The criticisms made against William Beveridge by the feminist movement have, by-and-large, not been without justification for women have indeed suffered at the hands of the social insurance s

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WHAT ARE THE GENDER LIMITATIONS

 OF THE CONCEPT OF ‘CITIZENSHIP’ ENSHRINED IN THE BEVERIDGE WELFARE STATE?


CONTENTS

What are the gender limitations of the concept of “citizenship” enshrined in the Beveridge Welfare State?

REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORD COUNT        3,094


What are the gender limitations of the concept of “citizenship” enshrined in the Beveridge Welfare State?

The concept of citizenship is both interesting and complex as it can encompass a range of meanings for people depending on their personal background: be it race, colour, status, class, religious beliefs etc. Indeed, we have recently seen a plethora of political and personal debate relating to citizenship concentrating on a person’s place of birth, class, religious beliefs etc. For inhabitants of Britain today, the term ‘citizenship’ appears to have become integral aspect of everyday life. We are constantly bombarded with both news reports and newspaper headlines extolling the virtues of our being good (or bad) citizens: (Garner, 2002: B.B.C. News, 2001; 2002: Wintour and White, 2003). The current Labour Government, headed by Tony Blair P.M., has recently introduced legislation, which aims to teach schoolchildren how to be a good citizen, Education Act 2002 (Great Britain, Parliament, 2002 6:84 (i; ii)). More recently, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 (Great Britain, Parliament, 2003) categorises the actions of those deemed to be a ‘bad’ citizen: ranging from housing; parental responsibilities; graffiti and high hedges. However, the relationship between citizenship and gender appears to have fallen by the wayside.

This paper aims to explain the concept of citizenship in relation to women and their access to the welfare state. Further, it will offer an explanation as to how and why the citizenship debate has surfaced so aggressively in recent years. Finally, by focusing upon the gender limitations to citizenship clearly seen within the original

Beveridge Report (see Lancaster and Rathfelder 2003) at the inception of the

welfare state in 1942, we will review the case for women claiming full and equal rights of access to all benefits and welfare bestowed, thus far, upon their male counterparts. For clarity of purpose we should add that ‘gender’ in relation to this paper refers explicitly to women, whilst ‘citizenship’ will be used in relation to individuals aligned together under the governance of one nation state.  

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, (Simpson and Weiner [Eds.], 1989) the term citizenship is derived from citizen plus ship. It states that a citizen can be:

1. An inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town; especially one possessing civic rights and privileges, a burgess or freeman of a city.

2. A member of a state, an enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an alien; in U.S., a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public offices, and is entitled to full protection in the exercise of private rights [and that citizenship therefore implies] the position or status of being a citizen, with its rights and privileges.

This definition of citizenship appears simple enough and implies that individuals have certain universal rights, privileges and protection offered to them by inhabiting a specific area. However, if we then review Thomas Humphrey Marshall’s (1893-1981) theory of citizenship, the picture becomes somewhat less clear. Marshall states that

citizenship actually has:

…three parts, or elements, civil, political and social. The civil element is

composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice…By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of members of

such a body…By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in

the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society.                                                  

(Marshall, 1950)

From this, we can see that Marshall implies that citizenship is available to all members of society. Furthermore, Marshall believed the road to citizenship to be built-up and developed in a steady, defined manner:

...it is possible, without doing too much violence to historical accuracy, to assign the formative period in the life of each to a different century – civil rights to the eighteenth, political to the nineteenth, and social to the twentieth.

(Ibid).  

Many writers have taken issue with Marshall’s theory, not only with his presumption of incremental change but also with his principle of citizenship as a universal benefit (Pascall 1993; Walby 1994; Kennett 2001; Pedersen 1993; Pateman 1989); of these, Pateman is particularly critical of Marshall’s notion of citizenship as being universal: she argues:

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The patriarchal understanding of citizenship … allows two alternatives only:

either women become (like) men, and so full citizens; or they continue at

women’s work, which is of no value for citizenship. Moreover, within a patriarchal welfare state neither demand can be met. To demand that citizenship, as it now exists, should be fully extended to the women accepts the patriarchal meaning of ‘citizen’, which is constructed from men’s attributes,

capabilities and activities. Women cannot be full citizens in the present meaning of the term; at best, citizenship can be extended to women only as lesser men.

(Pateman, ...

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