"Stereotypes are always inaccurate" Critically discuss.

“Stereotypes are always inaccurate” Critically discuss

Introduction

Does a person’s view of the qualities that members of particular groups have, reflect the reality of life, or are errors being made when groups and behaviours are observed? A definition of stereotypes with the fewest constraining assumptions is that they are qualities seen to be associated with particular groups or categories of people. Four key approaches, namely kernel of truth, illusory correlation, cognitive miser and self-categorisation theory will be closely looked into. I will attempt to answer a set of key questions that may help to address the situation. Firstly, How does each approach attempt to explain the origins of stereotypes? On the basis of their assumptions, where do these four positions stand on the issue of stereotype accuracy? Do they say stereotypes are always, sometimes or never inaccurate? This will allow me to relate the theories to each other and hence provide a better understanding on the question of accuracy.

Kernel of truth - KOT

This explanation of stereotypes assumes that there is some aspect of social reality distorted in the content of stereotypes. It assumes that a groups culturally distinctive behaviour or the socio-economic position it finds itself in, could give rise to certain stereotypical perceptions of the group being displayed. For example, a particular ethnic group may have an economically disadvantaged position in society. They may receive poor wages, have high unemployment, live in poor housing conditions and not achieve much in education. Because of these situations, it’s easy to see how people can perceive the group as, ‘poor’, ‘lazy’ and ‘stupid’. Once people start to categorise in this way, they knowingly make certain distinctions. They then exaggerate the attributes given, to the extent that they become stereotypes.

Stereotype accuracy

For KOT, stereotypes are partly accurate because they may be based upon real and important differences between groups. Stereotypes must have some sort of, ‘grain of descriptive truth’ about them or else we wouldn’t see the existence of so many differences between groups. There must be certain characteristics that are specific to particular groups based on culture, traditions or other aspects, which are true for that group only and reflect the social reality of being a member.

To see whether the kernel of truth idea truly existed, researchers observed whether the characteristics of a particular stereotyped group reflected how people saw that group. It was assumed that this would show the accuracy of stereotypes because they were comparing stereotypes, with information about personality characteristics of group members via self-report measures. Abate and Berrien (1967) assessed how Japanese and American students saw the stereotypes of their own nations (self-stereotypes) and that of the other nation (hetero-stereotypes). This was compared with the students’ responses on the Edward’s Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS). The accuracy of stereotypes was dependant upon the degree of correlation between the stereotypes and the EPPS score (the ‘vereotypes’).

Results showed agreement between self and hetero-stereotypes, but less agreement between the EPPS responses and both national self-stereotypes and national hetero-stereotypes. The respondents couldn’t even perceive their own national group accurately never mind a foreign group. This questions how useful these, ‘vereotypes’ are at reflecting stereotypes. Also, self-reports and ‘objective’ measures have come under many criticisms, which have lead to the conclusion that accuracy correlations such as these are hard to interpret.

Evaluation of the kernel of truth approach

It seems that the kernel of truth sees measuring individual-level characteristics as a more accurate way of assessing stereotype accuracy. How can you find the truth about people and hence stereotypes in their personality? We want to look at individual people as members of larger groups, not the stereotype of individual people. Katz and Braly emphasize the need to observe individuals and groups as separated levels,

“There are no racial or national groups which exist as entities and which determine the characteristics of the group members”

(1933, pg. 289, citation in Oakes and Reynolds, (1997) pg. 53)

They say that since this approaches view of how stereotypes can be measured is inaccurate, so must be their assumptions regarding its development.

A different approach taken to see whether there is a kernel of truth about stereotypes was by observing the convergence of the self-stereotype with that held by another group. Though some success has been found with this, it has been argued that the group being stereotyped simply takes in the stereotype that the other group holds of them, which is a general problem. Also, accuracy depends on whether this convergence can be accepted by the stereotyped group in terms of their beliefs. In addition, the factual validity becomes controversial when a given group assigns unfavourable traits to itself.

And so, do stereotypes have a ‘kernel of truth’? Evidence against it has by far outweighed evidence for it. However, they do say that stereotypes are partly accurate and that there is room for an individuals experiences to change their views, on top of the socialised fact. In many cases, increased contact has correlated with stereotype accuracy. However, convergence of self-stereotype and the stereotype of the group held by others should be understood by a shared understanding of social reality rather than outright stereotype accuracy

Illusory correlation – I-C

Research shows that people seem to perceive minority groups ...

This is a preview of the whole essay

Illusory correlation – I-C

Research shows that people seem to perceive minority groups more negatively than majority groups, even though the two groups behave the same way. Illusory correlation explanation of this effect is that negative behaviours become associated with minority groups because of their shared distinctiveness. When people observe two rare events (minority group and infrequent act), they have the tendency to put the two together and see them as correlated. This results in perceivers assuming that the behaviours observed are diagnostic of a person or group and use this idea in future impressions.

To support this idea, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) carried out an experiment where subjects had to read 39 sentences. Each sentence described a behaviour of a person in either Group A or Group B. The experimental conditions ensured that both Group B members and undesirable behaviours were made distinctive. The participant’s task was to recall the statements by assigning the actions to one of the two groups. Results showed that the desirable actions were quite accurately assigned but undesirable ones were biased whereby more were assigned to the minority group. In the lab, it seems to work all the time and so it was concluded that,

“The illusory correlation in group perception is a quite reliable phenomenon”

(Hamilton and Sherman 1989, p.69)

Stereotype accuracy

I-C claims that stereotypes are always inaccurate. This is because stereotypes are formed on the basis of false combinations and so the likelihood of error is potentially high. People attempt to estimate difficult co-variations and so are prone to making errors when judging the relationship between two characteristics or events. This implies that their judgements are wayward, and so the whole formation of their stereotypes is inaccurate. As such, their associations lack any aspect of social reality within them.

Unlike KOT, this view can account for the many examples of stereotypes that are not statistically accurate. A typical example is that people have been accustomed to the stereotype of seeing AIDS as being a homosexual disease. This disease is infrequent and homosexuals are a minority group. When the two co-occur, the stereotype is formed. However, this isn’t true statistically as the incidence of AIDS is actually higher in heterosexual women. It’s hard to see how KOT can explain this using the idea of characteristics being specific to particular groups, based on cultures or traditions. Further support comes from the finding that people don’t even have to be presented with infrequent information about a target group for a stereotype to form. When both the majority and minority groups are described by positive information, participants still favour the majority group. For example, the illusory correlation of African-Americans and welfare recipients when most recipients are white.

For I-C, the extent to which stereotypes are accurate is dependant upon the truthfulness of the correlations. Considering that most, if not all, cases of correlations are not true, the accuracy of stereotypes must be non-existent. The human mind is not always an accurate perceiver of the external world and the illusory correlation effect is just another example of mistakes that we all make everyday.

Evaluation of the illusory correlation

Unlike KOT, this view seems to ignore the traits of other groups in shaping our beliefs, and the role of society, as important aspects of stereotype development. This questions the role of illusory correlation when people form stereotypes in the real world. Hamilton and Gifford (1976) used abstract, artificial groups in order to demonstrate a cognitive bias because they didn’t want any previously formed beliefs that people would’ve associated if actual social groups were used. As demonstrated by KOT, in the real world, people do carry views and beliefs about various groups and the extent to which they display their beliefs changes. Therefore, it’s not just a case of combining events and behaviours.

For I-C to claim that stereotypes are inaccurate would mean that they develop under conditions where the perceiver has no pre-existing beliefs about the particular group in question. For adults, these conditions are extremely rare, yet they continuously form new stereotypes of groups that they have never encountered. McArthur and Friedman (1980) showed, using real groups, that the illusory correlation effects were only found when the group acted in a way that was normative for them according to pre-existing beliefs.

Research has shown that members of minority groups associate themselves with more frequent behaviours, not less and with positive acts, as shown by Sanbonmatsu et al (1987) and Schaller and Maass (1989) respectively. For I-C, this is problematic since their argument is based on infrequent and negative acts. McGarty et al (1993) have shown that just by saying to participants that either there will be twice as many statements about Group A or that half the statement will feature desirable behaviours by Group A, yields the illusory correlation effect. Since I-C claim that it’s the way we filter and store information, a big problem arises because McGarty hasn’t even presented any information! Therefore, how can the I-C approach claim that stereotypes are inaccurate if contrary results, as well as alternative processes are being observed in studies?

However, the I-C may have a stronger role in the eyes of a child since they are yet to be exposed to the social world so have few, if any, pre-existing beliefs about groups. Also, if there were some, ‘kernel of truth’ on which groups were seen differently, the illusory correlation might contribute to overgeneralising how intergroup differences are perceived, thereby affecting future impressions. A weak initial correlation may be strengthened by one instance of the co-occurrence through recognition and overestimation. This approach may also play the part of reinforcing stereotypic beliefs acquired through social learning (such as through parents).

Cognitive Miser – C-M

Cognitive miser claims that we stereotype because our processing limitations restrict are abilities to see a social target as individuals. We think categorically because we’re looking for cognitive economy by using energy-efficient stereotypes. Stereotypes require fewer resources than individuation, which is a,

‘time consuming and effortful affair’

(Macrae et al 1994, pg. 37).

Fiske and Neuberg describe it as,

‘a necessary, if unfortunate, by-product of our cognitive makeup’

(1990, pg. 14).

‘Necessary’ here refers to our limited capacity to process information. Categorizing reduces the amount of information taken in and hence allows us to generalise our images of social categories. This saves us the pain of going through the process of seeing the uniqueness of each individual – a capacity-draining process.

Macrae et al (1993) imposed conditions of information overload on participants, in a way similar to how real-life social interactions are. They then saw whether participants simplified the stimulus by stereotyping when under cognitive load. The prediction was that individuals would prefer to stereotype instead of looking at individual traits or the behaviours in the given context, when dealing with cognitively demanding tasks. These prediction seem to be confirmed, which has lead to the suggestion that when, ‘the information-processing going gets tough, stereotypes get going’ (Macrae 1993, pg. 79).

Stereotype accuracy

Cognitive miser assumes stereotypes are always inaccurate. Stereotyping is an information processing error whereby the perceiver sacrifices accuracy in favour of efficiency. When we look at individuals solely, we have this non-stereotypical perception of the person, rich in detail. However, because our interests lie in processing information efficiently, in order to save energy resources and hence economize, we lose out on this rich, detailed informational aspect of the individual. In their view, individuation, though capacity-draining, is accurate whereas stereotypical, group-based views, though efficient, are skewed images and oversimplified distortions. When you decide to generalise through categories, you are ultimately contaminating the impressions because information isn’t put together bit by bit. For an impression to be accurate, the process by which they are formed cannot involve categorisation in any way. Instead, the ‘true’ characteristics of others have to be considered and appreciated in an uncontaminated way. As Brewer (1998, p.28) mentions,

‘Categorisation erases the complexity and richness of detail that a more personalised representation of that individual would contain’

Social reality is the individual. Everything is real in terms of the individual. C-M says that stereotyping isn’t accurate because we categorise individuals into groups when individuals themselves contain accurate information. I-C sees minority groups displaying rare acts and so the two become bound together somehow - a false combination. The individuals aren’t observed singularly and so it’s inaccurate. In both approaches, the level of the individual perception is prioritised. They say categorising individual information into groups is an information saving device. Accuracy for both means that we must see people as individuals because in reality, they are the most important thing. That is, ‘we are individuals, if you don’t see us as individuals, then it’s inaccurate’.

Self-categorisation theory (SCT)

SCT claims that stereotypes develop through categorisation, but everything is categorised because the stimuli are given meaning from the context that they are perceived - context-dependant identity. This is how we make sense of the world and the reality within which we live. This context-dependant identity includes taking a hold of the relations between stimuli as aspects of their representation. These relations are ultimately concerned with the relative similarity and difference within the context of the stimulus as a whole. Social categorisation reflects some aspect of social reality in what people perceive. Under different conditions, an individual can act as either an individual or a group member. Therefore, stereotypic perceptions don’t occur because we categorise and individual perception because we don’t’. Instead, these perceptions take place depending on the state of similarities and differences (level of inclusiveness) at which categorisation occurs. Categorisation represents varying degrees of reality and isn’t simply a distortion or overgeneralization of stimulus. We construct meaningful representations.

Stereotype Accuracy

SCT says that it has nothing to do with accuracy on a general measuring basis. It’s more to do with individuated and stereotypical perception involving equal degrees of categorisation. Different levels of categorisation (fit, perceiver readiness) give rise to varying social realities. Seeing individuals as representing accuracy is rejected. It’s more to do with the psychological and social reality by which a group is identified. In a study by Nolan et al (1990), which tested categorisation with varying cognitive loads, comparing resource-based and fit-based processing, strong evidence for the latter was found but none for the former.

SCT claims that stereotyping is psychologically valid for the perceiver because categorisation gives the perceiver an accurate representation of reality. It’s not a matter of accuracy in terms of whether it’s true because you can’t tell, since social reality is relative to the perceiver. There isn’t a truth to be had. Accuracy is simply the wrong question. Conventional methods of measuring stereotype accuracy have been measuring accuracy against some sort of reality. However, SCT argues that reality isn’t even there since it’s relative to the perceiver. There is no universal definition of reality for every aspect of everything in the social world, to which one can measure the extent of accuracy of the stereotypes they hold? Groups and individuals both exist objectively. People can be individuals or they can be group members. At times we need to categorise socially and personally to represent the social life accurately for the perceiver, depending on the state in which they exist (individual or group). To stereotype an individual is wrong, as is looking at a group and seeing personality. It’s a mismatch of levels.

Evaluation of SCT and Cognitive miser

Accentuation, for C-M and I-C leads to inaccuracy. However, SCT claims that for accentuation to distort perception, means that there has to be some sort of fixed standard to which the extent of distortion can be measured. That is, some sort of, ‘kernel of truth’ to be measured against. From an SCT perspective, this is impossible because people show context-specific and variable categorisations that are related to real stimulus variation. There is no, ‘standard’ point. There are different stimulus relationships and different levels of perception (individual and group), and so this, ‘standard’ if it exists at all is constantly changing. Therefore, accentuation is simply a,

‘shift in the salient level at which similarities and differences are defined’

(Oakes and Reynolds, 1997, p.62).

Accurate representations shouldn’t apply to all members of a group individually. It’s more to do with the level of perception used in relation to the social context. The C-M and I-C view of accuracy being equated to individuality cannot suffice since stereotyping has more to do with group-level perception. Therefore, terms such as, ‘accentuation’, ‘stereotypic accuracy’ and, ‘dispersion accuracy’, far from distorting accurate perception, are in actuality aspects which people select which allow them to make valid perceptions on the basis of context and relational properties. It could be said that SCT follows subtly from KOT, as it seems to imply that we use our knowledge of, ‘grains of truths’ to categorise because they reflect some aspect of reality in what we perceive.

However, though stereotypes may be psychologically valid for the perceiver, morally they’re another issue altogether. Do we really want to know about psychological validity or do we want to know the truth? How can it be ‘valid’ to characterise people as lazy, ignorant and dirty? If stereotypes are seen as psychologically valid, then we have to deal with intergroup discrimination through real social and political sources. How do we deal with ‘psychologically valid’ stereotypes that are negative? Those that are, will probably lead to prejudice and discrimination. In relation to political aspects such as these, Ottati and Lee (1995), argue that stereotypes, though negative, are still psychologically valid for the perceiver. However, when the perceiver starts to believe in the, ‘kernel of truth’ aspect of the stereotype, they find themselves discriminating.

Conclusion

Are all stereotypes accurate and acceptable because they are psychologically valid for the perceiver? Although SCT appears fruitful, we need to look at stereotypes in terms of their social validity. That is, the context of social, ideological and political processes that influence their formation. Therefore, to return to the beginning, ‘stereotypes are always inaccurate?’ We can say that it’s not as simple as that. There are many processes that take place within the individual, within groups, between groups and in our social world. It all boils down to the question of what is social reality. By whose social reality are we comparing our judgement with to measure accuracy? Everyone has their individual views of the social world and behaves accordingly, and so stereotypes can’t be accurate or inaccurate. We are all living, and in the process of which, we make judgements and stereotype. We do whatever is required to get on with our lives and the fact that we stereotype is merely consequential.

References

Masip, J., & Garrido, E., (2001) Is there a kernel of truth in judgements of deceptiveness? Angles of Psychology, volume 17, 101-120

Bernhardt, P.C., (1996) The illusory correlation (online). Perspectives, volume 1, no. 3

Hilton, J., (1996) Stereotypes. Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 47, 237-271

Nolan, M., Haslam, S., Spears, R., & Oakes, P., (1999) An examination of resource-based and fit-based theories of stereotyping under cognitive load and fit. European journal of Social Psychology, volume 29, 641-663

Oakes, P., & Reynolds, K., (1997) Asking the accuracy question. The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and group life, pg 51-71. Oxford. Blackwell

Hopkins, N., Reicher, S., & Levine, M., (1997) On the parallels between social cognition and the ‘new racism’. The British Journal of Social Psychology, volume 36, 305-329

Anderson, S., Klatzky, R., & Murray, J., (1990) Traits and social stereotypes: Efficiency differences in social information processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 59, no.2, 192-201

Macrae, C., Milne, A., & Bodenhausen, G., (1994) Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, volume 66, no. 1, 37-47

Shavitt, S. et al, (1999) Broadening the conditions for illusory correlation formation: implications for judging minority groups. Basic and applied Social Psychology,

Spears, R., and Haslam, S., (1997) Stereotyping and the burden of cognitive load. The Social Psychology of stereotyping and group life, pg 170-207. Oxford: Blackwell

Brown, R., (1995) Prejudice: its Social Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell