Germany’s world policy was not solely responsible for making war inevitable. The foreign policy of Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans also contributed to making conflict certain. The Slav nation of Serbia had attained independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and in 1908 the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also granted independence, however the Austrians decided to annex the territory to its own empire, to the abhorrence of the Slavs.42 Austria’s actions destined to bring it in into conflict with Russia, the natural protector of the Slavs but Russia still weakened from its humiliating loss to Japan in 1905 was forced to stand by and allow Austria free rein. However Austria’s actions had the effect of creating further hostility towards the Austrians from the Slavs and more importantly heaped further humiliation on the Russians, obliterating a decade of partnership between the Austrian and Russian empires in the Balkans and placing them on a collision course towards war. 43 Due to Germany’s need to bolster Austria-Hungary, any war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would almost certainly involve Germany.
By 1912 Russia was sufficiently recovered to once again get involved in the Balkans, sponsoring the Balkan League (consisting of several Balkan states including Serbia), its direct purpose to defeat the Ottoman Empire, although a further aim was to limit Austrian influence on the Balkans. 44 The success of the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 lead by the Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria (which was an Austrian ally) had the effect of strengthening Austria’s arch-enemy Serbia as well as their ally Russia. 45 Russia desired to create a Pan-Slav union across the Balkans which would essentially be its satellite, Austria-Hungary was naturally opposed to such a prospect since its empire was made of numerous ethnic groups including Slavs who might wish to defect or increase the demand for self-determination within the empire. Furthermore Germany saw the Balkans as a route to their interests in the Middle East as well as bolstering the position of its ally Austria-Hungary and was determined to limit Russia’s influence on them. 46
The Balkans were a major bone of contention, the main powers in the Balkans all wished the region to follow different paths, yet due to their domestic inability to appear to have failed, the main powers were unable to compromise fully on the future of the Balkans, which made conflict over them almost inescapable without a serious reversal of policy, the impact of which would be to relegate said power from prominence in the Balkans.
The question surely arises why diplomatic victories were so important in the early 20th century and what role did this play in making war inevitable? In the 21st century, it is easy to dismiss the opinion that war could ever have been viewed as an honourable act, yet such ideas were prevalent in pre-World War One Europe and massively contributed to the inevitability of war.
Before the outbreak of war, nationalism swept across Europe, with Europeans increasingly identifying themselves along national lines. Germany did not create nationalism yet also could not ignore it. “Governments could not prevent nor control forces which produced this shift” 47 towards nationalism. Nationalism provided domestic governments with a new jingoistic style of patriotism that bolstered their own popularity, French President Raymond Poincare taking advantage of patriotism to strengthen his government by abandoning past French attempts to placate Germany and adopt a more aggressive European policy, which appealed to the working classes in particular. 48
German nationalism grew at a dramatic rate, fanned by nationalist organisations such as the Pan-German League which despite a limited membership became a powerful pressure group promoting German foreign expansion at any cost. The Pan-German League drew on the emerging German media to promote its cause and criticise failures of German foreign policy. The role of these organisations in creating the necessary atmosphere for war cannot be underestimated, in 1911 following Germany’s humiliation at the hands of Britain and France in the second Moroccan crisis, far right nationalist groups called for the Kaiser to be deposed. The effect of such calls would result in the Kaiser and his government being less willing in future to risk a diplomatic defeat for the fear of domestic reprisals and also offers greater understanding to Germany’s unstinting support for Austria-Hungary during the July Crisis, fearful of what these groups might instigate if Germany was seen to stand by and allow her chief ally to be humiliated at the hands of Serbia and Russia. 49
Furthermore the theory of Social Darwinism had also took hold in many European countries, creating a widespread belief that the world was little more than a battleground, in which the world’s various nationalities would have to fight it out to the death, with only the survival of the fittest assured. Friendship and respect for other nationalities was deemed inappropriate, instead readiness for war was deemed the only suitable attitude, the alternative being decline. War was not to be seen as an act that a nation should be ashamed of or try to avoid, “war is God’s test of a nation’s soul.” 50 Indeed European war, certainly between Russia and Germany was seen by its proponents as being primarily about establishing racial superiority, Moltke writing in early 1914 of the predicted war as being “a struggle between Teuton and Slav.” 51
The impact of nationalism and social Darwinism lead to greater public acceptance that war might be necessary to avert a diplomatic failure at the expense of a rival, furthermore due to increased public awareness of foreign policy as a result of improvements in the media, diplomatic failures threatened the survival of governments more than ever before, therefore with the stakes raised increasingly high, governments became more prepared to risk war to satisfy its domestic population which in itself made war inevitable, as eventually a crisis would almost certainly develop (as it did) where the main parties would chose war instead of peace. 52
All nations were preparing for war and tension was rising, with little idea of what war would be like. Germany’s military leaders fully expected that any European war could be fought as quickly and decisively as its campaign against France in 1870. 53 That war had been won largely due to Germany’s speedy mobilisation and influenced the pre-war belief of the German military that a victory was largely dependant on a German strike on its enemies, Germany’s Schlieffen plan envisaging a lightning attack on France via neutral Belgium, before turning focus to Russia, which the German military anticipated would take longer to mobilise their troops. 54 All of the major European powers had carefully prepared war plans based entirely upon the prospect of war between the two alliance blocks, Keegan shrewdly arguing that “secret plans determined that any crisis not settled by sensible diplomacy would, in the circumstances prevailing in Europe in 1914, lead to general war.” 55
At the turn of the century, Germany was convinced of the threat from Russia and as the years passed her leaders become more and more fatalistic about the Russian threat, due to Russia’s dramatic economic and military growth, which might in future even overtake Germany. Although A.J.P. Taylor’s assertion that Germany fought in 1914 as a result of Russia’s decision in 1913 to improve her strategic rail system is incorrect, unquestionably Russia’s advancement perturbed Germany. 56
For the reasons previously explained, a German war with Russia was inevitable by 1914 and due to the Schlieffen Plan, which the German military did not contemplate altering, no German war with Russia could not involve France, as the German military believed that to avoid the prospect of a two front war, it needed to knock out France before it could attack turn to Russia. Therefore a German war with Russia automatically meant war with France i.e. a major European war.
Few German military experts anticipated that Britain would get involved; however the Schlieffen Plan also bears responsibility for creating a world war involving Britain. The biggest flaw of the Schlieffen Plan was that it required a German invasion of neutral Belgium to attack France, which would give Great Britain reason to take part in any European war. Launching an attack on a neutral country (guaranteed by Britain), would likely convince the British that Germany was an aggressor and needed to be stopped before Germany became too strong. 57 The Schlieffen plan created the potential for all five European powers to become involved in a major conflict.
Quite simply war had become inevitable because too many people wanted war due to the long term causes previously explained and not enough people feared what a 20th century war would entail.
The fact that a European war was successfully avoided several times before 1914 does not mean that it could have continued to be avoided indefinitely, instead Europe’s avoidance of war until 1914 attests to the fact that Europe, already a hotbed of distrust and tension was facing a “systemic crisis, an approaching breakdown.” 58 The crisis of 1914 proving to be breaking point.
The international humiliations experienced by both Germany (at the expense of France & Britain during the 1911 Morocco Crisis) and Russia (by Austria-Hungary in 1980) strengthened their respective government’s resolve not to cave in again and suffer further diplomatic failures, therefore their responses to a crisis in 1914 would be different to that of past crises.
Fischer is accurate in that German foreign policy before 1914 was most conducive to the inevitable outbreak of a European war. The Wilhelmine government via its hostile foreign policy alienated potential allies such as Russia and Britain and created a political atmosphere that required only a spark for a European conflict to develop, Gordon appearing to agree with Fischer by arguing that in its pursuit of world power status Germany deliberately risked war with other European states who opposed it, “As far as German policy is concerned, its readiness to risk war for its own ends - either a local Balkan war fought by its ally in Vienna or a larger, continental-sized war in which it, France and Russia participated - now seems unshakeably established.” 59
Yet some historians have argued that Germany’s economic and military rise should not automatically be viewed as making it responsible for making war inevitable. After unification Germany was a country with a bigger population than France and was more industrialised than Russia, therefore it was only logical that it should aim to overtake these countries. Furthermore historians such as Hillgruber and Hildebrand have pointed to the fact that in the years before 1914, Germany was essentially playing catch up with Britain, France and Russia, rather than attempting to achieve hegemony over them. In their opinion, Britain, France and Russia acted irrationally by ignoring Germany’s need to expand and viewing its expansion as threatening to their own security. Had Britain, France and Russia been less sceptical of German expansion, Germany would have felt less threatened by encirclement, Hillgruber claiming Germany’s defensive policies were incorrectly deciphered by the Triple Entente as being acts of aggression when in fact Germany’s actions before 1914 were simply misunderstood by the other powers. 60
Another aspect rarely given enough recognition, is that due to German’s central position and economic capacity in Europe, any expansion by it would almost certainly have made her neighbours suspicious. 61 The way that Germany was united through military force against Denmark, Austria-Hungary and France would only confirm these suspicions.
Contrary to what Fischer would have us believe, it is wrong to completely blame Germany for the political situation that existed in 1914. Although Germany’s aggressive world policy greatly increased European tension and lead to an arms race, had Russia not allied itself with France or later threatened Austria-Hungary’s position in the Balkans, Germany may have felt less compelled to support Austria-Hungary so strongly. Similarly had Austria-Hungary accepted its own decline, instead of seeking reassurances of support from Germany, the effect on Germany may have been to abandon the idea of Weltpolitik and return to Bismarck’s original policy of appeasing the European powers. Had Great Britain remained in glorious isolation, Germany may not have felt encircled by enemies. Furthermore Germany was not directly responsible or alone in adopting nationalist agendas, promoting jingoistic nationalism or intensifying the arms race.
By 1914, a situation had been created whereby war between the European powers was inevitable, all that was required was a spark to set it off, Howard stating that “from 1911 onwards it is hard to find any military leader suggesting that war could or should any longer be avoided.” 62
THE JULY CRISIS
The catalyst for the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, heir to Emperor Franz Josef, on June 28 1914 in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo.63 War broke out as a result of the reaction of the various states to the assassination and therefore the answer to the question of German war guilt must lie primarily here.
All of the main states involved in the July Crisis can be identified as being responsible to some degree for the conflict that developed however some states and their leaders are guiltier than others. In the following section, the roles of the various states involved in the July Crisis (Serbia, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and Germany) will be analysed. For the sake of straightforwardness, instead of assessing the July Crisis in chronological order, each country’s role in the July Crisis will be examined country by country in ascending order of guilt.
Great Britain’s role in the July Crisis has often been viewed as controversial. It has been contended that had Britain indicated its intention to support France, Germany may have been more restrained in its support of Austria-Hungary, which could have avoided war. This is unfair, Britain was determined to act as a mediator between the two emerging factions, the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey hoping to avoid inflaming Germany by coming out in support of France and Russia, while at the same time not promising Russia and France its support, thereby hopefully preventing them from acting too rashly.64
Troubled by ongoing problems in Ireland, as late as July 29th, the majority of the British Cabinet refused Grey’s proposal that Britain should publicly declare its support for France in case of a German invasion and reaffirm its promise to uphold Belgian neutrality. Although Grey would privately warn Germany that Britain would fight with France if she were invaded, it was not until August 2nd, when war between Germany and Russia and France seemed definite that the British government finally agreed that she would support France if it were attacked by Germany.65
The July Crisis developed at a faster rate than the British could respond to it and it was not until the very last stages that the British government even accepted it would have to take part in any European war, in this respect Britain is no more culpable than any other country without a direct interest in the July Crisis. 66 However the German invasion of Belgium on August 4th, left the British with little room for manoeuvre, while German violation of Belgian neutrality would act as a sufficient moral excuse to explain British involvement, Germany’s invasion of Belgium and the following attack on France forced Britain to act to maintain the balance of European power, to allow Germany to dominate the European continent could not be tolerated. 67
Great Britain fought as a result of the German threat, not to its own borders but to the European equilibrium. It did not desire a European war, by the time Britain became involved, war was already a reality.68 Britain’s culpability is very limited, smaller than that of any other state involved in the July Crisis, furthermore Britain’s continued efforts to mediate against war in 1914 can be viewed favourably.
Contrary to Remak’s thesis, Serbia did not want, or is greatly responsible, for the war that broke out in 1914, exemplified by its response to Austria-Hungary’s ‘unacceptable ultimatum’ to the Serbian government following the Archduke’s assassination. 69 To the amazement of the European Powers, Serbia accepted all but one of Austria-Hungary’s demands, which lead Kaiser Wilhelm II who had urged the Austrians to punish the Serbs to conclude that a case for war no longer existed. 70
Serbia’s culpability lies in its failure to properly warn the Austrian-Hungarian government of the real threat of assassination to Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Evidence has shown that while the Serbian government did not order or even approve of the planned assassination, it did not stop it or give Vienna sufficient warning, the Serbian ambassador merely warning the Austrian-Hungarian government of the hypothetical possibility of an assassination attempt on the heir to the throne. 71
Nonetheless Serbia’s responsibility for the outbreak of war is not great, royal assassinations during this period were hardly uncommon, especially not to the Hapsburgs. 72 Furthermore there was significant concern within the Imperial court even from the Emperor himself about the safety of the visit; however it went ahead as planned with no increased security. 73 Serbia was forced into war by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war.
France had little alternative than to go to war in 1914. Although France had harboured a grudge against Germany for almost half a century because of its annexation of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 and the machinations of Bismarck to alienate it from the European fold, there was no real threat of France attacking Germany to retake them. 74
Examining the memoirs of French military chief Joffre, it is clear by July 27th that the French military was under no illusion that war seemed inevitable and that in any war that broke out between Germany and Russia, Germany would almost certainly invade France and therefore it was necessary to liaise with their Russian allies to ensure that once hostilities had been established, Russia would immediately attack East Prussia and therefore instantaneously making the German Schlieffen Plan of avoiding a two front war obsolete. Russia signalled its agreement to the French request. 75
French preparations for war could easily be viewed as directly contributing to the increase of tension during the July Crisis and therefore making war more likely, however Joffre who personally favoured the offensive, points out that as late as July 28th the “main preoccupation of the French government was to make no move which could be construed as anything except a reply to some step taken by Germany.” 76
Therefore it can be argued that France’s response was purely reactionary, thereby limiting its culpability for either initiating or starting the subsequent war. France was acting in a purely defensive manner. It did not want war with Germany but if France was forced into war by a German invasion, it wanted a guarantee of Russian support.
When the French government was informed on July 29th that a secret general mobilisation of Russian forces was to take place, the government’s response was to instead suggest a partial mobilisation which would act as a caution to Germany and Austria-Hungary but not inflame the situation as much as general mobilisation. 77
France by this point was in no position to try and hold Russia back, to have done so could have weakened their alliance or in the worst scenario broken it, which could leave France without its main ally. 78 France’s future as a world power was also at stake and she was well aware of it, following Germany’s declaration of war on Russia, the Germans effectively gave France a single option to avoid war; the handover to Germany of its defensive strongholds on the border with Germany. The acceptance of such a proposal by the French government would have been unthinkable, furthermore it clearly identified Germany’s aim to be “victorious, with or without fighting,”79 aside from accepting complete defeat, France had no option but to mobilise its military and await a German declaration of war. France’s culpability only outranks that of Great Britain and Serbia because France could have tried harder to stop Russia mobilising, although its reasons for not doing so were out of survival not of a desire for war.
Russia’s role in the July Crisis has always been recognised as being decisive. Russia supported Serbia just as strongly as Germany supported Austria-Hungary, the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov advising Serbia not to oppose an Austrian attack and thereby strengthening Serbian resolve not to comply with Austria’s wishes in the ultimatum, even though recent evidence has shown that the Russian government realised fully that in supporting Serbia, it would almost certainly lead to war with Austria and quite possibly with Germany. 80
Preliminary Russian mobilisation of its forces on July 25th to combat an Austro-Hungarian attack can be viewed as being the point of no return for European diplomacy. Despite attempts to place preliminary Russian mobilisation in the context of defence from an inevitable German threat, Russia’s decision to order preliminary mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, even before the time limit placed on Serbia by Austria-Hungary to answer its ultimatum had passed, greatly exacerbated the July Crisis. 81
While Russian preliminary mobilisation could be seen as an attempt to act as a deterrent to Austria-Hungary from attacking Serbia, the impact of Russian preliminary mobilisation against Austria had the effect of galvanising Germany’s political elite into thinking that if Russia meant to go to war with Austria-Hungary, then Germany could not stand by and allow her chief ally to be attacked. According to German Admiral von Muller, the impact of Russian military preparations worked to convince those in the German government who had not originally favoured war that a German war with France and Russia was inevitable, leading to Germany abandoning any serious attempts to broker for peace and instead turning its focus to keeping British neutrality in the upcoming war by allowing “Russia to put herself in the wrong.” 82 Russian preliminary mobilisation acted as a trigger which pushed the Germans into deciding upon war. Russia must accept significant blame for the situation developing in this manner and the subsequent war.
Austria-Hungary’s reaction to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not an immediate act of retaliation against Serbia, which might have been tolerated by all the European powers considering the shock at Franz Ferdinand’s murder and the determination not to be seen to condone political assassinations. Instead Austria’s reaction was restrained. The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand while deeply shocking to the Austrian population and viewed as being a gross insult to the Hapsburg dynasty was not greeted with mass grief at the Imperial court.83
Instead the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand provided the perfect provocation for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, enabling them to crush Slav nationalism once and for all. Conrad von Hoetzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff immediately pushed for war against Serbia and if necessary against their great power ally Russia. Leopold von Berchtold, the Foreign Minister agreed, believing the Archduke’s murder meant that public opinion would support such a war.84 Austria-Hungary’s calculated deliberations of the merits of a military response exemplify their limited interest in maintaining peace. Furthermore Austria-Hungary’s request to Germany for support, acknowledges the fact that Austria-Hungary had realised that limiting war to only Serbia was not guaranteed. 85
With a promise of full support from Germany, the Austrians would have declared war on Serbia immediately, but delayed due to the concern expressed by the Hungarian government. To satisfy this concern, the Austrian government agreed to give an ultimatum to Serbia of its demands, which had to be met to prevent an Austrian attack. However the Austrian government deliberately set demands, which were so extreme, and in many cases contravened Serbian sovereignty that it would leave the Serb government with little choice but to refuse therefore giving the Austrians an excuse to push ahead with the war that it had already decided it was going to wage. 86 Austria-Hungary had decided to force a war with Serbia, Austria’s reluctance to act unilaterally transformed the July Crisis from a localised crisis into a European one. Austria-Hungary’s portion of blame during the July Crisis is only surpassed by Germany’s.
Finally we turn to Germany. Germany did not initiate the July Crisis of 1914 and it is my considered judgement that the blank cheque of support which it gave to Austria-Hungary and the encouragement to deal with the Serbian problem does not in itself make it responsible for the deepening of the crisis at this stage, had Austria-Hungary not requested German backup for its planned war or opted not to act against Serbia, then Germany would not have forced her to act. The Austrians did not offer Germany a choice between war and peace but a request for support if Russia interfered in a war it was planning against Serbia.
In response to Austria’s request for support, Kaiser Wilhelm II told Austria it could “count on Germany's full support,”87 in its conflict with Serbia and even Russia if necessary. He also urged Austria-Hungary to act immediately. Wilhelm II was not a warmonger, as we investigate Germany’s role in the July Crisis further, it will be shown that as war became more and more likely, Wilhelm desperately tried to stop it. Wilhelm’s support for Austria-Hungary was out of loyalty to his chief ally and in disgust at the murder of a fellow royal, he urged Austria to act swiftly believing that to do so would be viewed by the other European powers including Russia as a justifiable act of revenge following the Archduke’s murder. The Kaiser anticipated the situation would be resolved in a week with “Serbia backing down” and Austria-Hungary, Germany’s chief ally, invigorated by its diplomatic victory. In a worst-case scenario he believed that even if Russia did not tolerate an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, it would not use force, as she “was by no means ready for war,”88 Russia was expected to back down just as she had done in 1909 during the Bosnian annexation crisis. At this stage the worst Germany can be blamed for is misjudging the crisis and underestimating their opponents, which was hardly unique to Germany during this time period.
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who had only been informed of the blank cheque to Austria the day after Wilhelm II granted it, took control of the increasingly tense situation. Bethmann-Hollweg’s secretary Kurt Riezler has left behind a remarkable insight into the Chancellor’s deliberations during the July Crisis. Bethmann-Hollweg was just as eager to support Germany’s Austrian allies as the Kaiser. Austria-Hungary had to be supported, if Austria ceased to be a great power which its failure to reply to the assassination might imply it no longer was, it would cease to be a major target of the Russians, therefore leaving them to focus their entire troops on Germany in the event of war. 89 Furthermore after being harshly criticised for his timidity by nationalists in past crises, the Chancellor was not again prepared to disregard such a powerful section of society, especially when it appeared that German/Austrian pride had been insulted.
It is evident at this stage that the Chancellor’s aim was not to wage a European war but to obtain a major diplomatic victory on behalf of Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia. Bethmann-Hollweg still believed that Russia would have little choice but to restrain its Serb allies, the effect of which would be the weakening of both, especially Russia for which a further international humiliation would have serious domestic ramifications for the Russian government, the impact of which would be to limit a future Russian threat to Germany. 90
Riezler does concede that as early as July 7th, the Chancellor accepted that “an action against Serbia can lead to world war”, fully aware of the monumental risk that he was taking by continuing to encourage Austria-Hungary to act. Nonetheless he saw it as his “gravest duty” to do so. In pursuit of its diplomatic aims Germany had to be prepared to take a “leap into the dark.” 91 Although the Chancellor believed that Germany’s actions during this time could end up transforming the European landscape, toppling more thrones than it would strengthen; merely maintaining the status quo was also not an option.
Austrian sluggishness fulfilling its part of the bargain to promptly attack Serbia essentially destroyed any hope of a diplomatic victory, “the link between the assassination of the Archduke and the ‘punishment’ of Serbia would become more and more tenuous and European public opinion less and less likely to see it.”92 The German Foreign Office was instructed to begin looking for other ways to limit the Austro-Serb conflict developing into world war, including a personal appeal to the Tsar to ignore Austria’s attack on Serbia as “Serbia is a source of wild anarchist activities and that it is in the interest of monarchism in general to curb this.”93
The German government no longer seemed to accept the possibility that Russia could be placated, yet remarkably Bethmann-Hollweg did not move to change his policy or restrain Austria-Hungary, instead Bethmann-Hollweg worked to increase European tension by advising Austria to make its ultimatum to Serbia so unpalatable as to be unacceptable, thereby giving the Serbs no option but to refuse and appearing to give Austria-Hungary the moral high ground. 94
While publicly expressing its support for mediation, Germany covertly undermined the efforts of British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey to act as a mediator between Austria and Serbia. Grey’s call to Austria (made through Germany) for moderation following the ultimatum to Serbia and a request for a time extension for the Serbians to respond was not passed onto the Austrians until after the original time limit had expired. Another British suggestion that a great power ambassadorial conference should be held, which would serve to pressure Serbia to fully comply with Austrian demands was rejected by Germany. 95
A preservation of the status quo in the Balkans was unacceptable to Germany.96 Not only would it appear as a diplomatic defeat but would have the effect of weakening Austria-Hungary’s long term position in the Balkans, which in turn would weaken the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its ability to serve as a reliable ally to Germany. It was essential to Germany that Austria-Hungary once again became the principal power in the Balkan region, the only way to do so would be at the expense of Russia. 97
In the event of European war, Germany’s military based a total German victory upon the Schlieffen Plan. Therefore when Russia begun preliminary mobilisation on July 25th, a sense of urgency dramatically developed in Germany and the prospect of war increased massively, the German military arguing that war was preferable to altering the Schlieffen Plan and warning the Chancellor of the need to prepare for war if the Schlieffen Plan could be expected to be successful. 98
In response to these warnings, there was a definite shift in the attitude of the Chancellor. The military insisted that in the interest of its own security, Germany needed to once and for all weaken or break the Franco-Russian alliance, the only way to do so would be war. Increasingly the Chancellor felt incapable of opposing the predominant view within the military that war was not only necessary but also vital to Germany’s long-term interest. Bethmann-Hollweg with resignation accepted that war with Russia was not only likely but also favourable to Germany if fought under the right circumstances. 99
Domestic support from Germany’s powerful social democratic movement removed the Chancellor’s last remaining inhibition about war with Russia. Throughout the July Crisis, Germany’s working classes had grown increasingly enraged at what it perceived to be Russian aggression towards innocent Germany and would welcome war when it was declared. The last real obstacle to war had been removed; Bethmann-Hollweg would not have gone to war without the support of the Social Democrats, the largest party in the Reichstag, negating Fischer’s argument that Germany aimed for war in 1914 regardless of the cost or that it was in pursuit of weakening the Social Democrats, the effect of July 1914 was to merely confirm what many within the party already suspected, that the Social Democrats could not be ignored, which would strengthen rather than weaken their position. 100 To ensure British neutrality, Bethmann-Hollweg contended that it was absolutely essential for Germany to appear to be the innocent party, with Russia being portrayed as the aggressor; which could only be possible if it appeared that Germany had been threatened or attacked. 101
The Austrian inability to move its military until August 12th left the Germans in a dangerous situation; Bethmann-Hollweg feared that his aim of forcing Russia to take responsibility for war would fall apart during this period if Austria-Hungary and Germany appeared to be the aggressors, while the other states proposed further mediation. Bethmann-Hollweg argued that Russia must bear total responsibility for the broadening of the conflict. Although Russia had begun preliminary mobilisation of its forces some days previously, Bethmann-Hollweg rejected calls from Moltke to mobilise the German army until such a time when Russia had declared general mobilization, which could be portrayed as an act of military aggression towards Germany, the Chancellor believing such an act would guarantee British neutrality. 102
By this point Germany and its leaders had changed their policy again, deciding upon a general European war. On July 27th, even before Austria had declared war on Serbia, Moltke began preparations to attack France via Belgium, drafting a request for German passage through neutral Belgium. 103 Moreover Bethmann-Hollweg betrayed his true aims in a meeting with the British ambassador to Germany on July 29th, in which the German Chancellor attempted to extract a promise of British neutrality in return for not annexing French territory following a German victory. 104 The Chancellor had clearly indicated that in any upcoming war, Germany would not only fight Russia but crucially to the overall question of culpability France too.
The British reaction to this revelation is clear, although publicly constrained by the British government who were preoccupied with Ireland; privately Sir Edward Grey warned that Great Britain would fight with France if it were attacked. 105 If Bethmann-Hollweg’s actions in the previous two weeks are to be dismissed merely as being mismanagement of a crisis due to a belief that war or at the very least world war could be avoided, the British response should have given the Chancellor a massive jolt of reality and forced him to adapt his policy.
There is evidence that at this point, when British neutrality was in doubt, Bethmann-Hollweg attempted to urge Austria-Hungary to enter into mediation with Russia, Bethmann-Hollweg finally realising the seriousness of his actions, however Austria insisted that the plans for its attack on Serbia was already too far advanced to stop it, which Bethmann-Hollweg seemingly accepted on face value. Furthermore and probably unbeknown to Bethmann-Hollweg, Moltke had telegraphed the Austrian government urging them to continue to mobilise and promising that Germany would soon follow suit. 106
The fact that the Austrians opted not to obey Bethmann-Hollweg does not vindicate the Chancellor in any way, after all it had been Bethmann-Hollweg that pushed Austria towards war. Furthermore while Moltke’s actions convinced the Austrians to continue as previously agreed, even at such a late stage had Bethmann-Hollweg categorically stated to Austria-Hungary that Germany would not support her in any war against Russia, for the sake of its very survival Austria-Hungary would almost certainly have followed Germany’s wishes. Germany gave no such ultimatum. By the end of July, European war had become the only acceptable way out of the July Crisis of 1914 for Germany and Bethmann-Hollweg, which therefore indicates they must take more responsibility than any other state or individual for starting the First World War. Instead of attempting to bargain for peace, Bethmann-Hollweg turned his concentration fully to ensuring domestic support and portraying Russia as the aggressor. General Russian mobilisation on July 30th fulfilled Germany’s requirements. Only for Germany did Russian mobilisation automatically equate to war, the constraints of the Schlieffen Plan did not leave any other alternatives. 107
Kaiser Wilhelm II was in a total state of panic at the state of events. The Kaiser had already expressed his belief that Serbia’s response to the Austrian ultimatum being sufficient to avoid war and once Austria had declared war on Serbia on July 28th; he advised that she halt her military in Belgrade but this had been ignored. 108 In
between these events the Kaiser frequently telegraphed his cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, urging him to encourage his ministers to stop the mounting tension,109 the Kaiser failing to recognise that it was his own chief minister who was most responsible for creating the situation Germany now faced.
The Chancellor appeared to make one final attempt to maintain peace, warning the Russians on July 29th, that if they opted for general mobilisation it would “compel us (Germany) to mobilise and that then European war could scarcely be prevented.” 110
The ultimatum to Russia was little more than a public relations stunt, Germany had already decided upon war, the only way it could have been avoided would be a sudden and humiliating back down by Russia, which was highly unlikely at this stage, although the Tsar continued to urge mediation.
Germany declared war on Russia on August 1 1914. Meanwhile both Belgium and France were given the choice of accepting a peaceful German invasion (and a subsequent loss of sovereignty) or an all out war. In this action, Germany clearly displayed unprovoked aggression towards its neighbours. When both refused Germany’s offer, she proceeded to invade, declaring war on France on August 3rd, leaving Britain little option but to declare war on Germany on August 4th.111
The First World War had begun.
CONCLUSION
Historian A.J. Grant wrote in 1947 that the “causes of the Great War will occupy the pens of countless investigators perhaps for decades to come,” 112 a prophecy that has proven to be extremely accurate. Fritz Fischer’s study reinvigorated the war guilt debate. He is correct when he states that Germany bears major responsibility for the outbreak of war, however Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg sums it up best when he wrote decades before Fischer published his thesis, “the supposition that Germany let loose war out of mere lust of world power is so silly that a historian would only take it seriously in the entire absence of any other explanations at all.” 113
There is inadequate evidence to support Fischer’s argument that Germany planned the First World War. Similarly while German desire for a place on the world stage worthy of its status contributed to making war inevitable, one cannot place the entire blame for the outbreak of World War One on Germany’s desire to expand. Furthermore one
must avoid buying into Fischer’s attempts to create similarities between the governments of Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler.114 Fischer diminishes his own argument by attempting to tar the entire German government of 1914 with having a Nazi-style dream of world domination.
Germany does bear considerable responsibility for her role in creating the alliance system, alienating Russia and Great Britain and allying herself to the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Austria-Hungary and Russia both share considerable responsibility for their conduct in the Balkans, which made conflict there inevitable and due to the alliance system and the Schlieffen Plan, any conflict regardless of its size could easily develop into a global war. One must also take into account the impact of social Darwinism which had become increasingly commonplace amongst Europe’s decision-makers, making the various European governments less willing than they had been previously to compromise. No one person or state can take sole liability for the events that preceded the First World War.
If Fischer’s theory is correct and Germany really did desire world domination, it would have responded to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria with a demand to the Austrians to avenge his death. It did not. Of the states involved in the early stages of the July Crisis, only Austria-Hungary wanted war. Austria-Hungary bears considerable responsibility for driving the crisis towards a European war, knowing that its decision to make a punitive strike against Serbia would almost certainly force Russia to back Serbia; nonetheless the Austro-Hungarian government chose to risk a European war by requesting German support. Germany’s response to Austria-Hungary’s request for support with a blank cheque, while inflaming the situation cannot be seen as Germany’s way of forcing a European war. In turn Russia’s unstinting support for Serbia strengthened its resolve not to buck to Austria-Hungary’s demands and by moving towards mobilisation, Russia more or less confirmed the paranoid German belief that she was being encircled.
Undeniably during the July Crisis, the German government had concise ambitions which included the strengthening of her Austrian ally and the weakening of her Russian enemy. Fischer is correct in that some members of the German government did have a more long term aim of establishing a German hegemony over continental Europe, yet this was not at the core of Germany’s actions during the July Crisis. Germany hoped to achieve a diplomatic success; she did not want war and fully expected that Russia would respond to this crisis as it had done in past crises with a humiliating back down.
Germany’s aims were undone by its miscalculation of British and Russian policy. Once Germany had committed herself, the necessity of not appearing to have suffered an international humiliation forced the Chancellor, albeit knowingly, to continue to risk war and increase tension in the pursuit of a diplomatic victory and a possible weakening of the Entente.
It was not until the latter stages of the July Crisis that Germany realised that war was the only alternative to a humiliating climb down and her leaders finally chose war, although the Chancellor deemed it necessary to ensure that Russia and not Germany be held responsible. Furthermore due to the nature of Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, any conflict with Russia would also involve France and quite possibly Britain, Germany being the catalyst for turning a small conflict in the Balkans becoming a world-wide conflict.
Germany must bear most responsibility for starting the First World War as her mishandling of the July Crisis had the effect of creating a World War. However considering the actions of Austria-Hungary and Russia during the July Crisis, which greatly exacerbated the situation, it would be wrong to limit blame exclusively to Germany.
Culpability for Germany’s deeds during the July Crisis is borne by Bethmann-Hollweg, the head of the government and Moltke, the head of the military. The Chancellor had not wanted war but had misjudged the situation, quite simply taking “risks that were immeasurably too high.” 115 One cannot absolve the Chancellor of responsibility because the product of his actions was not intentional, he was aware early during the July Crisis of the possibility of a world war developing but he carried on increasing the tension, which unfortunately for him progressed at such a rate as to make it difficult to “withdraw the stakes.”116 One should note however that the Chancellor was acting at least in part as a response to the political climate which included social Darwinism, nationalism and the aftermath of Weltpolitik, factors that were beyond his control.
Moltke, who had pushed for a preventative war for years, took advantage of the situation that he had longed for to convince Bethmann-Hollweg of the necessity of war, Russian preparations appearing to confirm to the Chancellor the Russian threat.
The Kaiser has been treated very unfairly by history. While it has been popular to paint the Kaiser as a warmongering buffoon (he does bare some responsibility for increasing European tension before the war), throughout the July Crisis he was one of the few senior Germans who consistently attempted to stop the crisis developing further. 117
The First World War hastened European decline. 118 It accelerated the end of the great European empires and also contributed to America’s emergence as the dominant world power. The unexpected horrors of World War One worked to increase the pacifist determination to avoid another conflict at all costs, unwillingness to respond to threats to European security contributing to the rise of Adolf Hitler, the outbreak of the Second World War and the destruction of European stability for a second time in twenty five years. The impact of the Two World Wars advanced the communist cause, which would divide Europe for over seventy years and lead to the Cold War, which on more than one occasion would bring the world close to nuclear meltdown. 119 There were no winners in World War One, everyone lost.
Considering the impact the First World War had upon shaping how the rest of the 20th century panned out, it would be understandable if one credited those responsible for starting the First World War with also bearing some responsibility for the other numerous conflicts and violent events that can trace their roots in the First World War and made the 20th century the most violent ever. It is both frustrating and fascinating to consider how different the world would be today had the First World War not broken out. However going down this path is fundamentally unpredictable and unhelpful, if those responsible for causing the First World War are to be blamed for every subsequent violent act, can we also not also blame the First World War on past conflicts?
It should never be underestimated that none of the politicians or military generals who contributed to the outbreak of war expected the war that the First World War became. Hindsight is a wondrous thing, when we attach blame for starting the First World War we also tar individuals and states with blame for the deaths of millions of people. While we cannot excuse it, we must acknowledge that when the choice between war and peace was being debated in Europe’s capitals in July 1914, almost everyone anticipated that any war would be short, with limited casualties. No one expected the war that was unleashed, Reynolds stating that, “'no one thought they were helping start the First World War.” 120
Footnotes
Introduction
1 James Joll. Cited in Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. xiii.
2 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 1.
3 ibid. Pages 2.
4 ibid. Page 47.
5 H W Koch. Introduction in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Page 6.
6 ibid. Page 7. Koch demonstrates the argument that the war developed accidentally by pointing to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s comment on how the European states “slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war.”
7 Philip Bell. Cited in Paul Hayes (Editor), Themes in Modern European History, Routledge, 1992. Page 113. “Socialists argued strongly that war was the product of capitalism, and of imperialism, which Lenin had described as the highest stage of capitalism.”
8 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Pages 121-123.
9 ibid. Page 119.
10 H W Koch. Introduction in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Page 7.
The Fischer Controversy
11 Fritz Fischer. War of Illusions, Chatto & Windus, 1975. Page 470.
12 Fritz Fischer. Cited in Gordon Martel (Editor), Modern Germany Reconsidered, Routledge, 1993. Page 55.
13 Fritz Fischer. Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. Page 31.
14 John C. G. Rohl. Imperial Germany Part Two: The Riddle of 1914 from Modern History Review, No.1, Vol 2, 1990. Page 10.
15 David Stevenson. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Macmillan, 1997. Page 11.
16 Fritz Fischer. Cited in Gordon Martel (Editor), Modern Germany Reconsidered, Routledge, 1993. Page 56.
17 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 136.
18 Marshall Joseph Joffre. Memoirs of Marshall Joffre, Volume 1, Geoffrey Bles, 1932. Pages 118-127.
19 It was fundamentally impossible for the simple reason the Schlieffen Plan required Germany to mobilise before or straight after its enemy to enjoy a chance of success. If Germany was capable of secretly mobilising for an entire week, the Schlieffen Plan would itself cease to be relevant. Keegan gives a thorough explanation of the various war plans including Schlieffen in John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Pages 21-51.
20 Fritz Fischer. Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. Page 72.
21 Riezler’s diaries were not published until the 1970s. Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Pages 156-157.
22 Fritz Fischer. Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. Pages 103-104.
23 ibid. Page 50.
24 ibid. Page 50.
25 H W Koch. Introduction in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Page 12.
26 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Pages 131-132.
Did Germany make war inevitable?
27 F.H. Hinsley. Introduction in The Origins of the First World War. Keith Wilson (Editor), Decision for War, 1914, St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Page 4.
28 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 179. The German military believed war was inevitable, Moltke stating “the sooner the better.”
29 ibid. Page 179.
30 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 8.
31 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Page 100.
32 ibid. Page 131.
33 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Pages 4-5.
34 Frank McDonough. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Page 29. Imanuel Geiss. Origins of the First World War in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Page 47.
35 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 130-131.
36 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 130-131.Hew Strachan. The First World War, Simon & Schuster, 2003. Page 37.
37 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 130-131.
38 ibid. Pages 135-142. Hew Strachan. The First World War, Simon & Schuster, 2003. Page 37. John M. Merriman. A History Of Modern Europe, Vol 2, From the French Revolution to the Present, W.W. Norton, 1996. Page 1013.
39 John M. Merriman. A History Of Modern Europe, Vol 2, From the French Revolution to the Present, W.W. Norton, 1996. Page 1016.
40 ibid. Page 1016.
41 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 156-158.
42 John M. Merriman. A History Of Modern Europe, Vol 2, From the French Revolution to the Present, W.W. Norton, 1996. Page 1019.
43 ibid. Page 1020.
44 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 62.
45 ibid. Page 63.
46 ibid. Pages 62-64.
47 F.H. Hinsley. Introduction in The Origins of the First World War. Keith Wilson (Editor), Decision for War, 1914, St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Page 7.
48 M Hewitson. Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy, The English Historical Review, Volume 115, Issue 462, June 2000. Pages 570-606.
49 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 116-117, 159.
50 H W Koch. Social Darwinism as a Factor in the ‘New Imperialism’ in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Pages 332-334.
51 Fritz Fischer. Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. Page 33.
52 M Hewitson. Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy, The English Historical Review, Volume 115, Issue 462, June 2000. Pages 570-606.
53 Fritz Fischer. Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Chatto & Windus, 1967. Page 103.
54 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Pages 11-12.
55 John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Page 55.
56 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 126. Mombauer gives an accurate critique of the Timetable theory produced by A.J.P. Taylor.
57 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Pages 75-76.
58 Paul W. Schroeder. In World War I as Galloping Gertie: A reply to Joachim Remak in H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Pages 103-104.
59 M. Gordon. Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases, Journal of Modern History, vol. 46, 1974. Page 194.
60 M Hewitson. Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy, The English Historical Review, Volume 115, Issue 462, June 2000. Pages 570-606.
61 ibid. Pages 570-606.
62 Michael Howard. Europe on the Eve of the First World War. In R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Editors), The Coming of the First World War, Clarendon Press, 1988. Page 10.
The July Crisis
63 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 1.
64 ibid. Pages 75-76.
65 Zara S. Steiner & Keith Neilson. Britain and The Origins of the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pages 234-239.
66 ibid. Page 242.
67 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Pages 75-76.
68 Zara S. Steiner & Keith Neilson. Britain and The Origins of the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Page 256.
69 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 15.
70 ibid. Pages 15-16.
71 Joachim Remak. 1914 - The Third Balkan War:Origins Reconsidered. In H.W. Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Pages 93-96.
72 Emperor Franz Josef’s wife the Empress Elisabeth was assassinated in 1898, while his brother the Emperor of Mexico had been murdered by Revolutionaries in the 1860s. ttp://www.geocities.com/Vienna/1605/sissy.htm, http://www.krischanphoto.com/austria/1848/1848.htm - online biography/timeline of the Hapsburg dynasty.
73 Ruth Henig, The Origins of The First World, Routledge, 1989. Page 22.
74 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 75.
75 Marshall Joseph Joffre. Memoirs of Marshall Joffre, Volume 1, Geoffrey Bles, 1932. Pages 117-118.
76 Marshall Joseph Joffre. Memoirs of Marshall Joffre, Volume 1, Geoffrey Bles, 1932. Page 118. Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 75.
77 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 93.
78 ibid. Page 75.
79 ibid. Page 67.
80 D.W. Spring. Russia and the Coming of War. In R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Editors), The Coming of the First World War, Clarendon Press, 1988. Pages 60-85.
81 L.C.F. Turner. The Russian Mobilization of 1914, Journal of Contemporary History 3, 1968. Pages 70-71, 80.
82 ibid. Page 80.
83 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 1. Emperor Franz Josef’s response to the assassination of his heir betrays the lack of affection between the two “A higher power has restored that order which I alas could not sustain.” A reference to Franz Ferdinand’s humiliation of the Habsburg dynasty be marrying a mere Countess, who was deemed by the elderly Emperor unworthy to be the next Empress of Austria and was banished from the imperial court in Vienna, the children of Franz Ferdinand barred from the succession. R.J.W. Evans. The Hapsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War. In R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Editors), The Coming of the First World War, Clarendon Press, 1988. Page 35.
84 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 172. Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy 1765-1918 (European History Series), St Martin’s Press, 2001. Pages 376-375
85 Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy 1765-1918 (European History Series), St Martin’s Press, 2001. Pages 376-375
86 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 15. V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 198, 204-205.
87 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 65.
88 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 199. Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Pages 65-66.
89 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Page 173.
90 Wayne C. Thompson. In Holger H. Herwig, The Outbreak of the World War I (Sixth Edition), Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997. Pages 92-93.
91 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 201.
92 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Pages 172-173.
93 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 210.
94 Wayne C. Thompson. In Holger H. Herwig, The Outbreak of the World War I (Sixth Edition), Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997. Page 93-94. V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Page 210.
95 Zara S. Steiner & Keith Neilson. Britain and The Origins of the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pages 237-239.
96 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Pages 212-213.
97 ibid. Pages 212-213.
98 ibid. Pages 213.
99 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 74.
100 David Stevenson. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Macmillan, 1997. Pages 28-30.
101 Edgar Feuchtwanger. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, Routledge, 2001. Page 174.
102 V. R. Berghahn. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan, 1973. Pages 216.
103 Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War, Longman Group, 1996. Page 71. Michael Brock. Britain Enters The War. In R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Editors), The Coming of the First World War, Clarendon Press, 1988. Page 159.
104 David Stevenson. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Macmillan, 1997. Page 29-30.
105 Zara S. Steiner & Keith Neilson. Britain and The Origins of the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Page 241.
106 Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 17. David Stevenson. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Macmillan, 1997. Page 30.
107 Few outside of the German government/military realised this, Keegan argues that only Sir George Buchanan and Jules Cambon, the British and French Ambassadors to Russia respectively, acknowledged it. Buchanan had warned the British government that “Russian mobilisation would push the Germans not into a responsive mobilisation but a declaration of war. John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Page 66.
108 Copies of the telegrams (between July 29 1914 & August 1 1914) between the Tsar and The Kaiser were written in English and can be found online at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/willynilly.html.
109 David Stevenson. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Macmillan, 1997. Pages 28-30.
110 John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Page 70, 76.
111 ibid. Page 76-77.
Conclusion
112 A.J. Grant. Europe: The story of the last Five Centuries, Longmans Green & Company, 1947. Page 800.
113 Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. Reflections on the World War, Thornton Butterworth Ltd, London, 1920. Page 163.
114 Fischer’s identification of similarities between the governments of Adolf Hitler and Wilhelm II had the result of galvisning the German establishment to completely discredit his work throughout the 1960s. Annika Mombauer. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Longman, 2002. Page 133-135.
115 Joachim Remak. In 1914 - The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered in
H W Koch (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, Macmillan, 1972. Page 94.
116 ibid. Page 94.
117 Keegan notes that in the Kaiser’s desperation to prevent an all out European war, he ordered Moltke to abandon the Schliffen Plan, instead of attacking France, Germany should head all its forces East, which would hopefully influence Britain to remain neutral and convince France not to come to Russia’s aid. John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Page 76.
118 Hajo Holborn. The Political Collapse of Europe, 1982, Greenwood Press, 1951, Pages 87-88.
119 John Keegan. The First World War, Pimlico, 1999. Pages 1-2.
120 David Reynolds. Britannia Overruled, Pearson, 2000. Page 87.
Books
Albertini, L. The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. London, Oxford University Press, London, 1952-7.
Berghahn, V. R. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, London, Macmillan, 1973.
Bethmann Hollweg, T. von. Reflections on the World War, London, Thornton Butterworth Ltd, London, 1920.
Evans, R.J.W. & Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge von (Editors). The Coming of the First World War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988.
Feuchtwanger, Edgar. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, London, Routledge, 2001.
Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War, London, Chatto & Windus, 1967.
Fischer, Fritz. War of Illusions, London, Chatto & Windus, 1975.
Gilbert, Martin. The First World War, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995.
Grant, A.J. Europe: The story of the last Five Centuries, Longmans Green & Company, 1947.
Hayes, Paul (Editor). Themes in Modern European History, London, Routledge, 1992.
Henig, Ruth. The Origins of The First World, London, Routledge, 1989.
Herwig, Holger H. The Outbreak of the World War I (Sixth Edition), Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997.
Holborn, Hajo. The Political Collapse of Europe, 1982, Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press, 1951.
Joffre, Marshall Joseph. Memoirs of Marshall Joffre, Volume 1, Geoffrey Bles, 1932.
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Koch, H.W. (Editor), The Origins of the First World War, German Power Rivalry and German War Aims, London, Macmillan, 1972.
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Martel, Gordon (Editor). Modern Germany Reconsidered, London, Routledge, 1993.
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McDonough, Frank. The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997
Merriman, John M. A History Of Modern Europe, Vol 2, From the French Revolution to the Present, London, W.W. Norton, 1996.
Mombauer, Annika. The Origins of the First World War, Controversies & Consensus, Harlow, New York, Longman, 2002.
Okey, Robin. The Habsburg Monarchy 1765-1918 (European History Series), London, Macmillan, 2001.
Palmer, Alan. The Kaiser : Warlord of the Second Reich, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978.
Reynolds, David. Britannia Overruled, London, Pearson, 2000.
Rohl, John C. G. The Kaiser and his court : Wilhelm II and the government of Germany, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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Stevenson, David. The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997
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Williamson, S. R. Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, London, Macmillan, 1991.
Articles
http://media.ucsc.edu/classes/thompson/history30c/Preventive%20War
Gordon, M . Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases, Journal of Modern History, vol. 46, 1974.
Hewitson, M. Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy, The English Historical Review, Volume 115, Issue 462, June 2000.
Rohl, John C. G. Imperial Germany Part One: The Riddle of 1914 from Modern History Review, No.1, Vol 2, 1990.
Rohl, John C. G. Imperial Germany Part Two: The Riddle of 1914 from Modern History Review, No.1, Vol 2, 1990.
Turner, L.C.F. The Russian Mobilization of 1914, Journal of Contemporary History 3, 1968.
Internet sities
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/willynilly.html.
http://www.geocities.com/Vienna/1605/sissy.htm, http://www.krischanphoto.com/austria/1848/1848.htm - online
