Before grasping power, Haffez Assad was able to properly align the Ba’ath party and the military creating a social mechanism towards mobility. By doing so, Assad solidified his control over the Syrian government for the remainder of his lifetime. The party’s two functions as both political and military agents drew support from peasants, workers, bureaucrats, soldiers, and youth serving as a ladder by which individuals could move into positions of power (Van Dam 50). Religious tolerance was promoted a basic tenet of Ba’ath ideology eliminating ethnicity as a barrier for political involvement. Hence, the military/government extended itself to Syrians from all sections of society – from the top to the very bottom. Appointment to the subdistrict level or even to village positions must be approved by the Ba’ath Regional Council, “local administration therefore, has become an instrument for the Ba’ath party to maintain its control at the grassroots level” (Long et al 236). By permeating the merger between the military and government to all facets of Syrian society, Assad reduced the likelihood of an overthrow ever taking place strengthening his regime because becoming part of the military and thus the government offered influence and respect. The need to create or become part of an alternative radical movement became pointless. Therefore, the party was transformed from a small, ideological party into a mode of mass political mobilization/upliftment.
By incorporating various social, ethnic, and religious groups in both the government and military, Assad was able to successfully purse the Ba’ath party’s ideological aims. The major goals of party included a program of social and economic reform, greater Arab unity, the need to defeat Israel, and religious toleration. These key elements of the ideology were geared both to the intellectual elite and to a wide spectrum of lower classes (Long et al 238). Hence, Assad united the Syrian people under specific nationalistic goals ultimately breaking the various divisions. Even Assad himself and most of the high ranking officers of the Ba’ath party were part of a minority religious sect, the Alawites. Only about11-15 percent of the Syrian population are Alawite, yet they played such a disproportionate large role in Syrian politics and armed policy (Long et al 231). Instituting an ideology accepted by most Syrians, Assad created his own form of a nationalistic movement where citizens could align themselves with the state. The Ba’ath “ideology” justified the government’s disproportional role by eliminating potential divisions. However, in a true representational government, the majority would not tolerate a minority hold most of the power. However, Assad used Ba’ath ideology to unite the Syrian people embedding himself into power reinforcing a dictatorial role.
The most important institution of the new Syria was the presidency. Under the 1973 constitution, the president determined the general lines of state policy, appointed and dismissed prime ministers and cabinets, controlled other major appointments, chose senior members of the judiciary and could veto legislation. The president was elected for seven years and Asad was elected in 1971, 1978, 1985, and 1992 with an overwhelming 99 percent of the electorate (Yapp 261). The other institutions of government were much less important than the presidency. Ministries merely executed policy, prime ministers tended to be long lasting servants of the president, and parliament consisted of the single chamber people’s council which was dominated by a Ba’athist majority (Yapp 261). With this system in place, it is clear that power was heavily concentrated in the hands of Assad and whoever he chose fit. Other government institutions were merely created to mirror the existence of a republic/democracy; however the real power lied in the hands of the Assad. Even though the overwhelming election results favored Assad, it is more likely that these numbers were inflated or even lied about to sanctify the power of the regime. Without any form of “real” checks and balances, the government rested in the hands of a dictator.
To further broaden Assad’s political base, a multi party system was introduced to Syria. The National Front was established within the People’s Council representing a range of moderate leftist Syrians (Van Dam 156). By doing this, Assad made his potential opponents on the left responsible for government actions as well preserving Ba’athist dominance. Assad was able to curb his enemies by making them physically active in the government. However, because the president had such a wide range of power, the National Front essentially is invisible still leaving a one party system in Syria dominated by Assad, the Ba’ath party, and the military – closely resembling a government dominated by a military dictatorship.
There is no doubt that without a strong military backing, Assad and the Ba’athists would have eventually been overthrown just as its predecessors were. This, above any other reason, is why Assad’s was the last coup. This Ba’athist military used tough and brutal military tactics to quell resistance movements. In fact, between 1976 and 1982 there was severe anti-Ba’athist sentiment among Islamic fundamentalists (Yapp 263). For the Sunni majority, the Alawites are a heretic Muslim sect whom many don’t consider to be true Muslims, yet this minority continues to dominate the government. Asad made some attempt to conciliate Muslims by conceding their demand that the president should be a Muslim (Yapp 263). This did not satisfy the activists a jihad was launched against the regime. In February 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood ambushed government forces, who were searching for dissidents in Hamah. Several thousand Syrian troops, supported by armor and artillery, moved into the city and crushed the insurgents during two weeks of bloodshed. When the fighting was over, perhaps as many as 10,000 to 25,000 people lay dead, including an estimated 1,000 soldiers. (Yapp 263). In addition, large sections of Hamah's old city were destroyed. The Hama massacre was the last serious challenge to the regimes authority. Individuals who politically opposed Assad’s regime were jailed. The use of the military to suppress opposition is more descriptive of an atrocious dictator, rather than a democratic president. Assad established the ability to call upon the military to support his regime and quell opponents, thus solidifying his position of brutal control.
The issue of succession is another aspect of Assad’s government that likens it to a military dictatorship. Elections would have been held if Syria was really a republic and the likelihood of Assad’s son coming into power would have depended on his popularity among the people. However this is not what took place. Assad, weakening in health and suffering from a heart attack, needed to quickly find a successor who would be able to uphold the regime. Asad began to systematically groom his oldest son, Basil for the succession. However after being killed in an auto accident, Asad immediately called up his other son, Bashir an ophthalmologist in London to receive the military and political training necessary for succession (Long et al 240). From 1994 to 2000, Bashir moved extremely quickly up the ranks of the military to become an army colonel and at the time of his father’s death in 2000 he was being introduced into the party.
With the president’s death, the question still remained of whether Bashir could legally succeed his father and whether the ruling elite would let him. Even though Assad loyalists spent years campaigning for the succession of Bashir, there were many factors that indicated he was not qualified to take control. He was only 34 years old and the constitution stated one had to be at least forty to assume the presidency and he held insufficient military rank to assume command of the armed forces (Long et al 240). Bashir, his supporters, and his father’s colleagues and loyalists formed a council that openly endorsed Bashir. Within the next two days, the People’s Assembly had changed the constitutional age of succession to thirty-four and the Ba’ath party officially named Bashir the party’s candidate for the presidency. The army promoted him to lieutenant general and named him commander in chief of the Syrian army. Bashir received 97.29 percent of the vote and in 2000, succeeded his father (Long et al 240). The succession of a son to his father’s top governmental role is more descriptive of a monarchy rather than a democracy.
Having control over both the governmental and military structures, Assad ushered in an era of political stability and power forming a system of one party rule eliminating any source of political opposition. Assad’s arrival into power was initially marked by a military coup, rather than a democratic election. To be political successful within Syria, one had to align themselves with the Ba’ath party. Under the rights granted to him by the constitution, Assad had a free range of power over all decisions in Syria. He used the Ba’athist ideology to eliminate Syrian divisions justifying the government’s disproportional role. In addition, the extensive violence and brutality associated with the suppression of resistance movements was enough to turn any anti-Ba’athist sentiment into an acceptance of the regime. Moreover, dynastic succession is certainly unusual for a democratic state. Looking back at the definition of a military dictatorship and through analysis of his regime, it is possible to conclude that Syria’s government under Haffez Assad was in fact a military dictatorship.
Bibliography
Long, David E. and Bernard Reich. The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.
Yapp, M.E. The Near East Since the First World War. Essex: Pearson, 1996.
Van Dam, Nikolaos. The Struggle for Power in Syria:Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1978. London: Croom Helm, 1979.
