Young Ireland aimed for armed rebellion in Ireland and yet as can be seen by the Battle of Widow McCormack’s Cabbage Patch their actions were small in scale and did not have a lasting or successful impact on advancing the cause of the Irish Question; in addition it did little to attract support, only young and literary people supported them along with some middle-class farmers. The same could be said of the Fenians as their methods consisted of small violent acts that were poorly organised, their two attacks in England show this. In Manchester they attempted to rescue two leading Fenians from a prison van during which a policeman was killed; the second being carried out in London in December when to secure the release of a number of Fenians part of a wall of Clerkenwell Prison was blown up. These attacks show a lack of coordination but although their actions were largely unorganised and on a small scale the Fenians had an important impact upon the British government and on the Irish Nationalist cause as they focused Gladstone’s attention on the Irish question and provided the ‘Manchester Martyrs’ as inspiration for future groups such as the Easter Rebels.
Poor planning and uncoordinated leadership hindered the Easter Rebels, for example their planned rebellion was not wide spread and due to a lack of organisation and the failure to gain arms from Germany, it only took place in Dublin where the general public were not supportive and in many cases did not understand the rebels’ actions. Furthermore many people were hostile towards the Easter Rebels and so did not support them due to their unconstitutional methods and poor leadership as can be seen by there being many leaders with different aims and ideas for the organisation. For instance Pearse believed that death was “a glorious enterprise and a noble sacrifice,” 6 whilst Connelly was a Marxist. Even constitutional leaders showed weaknesses at times. For instance Redmond showed an over willingness to compromise, such as his agreeing in principal to the exclusion of Ulster in 1914 and 1916. This ultimately lost him support and damaged his credibility.
Sinn Fein benefited greatly from efficient leadership and organisation. In 1916 Sinn Fein “remodelled itself [to become] a revolutionary party committed to the establishment of the Irish Republic,” 7 which was appropriate in Ireland post- Easter Rising. Support for Sinn Fein in 1914 was limited and the organisation was ignored by the authorities. However this had changed by 1917 when there were 250,000 members and their popularity had increased partly due to the inaccurate link to the Easter Rising that they promoted. This led to success in the election of 1917 when they won two by elections and in the general election of 1918 where they won 73 seats. “Sinn Fein could now realistically claim to represent the will of the Irish majority,” 8 and so have a large influence on the British government and so become closer to gaining their aim of an Irish Republic. This made “some form of revision of the Act of Union inevitable.” 9 They had their own militant section, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) led by Michael Collins who had “come to exert a powerful influence,”10 over the IRA and became “everything,” 11 to it, and so they were a much more effective militant wing than Young Ireland or the Fenians had been. They became more widespread in their attacks and started to target members of the public who were accused of “giving comfort to the enemy,”12 as well as the police and soldiers greatly weakening British rule in Ireland. In 1919 Sinn Fein under the leadership of de Valera set up their own parliament – the Dail Eireann which tried to gain further advancement of their cause by issuing a “Declaration of Independence.”13 De Valera was able to combine his power over both the political and militant wings of Sinn Fein. Furthermore De Valera showed unwillingness to compromise as he didn’t join the Irish Convention of 1917, unlike Redmond, and refused the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Such leadership and organisation helped Sinn Fein reach the position were they could force the British government to agree to a degree of separation under the Anglo- Irish Treaty of 1921
The British political situation was also a factor, a weak and divided Tory government passed Emancipation in 1828 rather than risking Civil War. O’Connell benefited as a result of the weakness of Wellington’s government which ended in 1830. The Whigs coming to power in the 1830s allowed O’Connell to “use his commanding position as leader of a small but significant third party to play off the Whigs against Conservatives and thus extract reform for Ireland.” 14 Parnell benefited from the situation in 1885 as he held the balance of power within Parliament and Gladstone was sympathetic to the home Rule idea. The Liberals were reliant upon the support of the Irish Party and so were supportive of the Irish cause. In addition the December 1910 general election helped Redmond as the support for the IPP was important in allowing Asquith to continue as Prime Minister. Furthermore after the 1910 election the House of Lords “agreed to bow to the will of the House of Commons and pass the Parliament Bill.” 15 This resulted in the Parliament Act of 1911 which meant that the Lords were only able to hold a Bill back for two years before it was passed. This ultimately meant that any Home Rule Bill that was opposed by the Lords would still be passed and subsequently led to the 1912 Home Rule Act becoming law.
However by 1841 Peel was in a “much stronger position than Wellington had been,” 16 and he “commanded a strong, united and confident party with a large majority in the House of Commons.” 17 Therefore Peel took a strong stance on response to O’Connell’s repeal campaign, successfully calling O’Connell’s bluff over the Clontarf meeting, meaning O’Connell’s repeal campaign failed. The strength of government can be seen when in 1865 they responded to Fenians activities by suppressing their newspaper The Irish people and arresting many leading Fenians. The coalition government of 1915 including Unionists such as Carson shows the unfavourable circumstance of it being harder for Redmond to get support from the British government for further Irish reforms. This led to a decline in Redmond’s influence which Sinn Fein later benefited from. Furthermore Lloyd George’s political skill was an unfavourable factor for the Irish nationalist leaders. For instance Lloyd George successfully managed to get both the Irish nationalists and unionists to agree his proposed Anglo- Irish Treaty by leading them to believe different things about the division of Ulster from the rest of Ireland. Furthermore Lloyd George seriously weakened Redmond’s credibility amongst the Irish people due to the Irish Convention and the 1916 agreement. Also during the Rebellion of the 1916 the Easter Rebels were “outnumbered by solders and armed police,” 18 meaning that the strength of the British authorities created a “hopeless,”19 situation for the rebellion which was “doomed from the start.” 20 However the response of the British government helped the Easter Rebels to posthumously advance their cause by their response to the Rebels in 1916. The British army was put in control of dealing with the rebellion. 3000 people were arrested and out of those 15 were sentenced to death; the harshness of the response to the Rebels “together with reports of ill treatment of prisoners and intimidation of civilians-aroused horror and resentment [to the British] in all classes in Southern Ireland.” 21
The British government went some way to help Sinn Fein advance their cause by their policies playing into their hands. For instance the arrest of Sinn Fein members made the inaccurate link to 1916 and so increased Sinn Fein support. Also in December 1916 the British government released several Irish prisoners which provided “new, more revolutionary recruits for Sinn Fein.” 22 The Conscription Act was passed in May 1918 to which Sinn Fein along with the IPP organised a nation wide campaign against it and a one day strike of Irish trade unions also took place. The majority of the anger in Ireland was directed toward the British government who bowed into mounting pressure and did not introduce compulsory conscription into Ireland. In addition the harsh use of the Black and Tans during the 1919-1921 war angered Irish people due to their harsh actions such as in response to ‘Bloody Sunday’ in November 1920. The harsh actions of the Black and Tans meant that the British government was heavily criticised both in the UK and Ireland. Sinn Fein were also helped by the Black and Tans and the Anglo- Irish war as both sides realised that neither of them could win, especially as the IRA were short of men and materials and the British government were not prepared to use full force, leading to the possibility of negotiations and a truce.
Particularly during the earlier years of Irish nationalism, social and economic circumstances in Ireland played a large role in dictating the success or failure of the Irish cause. For instance Ulster Protestants saw Irish nationalism linked with Catholics and so they became more organised in resisting Home Rule as can be seen by the actions of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the growth of Ulster unionism, particularly after 1912 with the Solemn League and Covenant signed by a quarter of a million men some of whom signed in their own blood. The UVF threatened “violence to secure a satisfactory political solution,” 23 and the Conservative party had “pledged their unlimited support for Ulster.” 24 This therefore meant that Redmond and other nationalist leaders had further opposition to their cause with government support. In addition “Redmond was unable to counter Unionist suspicions that Home Rule was a spring board to [a republic].” 25 Such resistance proved a huge barrier to the aim of independence for Ireland and partially explains the exclusion of Ulster in the 1921 Treaty.
During the famine of 1845-9 “many of the peasantry existed in a state of semi-starvation, since they lacked the money to buy food.”26 Although Young Ireland emerged as a result of the famine, in general the population was more concerned with issues affecting “the local, the immediate and the everyday,”27 rather than showing interest in nationalist politics due to the hardships they had suffered. After the famine there was greater prosperity of the middle classes and peasants, thus fewer people supporting a nationalist organisation such as the Fenians, so their attempts at advancing their cause had little impact on a large proportion of Ireland.
“Irish farmers found themselves faced with agricultural depression at the end of the 1870s.”28 This gave rise to Parnell and the Land Leagues which ultimately led to the Second Land Act being passed in 1881 which improved the rights of tenant farmers. Such circumstances allowed Parnell to tap into peasant tenant discontent and mobilise support in Ireland by linking these agrarian concerns with the Home Rule campaign. For Redmond the fact that there were no other issues such as tenant rights, the 1903 Wyndham Act solved this, meaning that more people were inclined to support him and so he was able to push the IPP for greater freedom from British rule such as the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912.
World War One did little to advance the Irish nationalist cause partly because the Irish question was no longer a priority for the British government and although the July 1917 Irish Convention was held to secure an Irish settlement Lloyd George’s “real intention was to keep the Irishmen talking while he got on with the task of winning the war.” 29 Furthermore “as the war dragged on the prospect of any rapid change [for Ireland] became increasingly remote.”30 Therefore partly as a result of this the Irish nationalist leaders did little to advance their cause during the war years and indeed hindered any success since only after the war had ended did the Irish question begin to appear on the government’s agenda.
Therefore at certain times the Irish Catholic and Nationalist leaders did advance their cause as can be seen by the achievements they gained, such as the Anglo- Irish Treaty in 1921 and with it the creation of an Irish Republic. However at certain times the leaders were less successful in advancing their cause such as Young Ireland. The factors enabling the nationalist leaders to advance their cause were a mixture of social, economic and political circumstances along with the leadership and organisational qualities of the various leaders and organisations as revisionist historians have argued rather than the idea of a constant struggle against the British to achieve an Irish Republic expressed by Irish Nationalist historians. Irish nationalist leaders were only able to advance their cause when all the circumstances were right between 1801-1921. Sinn Fein was able to effectively advance their cause further than previous leaders had been was due to them having the perfect mix of the right circumstances and leadership which was not always true of other leaders.
Word Count: 2970
References
1 Adelman, p.15
2 Adelman, p.38
3 Adelman, p. 37
4 Adelman, p. 84
5 Adelman, p.91
6 Smith, p.71
7 Adelman, p. 134
8 Adelman, p. 138
9 Smith, p.82
10 Smith, p. 87
11 Smith, p. 87
12 Adelman, p. 142
13 Adelman, p. 138
14 Adelman, p.42
15 Adelman, p. 117
16 Adelman, p.48
17 Adelman, p.48
18 Adelman, p. 133
19 Adelman, p. 133
20 Adelman, p. 133
21 Adelman, p. 133
22 Adelman, p.136
23 Smith, p.66
24 Smith, p.66
25 Smith, p.61
26 Adelman, p.59
27 Smith, p.20
28 Adelman, p.83
29 Adelman, p.136
30 Adelman, p.130
Bibliography
Books
- Adelman, P, Access To History, Great Britain and the Irish Question 1800-1922, Hodder & Stoughton, 1996
- Cruise O’Brien, M and C, Ireland: A Concise History, Thames and Hudson, 1972
- Kee, R, The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism, Penguin, 1972
- Lydon, J, The Making of Ireland: From Ancient Times To The Present, Routledge, 1998
- Mac Annaidh, S (ed), Illustrated Dictionary of Irish History, Gill & Macmillan, 2001
- Smith, J, Britain and Ireland: From Home Rule to Independence, Longman, 2000
Articles
- Chapman, T, Ireland 1800-50, September 1993
- MacRaild, D, Parnell and Home Rule
- Neville, P, The Origins & Development of Irish Republicanism, History Review, September 2001
Websites
