Theories of the resurrection of the body are logically coherent.
Theories of resurrection of the body are logically coherent. Discuss.
The idea of the resurrection of the body immediately implies life after death. It also implies that a body that has been destroyed can come back in a state of physicality. In this essay, I will argue that such way of approaching the idea of life after death is not wholly logically incoherent. However, I will also consider dilemmas linking to questions such as: does the idea of the resurrection of the body defies our personal continuity? Is the body necessary for personal continuity? And, finally, is death a reality or a type of incarnation of the body into another form?
The key issues in arguing for the resurrection of the body comes when we begin to explore such questions as: does life after death necessarily necessitate a body? Can life after death ensure continuity of our personal identity?
Firstly, I believe it is important to distinguish between the concept of 'resurrection' of the body and that of 'immortality' of the soul as both concepts argue for life after death. By 'resurrection' of the body I understand that a body that has experienced death and physical disintegration is able to come back to its original form. For instance, the example of Jesus' resurrection fits exactly the category. The body is destroyed and then resurrected exactly to how it was prior death. According to the doctrine of the resurrection the body is a necessary element to ensure life after death.
However, if we were dualists we would argue that we are not merely made of material substance; we are not merely a 'body'. Plato argued that we have a soul that constitute our spiritual -self (including our spiritual experiences, such as thinking and acquiring self-knowledge). The soul is separate from the body being immortal but is incarnated within the mortal body. Therefore, at death, the body ceases to exist, whereas, the soul goes on existing. This way a dualist who believes in the reality of the soul can argue against the resurrection of the body whilst, at the same time, arguing for life after death. Other dualists, such as Descartes, maintain instead that the human being has two conscious realities: a physical reality and a mental reality.
A dualist, therefore, could argue that whilst the body dies personal identity is maintained through mental continuity. However, in his essay "Exorcising Descartes' "Ghost in the Machine" Gilbert Ryle points to the fact that dualism commits a category mistake by separating physical behaviour from mental behaviour. He draws a parallel with the analogy of the foreigner who goes to visit a university and is shown round colleges, laboratories, libraries etc... and yet who still asks: "where is the university?" as if the 'university' was a separate building from the rest. Therefore, I believe that the dualist claim of ...
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A dualist, therefore, could argue that whilst the body dies personal identity is maintained through mental continuity. However, in his essay "Exorcising Descartes' "Ghost in the Machine" Gilbert Ryle points to the fact that dualism commits a category mistake by separating physical behaviour from mental behaviour. He draws a parallel with the analogy of the foreigner who goes to visit a university and is shown round colleges, laboratories, libraries etc... and yet who still asks: "where is the university?" as if the 'university' was a separate building from the rest. Therefore, I believe that the dualist claim of after life can be logically rejected on the basis that it does not sufficiently explain the connection between physical and mental reality. This leads us to turn towards materialism, a theory more akin with the scientific and monistic view of the natural world. According to materialism mental events are also physical events. Our abstract, logical and psychological thinking can all be explained through brain processes which have, therefore, a mechanical framework. This does not mean that our brains are exactly the same as a computer as, by contrast to computers, the human brain responds to external inputs and its information is not set (determined) but acquired. Having said that, the perspective of arguing for the resurrection of the body from a materialist angle seems coherent and fairly attractive - given its scientific backbone.
Consider this grim scenario; suppose a scientist was able to create an exact replica of your body and brain using your genes and freeze them so that they could be activated at your death. You then would die and would be replaced by this replica, in all respects, another 'you'. Such process could be deemed as bodily resurrection (even though not in the conventional sense) and seems perfectly logically possible. This type of resurrection is strictly materialist and there is no need to account for another, spiritual, dimension. Yet, the person being re-created is not the same person but just a mere copy. Obviously, we do not know how far this replica, or clone, would succeed in replicating the deceased person's behaviour and mental activity. Or whether memories could be the same, or whether he would be able to 'feel' that he has personal identity the same way as the deceased person. These are dilemmas to which we simply do not have the scientific knowledge with which to answer them yet, however, this does not make the idea of bodily resurrection illogical, or even, improbable.
I believe that this version of the replica theory is much simpler and, thus, much more effective than Hick's own. Hick argues for the resurrection of the body from a metaphysical angle. He believes that at your death God creates an exact replica of you with the same physical and mental characteristics. This replica goes on to live in a 'different space' that only God can observe. Hick's theory avoids disrupting personal continuity and is, generally speaking, coherent as a whole. However, I would strongly argue against it on the basis that it depends on far too many hypothetical preconditions, such as: that God exists, that there can be another world, and, more importantly, given that such a world is able to deal with the problem of over-population.
Having thus established that, overall, a materialist view of the resurrection of the body has the potential of being the most probable and (as shown by the example of the hypothetical cloning) the most logical I can safely say that the idea of the resurrection of the body is coherent. However, having rejected the metaphysics behind the concept of life after death the materialist approach also encounters various problems. The materialist approach I have put forward merely argues that it is coherent to put a body back together, make it work, and then say that life after death is a reality. I believe this goes against the concept of 'resurrection'. By 'resurrection' we mean that a body comes to life after having experienced death. I have to underline that it is the same body that undergoes the process of resurrection - not another one put in its place. Yet, in the example of the clone the clone is a construction separate from its original. Therefore, I believe we can talk of this kind of bodily resurrection as being a reconstruction which seeks to preserve the continuity of the same type of entity.
To conclude with, in this essay I have analysed and commented on the idea of bodily resurrection from both a dualist and a materialist point of view. I came to an intermediate conclusion about the dualist approach as not being logical enough since it distinguishes between mind and body as if they were two completely differing substances, thus, causing a category mistake. I also argued against Kant's version of the replica theory on the basis that, despite being logically correct, it is far too hypothetical. On the other hand, the materialist approach (despite seeming more coherent) ultimately fails, too, to support the idea of reincarnation. One last final remark, by following a materialist view one could come to the conclusion that death is not a reality but merely a transformation of matter into other types of matters. Therefore, the question of life after death and the question of resurrection simply do not arise.
