In January 1953 the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed office on the back of an election victory allowing the Republican Party a chance at governance denied them for over twenty years.

    Eisenhower also reactivated the CIA for covert operations. Such a move was necessitated, as it was widely believed:

  Hitherto accepted norms of human conduct do not apply…we must…learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us

The use of covert operations had two notable and early successes in Iran and Guatemala but was to prove troublesome and occasionally disastrous.

    To sum up Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ it centred on a deterrence of ‘massive retaliation’, involved military alliances such as SEATO and NATO, Mutual Security Aid, foreign aid of a non-military nature, and covert operations free of moral restrictions. As J.L.Gaddis saw it, the ‘New Look’ represented an “asymmetrical response-of reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply one’s own strengths against the other sides weaknesses, even if this meant shifting the nature and the location of the confrontation.” All of this was underwritten by a strong and vibrant economy, without which the whole enterprise would eventually collapse.

     A central campaign pledge of Eisenhower’s 1952 election campaign was to end the war in Korea. The war had almost resulted in humiliating defeat for U.N (ostensibly U.S) forces and the whole notion of ‘containment’. Coming as it did after the ‘loss’ of China, Eisenhower came under extreme pressure to act decisively to win the conflict. An all-out offensive would risk further provoking the Chinese and conceivably the Soviets (especially if he used atomic weapons against Chinese ports and cities as recommended by the JCS). On a visit to Korea to see for himself the situation on the ground, Eisenhower betrayed his intention to end the war on his terms in his treatment of the S. Korean president Dr. Syngman Rhee. Rhee along with the top U.S commander, General Clark, had called for a renewed offensive to: “unify the country, turn back the communists and contribute to stability in Asia.” For his part, Eisenhower regarded such a plan as “bordering on madness.” He met Rhee “only twice for a total of one hour” u-turning on his administrations pledge to “seek liberation for communist satellites.” Eisenhower instead wanted an armistice, in itself an admission that ‘roll-back’ had been a pipe dream or simply election rhetoric. He would have to carry on Truman’s containment strategy. To achieve an armistice Eisenhower needed Chinese agreement, he aimed to let the Chinese know that failure to do so would result in him making a “move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons…we would not be limited by any world-wide gentleman’s agreement.” The psychological pressure of this ‘brinkmanship’ policy (the Chinese were well aware of Eisenhower’s use of every weapon at his disposal in WWII as SACEUR) contributed substantially to the Chinese agreement to the armistice which basically restored the pre-war borders along the 38th parallel. The ending of the war was a major success for Eisenhower, although it upset many in his own party who “denounced the settlement as a peace without honour.” Eisenhower had grasped the complexities of the cold war in which regional conflicts were becoming unwinnable without resorting to tactics likely to bring about an atomic war with the communist bloc, an horrendous potentiality.

    Elsewhere in Asia Eisenhower again used ‘brinkmanship’ tactics over the first Formosa Straits crisis. A real danger of a Chinese invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) enabled him to secure a ‘blank cheque’ from Congress allowing him unprecedented authority in deciding how best to defend Formosa and “related positions.” The Chinese, in response to bombing of their coastline by Nationalist under Chiang Kai-shek, had begun shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, where a sizeable portion of Chiangs army was based. The ‘blank cheque’ escalated fears of an imminent war in the event of a Chinese invasion, as Ambrose notes: “at no other time in the cold war did the United States come so close to launching a preventative war.” It was believed that the loss of the islands would present an inherent danger then to the “anti-communist barrier…in the western Pacific eg. Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China (Formosa), Republic of the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.” The tactic of ‘brinkmanship’ again held the peace and would do so again during the 2nd Formosa Straits crisis in Eisenhower’s second term of office.

    The acknowledgement of risks to other friendly states should one ‘fall’ became known as the ‘domino theory’, a term synonymous with Vietnam and a manichaean worldview. France, a strong U.S ally and a central NATO partner in Europe, had been fighting a losing battle against the forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism in Vietnam since 1946. French intelligence had colluded with flimsy U.S evidence to tar the Viet Minh nationalist movement as communist. With the ‘domino theory’, now in vogue, Eisenhower sensed a threat to Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Such a scenario would be a grave blow to the ‘free world’, potentially fatal. However the position in Vietnam, indeed the whole of Indochina was complicated by the situation regarding French Nato membership and the ratification of the European Defence Community (EDC). A continued stalemate would drain French resources, weakening its ability to meet its NATO obligations in Europe (fears abounded that France was redirecting U.S. aid toward the war effort in Indochina). The French requested U.S. bombers and technicians for their effort and virtually blackmailed the U.S. over EDC ratification, which Eisenhower desperately wanted. Although he did eventually send ten planes and 200 technicians to aid the French he refused to send combat troops. The crunch came when the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The U.S did not agree with the subsequent Geneva agreements, dividing Vietnam along the 17th parallel. So ruling out unilateral action to contain communism in S.E.Asia Eisenhower set about the formation of a defensive alliance similar to NATO. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) included.  Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, and S.Vietnam.  Though the United States was not a signatory, it was fully committed to defending these ‘allies’.  Eisenhower had managed to keep the U.S. out of Vietnam (partly in fear of U.S. public opinion) but at the same time had strengthened the non-communist states of the region against the communist threat.  In this sense the main thrust of U.S. policy in the cold war was set and continued almost unchanged until the end.

In Europe Eisenhower, as elsewhere, sought a strong alliance system to counter soviet power.  NATO, formed in 1949, was already in place, but strains had been placed on the organisation for a variety of reasons.  As mentioned above, the French war in Indochina had become an obstacle to its ability to meet NATO commitments.  Eisenhower was dismayed by the weakness France exhibited following defeat at Dien Bien Phu.  He remarked:

It seems incredible that a nation which had only the help of a tiny British Army when it turned back the German flood in 1914…withstood the gigantic 1916 attacks at Verdun could now be reduced to the point that she cannot produce a few hundred technicians to keep planes flying…in indochina.

Whether or not he underestimated the profound damage inflicted by two world wars on France is debateable, however, he believed in the importance of NATO as the bulwark of Western European and U.S. defence.  Eisenhower wanted West Germany to become a sovereign state, and importantly, to rearm under the NATO umbrella, thus, forming a powerful extension to the anti-communist camp.  France however, was apprehensive about this possibility, and with good reason.  The European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed, brining the two former enemies (and the former axis power, Italy) among others, together in an arrangement that would benefit security and be an active ingredient of NATO.  Owing to the desire for defence spending cuts, Eisenhower was anxious to procure French ratification for EDC.  However, in August 1954, after the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, for which the French partially blamed America, France rejected the proposed EDC.  

The major problem Eisenhower had to deal with was the implications of his ‘New look’ posture, as regards Western Europe and NATO allies.  The position called for troop reductions in Europe, the deterrent effect of which would be replaced by the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons.  This disturbed NATO allies who had obvious fears of a nuclear exchange over a ‘limited’ war; nobody wanted to live in a radioactive no-mans-land.  Dulles said during a meeting of the NSC in December 1953:

while we regarded atomic weapons as one of the greatest new sources of defense strength, many of our allies regarded the atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.

The United States was therefore, “compelled to soften its approach to the use of nuclear weapons”.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Soviet leader, Krushchev, who denounced the extremes of his predecessor’s policies at the Twentieth Party Congress, appeared to be more conciliatory toward the West.  Beginning in Poland, popular uprisings occurred with the aim of breaking free of the tight Soviet grip – though not necessarily from the Soviet Union itself.  The most significant uprising occurred in Hungary.  Eisenhower’s pledge to ‘liberate’ communist satellites, Krushchev’s speech and the autonomy bestowed to Poland fuelled popular feeling.  However, although the United States had anticipated a revolt; had encouraged it both through Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, when that revolt actually occurred, the Administration had no plans prepared.  Whilst the Hungarians pleaded for U.S. intervention, the Soviets ruthlessly crushed the uprising.  The silence form America was deafening.  Hungary, like Yalta, posed a problem the U.S. could do little about.  In Eastern Europe the Soviets were in control, and short of a nuclear war would remain so.  America was impotent.  Indeed, following Korea, one wonders simultaneously at the wisdom of Hungarian expectations regarding U.S. aid, and the hypocrisy of U.S. encouragement.  

At this time the Suez crisis erupted causing a major rift between the U.S. and three of its major allies.  Britain, France and Israel had attacked Egypt.  Eisenhower was furious, and immediately withdrew support for his two key allies in NATO.  This was a momentous decision and a potentially disastrous one.  Had America completely alienated Britain and France, then the future of NATO, Western security and ultimately the course of the cold war may well have been altered.  Derivative of Eisenhower’s denunciation of his wayward allies, however, was an elevation in American standing in the eyes of the Third World, whose allegiance the U.S. sought, in competition with the USSR.  On top of this, Eisenhower felt strongly that Britain and France had damaged any possibility of capitalising on communist disunity following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings.  The world’s attention had instead been on Suez.  The danger of Soviet intervention on the side of Egypt also raised the stakes.  Eisenhower’s determination to act through the United Nations was a welcome move.

Eisenhower’s policy of encircling and containing the communist threat had resulted in increased efforts to establish Egypt as the dominant power in the region, heading an alliance of middle-eastern countries.  This proposal broke down however, partly due to American ‘back-tracking’ on the Aswan Dam project, which resulted in Egypt’s turn to the Soviet Union.  In place of Egypt the U.S. aimed to strengthen Iraq, which according to Calvocoressi was “a cardinal mistake”.    Discrepancies between British and U.S. policy in the region aided confusion and hesitance in other Arab countries. Had the allies co-ordinated their regional policies this may have prevented anti-western feeling from developing.

To deny the Soviets any advantage to be gained from Iranian nationalisation of its oilfields (especially detrimental to the British), the U.S. and Britain engaged in covert operations to overthrow the government of Mossadegh, after “British, along with American oilmen, told Ike that Mossadegh was a communist”.  Operation AJAX, the codename for the CIA operation to restore the Shah, was successful, but only just.

As mentioned, Arbenz of Guatemala was overthrown following the success of another CIA operation, and elsewhere in South America, the hunt for communist regimes was ongoing.  The problem of Cuba presented itself when Castro took power in a socialist revolution.  Eisenhower immediately tasked the CIA with assassinating the Cuban leader as well as looking into the possibility of deposing him – the beginnings of what would eventually become the disastrous ‘Bay of Pigs’ incident.

Nearing the end of his presidency, Eisenhower wanted to make inroads into disarmament, Krushchev appeared to suggest such moves soon after ascending to leadership in the USSR, but which at the time had all foundered. In 1954 at a session of the U.N general assembly the Soviets had suggested “a moratorium on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and…the creation of a U.N commission to consider means of controlling those already in existence.” In 1955 the Soviets called for reductions in conventional forces and the “destruction of nuclear stockpiles.” However mutual suspicion contrived to scupper any such plans. The U.S. was loathe to give up any potential superiority whilst the USSR, in response to Eisenhower’s ‘open skies’ proposal, denounced the notion as a “ploy to legalise espionage against the USSR.” What had become clear from the summit in 1955 was that Eisenhower had “thrown the immense authority of the American Presidency against risking a military solution of the cold war.” By 1959 Eisenhower and Kruschev both wanted to “solidify the concept of peaceful coexistence.” However the cold war mindset domestically, extending to their respective allies, shackled the two preventing meaningful agreement on disarmament although peace was strengthened.

Eisenhower’s foreign policy was balanced between great successes and abject failures. If we are to regard the success of his ‘new look’ military posture, the underlying determinant in any single issue, as the eventual breakdown of the Soviet system, then it would seem it was indeed successful. However Eisenhower’s pledge to liberate communist satellite states by rolling back Soviet power to the Russian frontier was exposed as rhetoric as Korea and its aftermath showed. In a nuclear world, the exaggerated simplicity of the manicheaen worldview brought with it a tremendous danger even in the smallest actions. Chinese desires for Quemoy and Matsu, two islands in the mouths of two vital Chinese ports, can be perceived as nothing more than sensible defensive thinking. To the west, the U.S in particular, it represented an inherent and imminent danger to the whole of S.E.Asia. Senator Wiley said of the need to defend Quemoy and Matsu: “Either we can defend the United States in the Formosa straits-now, or we can defend it later in San Francisco Bay.” Aside from this hyperbole, it is an endightment of the times that Eisenhower had to resist the pressure and advice of virtually all his advisors, the JCS, NSA, CIA etc. to use atomic weapons against China; “five times in one year the experts advised…an atomic strike against China. Five times he said no.” By resisting, Eisenhower had succeeded where others may have failed to avert a catastrophic war with the USSR. The Domino Theory proved questionable: “ a full generation later…Ike’s prophecy looked as ill-considered as his notion that all Communists everywhere were but puppets on Moscow’s string”  Strains in Sino-Soviet unity were never detected at the time, an unfortunate failure and missed opportunity of the intelligence community. Guatemala was arguably in no danger of becoming communist and had the U.S aided it rather than opposed it, it could have been a different story for the populace doomed to right-wing military dictatorships. Eisenhower, though, did maintain a valuable peace, refusing to engage U.S troops especially in Vietnam (but he did send U.S personnel in, in the form of aircraft technicians, thus setting a precedent his successors were keen to follow.). He guarded American interests with tenacity as witnessed by any of the ‘near-war’ scenarios from the Formosa straits to the Berlin crisis and covert operations in Iran especially. He certainly didn’t guard non-American interests unless it was expedient to do so (would any national leader do otherwise?). his loyalty lay with his country not the S.Koreans, S.Vietnamese, French, British or the Guatemalans, they had their own guardians however weak and useless. In support of his own regime Eisenhower supported others where necessary. His emphasis on foreign aid was an intuitive move, which reaped many benefits, particularly the allegiances of certain third world nations. His eventual aim of reducing atomic weapons and a slowdown of the arms race were a bold move but were countenanced only on the assumption that the U.S. would remain superior in warheads.

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