Those who came to lead the West German republic understood the international role their fate had destined. Their present was always a result of the past. The cold war put them at the edge of the Iron Curtain, where every effort made to strengthen their position had to deal with suspicions of what such a policy might produce. So they worked closely with the United States, refused to be isolated from global decision-making, and tied themselves to the future Europe - to the future of their neighbours. They released national energies, while assuring the world community of their trustworthiness. As a tactic for political and economic success, this produced the right results and, when compared with the difficulties and defensiveness in the East, showed what free choice and industrial organization could do.
Broadcast to East Germany by relatives, travelers, and television, this success had an early effect. The rebellion put down in 1953 and the wall begun in 1961 kept the Eastern occupants under the control of a harsh authoritarian regime. The competitiveness of once well-known East German industries continued to decline. And even after de-Stalinization had freed controls elsewhere in Eastern Europe, citizens of East Germany were subjected to surveillance and limited movement.
As the chancellor of West Germany in the early seventies, Willy Brandt relieved some of the tension with negotiations to open travel and trade between the two Germanies in return for Western economic support. This ostpolitik recognized Eastern borders, reduced Western claims to be the sole representative of all Germans, and normalized diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic. It provided symbolic encouragement for the East and ultimately aided the unification of the two Germanies. In the next decade and a half, between these Brandt initiatives and unification, the idea of economically aiding the 'other' Germany even became accepted by such conservative politicians as Franz Josef Strauss. Elsewhere in Europe the French, the Danes and the Italians were fighting for their own settlements with the East. Independent threads of cooperation rapidly increased, but few seriously discussed a united Europe.
As has been evident throughout the previous stages of this argument, Germany was not seen as a substantial and individual political force. In a sense, Germany was classed a 'little brother' to be dealt with and pushed around as each superpower felt. With its separation and different authorities, any real political prowess came from the problems it caused. Due to the fact Germany was influenced by different countries, political leaders found that differing policies towards Germany caused complications. 'When Ronald Reagan refused to discuss Germany with Mikhail Gorbachev, the tension at border crossings increased' (Wallach & Francisco, 1992:7). The tone of friction between East and West was evident in the German Democratic Republic's delays on 'interzonal' autobahns and in the friendliness suddenly exhibited at Checkpoint Charlie when Willy Brandt introduced ostpolitik or Helmut Kohl accepted invitations to Moscow. However, the division of Germany also served as a blanket to the victims of WWII. The French and the Poles were assured that as long as Germany was divided and occupied by the major powers, it could not be a threat. The nightmares of occupation experienced by the Soviets seemed allayed by the establishment of a Soviet-oriented Germany. Even the British, Dutch and Czechs found it easy to snub a Germany denied both unity and full sovereignty.
Due to the obvious historical barriers towards Germany, their pro-European integration illustrates the idea of the 'little brother' syndrome. It was if Germany was trying to repair the damage of the years of war by its European policies. Konrad Adenauer was one of the founding fathers of the Schuman Declaration in 1950 that lead to the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was the signing of this treaty by the six members, one of them being West Germany, that stimulated a series of events resulting in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, if we look closer at the 1949 negotiations, we see that this 'little brother' idea is, in fact, further from the truth than one would imagine. At every level of the integration process, it is said that Adenauer 'patiently extracted concessions that enhanced its authority.' (Turner, 1992:121). He was fighting for the sovereign rights of the new West German government and by the end of 1949 Bonn had gained representation abroad. It was during the ensuing era that West Germany started to develop itself as a major economic power. Speaking in 1954, Ludwig Erhard said, 'That which has taken place in Germany these past six years was anything other than a miracle. It was merely the result of honest endeavour of a whole people, who again had the chance of applying human initiative, human liberty and human energies.' (Marsh, 1989:119). The German economy had experienced a doom and Adenauer was not about to let it end..
For most of the post-war period, West Germany's economic performance has been widely admired abroad. During the 1980s, the German economic model lost its shine. As the country started to tackle the unexpected challenge of reunification, Germany's economic attention was distracted away from western markets towards the task of rebuilding the East. Both during and since the Wirtschaftwunder in the 1950s and 1960s, the economy's success has contributed substantially to the stability and affluence of Europe. The Federal Republic, the third largest industrial economy after the US and Japan, at the end of the 1980s, made up about one quarter of western Europe's output. Post-war achievement has stemmed above all from internationalization of the economy. West Germany's exports have exceeded imports every year since 1951.
As Europe sought unified policy making, it was decided that monetary integration would promote intra-European trade and investment, by lessening exchange rate fluctuations. This meant that there was a need for an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). Germany played an integral part in this process that involved revaluations of the Deutsche mark and the Dutch guilder, devaluations of the Italian lira and Greek drachma, and mixed changes in other currencies. In certain instances, Germany had to lend Deutsche marks to other central banks that, in turn, sold those marks in the foreign exchange market to support their respective currencies. Towards the end of the 1980s Germany had become a major player in the economics of the EU. So much so that the implications of the German re-unification were that of a dramatic economic shock. Historian Harold James, in his official IMF history, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, summarized the basic dilemma confronting Europe, 'Germany, threatened by a large fiscal deficit as a consequence of the high costs of political unification, required monetary restraint. Tight money policies, however, elsewhere in Europe were to blame for the severity of the recession, and political pressure mounted for a relaxation. Germany's neighbours faced a dilemma: if the followed German monetary restraints, their recession would be intensified; if they failed to tighten, funds would flow out and lead to an exchange rate crisis.' (Yarborough & Yarborough, 2000:870).
During the 1980s, the trade surplus reached unprecedented proportions, the Federal Republic became the world's largest exporter, and the second biggest creditor after Japan. 'The country is still Europe's economic powerhouse.' (Marsh, 1989:120). As unification approached, Germany's economic dominance, over the medium term, was expected to increase; but the process of absorbing East Germany - which had an economic size of roughly one eighth of the Federal Republic's - took time and capital, energy and work. Although Germany lags behind the US and Britain in fostering an 'enterprise culture', the creation of new business by younger people showed an improvement in the 1980s. However, the breed of free-wheeling post-war entrepreneurs appears to have died out. There were no obvious successors to businessmen such as Max Grundig, who assembled a radio and electrical product empire, or Heinz Nixdorf, who built up the country's biggest home-grown computer group. Both men are now dead; and both groups have been taken over by multinationals - Grundig by Philips of the Netherlands, and Nixdorf by Siemens.
In conclusion, the statement that Germany is an economic giant but a political dwarf can both be supported and reputed. On the one hand, one can see that in comparison to the economic strength of the country, its political strength can be classified as dwarf like. However, it is hard to imagine that a country that had such an immense economic influence could fail to be politically similar. In terms of the European Union and the issues that affect the EU as a community, Germany has been at the forefront of integration and expansion. For a country that historical has bred such malevolence, their European policies have influenced and shaped the European Union into the institution that it is today. Another side to the argument is that Germany has not necessarily exerted political influence but it has caused many a confrontation over the correct policies to adopt. What is meant by this is that Germany has been the root of many an argument or sticking point between the superpowers that found themselves in control of certain parts of the country in the post-WWII period. The stature of the political prowess of Germany is not the only area of contention that the original statement illustrates. Germany experienced an economic boom that catapulted it into the world arena during the 1950s and 1960s. This renown was threatened by the implication of reunification in 1990 and could have caused Germany to falter as a world power. However, looking at the world economy in its present state, we can see that these fears were ill founded and at the moment, Germany can be considered as one of the world most powerful economic nations. Overall, one can agree with the statement if you consider the dwarf-like nature of Germany's politics only as such due to the immensity of the economy. However, German politics can be said to possess more power than the majority of the European people would imagine.
Bibliography
Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. Germany from Partition to Reunification
Yale University Press, 1992.
Wallach H G & Francisco R A. United Germany. The Past, Politics, Prospects.
Praeger, 1992.
David Marsh The New Germany at the Crossroads.
Century, 1989.
Yarborough & Yarborough The World Economy. Trade and Finance.
Harcourt College Publishers, 2000.
Griffiths & Wall Applied Economics.
Longman, 1999.
