Chief amongst Britain’s objection to the points, was that the points did not address the reparations issue. Britain had borrowed a lot of money and equipment from America during the war, and this needed to be repaid, and along with substantial bill for war pensions and the costs of demobilisation, she quite simply did not have enough cash to pay everyone. Britain demanded, and achieved a high level of reparations from the Germans, and this issue, not in the Fourteen Points became one of the most important clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. Britain also objected strongly to point two, offering complete freedom of the seas. As Britain was a colonial empire, she relied heavily on her navy as a fighting force, and this point was hamper her ability to wage unrestricted naval warfare. Therefore this point was numbed in the Treaty of Versailles. This leads to another major British objection to points, point five, offering an “absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims.” This was obviously unacceptable, as it could mean Britain losing colonies, even though she had been victorious. Lloyd George ensured that this point was not applied equally to all those powers involved in the war, only the losing ones, and as a result, Germany alone was to lose her overseas colonies, and Britain’s and France’s remained intact.
Point four states that steps will be taken to ensure that all national armies will be reduced and maintained at levels consistent with domestic security. While this idea was pressed by the Americans upon the British and the French, they were not treaty-bound to adhere to it. Germany alone was faced with strict and specific levels of armament, such as no air force, naval tonnage restrictions and a limit of 100,000 man in the army. Perversely, France, still wary of Germany maintained a fairly large army, and used it to occupy parts of the Rhineland in 1923. Again this shows the one sided nature of the conference and the biased interpretation and implementation of the 14 points.
Points nine, ten, eleven and twelve dealt with Wilson’s idea of self-determination for the peoples and nations of Europe. Point nine, in particular caused the British and Italians great concern. It states that the national frontiers of Italy were to be re-aligned along visible lines of nationality. However, Italy had only entered the war in 1915 alongside the British as a result of the Treaty of London, affording Italy areas previously part of Austria-Hungary in the event of victory. The areas Italy were to inherit were not necessarily inhabited by Italian nationals, and was therefore at odds with Wilson’s principle. A compromise was found and Wilson’s ideas were betrayed. The differing nations of Austria-Hungary also hoped to inherit a motherland as a result of Wilson’s point, but they too were to be disappointed, although this time for more practical reasons. As they were diverse and intermixed, some had to be grouped together for security, geographical and economic reasons. Simply it was not possible to give every nation autonomy. Checzslovakia was a prime example of this. Naturally, as with many of the other points, they were not equally afforded to Germans. Many were forced to live in areas of France, Poland, Denmark, and not least Austria.
There were of course, some of the points that were implemented, but these were mainly more to do with the methods of ending the war, and less so with attempting to keep the peace afterwards. Points six, seven and eight demanded the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Russia, Belgium and France respectively. Upon the signing of the Armistice, these points were implemented rapidly. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France as stated in point eight. It is worth noting, that point six demanded the evacuation of troops from Russia, and Germany did comply immediately, however for years to come, and throughout the Russian civil war, troops of many nations, including Britain, America and Japan were to be engaged, even on a small level in Russia. Wilson stated that Russia should be given an “unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development,” and clearly this was not the case.
One of the main points was the last one, point fourteen, aimed at preventing further wars on the scale seen in WW1. This “general association of nations” was to work together in an open and diplomatic environment, nullifying the need for the secret deals and secret diplomacy that led to the war. From now on a nations ambitions, legitimate or otherwise would be open for the world to see. This association was to become the League of Nations. The problem with this point was not in that it was not implemented in the Treaty of Versailles, but lies in the fact that its biggest and most powerful partner, the USA, refused to become involved and returned to isolation. Without this stabilising influence, the League of Nations was seen as powerless, and this was proven in 1923 when it failed to stop the French occupying the Ruhr Valley.
We have seen that Wilson’s fourteen points did form the backbone of the Treaty of Versailles, and it was used as a starting point for the negotiations when the talks began. When the treaty was signed, some remained intact, and were implemented, others were dropped completely. Some were implemented, but in a biased manner, focusing solely on Germany and ignoring infringements by Britain and France. Others were modified before implementation. It has been suggested that had the fourteen points survived the treaty negotiations unmolested, America may have been more inclined to ratify their involvement in the League of Nations, vastly increasing its chances of success. By the same token, had the arms, colonial, and self-determination rights been applied to the victorious powers and liberally as they were forced upon Germany, the French would have been unable to occupy in 1923, and the economic consequences for Germany would no have been endured. Also, the Germans may not have felt as aggrieved at the treaty if the British and French were being forced to comply also, and the seeds of rejection and extremism that gave cause to the rise of Hitler could have been prevented from taking hold. These things we will never know.
Bibliography
Gilbert, Martin History of the Twentieth Century (Harper Collins, London, 2001)
Martin, Laurence Peace Without Victory (Kennikat, New York and London, 1958)
