The same night, the chief of the imperial general staff, General Alan Brooke, confided to his diary that '... it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war. I wish to God it were safely over '.
At about 22.00 the supreme allied commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, had made an impromptu visit to paratroopers of the 101st Airborne at Greenham Common airfield near Newbury. His driver, Kay Summersby, recorded that the general, overwhelmed by emotion, climbed back into the car with his shoulders sagged.
Eisenhower had already written a letter accepting full responsibility if D-Day turned out to be a disaster. Churchill had assured him that they would go together. The Allied high command anticipated that a successful landing would cost 10,000 dead and perhaps 30,000 wounded, but were steeling themselves for much heavier casualties.
The British had never liked the idea of a direct assault on the coast of north-west Europe. They much preferred an indirect strategy - operations in the Mediterranean and the Balkans.
Since the late summer of 1942 the Germans had been constructing the 'Atlantic Wall', a formidable complex of defences running from the Franco-Spanish border to Denmark. It was the largest construction project in European history, involving at any one time more than 100,000 workers.
Under the direction of General Erwin Rommel, all beaches on which a landing was considered possible had been festooned with belts of obstacles and minefields, and covered by machine-gun and mortar emplacements.
Further back, bunkers of enormous strength at Merville, Longues and Pointe du Hoc on the Normandy coast enabled large-calibre German guns to bombard a landing force. In order to frustrate an airborne attack, German engineers flooded low-lying areas and strung wires across fields to deter glider landings.
The Americans had come to Europe to finish the war as quickly as possible, and this meant taking the shortest, most direct route to Germany. However, the disaster at Dieppe and their own experiences in the Pacific had qualified their optimism. Thus the D-Day landings were to be the most highly planned operations in military history.
The British had never liked the idea of a direct assault on the coast of north-west Europe. They much preferred an indirect strategy - operations in the Mediterranean and the Balkans.
Since the late summer of 1942 the Germans had been constructing the 'Atlantic Wall', a formidable complex of defences running from the Franco-Spanish border to Denmark. It was the largest construction project in European history, involving at any one time more than 100,000 workers.
Under the direction of General Erwin Rommel, all beaches on which a landing was considered possible had been festooned with belts of obstacles and minefields, and covered by machine-gun and mortar emplacements.
Further back, bunkers of enormous strength at Merville, Longues and Pointe du Hoc on the Normandy coast enabled large-calibre German guns to bombard a landing force. In order to frustrate an airborne attack, German engineers flooded low-lying areas and strung wires across fields to deter glider landings.
The Americans had come to Europe to finish the war as quickly as possible, and this meant taking the shortest, most direct route to Germany. However, the disaster at Dieppe and their own experiences in the Pacific had qualified their optimism. Thus the D-Day landings were to be the most highly planned operations in military history.
