Evaluation of sources-
The first source to be considered is Mikhail Gorbachev’s book “Perestroika: new thinking for our country and the world”. This is a primary source, written directly by the mastermind behind the two most important policies implemented during the decade in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s purpose through the book, however, is to promote the ideal nation and worldwide, in an attempt to cause empathy in the western world with the future changes of the USSR. The text exposes this continuously in a least valuable (and scarcely quoted) section of the book, relating exclusively with “perestroika and the world”.
The book itself has a very valuable explanation on how the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika are run and applied within the Russian society, and what the objectives of these policies are. Gorbachev appears to be lobbying for support to his new government as a change from the old style politics. The book itself could well be regarded as a presentation letter to the world of the new leader. As it advances (and the text is written later in time) one could also understand the text to be, somehow, a way to absolve himself from responsibilities on the uncertain future of the USSR (soon to be the collapse of such.)
Peter Schweizer’s ‘Victory’ is, on the other hand, a secondary source (a limiting factor?). Schweizer, a journalist, bases his text on exclusive interviews with key figures within the Reagan administration, mostly composed by intelligence services members as well as administration staff which worked with the president throughout his term (1980-88), and thus were up to date with the American foreign policy of these years.
The text, however, may well be very biased. The title itself, ‘Victory’, gives an insight into the western view that Capitalism defeated Socialism, rather than the second having self-destroyed. The book, from an American journalist is very sympathetic with the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ and, although giving a fair analysis on the last years of the USSR, promotes the idea that the US ‘won’ the ‘Cold War’.
Analysis-
In December 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev published his book ‘Perestroika’, as a result on his analysis of the implementation of the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, applied after being named Secretary General of the Communist Party in march 11, 1985.
The author explains the causes that provoked the “urgent need” for the implementation of his policies. Ironically, he states: “a delay in starting perestroika would have guided us to…a very serious social, economical and political crisis.” He then analyses the current national situation. “in the second half of the 70’s…the country began to lose impulse.” A great economical slowdown in 15 years brought the USSR close to a deadlock, as the only producer, the state, set the society under its determination. Alongside, the loss of morale in society, creative thought and bureaucracy brought the state into relaxation, showing “…a reality without problems…”, much as explained by Graeme Gill, suppressing criticism and covering up the truth with pompous campaigns. This is where his sociopolitical need for glasnost comes in; he claims there are still those who “…enjoy illegal privileges…” which need to be suppressed through “criticism” and “self-criticism”.
In economical terms, the implementation of Perestroika, on the other hand, required “contracting a comsumer mentality”. The bureaucracy of maintaining unemployment levels controlled by the state and equality of remuneration, tried to be suppressed, by granting “more independence to enterprises” through autocontability and autofinancing, to reduce corruption from state control. This is a contradictory invitation into “more socialism, more democracy”, as it invites to neoliberalism, decentralization, “recognition of political diversity” and the elimination of the party’s leading role.
As results of his policies, Gorbachev contradicts his concept of self-criticism, as he states conclusions which do not coincide with statistics; he states “soviet society is in movement and will not stop”, and merely facing few problems: “There are people who don’t know how to work…in perestroika. We must teach them.” Historians even coincide in the excess criticism being a demoralizer. Gorbachev continues to make emphasis on the positive need for glasnost to keep the soviet machine running, through newspapers and the ‘intelligentsia’, and incentive and increasing independence for economical restructuring. However, Gorbachev’s promoted intelligentsia brought forth a fatal Glasnost at the XIX party conference, as explained by Gill.
Gorbachev’s brainchild, for some historians a “reform out of control”, cost the party elections feeling that the party had lost its way and sense of purpose.
Schweizer, on the other hand claims that, much before Gorbachev, the USSR was lost, and because of US foreign policy. “American policy…was a catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Union, he begins. Initially, he gives credit to the USSR’s own problems: “ by the 1980’s economic difficulties became intractable”. He sets this as an ideal start point for the ‘Reagan Doctrine’, as he explains William Casey stated:
“They’re bad off, struggling; the situation is worst than we imagined. I want you [mr. President] to see for yourself how sick their economy is and, as a consequence, how vulnerable they are. They’re overextended. Their economy is in shambles. Poland’s in revolt. They’re bogged down in Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola, Vietnam: Their empire’s become a burden. We can do serious damage to them.”
America was to take advantage of the Russian critical economical situation and instability to starve resources and generate a malaise amongst the CPSU. The author thus exposes the areas of action.
First, the polish and afghan situations. “…Radio free Europe was being used to communicate ‘orders’ to Solidarity activists.”. By ‘ratlines’ created by the Mossad, the CIA economically and morally sustained the polish revolt; In the afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion, “The CIA was purchasing Egyptian arms and funneling them through Pakistan with the cooperation of the Pakistani ISI.”
Schweizer explains also the PSYOP program. This consisted in “…shaping the Kremlin’s thinking by putting it on the psychological defensive thereby making it less prone to take risks.” Confusing the tense instability and forcing the starving Russian economy into further military spending, he describes the program as to “sow uncertainty” and “‘harass’ soviet forces”. This would coincide with the technological blockade, rendering them obsolete in military terms as in vital economical aspects (See below).
As for the economy, the author explains, the main aspect was to destroy the oil and gas exports which meant $30 Billion per year. The objective was to block the Orenburg Pipeline project, and, as “Moscow was financing its world empire through oil exports”, and Prince Turki’s major concern was the “…encirclement of Saudi Arabia by the Soviet Union”, through US-Saudi security relationships, “We wanted to lower oil prices…that’s why we were selling them arms.”
The author thus becomes thoroughly explanatory of these major policies as a means to describe the further Soviet decay; as the ‘Reagan Docrine’ wanes, and Gorbachev comes to power in the USSR, he concludes that his party’s absolute death was imminent, and denounces that all recognition has been given to Gorbachev, underestimating Reagan’s role in the fall of the USSR.
Conclusion-
The conclusion to these sources and historical timeline may be very complicated to assess.
Andropov’s almost simultaneous rise to power with Ronald Reagan marked a new and final intensification of the Cold War which appeared to die out through the détente years of Brezhnev. However, these years were, for the USSR, the rise of corruption and economical slowdown (and deadlock), while for the US it meant prosperity and international cooperation. Faced with this, and the rise of the most anticommunist American president in history, Moscow enters the final stage into disintegration. The US’s international cooperation into finding out soviet reality gave them the upper hand which they properly used to seize the opportunities to further starve the fragile Soviet economy. The soviet leader, a former KGB leader, blindly focuses his economy about military spenditure, sacrificing the economy completely to try and maintain a lost battle with their ideological opposites. Internal policies would thus arise to be of main importance after Andropov’s death and Chernenko’s short-lived mandate.
The more humble Gorbachev would pick up a country in pieces and try to come to terms with America to focus on futile attempts to save the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. But his own policies could not foresee the damage already caused by older internal problems and the ‘Reagan Doctrine’. PSYOP had done its deed, and glasnost became only the internal tool; Perestroika, the inevitable move to capitalism.
Concludingly, one can consider that, to a large extent Gorbachev’s policies were the actual triggers into the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, these triggers were only short term factors which, in fact were inevitable consequences of both internal and external long term factors; the external factors (the American foreign policy) being more directly encouraged, and thus even more critical into enhancing the internal as well.
Bibliography-
-Schweizer, Peter 1994 ‘Victory: The Reagan administration’s secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union’ Atlantic Monthly Press.
-Gorbachev, Mikhail 1987 ‘Perestroika: New thinking for our country and the world’, Editorial oveja negra (translations made by Andrés Jiménez)
-Gill, Graeme 1994 ‘The collapse of a single party system: The disintegration of the CPSU’, Cambridge University Press
-Encarta Encyclopedia On-line (http://)
-Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ()
-HisoryOrb ()
-History Channel Online (http://)
-Voice of America (http://www.voa.gov)
-Matlock, Jack F 1995 ‘Autopsy on an empire: the American ambassador’s account on the fall of the Soviet Union’ Random House Publishers.
Appendix 1
This year saw the explosion onto the soviet scene of a whole range of autonomous political groups whose activity called into question the party’s constitutionally enshrined political monopoly and its capacity to continue to encapsulate the main stream of political activity within its bound.
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Appendix 2
As stated by Schweizer Himself, the ‘Reagan Doctrine’, the administration’s policy towards the USSR was based on:
“Covert financial, intelligence, and logistical support to the Solidarity movement in Poland that ensured the survival of an opposition movement in the heart of the Soviet empire.
Substancial financial and military support to the Afghan resistance, as well as supplying of mujahedin personnel to take war into the Soviet Union itself.
A campaign to reduce dramatically Soviet hard currency earnings by driving down the price of oil with Saudi cooperation and limiting natural gas exports to the West.
A sophisticated and detailed psychological operation to fuel indecision and fear among the Soviet leadership.
A comprehensive global campaign, including secret diplomacy, the reduce drastically Soviet access to western high technology.
A widespread technological disinformation campaign, designed to disrupt the Soviet economy.
An aggressive high-tech defense buildup that by Soviet accounts severely restrained the economy and exacerbated the resource crisis.
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Appendix 3
At the Mossad headquarters, Casey met with Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Hoffi, the chief of the Israeli agency. Several deputies were also present. The Mossad was one of the most respected and efficient intelligence agencies in the world. Not only did it have enormous capabilities in the Middle East but it also had developed quite a network in Central Europe. With the cooperation of émigrés from Poland, the Soviet Union, and Hungary, the Mossad ran a “ratline” from Albania to Poland, then into the heart of Russia.
Appendix 4
Herb Meyer, [Casey’s] special assistant, tasked with drawing up a vulnerability assessment of the Soviet economy, had stumbled across some interesting information. The Soviets had been selling gold heavily throughout 1981-in a very soft market. In 1980 they had sold 90 tons, their usual amount. But by early November of 1981, they had cashed in 240 tons, and the volume was increasing. “It was a telltale sign to both of us”, recalls Meyer, “that they were in big trouble.”
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Appendix 5
‘Solidarity’ propaganda poster
Translation from spanish version. See Bibliography.
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Full title is ‘Victory: The Reagan administration’s secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union’; due to space restrictions, the title is abbreviated.
After the brief 5 year rule of former KGB director Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko rules for 13 months between 1984 and 1985, and, at his death, Gorbachev becomes the youngest Secretary General of the CPSU-CC (54 years old).
Gorbachev, Mikhail 1984 ‘Perestroika: New thinking for our country and the world’ Editorial Oveja Negra, p. 15.
Glasnost means openness, transparency: it was a Project to clear international public opinion on the reality of the nation, by suppressing corruption and false reality.
Ibid., p. 61. This is sustained by Graeme Gill when he states: “Too many apparat workers were unable to operate in the new conditions…” p. 90
The society of intellectuals, an “organic part of soviet society with a profound sense of patriotism” p. 77
Schweizer, Peter 1994 ‘Victory: The Reagan administration’s secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union’ Atlantic Monthly Press, p. xi.
Director of the CIA (DCI-Director of Central Intelligence)
Solidarity was the opposition movement, led by Lech Walesa that uprised against the socialist government in Poland during the 1980’s. See Appendix 5.
Mossad, the Israeli secret service.
ISI, Pakistani Secret Service.
Op. Cit., p. 9. Schweizer then emphasizes: “Washington wanted any weapons going to the resistance to be of Soviet origin, to give U.S. officials plausible deniability if the Soviets complained…Egypt had an abundance of Soviet arms…”
Psychological Operations.
“Soviets were counting on the illicit purchase or theft of western technology to shore up deficiencies in the industrial and military sectors…”, p. 47. William Schneider states: “Western Technology was a lifeline for them [soviets].” Schweizer explains: “Cutting off that lifeline was an early and important objective.”
About 95% of what were the Russian hard currency earnings (p. 44). The author explains: “Western Europe [could become] Highly vulnerable to political threats of a Soviet shutoff of gas. Austria, Berlin and Bavaria would be 90 to 100 percent dependent on Soviet gas deliveries.
This is from Schweizer’s interview with Caspar Weinberger, an aide to Reagan.
Appendix 4 has a quote on this economic decay.
As, in the mid-1980’s the Iran-Contras scandal was a severe stepback: loss of key officials, internal divisions and other factors deadlocked the foreign policy. Source: Encarta Encyclopedia, History Channel Online.
Gill, Graeme 1994 ‘The Collapse of a single party system: the disintegration of the CPSU’ Cambridge University Press, p. 78
