In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles, the young Athenian, epitomises the rejection of an altruistic morality, which he claims is mere ‘spells and incantations’. For him this morality is determined by those who ‘knowing their own inferiority…are only too glad of equality’. In other words, this morality clearly is the refuge of the weak, but it should not be. What stands as just for Callicles is the state of affairs in which ‘the better and the wiser should rule and have more than the inferior’. Plato obviously views this position as a strong one, but the difficulty lies in Callicles’ interpretation of the weak and the strong, and Socrates argues that there is no link between the superior and the just ownership of a ‘larger share’ (whether this be of power, food or clothing). It is difficult for Callicles to advocate his point of view when he cannot determine exactly what quality it is that makes one man superior over another. What impact, then, has this argument on the statement in question? Here we see that there is a case for morality being the refuge of the weak, but this is viewed as a negative factor. It is not, however, successfully supported by Callicles’ arguments and thus his interpretation is not a strong one. It is not the case that morality is a refuge for the weak merely because they desire it to be, although this is a common view in ancient morality and, more recently, in the works of Nietzsche. It is worth noting, however, that in Plato’s Republic, when the argument concerns the rulers’ determining of the just, Socrates uses analogy to show how this is not in fact in their own interest but in the interests of those they rule – the weaker. This forms a basis for the argument that there is a different reason for morality being a refuge of the weak – that it is in fact seen as right to protect them as subjects.
Later in the Republic, Plato returns to the problem of egoism. The legend of the Ring of Gyges suggests that there is no reason to be moral other than to avoid punishment. It would be possible to apply a similar slant to Judeo-Christian morality – that is, to say that if one follows the moral rules set out by this doctrine it is possible to avoid punishment and social condemnation. In such a way, this system of morality can be said to provide a refuge for the egoist, for whom following the accepted system of morality will be doing so for his own self-interest (i.e. to avoid punishment and social condemnation). This is exemplified in book nine of the Republic, in which Plato states that ‘He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave…’ Egoism will not lead to a happy way of life, because one finds oneself just a slave to one’s own desires. Interestingly, though, Plato insists that men should achieve greater fulfilment by being less selfish. The irony here is that whilst arguing against egoism as a way of life, the very appeal he makes is to egoism. Effectively he states that one should act in a certain unselfish way because it will make life better for the individual in question. Morality here can provide a guise for the egoist to achieve what he wants, but without having to be concerned about the negative consequences that would no doubt arise from the blatant disregard for moral rules.
Bernard Williams, however, argues that there will be few who are completely egotistical, and those that are could only be psychopaths. Thus surely it would be said that they too represent a certain weakness – a lack of ability to control their own minds and faculties? Williams does, however, argue against the feasibility of the Ring of Gyges theory, believing instead that aspects of morality that prevent us from acting in ways that are unacceptable are ‘strongly internalised in upbringing’; so much so that it is not possible that they should simply disappear at any opportunity in which they are not policed. The implication here is that there is an inbuilt sense of conscience which gives a certain power to moral laws: ‘that is what it is for them to be moral rules, as opposed to merely legal requirements or matters of social convention’. Without any inkling of this sense, a person is surely a psychopath and thus cannot feature within the moral sphere. Therefore, if we consider the amoralist to be the most morally threatening thing that we might contend with, we must consider the fact that even with only ‘minimal concern’ for another human being he does not exhibit blatant disregard for moral rules and thus is on the brink of the ‘world of morality’. As long as this is the case, morality even has a certain hold over the amoralist, who would otherwise provide the biggest threat to those who are protected by its laws.
Nietzsche wants us grow out of this Judeo-Christian notion of morality. Whilst still promoting a core value of strong being superior to weak, rather like a latter day Callicles, for Nietzsche morality does not take its focus from the attainment of the good life. Rather than basing emphasis on happiness or pleasure, Nietzsche argues that we should seek greatness or nobility. Morality in the Judeo-Christian sense is merely a trick, created by the weak to protect themselves from the strong. The reality of Nietzsche’s morality is that the ruling class should exploit the weak – those who are not capable of nobility in the admired sense that he promotes. Nietzsche is arguing the wrong point here, however. The weak in fact cannot be described in the essence that he attempts to capture. In fact, the word weak encompasses a great deal more than that. Any human can be weak at any particular time – for instance when he is sleeping. So how does Nietzsche explain this? Any one of his ‘masters’ is weak when he sleeps, for he is in danger from anyone who might care to take advantage of his unconscious state. It is only an other-regarding theory of morality that allows such persons to be protected. Nietzsche himself cannot deny having weakness, both in the sense of his physical state, and the fact that his last recorded act of sanity, was one in which he showed pity and sadness for a horse that was being whipped. It seems ironic that whilst his moral philosophy attempted to criticise those who were weak, and why they deserved no protection, his final act revealed him to be exhibiting precisely such a trait that he would have despised.
The key to the statement above is yes, morality is the refuge of the weak, in the sense that it does protect the weak – whether they are weak due to age, sickness or even their state of sleeping or wakefulness. As long as Judeo-Christian morality protects any one person, it is protective of the weak because every person has the potential to be in a weakened state. However, why should this matter – what else is morality other than such a refuge? If one examines the Judeo-Christian theory of morality, it is difficult to identify what is intrinsically right about its ethical code other than its protection of people in society. While it cannot be denied that other ethical codes have been promoted in the past, it is generally accepted that the morality of today is that of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PLATO: GORGIAS AND REPUBLIC (TRANS B. JOWETT)
OXFORD CLARENDON 1953
NIETZSCHE: A NIETZSCHE READER (TRANS R.J. HOLLINGDALE)
PENGUIN 1977
ODERBERG, D.S.: MORAL THEORY – A NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH
BLACKWELL 2000
PAUL, MILLER & PAUL (EDS): SELF-INTEREST
CUP 1997
RAZ, J: VALUE, RESPECT & ATTACHMENT
CUP 2001
WILLIAMS, B: MORALITY – AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
CUP 1972
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (OUP 1992)
Following quotations in this paragraph are taken from ‘Morality: An Introduction to Ethics’ (CUP 1976) Chapter 1, ff p21
