The Sieges of Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley

        Ironically, despite being one of the symbols of Imperial ideals and the “white man’s war”, Mafeking was the first instance in the war in which the native blacks were actually armed by the British due to the inferior numbers of B-P’s troops. Forming what was informally dubbed the “Black Watch”, they played an invaluable role in the defense of Mafeking. This completely disproved British Imperialism, showing that the blacks were on an equal or perhaps higher level.  To the Boers, this was an unprecedented and morally reprehensible action. Arming blacks became roughly the same type of issue as the “dum-dum”: Neither side would officially admit to having used blacks.  Native casualties appeared nowhere on official casualty lists, and no mention was ever made of their outstanding service, but both sides did indeed use them.

Chapter II: Strategic and Psychological Importance of Mafeking to the Boers.

Baden-Powell’s bluff proved so remarkably executed that Boer military command fully believed in the existence of the Mafeking strike force. For the Boer High Command, the town of Mafeking represented an important threat to the safety of the Transvaal, and an important commando force had to be sent to deal with it

        Mafeking was also of great psychological importance to the Boers. Dr. Jameson and his Raiders had used Mafeking as their base from which to raid the Transvaal in an attempt to take its independence. The Boers had defeated Jameson at the Battle of Doornkop, but again they were threatened by what they believed to be a much larger force, this time with the whole weight of the Empire firmly behind it. They saw the siege as symbolic: if they managed to capture Mafeking, the symbolic birthplace of attempts to wrest independence from the Transvaal, they would retain their independence.

Chapter III: Strategic and Psychological Importance of Kimberley to the British.  

        Only days before Kimberley became a siege town, Cecil Rhodes, an influential mining millionaire who virtually owned Kimberley, made his appearance in the said town. Unbeknownst to Rhodes, he was serving as bait, laid by Milner, to attract the Boers and bring them fully into the war. When the war broke out and he became trapped inside Kimberley, Rhodes became quite vociferous in demanding relief for the town, given his concern for both his personal safety and his concern for the town of Kimberley. He even cabled on numerous occasions that if relief did not arrive soon he would surrender the town to the Boers. His influence in the town certainly put him in a position to do so, and such a surrender would have been a political catastrophe in Britain due the incredible public interest in the sieges.

        In addition to this there was an incredible amount of interest, both foreign and British, concentrated around Kimberley. If the Boers captured Kimberley, both the foreign and local interests would be furious. An incredible amount of political pressure would ensue, destabilizing the British government. The foreign interests would then enter into negotiations with the Boers to make a deal, which would probably result in an even greater foreign support for the Boers than was already being shown.

        

Chapter IV: Strategic and Psychological Importance of Kimberley to the Boers.

Boer justification for the siege of Kimberley was partly an issue of control of the rail system. Due to the fact that the rail was the only sure method of transport the British controlled, the Boers decided that they would capture strategically placed towns along the railway in order to disrupt transport and communication. These towns were Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking.

        Secondly, the Boers regarded Kimberley as important because it contained Rhodes, the “bête noir” of the Transvaal. Rhodes was intensely disliked by the Boers for multiple reasons, mostly his destructive mining. Though it was irrational thinking by the Boers, “Even in a phase of the war short on sense to make Rhodes the point of an assault on Kimberley was peculiar”, this was indubitably part of it’s importance for the Boers.

                                                

        Chapter V: Strategic and Psychological Importance of Ladysmith to the British.

As one of the three major besieged towns in South Africa, Ladysmith was one of the aspects of the Boer War that the British Public never tired of hearing about. In fact it might be said that Ladysmith was the town that created the interest of the British Public in the siege towns. As an entire British field force had been locked into its own base by the Boers in the first big defeat of the war, known as “Mournful Monday”. Britain was exposed to national humiliation: “All ashamed for England! Not of her-never that-but for her. Once more she was a source of laughter to her enemies.” This defeat shocked the British Public out of its blind confidence in the strength of the Empire and they were forced to re-evaluate their views. The three imperial towns were the perfect symbol from which to re-evaluate one’s opinions of the Empire: as the towns fell, so would the Empire.  

Ladysmith also happened to be the major town of the northern Natal and commanded the Ladysmith junction, important in terms of railway control. And of course, railway control was a critical factor in terms of strategy in the Boer War. For the British, to be deprived of the Natal Railway Line was to be deprived of mobility and supplies in the Natal: unthinkable. And control of the Ladysmith Junction effectively did this.

        Chapter VI: Strategic and Psychological Importance of Ladysmith to the Boers.

        The importance of Ladysmith to the Boers was purely strategic, though it was eventually to have a psychological effect on the Boers. The Boers had based their invasion routes around denying the British use of their most important means of transport: the railways. This would effectively deny to the British the possibility of moving into the interior of South Africa: they would have to stay close to the coasts in order to receive supplies and not be cut off.

        In addition to this, Ladysmith was an important town in the Natal, and therefore must be under control. The original plan of the Boers, which was to force the British in Cape Colony to peace by surrounding them, could only be effective if the Cape Colony felt completely hemmed in and surrounded. Thus the occupying of the Natal, Bechuanaland, and even some of the territory south of the Orange River was necessary to show the C.C that they were far from secure.

         

Part II: The Strategic and Psychological Effects of the Sieges of Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith.

         Chapter VII: Strategic and Psychological Effects of the Siege of Mafeking on the Boers and British.

 

The first and most obvious effect that the siege had on the Boers is of course the amount of commandos besieging Mafeking required. Due, though not entirely, to this misallocation of forces under the influence of B-P’s bluff, Boer forces were unable to attack C. Colony before the reinforcements arrived, which might have been a decisive victory for the Boers.

        The second effect that the siege had was to expose clearly one of the weaknesses of the Boer forces to both Boers and British. In the siege of Mafeking, B-P’s forces were outnumbered at a ratio of approximately 6 to1. However, B-P still managed to hold Mafeking, and the only real attack he had to fend of was Field Coronet Eloff’s last ditch attempt to capture the town before the relief arrived. This may be in part ascribed to the General Piet Cronje, who “had a reputation for being dour and headstrong”, but for the most part it was due to the very essence of the Boer army: the commando. While the commando was an incredibly versatile soldier with high mobility and able to take the initiative, the commando lacked military discipline. The commandos would refuse to carry out such a casualty heavy head on attack: this was their weakness.

Baden-Powell’s mission was a complete success. He bluffed to perfection. General Cronje and seven thousand seven hundred commandos swallowed Mafeking whole. B-P was able to delude them sufficiently long enough, using dummy entrenchments, cannons, and even men, that the Boers missed one of their most important strategic opportunities of the war: a lightning strike into an almost defenseless Cape Colony to recapture the whole of South Africa before British reinforcements arrived. Arguably, this had the effect of saving the war for the British.  

Mafeking also was an incredible boost to British morale. The fact that B-P was able to fend off the Boers and hold Mafeking until the relief instilled a belief in the B.P that they had won at the “white man’s war”. This, of course, resulted in massive public support of the war in Britain as morale and confidence went up and public opinion of the war soared.

With reference to the trend in the arming of blacks started in Mafeking, the effect of such an increase in armed forces is obvious: increased casualties. The larger the opposing forces are, the higher the casualty count will be, even if the casualties are blacks and therefore unofficially recognized. Also having them serve with such success put into question the Imperial ideals about inferiority of the blacks and the British “grit of the breed, unconquered and unconquerable.” 

        

Chapter VIII: Strategic and Psychological Effect of the Siege of Kimberley on the Boers and British.

        

        The siege of Kimberley was one of the most important modifying factors of the British advance in the War. Due to the repeated threats of Rhodes, the importance in terms of foreign investment and rising public interest in the sieges, the British were forced to prioritize the relief of Kimberley. The original plan of advance, a direct march on Bloomfontein and Pretoria, became an impossibility: there were already not enough troops to guard Cape Colony and march on the capitals.

When the British reinforcements arrived, the relief party became possible. Under the command of Methuen, the relief party suffered severe casualties and coming to a halt without having reached Kimberley, further adding to the burden of Sir Redvers Buller, who was then pressured to send reinforcements to Methuen. In short, Kimberley became a cumulative source of worries until it was relieved by French’s Cavalry.

When the Boers actually rigged and threatened to explode mines around Kimberley if the British advanced, the British became caught between the two important aspects of the town. If they stopped the advance, Rhodes might actually hand over Kimberley, and if they advanced, the mines might blow up, causing a diplomatic uproar against Britain for it’s faulty actions and more foreign support for the Boers. Thus the British were at an impasse, and their advance was slowed down even further rate. This slowed advance allowed the Boers sorely needed time to regroup and rethink their strategies.

        Chapter IX: Strategic and Psychological Effects of the Siege of Ladysmith on the Boers and British.

The effect of the siege of Ladysmith on the Boers was mostly psychological. Its effect was from the first major victory the Boers had experienced. By actually having outmaneuvered White’s forces and driven them into Ladysmith, the Boers morale was significantly raised. They began to see themselves as a group of modern Davids, smiting the British Goliath.

        The effect that the siege of Ladysmith had on the British was both psychological and strategic. Strategically, Ladysmith was a major stumbling block. Arguably, in letting himself be driven back into Ladysmith, White had wrecked the whole strategy of the war for the British, i.e. a clean, surgical strike at the capitals and turned it into a painfully slow, casualty heavy advance. Speaking from a purely strategic point of view, it would have been best to abandon Ladysmith. This view was expressed by both Lord Roberts and Buller, but was not feasible for reasons of morale and public opinion.

        In addition to wrecking the strategy of the war, Ladysmith also slowed down the British advance, and not just from the fact of having to be relieved. The fact that Ladysmith was under siege effectively denied the British the use of the Natal Railway Line, thus hampering their mobility even further.

        Psychologically, Ladysmith represented for the British Public a symbol of the Empire after it was shocked out its complacency following “Mournful Monday”. As such, when it was relieved the British Public was also relieved.

                                           

-Conclusion-

        The sieges of Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith were all of capital importance during the war, however their importance was not the same for both the Boers and British. To the British, the psychological value was the most important, due to the identification the B.P made with the towns and the state of the Empire, and the psychological shaped the British strategy during the war.                                         For the Boers, besieging the towns was mainly for strategic reasons, such as control of railways or enclosing a strike force. However, one might ask why, if they wanted the towns for strategic reasons, did they fail to properly assault them and then dissipate into the veldt at the appearance of the relief? Simply speaking, because there was a rather drastic change of tactics. Under the leadership of old fashioned Generals such as Cronje, Boer tactics had been fairly conventional and unimaginative, with the guerilla traits only starting to show due to the commando’s capacity to take the initiative. Only towards the end of the war did the guerilla fighting actually become a strategy recognized and approved of by the Boer High Command, mostly due to the younger generals such as Christiaan de Wet. When the Boers first besieged the towns they were following the conventional procedure, not the guerilla, in which case they would have used the hit and run raid. When the relief finally came, they had switched to guerilla warfare and therefore vanished into the veldt in accordance with that procedure. Thus is the seemingly irrational and indecisive comportment of the Boers explained, as well as the importance of the siege towns clarified.  

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