The collapse of the Weimar republic.

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It was not clear that the republic was doomed from the start, but it was evident that the republic was doomed from 1930, when the country was splitting into two groups, left and right, who both wanted an end to the republic, and a change to another political system, communist or Nazi. Hiden states that, "No one factor was responsible for the collapse of the Weimar republic, but the combination of factors and circumstances that lead to it's down fall." I agree with this statement to some extent.

By 1930 the government felt that time was ripe for a more authoritarian political system that would reduce democratic and social rights. The Centre Party politician Heinrich Bruning, one mastermind of this intrigue, hoped to restore a more authoritarian constitution limiting parliamentary rights and keeping the socialists and trade unions out of the state. In many ways this vision aimed to recreate the political system of the Wilhelmine Empire.

The first argument advocating that Bruning was responsible for the collapse of the Republic is that after Hindenburg had appointed him as chancellor, he used presidential emergency decrees (under Article 48) if the government faced opposition in the Reichstag, according to H.Boldt the use of decree laws increased from 5 in 1930 to 60 in 1932. On account of this rule with decree, under Brüning's chancellorship, the government thus no longer functioned democratically, undermining the Republic. Hindenburg's expanding role represented an abuse of the constitution's emergency powers, which were meant to protect the democratic functioning of the constitution, not to disrupt it. Worse, Hindenburg's failing energy made him an easy prey to a group of narrow-minded rightists in his closest entourage. Hindenburg's approval to dissolve the Reichstag in the summer of 1930 and again in the middle of 1932 proved disastrous. Both times the extremist parties, profiting from the economic crisis, made enormous gains, particularly the Nazis.

A further factor suggesting that Brüning was to blame for the downfall of Weimar was his financial and economic policy that has often been criticized for unnecessarily exacerbating the economic crisis. His policy was one of stringent economy and deflation. In July 1930 new raised taxes were imposed and a special levy on people in public employment. However, by the end of the year there was still a deficit of 1200 million reichsmarks, therefore Bruning reduced public employees pay by 23% and in January and February of 1931, there were compulsory price cuts for industrial products. Moreover he reduced unemployment benefits. These measures were obviously unpopular amongst employees and companies alike, failing to halt the rise in unemployment. Bruning’s austerity policy and earned him the nickname of ‘the hunger Chancellor’, igniting a movement of public opinion towards extremists parties, notably the Nazi Party. One economist, Holtfrerich claims that there were other policies which would have improved the situation. On the other hand, recent research has shown that his latitude should not be overestimated, as maintained by Borchardt, that Bruning had no real choice in his economic policy and that there was no feasible alternative. It was constrained by the regulations of the Young Plan. The Young Plan made deficit spending and inflationary policies to fight the depression nearly impossible. It has often been ignored, moreover, that Germany to a large degree was obliged to follow policies of other states. Everybody fought the crisis in similar ways, and the nation that would have adopted different ones risked sliding into even greater chaos. Economists have also pointed out the shortsighted German usage of the American loans in the years preceding the crisis. Short-term loans were invested in long-term projects. These investments created an artificial, unsound economic boom but did nothing to strengthen German productivity. When the American loans were recalled the towns often went bankrupt, this Bruning had nothing to do with in its first instance. Brüning, I feel, may well have exaggerated the crisis and caused unemployment to rise more than was necessary, causing a public move towards the Nazi Party. However, a more ambitious policy might have led to a complete collapse of the mark.  Bruning, to his own claiming, had in fact “almost attained his goal”.

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Bruning was, moreover, accountable for the collapse of the Weimar Republic because he failed to keep the confidence of Hindenburg. Bruning’s proposal to employ 600,000 unemployed workers on junker estates in East Prussia. The landowners regarded the plan as ‘agrarian Bolshevism’ and it resulted in “Germany’s social elite turning against Bruning” (Layton). Thus sealing his political fate, henceforth proceding to Von Papen’s appointment and a movement towards more extreme right-wing politics, and ultimately the upheaval of Hitler.

Another blunder made by Bruning, elucidating his fault in the breakdown of the government, was his failure to persuade the ...

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