To What Extent were military weaknesses responsible for Britain's adoption of the policy of Appeasement to Nazi Germany in the 1930s?

The failure of the League of Nations after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a significant factor in appeasement. The sanctions imposed on Japan were almost pathetic and it was now clear that flagrant disregard to treaties would not result in punishment. Thus when Hitler invaded the Rhineland in 1936 against the Treaty of Versailles, it would have been fundamentally wrong to punish him. As Bartlett comments “castigating Hitler after Japan’s precedent would have caused public indignation and even greater European tension” so it would follow that the failure of the League of Nations led to Britain’s appeasement of Nazi Germany.

In addition, Britain’s own economy made it difficult for her to rearm, even if she felt that she would end a policy of appeasement. Most of her post-war economic problems had begun to recover until 1929 and then depression set in during the 1930s. Ellen  makes the point that “The appeasement of Germany was not devised in the heat of the moment… Both the defence ration and appeasement were part of the government’s carefully calculated assessment of the economic, social, political and strategic realities that Britain faced.” The ministers were already aware that the increase in armaments spending was affecting the delicate budgetary balance. In 1935, defence had taken 15% of central government expenditures - £137 million out of a total of £841 million; in 1937, this had risen to 26% and jumped a further twelve percent in 1938. Taxes alone were unable to cover expenditure and in 1937 the Treasury had reluctantly agreed to a National Defence Loan. Near the end of 1937 was a commercial down-swing, where unemployment figures rose, prices rose and the sterling weakened against the dollar, the international markets volatile and at best, gloomy. Yet all of this would be a mere preliminary to the economic losses of all-out war, which would almost certainly destroy the British economy perhaps beyond repair. As Paul Kennedy comments “the avoidance of military conflict was closely allied to the avoidance of national bankruptcy” It would seem that this is perhaps the most important factor in administering appeasement towards Germany. Britain simply did not have a viable set of resources to allow her any other option. If her options were already pre-disposed towards appeasement, it would make sense that she would try and fit her other concerns into this policy of appeasement.

Furthermore, it seems that the sentiment of the British public had been strongly opposed to war since 1919. As Charles Wheeler puts it, the war had “Bitten into their souls”, while the self-governing dominions of the Empire (South Africa, Australia and New Zealand), whose support had been vital in the First World War, were strongly opposed to helping Britain in another war. On the other hand, Britain relied on its imperial trade more than ever. It is clear that the opinion of the public both at home and abroad was also significantly in favour of a policy of appeasement. With changes to the franchise, this specifically meant that a British politics was likely to favour appeasement, especially in light of the ‘Hitler-Chamberlain’ saga, for which new evidence has recently come to light that Chamberlain had struck a deal with Hitler whereby Hitler was to be allowed a free hand in Eastern Europe if he kept away from the West.

This “policy of appeasement started well before the advent of Hitler in Germany”. It lead to a deliberate decision to ignore Germany's secret rearmament, to pressure exerted by Lord Balfour, foreign minister, on France explaining that Germany this time would go East and therefore her rearmament did not constitute a threat to France, the signature of the pact of Locarno which, while giving the most stringent guaranties to the countries west of Germany, gave no guaranties at all to the countries east of Germany. Thus it can be seen that it is perhaps the economic restraints coupled with the public opinion, the incapacity of a nation to prepare for war combined with its adversity to war which created and upheld this British policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany. However, if it was economics and public opinion that determined this policy, then the other factors mentioned were surely supportive of a policy of appeasement.

(994 words)