Would increasing the power of the European Parliament reduce the 'democratic deficit' in the EU? Would this necessarily be a good thing?

Would increasing the power of the European Parliament reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU? Would this necessarily be a good thing?

The changing nature of the European Union, through expansion to 25 member states and the adoption of the single currency, led the European Commission to produce the White Paper European Governance (2001). The publication ‘concerns the way in which the Union uses the powers given by its citizens’ and it aimed to promote ‘greater openness, accountability and responsibility for all those involved’. The White Paper therefore intended to reduce the democratic deficit from which the EU is widely perceived to suffer.

The notion of a democratic deficit can take two forms linked to the mix of supra-national and inter-governmental decision making institutions of the EU. The first democratic deficit is the limited authority of the only directly elected institution of the EU, the European Parliament. The second relates to the nature of EU law having a higher precedence to member state’s parliamentary law. This became apparent when the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was declared incompatible with EU law by the House of Lords and had to be repealed; thus EU law takes precedence over future national laws. To eurosceptics this is an unacceptable loss of parliamentary sovereignty.

The Single European Act extended the use of qualified majority voting in the intergovernmental European Council to more areas of decision making. This reduction in the national veto, where previously any single objecting member state could strike down EU legislation in many areas, has increased the supranational nature of the EU. The EU can implement legislation that can have an effect in a member state without that member state’s approval. Therefore the elected representatives of national parliaments will have lost their power of scrutiny over more policy areas. If democracy is defined as governing in accordance with the will of the population, the loss of scrutiny can be said to hinder the principle of democracy.

As the EU decision making process is further taken out of the control of national parliaments, a way to compensate the reduction in accountability has been to increase the powers of the European Parliament. As the only elected institution of the EU it is technically the most accountable to the European electorate as a whole. But with increasing voter apathy its mandate becomes questionable. In the 1999 elections to the European Parliament, turnout in the UK was the lowest of all fifteen member states at 24%. The regional list electoral system ensures the results are proportional but at such a low turnout, the way the UK is represented in the European Parliament can be distorted.

In the European Parliament elections in the UK it is the euro sceptics that are more inclined to vote. The Conservatives gained more seats than Labour (36 to 28) and the UK Independence Party gained 3 seats. At the closest national elections (to the European Parliament elections in 1999) in 1997 and 2001, Labour gained a higher proportion of the votes than the conservatives on a much higher turnout. It can therefore be argued that the European Parliament may be the closest EU institution to the population of Europe, in terms of control and accountability via the ballot box, but at such a low turnout the political reflection of the electorate is distorted and its mandate becomes questionable. However if the European Parliament is given more powers it will probably encourage more people to vote, validating its mandate. Evidence in the UK suggests the electorate are less likely to vote when the elected legislature is perceived to be of little relevance wit few powers. For example apathy towards local government elections is greater than the apathy towards national elections. When London was given an elected assembly with more powers, turnout in the London Boroughs increased.

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Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Parliament has had its status upgraded to a ‘co-decision’ authority. In certain areas, mainly the budget, environment and the single market, the European Parliament has the right to be consulted on such legislation; Acts in these areas cannot be passed without its endorsement. To compensate for the loss of veto in certain areas, extra scrutiny has been given through the directly elected element of the EU, the European Parliament. This way the citizens of the EU are not totally bypassed by the increase in the amount of supranational decision making. In other areas the European Parliament has to be consulted and the European Commission, arguably the most detached institution from EU citizens, is now directly accountable to the Parliament and therefore to the people. The appointment and work of commissioners is scrutinised by the legislature and the Commission can be forced to resign if a motion of censure is supported by two thirds of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

The profile of the European Parliament has been raised by allowing it representation at Council summits; it has a direct input through its President at all Council meetings. This way the wishes of the national governments are combined with (in theory) the views of the European electorate when developing the EU policy agenda. However the President has no decision making power at the summits and can only express the views of the European Parliament, something that the European ministers could ignore. However I would argue this is not an example of a democratic deficit as the ministers were almost certainly elected on a bigger turnout and will therefore be more representative of their electorates and will have a more legitimate mandate to make decisions.

Although reforming the European Parliament by granting it more powers is seen as the best way of reducing the democratic deficit, a lack of democratic accountability is found not only in the powers of the other institutions but in their structure as well. The rules of composition of the European Parliament are based on nationality. The number of seats allocated to each member state is roughly based upon the size of their populations. Germany, having the largest population has the most MEPs at 99. Luxembourg being the smallest has only 6. However this leads to an inequality in the population per seat. Germany has a seat for roughly every 830,000 citizens whereas Luxembourg has a seat for every 66,000 citizens. As Luxembourg is relatively overrepresented, the vote of a Luxembourgian (being the smallest EU country) carries more weight than the votes of citizens of any other member state. This is not perfectly democratic as there is a lack of equality of representation. After enlargement in 2004 and 2007 the problem will be made much worse. A way to counteract this would be to increase the number of MEPs but this would prove to be impractical as the Parliament would become too dominated by the larger countries. A better solution would be to weight the votes of MEPs according to the size of the population they represent. The Treaty of Nice introduced a similar system whereby the weight of votes to be used in qualified majority voting (QMV) depends upon the size of the population. This also stops the smaller member states dominating the larger countries of the EU.

The democratic deficit can also extend to the European Commission, viewed as the executive branch of the EU which implements the decisions made by the Council and by the European Parliament. It can also propose legislation for adoption by the legislature and the Council of Ministers. Although Commissioners are directly appointed by the member states, upon appointment they are no longer accountable to their appointers. The oath of allegiance ensures they will not reflect the will of their national governments but will serve the interests of the EU only. This way their accountability to the member states who appointed them is gone. As upon appointment they no longer represent their member state’s interests they cannot act in a way which could force their national governments to withdraw their appointment. In some ways this is beneficial as discussions at the Council of Ministers can become strained and delayed. The current meetings to develop an EU Constitution are being delayed and compromised as each member state argues from its national point of view. This may be more democratic but an independent commission with commissioners unhindered by national points of view can put forward proposals and implement decisions more effectively and efficiently.

Despite not being democratically elected and not being accountable to the member governments, Commissioners are accountable to the European Parliament which can force them to resign on mass by a two thirds majority. This has never been used; although the whole Commission decided to resign in 1997 after a financial scandal. However as has been stated before, the mandate of the European Parliament is too weak to be described as democratic. This can also be said of the public accountability of the Commission’s employees. The work and actions of the directorate –general staff are scrutinised in the same way as the College of Commissioners. However, the Commission has no formal decision making powers; it can only propose legislation or implement decisions made by the directly accountable bodies: The Council (representatives are directly accountable to national parliaments) and the directly elected European Parliaments. The lack of formal decision making powers reduces the need for greater democratic accountability. Providing the Commission implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, there is no need for a more direct link between the citizens of the EU and the Commissioners by electing the Commission. All the decision making powers are vested in the Council of Ministers which is accountable to the national Parliaments and the European Parliament which is directly accountable to the electorate.

With such high voter apathy towards EU elections it may not be sensible to increase the powers of the European Parliament. Their mandate is not sufficient to warrant extensive powers. The European Parliament is also formed with a cleavage between the eurosceptics and supporters of the EU – there are MEPs representing parties that advocate complete withdrawal from the EU. If these MEPs are given more powers they may work in the most destructive way possible, rendering the institutions useless.

Others have argued that increasing the role of national parliaments should be the way to make the EU more democratic. Decisions made by both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should only be implemented after support has been granted by each of the member state’s elected parliaments. The national parliaments would also rule whether the decision has been taken at the most appropriate level, complying with the principle of subsidiarity outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. I would disagree with this: although it would make the decision making process more transparent and therefore more democratic, it would slow the process down to such an extent that the Union may not work. The success of the Union depends on compromise but needs to be balanced with the need for greater openness and transparency within the institutions of the European Union. For example the Council of Ministers and the College of Commissioners meet in secret. The public of the EU may feel a greater affinity to it if the institutions become less obscure and are visibly working.

There have been various suggestions about the future of the European Union. The German Chancellor supports a quasi federalist model where the Council of Ministers is replaced by a Senate (of the heads of member state’s governments) creating a bicameral legislature. Commissioners will be directly appointed by the lower house, the existing European Parliament. This option would be would make the process simple to understand and more transparent to the European public but a lack a lack of a European identity in many member states would make it fail.

The democratic deficit will not be reduced by giving more powers to the European Parliament. It already has the power to scrutinise the appointments and work of the Commission, the main non elected institution of the EU. Only structural changes could reduce the democratic deficit until the mandate of the European Parliament gains greater legitimacy through larger turnouts at European elections. The democratic deficit can be reduced by opening up the decision making process and by maintaining the powers of the intergovernmental institutions, mainly the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is accountable to the European citizens and is best placed to protect their interests. Until a common EU identity can be achieved along with greater support for a more powerful and closer union, the autonomy of the supranational institutions should be kept to a minimum.

Bibliography

Commission of the European Communities European Governance A White Paper (Brussels, 2001)

Quinn, T. GV101 Lecture 7 (2003)

Rosamund, B ‘The Europeanization of British Politics’ in Dunleavy, Gamble, Heffernen, Peele, eds., Developments in British Politics 7 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)

Chryssochoou, D. ‘EU Democracy and the Democratic Deficit’ in Cini, M., ed. European Union Politics (Oxford, 2003)

McCormick, J. Understanding the EU: A Concise Introduction (2003)

EUROPA European Institutions and other bodies: The European Parliament

Cope, S., ‘The Europeanisation of British Policy Making’ in Savage, S., Atkinson, R., eds., Public Policy under Blair (Palgrave, 2001)

Coxall, B., Robins, R., Contemporary British Politics (Macmilan, 1998)

www.europarl.org.uk

www.guardian.co.uk

Commission of the European Communities European Governance A White Paper (Brussels, 2001) p3

Quinn, T. GV101 Lecture 7 (2003) pp8-9

Rosamund, B ‘The Europeanization of British Politics’ in Dunleavy, Gamble, Heffernen, Peele, eds., Developments in British Politics 7 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp39-60 at p47

Chryssochoou, D. ‘EU Democracy and the Democratic Deficit’ in Cini, M., ed. European Union Politics (Oxford, 2003) pp365-383 at p 368

www.europarl.org.uk

McCormick, J. Understanding the EU: A Concise Introduction (2003) p105

EUROPA European Institutions and other bodies: The European Parliament pp1-3

McCormick, J. Understanding the EU: A Concise Introduction (2003) p105

Cope, S., ‘The Europeanisation of British Policy Making’ in Savage, S., Atkinson, R., eds., Public Policy under Blair (Palgrave, 2001) p41

Coxall, B., Robins, R., Contemporary British Politics (Macmilan, 1998) pp238-239

Chryssochoou, D. ‘EU Democracy and the Democratic Deficit’ in Cini, M., ed. European Union Politics (Oxford, 2003) pp365-383

13 Chryssochoou, D. ‘EU Democracy and the Democratic Deficit’ in Cini, M., ed. European Union Politics (Oxford, 2003) pp365-383 at pp369-371

13 www.guardian.co.uk

Would increasing the power of the European Parliament reduce the 'democratic deficit' in the EU? Would this necessarily be a good thing?

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