Conservatives party 1951 -1964
Macmillan came into office on 10th January 1957, taking over the leadership from Eden in what would be the middle of the Conservatives’ time in Government. This bold statement made by Macmillan on 20th July 1957 was not unjustified. Since the Conservatives came into office in 1951 national average incomes had risen, Britain was better housed, there was greater levels of employment, increased productivity, more schools to accommodate the post war baby boom, increased levels entering into further education and training and there was better care for the old. From this perspective the Conservatives had achieved a lot, especially considering the state of the country in which they inherited from the previous Attlee Labour government, which would justify thirteen years of Conservative leadership, yet still political writers have issued a ‘could do better’ evaluation of these years, with a Labour critique of ‘thirteen wasted years’.
Britain could have made considerably more headway in the post war period. Her failure is at least partly attributable to the shortcomings of Conservative government 1951 –1964.
(Pinto-Duschinsky. 1970. 58)
When they came to power they were determined to show that the position that the country was in at the time was due to Socialist mismanagement, and under their leadership the country would be far more efficient with greater material gains for the mass population. The problem was that this objective did not alter sufficiently over time as immediate economic success was never far from Conservative policies.
The economy was the tool for proving this increased efficiency and material gains, and was key to Conservative success, when the economy was performing well so too were the Conservatives. The economic boom of the early fifties that led to the ‘age of affluence’ worked perfectly for the Conservatives, with their traditional associations with industrialisations and capitalist policies appearing to be paying off. However this economic boom was not unique to Britain, in fact it was occurring in many major developed countries with West Germany and Japan leading the way and worryingly, British production lagging behind West Germany, France, Japan and Italy with Japanese exports increasing at ten times a greater rate than British exports.
Conservative economic policies of this period were accused of being too concerned with macro policies that supported rapid growth but failed to develop policies that directly improved economic efficiency and looked to developing the economy in the long term, with adverse effects on international competitiveness, leading to problems in the mid fifties that I will go onto discuss. The Conservatives saw the increased living standards representing electoral support that they were reluctant to give up in the pursuit long term economic goals. The talk about doubling living standards in 25 years was grounds upon which the Conservatives were confident that they could beat Labour, however the drive for ‘vulgar materialism’ led to problems in the mid fifties. “It was a government of Tory wets for whom social harmony was a higher priority than economic efficiency.” (Addison. 1992. 387)
The economic boom had led to the economy becoming ‘overheated and needed cooling’, to use the terms of the day, a result of the rise of affluence that required Conservatives to reduce government spending, increase bank rates to help lower demand with the aid of strict taxation. They had to deal with this carefully as it was the boom that had significantly assisted their stay in power and provided these increases in living standards that the electorate were so fond of. However measures had to be taken to lower inflation and wage increases from beyond what could be justified by increased productivity. Macmillan in his biography wrote,
To touch the brake or to lift the foot off the accelerator was not intended to be more than an attempt, however amateurish to drive safely along a crowded road, amid many pitfalls and dangers.
(Macmillan. 1971. 708)
Later ‘pitfalls’ for the Conservative party were the Sterling crises of 1957 and 1961, rejected application from the EEC, the Suez débâcle, the increasing notion that everyone’s economy was growing faster than ours and the realisation that Britain was now no-longer the global political force it had once been. Policy in the early 1960’s was aimed at increasing economic growth to catch up with the more developed economic nations, however these interventionalist policies were seen as a response to threatening political situation, not the positive Tory move towards long term economic policies. Investment was seen as the key to growth, but with the British investment being relatively low this was encouraged through tax incentives, but investment would come at the expense of consumption, which represented Conservative electoral advantage, so investment in British GNP was never wholeheartedly pursued. These events do not in my opinion best describe a ‘dominance’ of political leadership, so why were the Conservative party not surpassed into government by the party in opposition before 1964. So was Conservative ‘dominance’ attributable more to Labour weakness as opposed to Conservative strength?
Labour Party in opposition
By 1950 the Labour party had completed a programme that had transformed the post war British economy and British socialism and by the 1951 elections, they did not have anything new to offer the country, despite working class fears that a return to Conservative government would bring back the economic conditions that had characterised the 1930’s, it was the Conservatives who won office into government. Furthermore a division within the party had begun to appear between the left led by Bevan, and the right led by Morrison and Gaitskell that would considerably affect the party. At a time when the Labour party needed to unite to overcome the problems faced by the changing trends of working class identity away from traditional labour movements they were faced with the revisionist revolt against corporate socialism.
The British revisionists wanted to force Labour to bring its socialist pretensions into line with its acceptance of a ‘mixed’, mainly private enterprise economy.
(Foote. 1985. 208)
The revisionists’ view was that Labour appeared old fashioned, having attempted to drop the Marxists ideological image that had been associated with Labour’s past, they needed to find new and radical policies now that it had achieved its programme. It was true, Labour failed to be radical as Roy Jenkins best surmises the role of the party on the left,
The first duty of a party of the left is to be radical in the context of the moment, to offer a prospect of continuing advance, and to preserve the loyalty of those whose optimistic humanism makes them its natural supporters.
(Jenkins. 1953. 161).
The revisionists although positively challenging where the party was heading, in doing so they managed to ruin the basic agreements between the different sections of the party giving rise to a problem that had to be solved before Labour could think about getting back into government.
At this time Labour required a new definition of socialism in these times of change, they required new radical policies to regain the attention of the electorate, to challenge the party in opposition in order to avoid becoming the party of the status quo, but they were too busy with internal bickering. The Bevanites of the left criticised the policies of the Gaitskellites, but failed to provide any alternatives. These divisions I believe were a combination of internal and external factors. Certainly the strength of the economy and ‘age of affluence’ was not favourable to the Labour party but it was the way in which they reacted, or indeed lack of reaction to these changes that managed only to play into the hands of the Conservatives.
The sociological explanation failed to show why the labour party did not succeed in counteracting the social forces working against them and the political explanation does not reveal reasons why both left and right were unable to create a radical agenda for the party.
(Bogdanor. 1970. 79)
There was no issue from 1951 onwards which created distinct cleavages between the two parties, highlighting Labour’s lack of distinct policy. There was even a conspiracy that the political leaders were sweeping fundamental issues under the carpet. The fact that such a conspiracy was thought up really emphasizes that throughout this period of politics, the leadership battle, and the use of the term battle is a generous term to use considering the lack of real competition, was fought less on arguing the merits of each of their distinct policies but more on Labour’s critique of Conservative policies. Even with this the Labour party failed to capitalise on golden opportunities to win over the electorate such as the public animosity surrounding the Suez crises, they could have emphasized Britain’s lagging behind of other economic competitors, highlighted Conservatives short term policies that had made British exports so uncompetitive due to the Sterling crises, but ultimately they failed, too concerned with internal party matters.
At no stage were the opposition benches able to establish a decisive ascendancy over the Government in morale and in debate, even when all the cards which a Government’s opponents could possibly want had been trust into their hands.
(Powell 1959).
Even if skilful leadership can unite the party and make it an election winning force, by mouthing the old slogans, such leadership is incapable of making the Labour party an effective radical engine of government.
(Bogdanor. 1970. 103).
Perhaps there was an element of the incumbency factor involved, the electorate preferring the party in power seeing little reason to change, especially with their increased living standards from the ‘age of affluence’, from this perspective the electorate had little critique of the Conservative party. This simply characterised the ‘age of affluence’ as the electorate did not appear to be concerned with policy, more with where there next consumer good would come from.
They (the parties) could not ignore the fact that the mass of the electorate was more directly concerned with the standard of living than with the abstract causes championed by the small fringe groups at each end of the political spectrum.
(Pinto-Duschinsky. 1970. 76)
Despite Labour’s apparent failure to truly challenge the Conservatives in office, the general election results show that the parties were never really very far apart in attracting votes, perhaps due to the lack of distinct differences in policy.
General Election Results
Data Source: Bogdanor. 1970.
Affluence neatly fits in with try traditions
In danger of “allowing the Tories to run away with the kudos of being the party of prosperity and high consumption.”
(Crosland. 1956. 223)
Conclusion
Undoubtedly a large element of the conservatives ‘dominance’ between 1951 and 1964 can be attributed to the ‘age of affluence’ with the government reaping the rewards of the material benefits associated with this period as opposed to sound policies. However this was not the only factor in the equation. The Labour party of this period did not truly challenge for the leadership and the electorate seemed to be preoccupied with ‘vulgar materialism’ rather than opting for the party that will best serve the country. The years of affluence have been described as being years of disaster for the Labour party with the revisionists, led by Crosland and Gaitskell, questioning the ultimate aims of the party and in doing so managing to ruin the basic agreements among the different sections of the party, weakening the social foundations of the labour party and negatively effecting the political base of the party with Harold Wilson just managing to holding the party together.
The politics of the Conservative party throughout this period where there to largely compliment the ‘age of affluence’, to ensure its continued path, however in pursuing this course they manage to neglect key areas which landed them in trouble, yet due to the weak state of the opposition and the distracted nature of the electorate they managed to survive these difficult periods. Looking at this period from the Conservative perspective, is it any wonder that they based their appeal to such a large extent on the affluent society rather than politics when it was providing them with such success. There is a story of Lord Poole, one of Macmillan’s key party managers, driving on a Saturday to town observing the changing nature of society, watching people shopping in supermarkets, buying their first television or washing machine and exploring the possibilities of hire purchase.
If these were their desires and what they demanded with their votes, is it fair to blame the Governments of Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Home for providing them so generously?
(Pinto-Duschinsky. 1970. 77)
So in conclusion I believe that a large extent of the Conservative ‘domination’ of this period can be attributed to the ‘age of affluence’, with politics coming a distant second.
Bibliography
Addison, P. Churchill on the Home Front 1900 – 1955. London: Pimlico. 1992
Bogdanor, Vernon. ‘The Labour Party in Opposition 1951 – 1964’ in The Age of Affluence. London: Macmillan. 1970. pp. 78 – 115.
Crosland, C.A.R. “The Pattern of Consumption,” 1956; in The Future of Socialism London: Cape Publishers, 1964, pp. 209-223.
Foote, Geoffrey, The Labour Party’s Political Thought, Worcester: Billing and Sons Ltd, 1985.
Jenkins, Roy. Pursuit of Progress. 1953
Lowe, Rodney, ‘The Replanning of the Welfare state 1957 –1964’ in Francis and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990. Cardiff: University of Wales Pres. 1996. pp. 255 – 273.
Macmillan, Harold. Riding the Storm 1956 – 1959. London: Macmillan. 1971.
Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, ‘Bread and Circuses? The Conservatives in Office 1951 – 1964’ in Bogdanor, Vernon and Skidelsky, R, The Age of Affluence 1951 – 64, London: Macmillan, 1970. pp 55 – 77.
Powell, Enoch. ‘Labour in opposition 1951 –1959’, in Political Quarterly. 1959
Thomlinson, Jim, ‘“Liberty with Order”: Conservative Economic Policy, 1951 – 64’ in Francis and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990. Cardiff: University of Wales Pres. pp. 274 – 288.
Young, Hugo, One of Us, London; Macmillan, 1991.