such as Canada and Australia caused other parts of the empire to look for greater autonomy
and independence whilst still attempting to retain unions with Britain. Despite the problems
stemming from the empire, its protection was seen as essential to retain British super-power
status, leaving harsh action towards the strong independent movements in some colonies such
as India impossible, this best shown in the enflaming of Indian nationalism due to the Amritsar
Massacre. Internal rifts and lack of coordination sue to no single departmental voice ebing
assigned to imperial affairs weakened the empire and it faced riots, wars and revolts in colonies
spread across the globe, tying down troops. Imperial commitments seemed to outweigh
continental callings
Whilst facing all these huge structural problems, the growing importance of public opinion due to
the 1918 universal suffrage movement tripled electorate meant that the government had to abide
by the publics yearning for peace and be more sensitive to the demand for social reform such as
benefits and housing. This strain on the economy left less resources for rearmament. All
factors of British problems and policies indicated another war to be impossible. Troops
committed in colonial wars, social reforms tying down money and in particular the public opinion
vehemently opposing it due to memories of the horrors of WW1 and blind belief in the League
resulted in the 1919 Ten Year Rule which stated the British Empire would not be ‘engaged’ in
any war for the next ten years and justified immediate cuts in the armed forces, expenditure and
the abolition of conscription. The hostility and sway in the voting system caused parties to
rethink their policies, concentrating on disarmament rather than rearming Britain in an attempt
to regain popularity, as late as 1937 when the Inskip Report placed the army on the bottom of a
long list of priorities, the government were adopting responsible, moderate, inlooking and
appeasing policies to pick up the old Liberal votes. The huge cutbacks and neglect of the army
was a result of the traditional view of the ‘British ways of war’. It was seen as ‘natural’ to return
to small numbers not only to satisfy British tradition but also to avoid committing to a war and
appear too aggressive which may have provoked an arms race and alliance system which
partially caused WW1.
The three divisions of the defence system (RAF, army, navy) were overall very badly coordinated
and financed. The London and Washington conferences weakened the navy by inciting a strict
limiting ratio of 5:5:3 (Britain, USA, Japan). Emphasis was misplaced on defensive methods
due to the rapid development of new technology making it difficult to anticipate which sectors
were important. Internal rivalry between highly-positioned members of the services caused
failings as did the governments refusal to accept the necessity of funding. The extent of
disarmament meant that appeasement and the maintenance of peace was the only option for
Britain, if a war was incited then it would be very difficult to form a coherent strategy, a trained
large army and adequate munitions.
The legacy of the overly harsh Treaty made German grievances appear legitimate and
appeasement a necessary antidote made from a position of strength. However, French German
relations were very strained and Britain’s attempt to placate French provocation of war such as
the occupation of the Ruhr, left Anglo-French relations in a state of suspicion and resentment.
Britain became a referee in strained Franco-German relations to retain peace but remained
firmly neutral in all discrepancies, for example, MacDonald refused to sign a mutual assistance
pact in 1924 to avoid encouraging French unaccommodating attitudes towards Germany. The
Locarno Treaty security pact was an attempt to end European conflict in 1925. And seemed to
‘heal’ Franco-German rifts. This allowed Britain to risk a more detached position from eastern
European problems, freeing them from any alliance system to concentrate on imperial and
domestic policies. Intense speculation on the threat of Hitler was not considered. The Nazi
movement was seen as a temporary, harmless and natural backlash to Germany’s economic
problems.