The political cynicism and opportunism of vote chasing by the traditional right can be illustrated by reference to the local elections of 1983 in Dreux, where the UDF/RPR opposition formed an alliance with the FN in an election dominated by anti-immigrant themes. The PS, fighting in defence of immigrant rights, narrowly won in the March ballot, but voting irregularities forced a rerun in which the traditional right formed an alliance with the FN on the second ballot and were victorious. Most significant was the turnaround in the position taken by the national centre-right leadership, Chirac in March denouncing any collaboration with the FN as an "alliance against nature", then finding it "completely natural in Dreux" in September following the victory of the combined right (Schain, 1987,Mitra,1988).
As these issues achieved increasing prominence with the election campaign, the media exposure and the political manoeuvring, Le Pen and the FN gained increasing acceptance as legitimate 'players', and the problems of immigration and law and order became political currency on terms set by the extreme right.
Following the FN's successes in Dreux and elsewhere, the party's level of acceptability was, in terms of both its ideas and as a party itself, in fact greater than its voter support. A SOFRES survey of public opinion in May 1984 found that among respondents with a preference, 37% of RPR supporters, 24% of UDF and 9% of PS and PCF supporters respectively, "felt a lot or some sympathy for Jean-Marie Le Pen" (in Schain,1987,p236). By the June 1984 European Parliamentary elections "the problems of immigration, law and order and the link between the two, had become well established in the national political dialogue, and had been legitimised and defined by all party elites" (Schain 1987,p249) and the FN took 11% of the vote, matching the PCF, a major achievement.
It was therefore to a significant extent a consequence of political choices made within the established parties, for whatever motive, that social issues of immigration and crime were elevated to political issues, enabling the extreme right the 'political space' to establish themselves in the political mainstream.
Such an explanation is however, a partial one and must be placed more fully in the appropriate economic and political context. Again the question must be asked as to why it was that the extreme right lacked, until the early 1980's, even a modicum of electoral support. One fruitful area of explanation lies, as Shields notes, with the critical role played by the Gaullist regime, once the 5th republic had been firmly established. For while the Poujadist movement had generated significant support amidst the instability of the 4th Republic, and had received the further short-term stimulus of decolonisation and economic modernisation in the late 1950's and early 1960's, de Gaulle by resolving the Algerian crisis and dealing strongly and decisively with the OAS threat, diffused the extreme right's momentum and deprived them of a unifying cause (Shields,1991).
Very importantly the climate of political and economic stability that the 5th Republic ushered in, ensured that the sort of dissension ably exploited by the Poujadists in the 1950's, did not reoccur. Frears concurs with this assessment, identifying the major reasons for extreme-right failure in the 1960's and 1970's as being "...the much higher level of consensus and legitimacy that...the 5th Republic, with its stable and accepted institutions and its background of great economic development has known" (in Shields,1991,p71).
The surge of support for the FN from about 1983 onwards would seem to be in accordance with Frear's implicit argument , that "economic crisis and political instability are the recruiting grounds of the extremist movements" (in Shields, 1991 p71). The problems faced by the Socialist government in its attempts to implement Keynesian reflationary policies, namely inflation of more than 14%, a rocketing budget deficit, devaluation of the franc and continued high unemployment levels, coming after voters had withdrawn their faith in the traditional right, breaking a 23 year tradition, would seem to provide this fertile ground.
Yet while undoubtedly these factors were an important and significant element in the FN's 'success', factors such as unemployment, economic recession, crime, urban tensions and immigration were issues that were not specific to the early 1980's, the 'crise' had started much earlier. In the 1970's under Giscard France witnessed a three-fold rise in unemployment for instance, immigration was virtually brought to a halt in 1974, whilst under the Barre government (1976-1981) violent crime climbed dramatically (Shields 1991). Whilst the 'Gang of Four'was seemingly firmly entrenched as the established political elite, representing a more consensual and stable political framework, an increasing disillusion and disaffection with this same traditional political class was occurring. As Schain notes (1987), the growing public distrust of the established parties predated the rise of the FN, becoming increasingly evident in the late 1970's. However whilst there was a growing disillusionment with the politicians and a diminishing attachment to the established political parties, general interest in politics and political activity remained strong (Schain,1987). For many voters there was an increasing sense of distance between themselves and the politicians, a feeling that the issues and concerns that were important to them were not being addressed. As a consequence of this increasingly low esteem in which the parties were held voter loyalty declined, being especially evident after 1981.
Since 1958 the 5th Republic has seen great economic and sociological change, and this was accompanied in the early years of modernisation and prosperity by a sense of optimism. However by the mid-1980's this had been replaced, according to a 1985 SOFRES public opinion survey, by a deepening pessimism concerning the ability of France to reverse the perceived cycle of socio-economic decline (in Shields,1991). This had come in the wake of a Socialist government that had promised so much but failed to deliver, at least initially, had laid out reflationary policies and then replaced them when they were not working by policies resembling those of the previous administration of the right.
When the PS came to power in 1981, the political mood could be characterised in terms of 'hope' and the 'desire for change', Mitterrand's victory being followed as it was by the Socialist's landslide majority in June 1981, seemed to confirm this. For the French voters Mitterrand offered not simply promises of social justice, but economic recovery also. Whilst the government of the 5th Republic had from the start been dominated by the traditional right, "the left had remained the repository of hope for a better future (Shields,1991,p85). However after a plethora of social and economic reforms implemented during its 'honeymoon period', the shock to the system proved too much. As Shields comments "the Socialists were caught in a spiral of their own creation". The more they had railed against the perceived problems of French society, "the more they raised the stakes against their own eventual failure to resolve these when in government" (1991,p77). As they backtracked on their 'island of socialism' policies in favour of the 'politics of austerity' in the name of 'realism', their failure to deal with the problems they had inveighed against rebounded with unforeseen effect. As 'efficiency', 'discipline', 'rigour' became the watchwords, the high expectations of many were demolished and an increasing perception of incompetence and vacillation hugely undermined governmental credibility, and occasioned a more generalised disenchantment with the political establishment (Shields,1991). The left's defeat in the March 1982 cantonal elections illustrated this withdrawal of public confidence, something that was again confirmed in the various local, regional, European and national elections that subsequently followed between 1983 and 1988.
That the 'decus du socialisme' did not automatically and comprehensively rebound to the benefit of the established right, can be seen in terms of this increasing scepticism and disillusion with which the French political class as a whole was viewed (Shields,1991). Nor did the electorate turn from the left to the right in a uniform fashion, rather there was "a generalised upset in the patterns of voting allegiance" (Shields,1991,p79), a general electoral volatility that reflected both the 'discredit' of the left and the right. For Le Pen on the periphery of the political establishment such a situation enabled him to capitalise on the public mood, his powerful and persuasive oratory freely attacking the institutionalised parties of the 'Gang of Four' as lumbering and out of touch, and by doing so mobilising the 'mecontents' (Shields,1991). In such a climate when the perception is one where conventional politicians seem only to have inspired disillusion, with tired, old ideas, the FN could appear 'fresh' and dynamic, its radical solutions to the nations ills increasingly finding favour in the public imagination. In such a political and economic context slogans such as '2 million immigrants are the cause of 2 million French people out of work', could find a more receptive audience (Mitra, 1988).
Undoubtedly some of the FN's electoral support came courtesy of the 'protest vote', a 'warning' from a discontented electorate to all established parties, rather than an indication of wholehearted support for the FN. As Shields argues, a not inconsiderable (as John Major would say!) proportion of those who voted FN in June 1984 (European) and in 1986 (legislative) had voted for Mitterrand in the second ballot of the 1981 Presidential election. And similarly it was established that in 1988 as many as 1 in 4 Le Pen voters transferred their support to Mitterrand rather than to Chirac between the two rounds of the Presidential election. It could be argued that the FN became a vehicle for the "electorate of refusal" (Jaffre in Shields,1991,p73) or the 'party of the disgruntled' (taking over the mantle from the PCF whose importance and electoral significance had dwindled dramatically), an electorate "with no firm ideological anchor in any one political camp" (Shields,1991p73).
However to credit the FN upsurge as singularly a protest vote would be to ignore its positive attractions (Schain,1987) and the breadth of its support base. Without question strong support comes from its traditional electorate in the highly industrialised regions of France, which encouraged immigration during the expansion of the 1950's and 1960's, particularly the urbanised areas of the southern 'departements', where large numbers of 'repatries' from Algeria, the 'pied noirs' co-exist with large numbers of North African immigrants. Here Le Pen's nationalistic rhetoric and nostalgia for 'Algerie francaise' falls on appreciative ears (Shields,1991). The FN are able to exploit tensions and insecurities over jobs and crime, the immigrant being depicted as surplus manpower, who take jobs and keep wages low (cheap competition), and who as ever makes an easy target.
This is, however, only a part of the FN's electorate, an electorate which can be characterised by its ideologically complex and socially heterogenous nature.FN support encompasses the self-employed in business, industry and farming (not unlike the Poujadists), but also takes support from a more traditional right base such as doctors, dentists and lawyers (re 'Entreprises modernes et libertes'), as well as from the working class (many of whom see the left as 'caviare socialists', eg Tapie, who are out of touch with their reality), and middle-level executives (Mitra,1988). As such their support seems to cut across conventional class-based and socio-professional boundaries. Similarly whilst high levels of FN support are concentrated in urban areas with a large immigrant / pied noir population, they also appear to be successful in smaller communities inhabited by the middle-class and lower-middle class, on the periphery of areas with large immigrant communities - what Perrineau calls the "effet de halo" ('halo effect'), the FN injecting and feeding off unease, threat and fears, in a more indirect way (Mitra,1992).
The general disaffection, diversity and disaffiliation of the electorate on the one hand (seen by some as an indication of a more general dealignment), can be contrasted on the other with a much greater coherence when it comes to the 'voting motivation' of the FN electorate (Shields,1991). Crime and immigration are consistently the priorities, and very significantly an underlying or increasingly explicit feeling of 'insecurity' is cited in opinion surveys (Mitra,1992) as an important concern of the French public. The failure of the Socialist government's economic reforms in the early 1980's, a new emphasis on law and order, heightened political debate about immigration and 'racial problems', and a party exploiting public concerns (and increasing them in a self-perpetuating circle), ensured that the term 'insecurite' acquired a new political dimension, one that combined a sense of fear, uncertainty and insecurity (Shields, 1991). As Mitra notes, the relationship between this sense of 'insecurite' and the rise of the extreme right, can be illustrated in responses to an opinion survey asking why they had voted FN, which frequently included 'immigration' and a 'feeling of insecurity'(Mitra,1992).
Such a preoccupation is significant in that law and order and security have traditionally been important themes of the established right, and surely indicates their failure to understand and address public concerns. Also, as Shields adds, until 1981 a centre-right conservative government was the norm, and the importance it attached to the areas of law and order and immigration ensured that "the discourse of the hard-right was effectively neutralised" (1991,p82). With the new government of the left in control however, the FN could profitably accuse the PS of being a 'soft-touch' and 'lax' on crime, and who cosited immigrants with overly liberal policies. As popularity surveys swung dramatically away from Mitterrand and his government, the debate predictably shifted to the right as Le Pen set the agenda and the established parties scrambled to win back disaffected supporters.
Following the 1984 European elections and the left's bad defeat, mirrored as it was with the electoral breakthrough of the FN, the PS government of Fabius presided over an important right-ward shift in policy regarding immigration and law and order. Government policies were revised in the wake of their successful exploitation by the FN in the 1983 local elections and Euro-elections. Illegal immigration was targeted, deportations increased, security at the borders was more tightly enforced and financial incentives for repatriation were reintroduced. The PS Interior Minister, Defferre, spoke of an 'invasion' of illegal immigrants, warned of the potential for Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism and spoke of threats to 'the very fabric of French society and its value system' (in Shields,1991).
This notion of a threat to French identity is a very important part of the basis of Le Pen's rhetoric. He plays on the anxieties and feelings of insecurity claiming that the cultural and religious identity of France is being destroyed. As Shields comments, for him the vision is "of a nationally debilitated and spiritually degenerate France falling prey to the insidious forces of Marxist ideology and Islamic Arab influence" (1991,p74). The French Le Pen argues are no longer at home in their own country, and its social facilities, be they medical, prison, educational or housing, are dominated by a foreign population. But in his broader 'vision' the immigrant issue is simply a symptom, rather than the cause of "a spiral of moral and cultural decadence" into which France has sunk, pointing to homosexuality, abortion, sexual promiscuity and AIDS, as evidence (in Shields,1991,p74). Even the relative decline in the French birth rate, (La denatalite), is used as a warning of a relentless colonisation by Islam as France's demographic profile changes. Le Pen feeds this into a "latent xenophobia" a "fear of foreigner, deeply embedded in French society, which becomes explicit at times of crisis and high unemployment" (Mitra,1992, p68). For some who have no deeply-held religious loyalties or political commitments, Le Pen's personality, oratory, style and 'panaceas' might seem to ease their feelings of insecurity or anxiety (Mitra,1988).
The issue of the 'Islamic headscarf' in October 1989, when three girls at a school in Creil insisted on keeping their heads covered in accordance with Islamic requirements, caused heated national debate, with a great deal of media and political attention. Obviously the FN made political propaganda out of the incident, arguing religious and cultural colonialism and claiming that it illustrated the threat to the French identity. However, that such an incident could become of such great significance indicates a more serious and "more sensitive conflict of basic values, deeply embedded in French society" (Brechon & Mitra,1992, p67).
At the heart of the matter was the position that immigrants (especially North Africans) were to be accorded in French society. Was their acceptance conditional on their assimilation of French norms and culture or would France recognise the immigrant's particular cultural and religious identity? (Brechon & Mitra,1992). In a country which has had a legendary capacity to make foreigners into Frenchmen, the debate about immigration and the problem of immigrants has been a challenging one (Schain,1990).
The legislative elections of 1986 saw the left try to reclaim some of the moral high ground and attempt to erect a 'cordon sanitaire' around the FN with the support of the Church and the traditional right who saw them increasingly as a threat rather than simply a vehicle of protest. The RPR/UDF campaign however to a significant degree incorporated many FN themes into their platform.
The FN's success in 1986 in gaining almost 10 % of the votes and 35 seats in the National Assembly must be seen in the context of these efforts, as well as those of the press (accusations of extortion, bribery and torture - during his Algerian days - against Le Pen) to isolate the FN, and indicate a solid and expanding electoral and organisational base (Schain,1987).
The election of a right-wing government ensured a continued right-wing agenda on immigration and law and order. Even the return of the PS government in 1988 did not swing the debate back on to terms they could dictate. For many, Mitterrand's introduction of P.R. in the 1986 legislative elections, a political manoeuvre to try to split the right and head off a heavy PS defeat, had undermined his espousal of egalitarian ideals and championing of civil liberties, for in doing so he ensured the FN would have significant representation in the National Assembly. Many sneered that "Le Pen's best friend was Mitterrand" (Fenby,Guardian,21-03-92), and it tarnished his claim to moral ascendancy, damaging the left's power to set the parameters of the political debate in a number of sensitive areas. As a consequence the debate over immigration and law and order remains largely on terms set out by the right (Shields,1991).
It would therefore appear that the FN's sudden emergence onto the national political scene in the early 1980's was a consequence of a number of separate factors that came together and provided an opening that the FN seized upon. These factors comprised political, economic and structural changes, the combination of which provided the 'launch-pad' the FN needed.
The policies, optimism and expectations fostered by the PS in its lengthy period of opposition were, it discovered much more difficult to put into practice in an international economic setting than had been anticipated. The hopes invested in them as the 'alternative' to the centre-right - which had come to be perceived as direction-less, tired, jaded and complacent - were not realised. As a result there was a general sense of disillusion with both the moderate left and right who were perceived by a significant slice of the French electorate as having been 'discredited'. An increased feeling of 'disaffection' and consequently declining voter loyalty resulted, though this had started to become evident in the late 1970's. Electoral volatility and political instability ensured that voters were more open to alternatives that had hitherto been considered extremist. With the continuing decline of the PCF and with the onset of the economic recession, the FN with its simplistic slogans equating immigrants with unemployment among 'real' citizens and violent crime, were able to make inroads into the areas previously the preserve of the traditional parties.
As PCF support declined the FN were able to capitalise on the disaffected and gain some of the 'disgruntled' vote. Whilst from the mid-1980's SOS Racisme was able to mobilise large numbers in anti-racist demonstrations, it lacked the necessary political dimension to be an effective parliamentary opponent and counter-weight. As acceptance for the FN grew and its message became a key area of political debate, the established parties were forced rightwards. Whilst the centre-right maintained an ambiguous relationship with the FN, flirting with it through local alliances and deal making, it at the same time undermined its own base.
The left were equally willing to use political opportunism, using the introduction of P.R. in 1986 to split the established right, and allowing the FN the opportunity to gain significant political representation at both regional and national levels. They too were forced rightwards in their remarks and pronouncements as they tried to demonstrate their toughness on immigration and law and order issues.
However, despite continued electoral shares of around 11 - 15% in the Presidential elections of 1988 and the regional elections of March 1992 (when the PS felt it necessary for its entire campaign in the southern regions to be based on anti-Le Pen rhetoric) there appears some indication that its electoral share is starting to decline from this 15% threshold. Whilst the Socialists are in serious trouble and expect to be heavily defeated in the legislative elections of March 1993, the traditional parties of the right, the UDF coalition and the Gaullist RPR, have regained considerable lost ground and to an extent, thrown off the 'discredited' label. They have achieved this in part by absorbing some extreme-right rhetoric, winning voters back from the FN by taking a stronger line on the immigration/law and order issues. Whilst Chirac has from the mid-1980's onwards called for the withdrawal of social security benefits for immigrant families, ending immigrant family reunification and tightening the criteria necessary to acquire French citizenship, Giscard has spoken of preference being given to French nationals in the job market, abolition of the automatic right to citizenship via birth or marriage and the expulsion of those immigrants who have been without a job for more than 2 years (Economist,30-01-93). Such statements indicate a significant shift to the right which may seriously deflate the FN's support. Also the increasing popularity of the combined 'Green' parties may attract the protest votes of some of the 'disgruntled' who had expressed their dissatisfaction by voting FN in the 1980's.
Whilst economic recession and high unemployment played a part in the FN's rise, the renewed impact of these problems in the early 1990's does not appear to be having the same effect. Whilst immigration is still a political issue, with 16% of the French population now being first or second generation 'immigrants', the FN's message that unemployment and high immigrant numbers can simply be equated no longer finds such a receptive audience. Obviously economic factors have been an important component of increased FN support (as Frears noted above), but they are only a part of the explanation, as this illustrates.
Le Pen had hoped to dominate the anti-Maastricht debate in the September 1992 referendum but was overshadowed by the UDF's de Villiers and Pasqua and Seguin of the RPR, and whilst the 'non' vote was virtually half the electorate, the extent to which Le Pen was responsible is open to question (Economist,30-01-93).
It would therefore appear that the established parties of the right have found a new credibility, which has to a certain extent reflected its political alertness and opportunism in co-opting elements of FN ideology that had proved popular. Its increased public support has meant that it no longer has to even contemplate electoral pacts and alliances with the FN and can represent itself as the respectable face of the right, and it seems likely that once in power the sentiment of the extreme-right could well be considerably weakened.
The rise of the right occurred during the 1980's for the reasons outlined, but its acceptance has always outweighed its actual electoral support and it seems important to conclude any such assessment in this way, looking at the current and future prospects of success. With a peak of 15% of the national vote and 2/3rds of the French electorate considering the FN to be a "danger to democracy" (Economist,30-01-93), as well as the reinstatement of the 2 ballot, first past-the-post voting system, it seems improbable that they will achieve considerable political power (at least at a national level). Whilst the FN "has given a certain respectability to racism in France" (Mitra,1988,p63), their rise to prominence and their success in inserting their issues into the national political dialogue has also 'normalised' the issues and forced them to compete with other "more established issues [such as] class, material welfare and partisanship" (Brechon & Mitra,1992,p80), which tend to move the debate back on to the territory of the more moderate right and left.
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