in admissions by the proverbial rising tide appended to others. Meanwhile, highly privileged members of the favored race are even further advantaged simply due to their claim of membership, thus the tide has brought their yacht up even higher (Thernstrom 413). Ethnicity is not the appropriate engine for a just distribution. It fails to account for individuality and personal characteristics while exacerbating racial resentment. Additionally, empirically speaking, admitting students on the skewed basis of ethnicity and not academic performance places disadvantaged ethnic groups in a precarious situation where many inevitably drop out because they were unprepared for the academic standards of the accepting institution. Sadly, this case can aggravate already existing social stereotypes about less well performing races and destroy the self esteem of individuals (Thernstrom 406). In the same field, by admitting students that are set up for failure from the very beginning, students who were prepared and qualified but not admitted must bear the full brunt of the opportunity cost and attend a less prestigious institution (Thernstrom 410). Including consideration of ethnicity in school admissions hurts minority groups, breeds racial resentment, and creates an economic burden on society as a whole.

To contrast the argument for procedural fairness, or not including ethnicity in admissions criteria, is a different approach that proponents of procedural fairness fail to address. Admittedly, use of “group preferences” does not truly address the ethnic disparity at hand and can cause problems of its own, but there is a compromising alternative, namely “multifactor sensitive admissions.” All programs of Affirmative Action attempt to tackle the significant racial disparities evident at educational institutions, however “multifactor sensitive admissions” does so with a prospective and realistic approach that would to some extent fulfill John Rawls notion of dealing with economic disparity. The fundamental principle behind “multifactor sensitive admissions” is that it looks to the future to rectify problems that cannot realistically be dealt with at an early age in a society that values individual liberty so fundamentally (Fishkin 30). Instead of using unjust group preferences, “multifactor sensitive admissions” sets minimum thresholds for cumulative GPA and standardized test scores to address the problems associated with ill prepared students while leaving a diverse pool of qualified applicants for the school to choose from at will, so that a diverse student body can be assembled. By looking closely at each applicant who exceeds the minimum standards for admission, a student body can be molded into an optimal learning environment for all attendees. Ethnicity is one of many factors, other aspects such as talents and geography are included to nurture a dynamic and varied environment. The primary goal of “multifactor sensitive admissions” is for future equality, which takes several forms. First, a diverse student body allows characteristically white professions to become more available across the ethnic spectrum, thereby reducing the perception of African Americans primarily as less well educated (Bowen). Second, new role models for future generations of minority children will be created, thus eliminating stereotypes that mentally limit capable children (Bowen). Third, there is a societal benefit, in that empirically college educated minorities are more inclined to participate in community service, thereby aiding a more equitable distribution of goods society wide (Bowen). To conclude, “multifactor sensitive admissions” does not provide an immediate solution, but one that in time can create a lasting transformation in the social culture of the United States.

John Rawls, the champion of modern liberal distributive conceptions, sets forth the most morally just method of addressing deficiencies in early life chances. Sadly, however, I would be fooling myself to propose at length a system for realizing equality of opportunity based solely on his conceptions, because for society to advance we must eventually be able to realize what we conceive, and not only theorize about it. My proposal assumes two fundamental premises. First, something must be done to rectify inequality. To not do so would cast us into a realm of socially regressive and exceedingly oppressive societies. Second, whatever is done to alter admissions methods to selective universities will inevitably create some parasitic inequality of its own. I propose that “multifactor sensitive admissions” is the most error free path to a more just society, and while less idealistically preferable, it provides a solution that has the potential to be realized.

Rawls states that it is best to make amendments to “equality of life chances” at an early age however as James Fishkin notes, the American society would never stand to give up family autonomy regardless of the evident consequences (30). Therefore, the next best solution is to look towards the future and make relatively small changes so as to force generational evolvement of the social culture and thus the socioeconomic makeup. “Group preferences,” as before explained, realistically does more to intensify already existing disparities and is outright morally indefensible. James Fishkin’s notion of “retrospective individual compensation” is idealistic and morally sound, but highly subjective to the whims of the evaluator, and for that matter, immensely difficult to evaluate or quantify by any standardized means. Also previously taken up, “procedural fairness” creates a pretty picture of fairness, in much the same way that a picture of the Eiffel Tower might be cropped to hide a boozer sleeping on the sidewalk. That boozer represents the large broad socioeconomic immobility that plagues ethnic divisions in the United States. Short of digressing to petty mud slinging, “multifactor sensitive admissions” does have sufficient standing of its own. Its primary scope aims at correcting socioeconomic disparity without too harshly reverse discriminating against non-minorities.

To accept any form of Affirmative Action it is necessary to realize that there is a broadly based underlying issue beyond school admissions on an individual level, it is the front lines for thwarting inequality within society as a whole. Admittedly, “multifactor sensitive admissions” has practical problems to include its complexity, relative subjectiveness, and its propensity to only cure mild cases of inequality. On the contrary I argue, through a play on a statement by Winston Churchill, that “multifactor sensitive admissions” is the worst system, except for all of the rest. While hardly a knockout on any particular point, it addresses them all with utility. “Multifactor sensitive admissions” appeals to both empirical and moral realms. First, empirically, it works toward better societal results in the future. Furthermore, its founding on diversity sets a precedent for future minorities, negates stereotypes, and provides a more community friendly society. Morally speaking, it understands that individuals are brought up in highly diverse environments over which they had no control, and thus we as a society are morally obligated to make limited amends for their misfortune (Rawls 75). “Multifactor sensitive admissions” gives universities a diverse and dynamic tool to admit students, who meet minimum standards, on a more personal basis that improves their chances of success and synergistically improves the learning environment of the entire student body.

In my first essay regarding admission to selective universities I took a fervent stab at explaining why practices in Affirmative Action inevitably cause reverse discrimination. I further took the stance that unfair selective admissions practices had the potential to undermine capitalistic ambition. Both of the statements are generally true in theory, and the second especially creates concerns for me personally. For example, some countries have seen violent backlashes to their policies of land redistribution that amount to Affirmative Action practices. This essay provides a distinct contrast in personal policy. My views have altered considerably, especially following the Rawls readings. Therefore, I understand the necessity of redistributive practices, but realistically, I still see the same problems with the particular brand of Affirmative Action that I addressed in the first essay. With a newfound distinction in practices it allows me to despise some of them while embracing others out of necessity and the hope for a more just future. In the first essay I contended that all practices of Affirmative Action were morally wrong, however I now find that “multifactor sensitive admissions” is an acceptable brand that attempts to bring together a moral and empirical justification without many of the overzealous features held by other practices. A more equitable distribution of goods in society is a necessity, and while no practice aimed at redistribution is flawless in theory or practice, one must be undertaken as the means to a more progressive society.

Works Cited

Bowen, William G. and Derek Bok. 1998. The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fishkin, James S. 1981. Justice, Equal Opportunity and the Family. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rawls, John. 2001. Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, ed. By Erin Kelly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Thernstrom, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom. 1997. America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible. New York: Simon and Schuster.