Examine the main premises behind Eisenhower's concept of containment

Eisenhower was adamant not to rage another land-war like that of Korea again, it was unthinkable that the United States should secure an armistice in Korea and then send US troops to fight another local War somewhere else.  It would not only be hypocritical, but it was both costly in American lives and money, as we have seen the implications of nuclear strikes by the US was enough to  

Security policy NSC 162/2, approved by Ike in late October 1953, was a fresh survey of American military capability in the light of their global commitments.  The maintenance of a strong military posture backed specifically with the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power, it considered the use of nuclear weapons to be like that of any other munitions.  (Ike famously stated a year later that he saw no reason why a tactical nuclear warhead shouldn’t be used “just like a bullet or anything else.”)  It also called for the cut back of the post-Korean army strength of twenty divisions to fourteen by 1957, a cut of 500,000 men, the navy to be cut only slightly by a few ships and 100,000 men, where as the air force would be increased by 30,000 men. 

1954 saw the prospective end of French rule in Vietnam to the Nationalist/Communist force the Viet Minh; this was met with great anxiety in the Eisenhower administration.  Eisenhower sought allies in halting this “falling of dominos” in Southeast Asia, he suggested propping up the already garrisoned French army with European and Asiatic troops, with America supplying only material not lives.  Unsurprisingly Ike failed to secure backing with this plan from plan to Britain, Australia, Thailand and New Zealand, and so it was to be with much chagrin on Ike and Dulles part, a diplomatic compromise with the Communists would have to do.  U.S policy henceforth took the task of promoting an agreement on Indochina that could be integrated into a larger Southeast Asian security pact, drawing a line communists could not cross, so as to resist and fight communist subversion.  Although unhappy with the loss of North Vietnam, “the keystone to the arch of south-east Asia”, Dulles stated it was important not to seize the future opportunity, the focus of efforts on making sure communism did not spread through out Southeast Asia and South west Pacific.  

 SEATO was an alliance designed to specifically to combat subversion in this part of the world, giving member nations more confidence and clout to deal with Communist threats.  Although somewhat flawed, the SEATO protocol thus established a legal basis for United action should it be needed and also gave Southern Vietnam a “measure of status as an independent nation”, from Dulles and Ike’s perspective it “served as a deterrent”.  Again we can see another thread of Eisenhower’s containment policy, his penchant for alliances to contain communism, with the additional fiscal benefit of sharing and spreading the cost and responsibility onto other nations.

NSC162/2 exposed ‘rollback’ policy as being high risk and relatively futile, instead it highlighted the need for the West to nurture the already growing signs of unrest in the Eastern bloc, not to incite premature revolt.  Dulles stated that to aggressively detach Soviet satellite states from the USSR would almost certainly risk general war that it wouldn’t deal with the root of the problem that of Soviet unimpaired nuclear capability.  Instead the Eisenhower administration would support any moves by States to throw off their communist shackles, but not militarily, as he believed would risk a war with the Soviets that could very easily turn into nuclear conflict and Armageddon.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the US/USSR response is a clear example of this non-military rollback policy in action.  The Soviet Union through its “de-Stalinisation” program adopted more liberalised economic and social policies with regards to the Eastern European States.  This was a bid to help the states increase their economic output, to lessen the strain off of Moscow, therefore boosting the USSR’s wealth as a whole. This in turn encouraged demands for greater reforms, particularly in Poland and Hungary.  Imre Nagy, a former Hungarian premier who represented liberal reform within Hungary, was re-instated as a gesture by the Communists to neutralise mounting criticism toward them in the country.  Yet it inspired the people into taking greater militant action, with the outbreak of rioting in Budapest on the 23rd of October.  This unrest was furthered by Nagy’s announcement of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw pact proclaiming Hungarian neutrality and asking the UN for help in their struggle.  What followed was a tense week whereby the Red Army was sent in to crush the uprisings, the Nagy government no doubt encouraged by years of encouragements by the radio propaganda of, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, hoped the US would become “activated” into their commitment of liberating them from the oppressive Soviet system.  

It was the first real opportunity for Eisenhower administration to operate their rollback policy, they possessed massive strategic missile superiority over the Soviets and their assistance could have been seen to be legitimate under international law in protecting a pro-western established government.  But as we have seen earlier the “New Look” had relegated the original election ‘liberation’ promise as to naught but rhetoric, liberation was a sham Eisenhower later commented …unless the major nations of Europe would ally themselves spontaneously with us (an unimaginable prospect) we could do nothing. This is a good example of Eisenhower’s concept of containment and its implementation, in that he chose not to risk potential world war with the Soviets, fearing irrational escalation that could have easily led to a nuclear conflict.

In what is now seen as the “Golden Age” of the CIA, under Ike the Central Intelligence Agency began to come into its own.  Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq’s nationalisation of Iranian oil-fields led to an international boycott which was followed by a serious economic “crunch” in Iran which Ike saw as potentially inviting to the Communist spread.  After Ike snubbed Mossadeq’s plea for economic aid, Mossadeq turned to the Soviets for support prompting Ike to authorize a CIA backed coup to overthrow Mossadeq.  General Zahedi was replaced as PM, with the Shah given increased power, after clever negotiations on the part of Western oil companies; Iranian Oil was safeguarded for the Western powers.  Eisenhower regarded the execution and outcome of this venture as one his administrations successes, however it was soon to come back to haunt him some 5 years later.  Other operations such as in Guatemala, the Congo, attempts to overthrow Castro in Cuba and the completion and use of the U2 spy plane are other examples of the CIA’s tenure during the 50’s.  

The growing use and implementation of CIA under Eisenhower, furthers our understanding of Ike’s concept of containment.  Sponsoring covert operations to overthrow and undermine un-savoury leaders and regimes to halt the spread of communism was not only cheap, but it lessened the risk of confronting Moscow head to head, Eisenhower’s fear of war with Moscow and its possible escalation ensured his containment was based on defensive deterrence.

The Middle-East was supplying 75% of the oil used by Western Europe by 1957, with the United States supplying 47% of the total international investment in Middle Eastern Oil.  Western European economic interests were directly linked to those of the US should the Middle East and consequently Western interests fall under the Soviet yoke, Ike believed a massive communist victory in Western Europe would surely follow.  The Suez crisis of ’56 had greatly undermined Western Supremacy in the area, not just in the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Britain and France but also in allowing the Soviet Union to appear a supporter of Arab nationalism, defending Western aggressors.  Subversion by the USSR was viewed as the “greatest immediate danger”, not ruling out also the “ample military power in the area”, Dulles stated to a Senate committee.  Ike in his proposal to the Senate argued the “legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect”, it was to be a deterrent not only to Communist armed and subversive aggression, but also to assure members of the Baghdad Pact as to US commitment; with the added bonus of gaining economic aid and military arms to bolster their regimes. The undoing of the doctrine was the US inability to deter the Soviets from providing arms and economic aid themselves to Middle Eastern regimes, the US alienated Nasserite, pan-Arabism sentiment, pushing nationalists into closer co-operation with the Soviets.  Here we see the failure on the part of Ike and his administration, bringing the cold war into the Middle East and the instigation of their deterrence model over unstable and volatile peoples, their interests and contain Soviet influence.

General Dwight D Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, argued that containment under the Truman administration was not pro-active enough in taking the cold war to the Soviets. Rather, a more (or less) aggressive policy that was not only cheaper but would rely heavily on the United Sates superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems. “Massive Retaliation” would ensure communist states such as China and the Soviet Union would be deterred from encroaching and expanding their spheres of influence aggressively, the United States often being ambiguous in their intended use of tactical nukes if the situation could not be dealt with through diplomacy.  This ambiguity is key in understanding the threat that was key to Ike and Dulles containment policy, it would thus be up to the aggressor’s calculations on weather it would risk inciting America’s nuclear capability.  This can be seen in Korea and this Formosa crisis, also NATO was heavily equipped with US nuclear arms that not only lessened anxiety in the Western States but would keep the vast Red army in Eastern Europe in check.  However the use of nuclear deterrent to discourage Moscow and Peking exploiting third world liberation movements in reality proved somewhat ineffective.  Ike himself admitted in 1955 that their strategy did little to stop the losses incurred by the enemy “nibbling”, so long as they did not do anything drastic enough to provoke a major war “he need not fear the deterrent”Eisenhower’s commitment to alliances saw the formation of SEATO to protect Western interests from communism in South East Asia.  Rollback, a policy that was amended after NSC 162/2 in light of its potential to cause a direct “hot” conflict with the Soviets, the “captive peoples” would have to liberate themselves, Ike was not prepared to instigate World War III for them.  Covert and Psychological warfare was waged, with the staging of coups in Iran and Guatemala, yet this were merely short-term solutions, with Ike’s administration failing to see the long term nationalist issues that had to be carefully dealt with. Similarly the Middle-East saw frantic and somewhat clumsy efforts at trying to shore up non-communist nationalism, Gaddis and Divine both argue that the US had little faith in the ability of “non-communist nationalism to sustain itself”, with national sovereignty being violated as a result of a confused paranoid actions.  However Ike’s “new look” policy of containing Communism, was in comparison to policies before and after, more nuanced and coherent and for the most part showed clear awareness of the enemy, exploiting Soviet and Chinese weaknesses without exhausting and over-stretching the United States.

   

---