`guerrilla leaders over the years.
`The fifties and sixties saw a general increase in the
`levels of guerrilla activity. During these years many nationalist-
`liberation movements took advantage of the weakness of the colonial
`powers after the destabilizing affects of WWII. The nascent guerrilla
`movement usually started in a remote area of the countryside, where
`the central authority would have difficulty imposing its will, or a
`previous war had led to the creation of a power vacuum. During this
`'incubation period', as counter-insurgency analysts are fond of
`calling it, a dynamic and close knit leadership would set about
`exploiting, fomenting and mobilizing popular discontent. Militarily,
`the guerrilla must constantly harrass the enemy: capturing weapons,
`executing ambushes, chipping away at the morale and resolve of the
`government troops and always remaining elusive and impossible to
`find. Eventually the government will cede ground to the guerrilla,
`fallling back on strong points which then become the new target. As
`the regular troops fall back the guerrilla will expand his operations
`to seek economic, political and psychological victories. Bringing the
`war to the cities and the attention of the outside world, making the
`country ungovernable and foreign investors nervous.... creating the
`climate of collapse. The key to this whole enterprise is both to
`alienate the population from the government and to win popular
`support for the cause. In Mao's oft quoted phrase 'the guerrilla must
`be to the population as little fishes in the water', able to move
`freely and in safety among an inexhaustible supply of potential
`recruits and storehouses. It was these tactics which brought victory
`to the FLN in Algeria, fought the Americans to a stand still in
`Vietnam, dismissed the British in Cyprus and brought the corrupt
`dictatorship of Batista crashing down in Cuba. This is indeed an
`impressive string of victories for the guerrilla fighter, and under
`these circumstances it is easy to understand the pessimism expressed
`by Colonel Nemo, a leading French officer of the 1960's, when he held
`that "Regular armies have almost never gained the ascendency over
`guerrilla operations of any importance." (Lacquer:P.390) To the
`military analysts of the West the guerrilla seemed invincible and
`withdrawal or capitulation the only answer. Even the failures of the
`Huks in the Phillipines and the MRLA in Malaya gave little
`consolation or hope, as the former drew great concessions from the
`Phillipine government and the latter proved prohibitively expensive
`to the British. However, to accredit the successes of guerrilla
`movements solely to their ideological fervour, tactical ability, or
`even the justice inherent in their cause is to follow a red herring.
`To truly understand the success of the insurgent we must also examine
`the weaknesses of the other side, rather than the strength of the
`guerrilla.
`We have established then, that the explanation for the
`success of many guerrilla movements seems to baffle and confuse
`military men, yet the answer is simple enough. " Guerrillas who know
`their trade and have popular support cannot be eliminated by the
`means available to most governments" (Taber:P.27) The key phrase
`here, and the answer to the problem, is 'most governments'. The
`overwhelming majority of guerrilla actions were directed against
`colonial liberal democracies, who, by their very nature, were
`circumscribed in their responses and held accountable to public
`opinion. Indeed, the counter-insurgency war fought by the French
`against the FLN in Algeria pushed France to the brink of political
`and economic collapse.
`Full-scale guerrilla war began in Algeria in 1954, shortly
`after the loss of Indo-China and the debacle of Dien-Bien Phu.
`However, Algeria was considered to be virtually a province of
`metropolitan France itself, and her leaders would not even consider
`concessions to the guerrillas and certainly not withdrawal.
`Therefore, a bloody seven year war followed involving more than half
`a million French troops and massive amounts of military hardware. The
`struggle was brutal and involved torture and indiscriminate killings
`on both sides. However the excesses of the French troops quickly
`became public knowledge and were denounced both at home and in the
`world at large. Thus the French, however loosely, were bound by
`international law, the rebels were not. The guerrilas could strike
`hard and fast and then retreat quickly to their mountain strongholds,
`shielded always by a sympathetic population. Militarily, the French
`were never beaten in Algeria, nor were the insurgents defeated. The
`success of the guerrillas lay in the economic and political
`consequences for France if it continued the 'pacification' of its
`North African colony. In the end the price was to high and the French
`granted independence to Algeria in 1962, beaten not so much by the
`guerrillas, but by the restraints of a faltering economy and the
`virulent hostility of domestic and world opinion to further
`bloodshed. As De Gaulle noted, with some resignation, "only Russia
`with its communist methods could have put an end to the rebellion."
`(Laqueur:P.294)
`The next distinct area of guerrilla warfare is
`insurrection against a domestic incumbent. In this sphere it is much
`more difficult to find many success stories for the guerrilla
`fighters. A domestic regime seriously threatened by revolutionary
`forces soon finds that the words 'self-restraint' disappear from its
`vocabulary. However, one of the more celebrated victories for a
`guerrilla fighter against a domestic incumbent was the overthrow of
`the Batista regime by Fidel Castro. The Cuban revolution is a classic
`example of guerrilla orthodoxy. In 1956 Castro landed in Cuba with a
`small band of followers and headed for the remote Sierra Maestra
`mountains where he carved out his safe havens. After the initial
`attempts at flushing out the insurgents from the mountains had
`failed, Batista decided they were nothing more than irritants who
`would quickly turn to the traditional form of banditry practised in
`that area. However, with a secure mountain base Castro spent the next
`year cultivating the loyalty of the peasants, by offering land
`reform, and attacking small army outposts from which he armed new
`recruits. Gradually the insurrection spread and became stronger,
`creating liberated zones and instituting its own administrative
`system, pushing the army back and encroaching on the major urban
`areas. The guerrillas seemed to be everywhere, constantly harrassing
`the government forces and only fighting when victory was assured.
`Inevitably, the morale of the army collapsed, the Batista regime was
`corrupt and inefficient, but worse than this it offered only
`vacillation and weakness in place of strength and leadership. After
`two years, when the climate of collapse had been achieved, Batista
`fled the country, the army surrendered and Castro, with his small
`band of guerrillas but vast network of urban and rural sympathizers,
`marched into Havana. The Batista government fell more through
`ineptitude than self-restraint, only in the latter stages of the war
`did the army commanders turn to a scorched earth policy to defeat the
`insurrection, but by then it was already to late.
`The next distinct area of guerrilla activity is that of
`the separatist movement. The appeal of the guerrilla separatist
`movement is, of necessity, limited and the situation would have to be
`pretty desperate for a whole region to become an effective and secure
`base for guerrilla operations. In the modern era there has been only
`one clear cut success for a guerrilla separatist movement: that of
`the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia. But even this was only achieved
`after years of bloody war, a lenghty period of economic and political
`instability throughout the Horn of Africa and massive amounts of
`foreign military aid. Overall, unless the demands of the guerrilla
`movement are limited in character, such as a stronger degree of
`cultural or administrative autonomy, the likelihood of success is
`minimal unless the guerrilla movement is meticulously fostered by a
`neighbouring state.
`In the last fifty years guerrilla warfare has achieved a
`number of notable successes: China, Vietnam, Algeria, Palestine; and
`with such illustrious scalps as that of France, America and Britain
`to its credit. The activities of guerrilla fighters have also
`extracted major concessions from domestic governments, as in the
`Philippines, and hastened the departure of a colonial power after the
`initial insurgency had been suppressed, as in Malaya and Kenya.
`However, against these successes must be balanced a long catalogue of
`failures. In Latin America the lessons of the Cuban revolution were
`digested quickly. The elites of such states as Peru, Bolivia and
`Brazil moved swiflty to suppress the nascent guerrilla movements
`through the indiscrimminate use of State terror and coercion. In
`Africa, the insurgents fell to warring among themselves as the
`unifying cause of fighting colonialism receded. In Iraq the Kurdish
`rebellion of 1974 was brutally defeated by a government content to
`use any means to ensure victory. In all of these countries the cause
`which the guerrillas were fighting for was different, the terrain and
`geography was different, the political and social structures were
`different. The common thread uniting these disparate conflicts was
`the fact that the State was prepared to use maximum force without
`regard to external or internal factors of constraint. In the absence
`of a general war, a determined and repressive State will always be
`able to defeat the guerrilla, or, at the very least, prevent the
`guerrillas from achieving the equalization of military forces or the
`climate of collapse. Therefore, we must conclude that the success of
`the national-liberation movements thrown up by the historical process
`of decolonization post 1945, was a testament to the overwhelming
`desire to be free of foreign domination and the self-restraint of the
`liberal-democratic regimes involved. Victory for the insurgents was
`achieved because the war's became unpopular, expensive and damaging
`to the prestige of the state. "Guerrilla warfare is decisive only
`when the antiguerrilla side is prevented for military or political
`reasons from committing its full resources to the struggle."
`(Laqueur:P.392)
`
`BIBLIOGRAPHY:
`J. BAYLIS CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY
`A. CAMPBELL GUERRILLA'S
`W. LACQUEUR GUERRILLA
`R. TABER THE WAR OF THE FLEA
`Q. WRIGHT A STUDY OF WAR (vol 2)
